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 REGULATING RISK  
BY “STRENGTHENING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE” 
 
Paul Rose∗ 
 
 
*** 
This essay, prepared for the “Regulating Risk” symposium of the 
Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, reviews the connection between risk 
and corporate governance, then examines the “Strengthening Corporate 
Governance” provisions of Subtitle G of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). The 
corporate governance provisions, covering proxy access and the 
separation of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board, seem likely to 
have one of two possible effects. On the one hand, the provisions may be 
pernicious, in that they further enhance shareholder power without a clear 
justification for increased shareholder power, and more particularly 
without a justification for shareholder power as a risk management device. 
Indeed, Dodd-Frank’s corporate governance provisions may work at cross-
purposes to the risk management intent of the remainder of Dodd-Frank: 
the corporate governance provisions operate under the assumption that 
enhanced shareholder power will result in better monitoring of managerial 
behavior, which presumably will help to prevent future crisis, but both 
theory and evidence suggest that diversified shareholders generally prefer 
companies to take risks that other constituencies (including taxpayers) 
would not prefer.  
 
On the other hand, Dodd-Frank may have very little effect on investor 
behavior or risk management. Increases in shareholder power over the 
past years (fundamentally the result of increased federal regulation) have 
made management more responsive to - and in some cases probably overly 
responsive to - shareholder concerns over agency costs. Indeed, some of 
the proposed reforms already have been or were likely to have been put in 
place at most public companies. If private ordering is already working, 
what is the point of imposing strict governance constructs across the 
                                                                                                                                         
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University – Moritz College of Law. 
This essay benefited from comments at the Conference on “Regulating Risk” at the 
University of Connecticut School of Law, April 16, 2010. Any errors are 
attributable solely to the author.  
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market as a whole, especially when most of the affected firms are victims 
of, rather than contributors to, the Financial Crisis‘ 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Of the many explanations of the Financial Crisis of 2008, perhaps 
the most pervasive is the linkage of the crisis to managerial greed: the crisis 
as the result of managerial expropriation and excessive risk-taking 
permitted by lax corporate governance and risk management. To assess the 
characterization of the Financial Crisis as a governance crisis, we must test 
the strength of the links between managerial behavior, corporate 
governance and risk management. Certainly, in the run-up to the Financial 
Crisis existing systems of governance and risk management failed to detect 
and mitigate firm-level risks before they became systemic risks.  Are these 
failures of risk management ultimately corporate governance failures?  If 
they are, how do we address them? 
Regulators and firms can (and do) attack governance problems 
from multiple angles.  Firms incentivize managers better by constructing 
executive compensation schemes that closely link operating and/or stock 
performance to compensation.  Firms create monitoring systems that allow 
managers and directors to recognize, evaluate, and mitigate risks to the 
enterprise, and regulators create monitoring systems within regulatory 
structures that allow them to recognize, evaluate, and mitigate systemic 
risks created by a myriad of firm decisions.  Regulators provide regulatory 
support for a vigorous market for corporate control and impose, either 
through new regulations or through existing corporate governance 
mechanisms (such as proxy voting), governance structures that limit 
managerial authority and/or increase managers’ accountability to 
shareholders. 
This essay will focus on a specific effort of this last means of 
managing agency costs—regulated governance arrangements—as a means 
of managing both systemic and firm-specific risk.  The essay will first 
briefly consider the connection between risk management and corporate 
governance, showing how the two are often linked. This link is implicitly 
assumed by the recently passed Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”).  The second part of this 
essay will consider the Dodd-Frank Act’s assumptions concerning risk 
management and shareholder power, and will argue that in the worst case 
the Dodd-Frank Act exacerbates rather than mitigates risk, and in the best 
case is merely a pointless exercise in political crisis management that will 
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have no significant positive or negative effect on corporate governance or 
risk management.  
 
II. LINKING RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Risk management, broadly conceived, is an essential aspect of 
good corporate governance, and vice versa.  However we define corporate 
governance (as a description of the relationship between corporate 
stakeholders, as a set of rules or processes governing the corporate entity, 
etc.), risk management works hand in hand with corporate governance as a 
means of constraining agency costs and promoting efficient and prudent 
management.  Indeed, risk management so overlaps with corporate 
governance that the terms may sometimes be used synonymously.  Because 
risk management practices in many financial firms failed during the 
Financial Crisis, it has been said that corporate governance failed during 
the Financial Crisis1—if this is true, the Financial Crisis is not a risk 
management problem but a larger crisis in corporate governance. In this 
essay I do not seek to dispute that corporate governance failures at some 
firms contributed to the Financial Crisis. However, even if we assume that 
this is the case, determining which aspects of corporate governance failed 
is crucial: as Brian Cheffins has noted, important normative implications 
flow from this determination.2 If the failure is in part due to incentive 
compensation systems, should these systems be subject to additional 
regulation, and if so, how should they be regulated?  If the failure is also 
due to failures of internal controls systems, should we rethink or enhance 
the regulatory framework under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley?  
At the level of each specific firm, the precise nature of the failure 
of governance and risk management is likely to be somewhat different. 
Perhaps like Tolstoy’s unhappy families,3 each is unhappy in its own way 
and failed for reasons that elude a simple narrative of greed or hubris.  As 
we continue to unravel the causes of the crisis, we do find some common 
factors in the stories of financial firms like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, 
                                                                                                                                         
1 See Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 
Stock Market Meltdown?  The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (2009). 
2 See Id. at 3. 
3 See LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa 
Volokhonsky trans., Penguin Books Deluxe ed. 2002) (1877). 
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AIG, and others.  William Sahlman has aptly summed several common 
factors: 
 
In studying the financial crisis as it unfolded over the past 
couple of years, it seems clear that many organizations 
suffered from a lethal combination of powerful, sometimes 
misguided incentives; inadequate control and risk 
management systems; misleading accounting; and, low 
quality human capital in terms of integrity and/or 
competence, all wrapped in a culture that failed to provide 
a sensible guide for managerial behavior. This assessment 
refers to financial services firms like Countrywide, AIG 
and Bear Stearns: it also applies to other actors like 
regulatory agencies, politicians, ratings agencies and 
probably to individual consumers.4 
 
One of the financial firms that suffered from this “lethal combination,” 
UBS, provided its shareholders with a frank assessment of its risk 
management and governance failures. The 50-page report5 provides a 
helpful catalog of the numerous specific failures at UBS, the majority of 
which almost certainly affected most other financial firms, including:  
 
• Incomplete risk control methodologies.6  
• Insufficient challenge of the business case and governance 
approach.7  
• Inappropriate risk metrics used in strategic planning and 
assessment.8  
• Failure to own the business.9 
                                                                                                                                         
4 William A. Sahlman, Management and the Financial Crisis (We have met 
the enemy and he is us . . .) 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-033, 2009), 
available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-033.pdf. 
5 UBS AG, SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON UBS’S WRITE-DOWNS (Apr. 18, 2008), 
available at http://www.ubs.com/1/ShowMedia/investors/share_information/ 
shareholderreport?contentId=140333&name=080418ShareholderReport.pdf. 
6 Id. at 29.  
7 Id. at 33. 
8 Id. at 34. 
9 Id. at 36. 
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• Ex-post review versus pre-agreed limits [asking for forgiveness 
rather than permission].10 
• Failure to respond to wider industry concerns.11 
• Over-reliance on VaR.12 
• Over-reliance on [debt] ratings.13 
• Lack of recognition of idiosyncratic risk.14  
• Asymmetric risk / reward compensation.15  
• Insufficient incentives to protect the UBS franchise long-
term.16  
 
With UBS, we indeed recognize powerful, sometimes misguided 
incentives (in the form of trader and management compensation);17 
inadequate control and risk management systems that could not adequately 
evaluate and respond to risks; misleading accounting (UBS restated its 
financials for 2008);18 and, low quality human capital in terms of integrity 
and/or competence (lack of a willingness to challenge the bankers at UBS, 
and a decline in the number of skilled risk managers).19  
If UBS’s risk management and governance problems were typical, 
we might ask how better corporate governance at UBS could have 
prevented the crisis. Arguably, management (including the board) should 
                                                                                                                                         
10 Id. at 37. 
11 UBS AG, supra note 5, at 37. 
12 Id. at 38.  A 2009 article by Joe Nocera contains two pithy quotes from two 
famous VaR Skeptics:  
David Einhorn, who founded Greenlight Capital, a prominent 
hedge fund, wrote not long ago that VaR was ‘relatively useless 
as a risk-management tool and potentially catastrophic when its 
use creates a false sense of security among senior managers and 
watchdogs.  This is like an air bag that works all the time, except 
when you have a car accident.’  Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the best-
selling author of ‘The Black Swan,’ has crusaded against VaR 
for more than a decade.  He calls it, flatly, ‘a fraud.’ 
Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 24, 26-27. 
13 UBS AG, supra note 5, at 39. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 42. 
16 Id. 
17 Sahlman, supra note 4, at 4. 
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
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have recognized the dangers in the subprime market and begun to de-lever 
(debt to equity ratios were 30:1 at Lehman and Morgan Stanley).20 With the 
benefit of hindsight, it seems that UBS’s internal controls systems were not 
adequate, that risk managers were using incomplete information and 
incomplete models, and that UBS had a culture that was focused on short-
term profits and, in the words of the report, had “[i]nsufficient incentives to 
protect the UBS franchise long-term.”21 But even with the risk management 
systems then in place, one may ask why risk managers could not anticipate 
the crisis.  I suspect that many risk managers did, in fact, recognize the 
problems in the housing and credit markets before the crisis, but obviously 
did not anticipate the magnitude of the problem, nor appreciate the 
interconnectedness of financial institutions.  Some probably did express 
their concerns to management, and perhaps their concerns were discounted.   
A better question might be to ask why managers believed that they 
could time the market so that they would be able to stop dancing just as the 
music stopped playing, sure in the knowledge that risks would have been 
passed along to someone else or adequately hedged, and that we would 
make the fabled “soft landing” that Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke predicted 
in February 2007.22 A partial answer to this question may be found in 
behavioral explanations of the Financial Crisis, but a simple explanation 
may also be found in the incentives of the managers.  Citigroup, for 
example, had to “keep dancing,” as Chuck Prince put it, in order to stay 
competitive with other banks.  The low rates brought about by Fed policy 
helped drive the leveraged buyout business; banks like Citi had “no 
credibility to stop participating in this lending business . . . My belief then 
and my belief now is that one firm in this business cannot unilaterally 
withdraw from the business and maintain its ability to conduct business in 
the future.”23 He believed that “if you are not engaged in business, people 
leave the institution, so it is impossible to say in my view to your bankers 
we are just not going to participate in the business in the next year or so 
                                                                                                                                         
20 Michael J. de la Merced, Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Ross Sorkin, As Goldman 
and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2008, 
9:35 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-
become-bank-holding-companies/.  
21 UBS AG, supra note 5, at 42. 
22 Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Chief Says Outlook Is Positive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2007, at C10. 
23 Cyrus Sanati, Prince Finally Explains His Dancing Comment, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Apr. 8, 2010, 2:04 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/ 
08/prince-finally-explains-his-dancing-comment/. 
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until things become a little more rational. . .  You can’t do that and expect 
to have any people left to conduct business in the future.”24  
How, then, should we characterize the governance failures at UBS 
and other financial firms, and how do they relate to risk management?  
Certainly the control systems—and particularly the risk management 
systems—failed, though perhaps not in every case due to a reckless 
indifference to risk.  As with the failure of Long Term Capital Management 
over a decade ago, the state of the art in hedging and risk management 
simply was not good enough, and a failure to respond to warning signs and 
challenge existing models and business practices clearly contributed to the 
collapse.  Moreover, I believe that the incentive structures were also flawed 
in that traders and originators had incentives to take on excessive risk 
without internalizing the costs of that risk.  Where appropriate limits are 
placed on trading activities—a real back office check on the risk assumed 
by the front office—a high-reward incentive structure is less problematic.  
The problem comes when lax controls are combined with incentives to take 
heavy risk.  
Over both of these areas—risk management systems and incentive 
schemes—management and the board must provide oversight.  Generally, 
they are obligated to ensure that systems are created and function 
effectively in controlling (but not hobbling) the animal spirits that drive the 
business forward.  With this understanding, the governance structures at 
most major financial institutions (excepting perhaps Goldman Sachs) can 
be said to have failed from a risk management perspective.   
Although my description of how risk management failures can be 
described as failures of corporate governance may not offer the strongest 
argument in support of the position, I believe that it is at least a reasonable 
assessment of how the two failures may be linked.  But importantly, even if 
we recognize that the Financial Crisis was a risk management crisis, and 
that as a risk management crisis it is in effect a corporate governance crisis, 
we have still only introduced a problem, and have not justified any solution 
to that problem.  If we accept that poor corporate governance at least 
contributed to the Financial Crisis, we must now turn to the question of 
how corporate governance can be improved in order to better manage risk.  
This question was recently addressed in the sweeping Dodd-Frank 
legislation, in part through Subtitle G: “Strengthening Corporate 
Governance.”  In the next section, I will focus on the assumptions 
                                                                                                                                         
24 Id. 
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underlying Subtitle G’s corporate governance prescriptions, and on the 
implications of the prescriptions for risk management. 
 
III. REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TO MANAGE 
RISK 
 
In this section, I will first begin by describing the governance 
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, then turn to an analysis of the 
assumptions underlying the governance provisions.  I will then discuss the 
implications of the provision, focusing on how they are likely to affect risk 
management. 
 
A. “STRENGTHENING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE”: SUBTITLE G 
OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
 
The first point of interest in the Dodd-Frank Act is its scope: Dodd-
Frank’s corporate governance provisions are not limited to “too big to fail” 
firms or financial services firms.  They generally apply to any company 
traded on a national stock exchange.  The Dodd-Frank Act does not 
explicitly preempt state law, but instead applies the SEC’s power to 
approve listing standards of the national stock exchanges.25 The Dodd-
Frank Act contains provisions that affect shareholder rights and that focus 
on executive compensation.26 Although appropriate incentive compensation 
is an important component of an overall corporate governance structure, 
other papers in this symposium provide a detailed analysis of the 
advisability of the compensation rules set out in the proposed regulations.  
This essay will focus on the corporate governance aspects of the Dodd-
Frank Act that relate to shareholder rights.  
The final version of Subtitle G of the Dodd-Frank Act contains two 
major corporate governance provisions:27 1) explicit approval of an SEC 
                                                                                                                                         
25 Richard J. Sandler, Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation in 
the New Dodd Bill, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 
17, 2010, 8:34 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/03/17/corporate-
governance-and-executive-compensation-in-the-new-dodd-bill/. 
26 See id. 
27 Other sections of the Dodd-Frank Act not discussed in this paper also cover 
important governance-related issues such as say-on-pay. This essay is limited to an 
analysis of Subtitle G. 
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proxy access rule;28 2) and a comply-or-explain provision on the separation 
of the CEO and board chairman position.29  The Senate version of the bill 
contained a majority-voting requirement, but this was eliminated in a 
compromise with the House version of the bill.30  A provision in the 2009 
Dodd Bill, absent in all versions of the 2010 bill, would have prohibited 
classified boards unless approved or ratified by shareholders.31  
 
1. Proxy Access 
 
In a shift from the 2009 Dodd Bill,32 the SEC “may” require proxy 
access for shareholders, rather than requiring the SEC to issue proxy access 
rules within 180 days of the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment.33 In response to 
this authority, on August 25th, 2010, the SEC approved rules that provided 
shareholders with the right to place director candidates on the corporate 
ballot.  To be able to nominate a director under this rule, a shareholder or 
group of shareholders must hold 3% of the company’s shares for more than 
3 years.34   
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
28 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. § 971 (2010) (enacted). 
29 Id. § 972. 
30 David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation 
Legislation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jul. 7, 2010, 
9:15 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-
frank-financial-regulation-legislation/.  In the Senate version of The Dodd-Frank 
Act, stock exchange listing requirements would have been required to include a 
majority vote standard in uncontested director elections for all listed companies.  
Plurality voting was permitted only in contested elections. A director receiving less 
than a majority of votes cast would have been required to submit his or her 
resignation.  The board could have then refused the resignation, but the bill 
required that it then publicly explain why it did not accept the director’s 
resignation.  The majority voting requirement would not have been met by the 
plurality-plus voting rules in place at many companies.  Sandler, supra note 26. 
31 Sandler, supra note 25. 
32 Id. 
33 H.R. 4173, § 972. 
34 Lucian Bebchuck & Scott Hirst, Proxy Access Is In, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 25, 2010, 11:20 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/25/proxy-access-is-in/. 
10 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 17:1 
 
2. CEO and Chairman Positions 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to promulgate rules 
mandating proxy statement disclosure concerning the separation of the 
CEO and chairman roles—companies must explain why the same or why 
different persons serve in these roles.35 Similar disclosure is already 
required under the “Corporate Governance” disclosures mandated under 
Item 407 of Regulation S-K.  In particular, Item 407(h) requires companies 
to “[b]riefly describe the leadership structure of the registrant's board, such 
as whether the same person serves as both principal executive officer and 
chairman of the board, or whether two individuals serve in those 
positions….”36 If one person serves as both CEO and chairman of the 
board, the company must “disclose whether the registrant has a lead 
independent director and what specific role the lead independent director 
plays in the leadership of the board.”37 The disclosure should also explain 
“why the registrant has determined that its leadership structure is 
appropriate given the specific characteristics or circumstances of the 
registrant,”38 and “disclose the extent of the board's role in the risk 
oversight of the registrant, such as how the board administers its oversight 
function, and the effect that this has on the board's leadership structure.”39  
 
B. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
 
The corporate governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
suggest several tenuous assumptions about the role of corporate governance 
in preventing financial crises.  First, the inclusion of the provisions in the 
Bill arguably assumes that the governance structures required by the 
provisions could have helped prevent the Financial Crisis of 2008, or at 
least limited its effects on compliant firms.  More specifically, the Dodd-
Frank Act makes assumptions about the desirability of shareholder power 
and the risk preferences of shareholders.  Each of these assumptions has 
tenuous support. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
35 Huntington, supra note 30. 
36 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(h) (2010). 
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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1. Could the Provisions have Helped Prevent the 
Financial Crisis? 
 
There is plenty of blame to go around when one looks for causes of 
and contributions to the Financial Crisis.  The question as posed—could the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions have helped to prevent the Financial 
Crisis?—may be interpreted so broadly that it becomes unreasonable.  I 
doubt that anyone would argue that the whole of the blame for the 
Financial Crisis rests on a few corporate governance practices that the 
Dodd-Frank Act intends to cure.  But even if we think of the question more 
narrowly—that the “right” corporate governance practices could have 
provided more warning, could have added accountability to corporate 
governance, could have ensured more independent thinking by the board 
that may have resulted in decisions that would have at least helped mitigate 
some of the effects of the crisis—Dodd-Frank implicitly holds expectations 
of the value of corporate governance.  More precisely, the Dodd-Frank Act 
assumes a need for mandatory, one-size-fits-all corporate governance 
reform and shareholder empowerment. 
As a preliminary matter, the evidence that corporate governance 
matters for firm performance is uneven.40 Intuitively, this is primarily due 
to the fact that “good” corporate governance is firm-specific and often 
based on qualities, such as corporate culture, that are not readily 
quantifiable and so are difficult or impossible to reduce to a set of metrics.  
Determining causation in governance and performance is challenging, and 
corporate governance research is replete with studies attempting to isolate a 
particular metric (say, the separation of the CEO and chairman roles) to 
determine whether the separation improves some measure of firm 
performance.  Much effort has recently gone into determining the accuracy 
of the good governance metrics offered by governance ratings firms and 
proxy advisors like RiskMetrics’ ISS unit.  We have some evidence that 
some of the metrics used by ratings firms can meaningfully predict 
                                                                                                                                         
40 Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang reason that the failure to find an association 
between corporate governance and abnormal returns in the last decade is due to the 
fact that investors have learned to appreciate the differences between good-
governance and poor-governance firms, and these differences have been factored 
into market prices. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C. Y. Wang, 
Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns 
(unpublished discussion paper, no. 667), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1589731. 
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performance, but at least some of these studies were commissioned by or 
produced by the subject ratings firms.41  Other independent work suggests 
that the ratings used by various firms do not accurately predict firm 
performance.42 To underline an obvious but often disregarded point, proxy 
advisory and corporate governance ratings firms are, after all, businesses.  
They must have something of value to offer their clients, and they must 
differentiate their products by price or by methodology.  It would be 
problematic for these firms if something basic—for example, share 
ownership by independent directors, as Professors Bhagat, Bolton and 
Romano’s work suggests43—is a more reliable predictor of firm 
performance than their multitude of metrics.  A simple, single metric could 
be produced by the clients—institutional investors—relatively cheaply.  
Instead, we have a profusion of proprietary rating systems, each constantly 
tweaked and recalibrated—a process I call “methodology churn.”  No two 
are alike, although the ratings are offered (at least by those firms that do not 
engage in detailed analysis of the companies they rate by particular 
governance issue) as though there were a single grand unified theory of 
corporate governance, perfectly expressed by their proprietary 
methodology.  On this point, I note that Bebchuk, who is generally allied 
with the governance ratings firms in the general goal of promoting 
shareholder empowerment, has argued that governance ratings that try to 
impose a great number of “good governance” metrics on firms are less 
useful in predicting good governance than simply keying on a few 
                                                                                                                                         
41 See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance 
and Firm Performance (Dec. 7, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586423 (creating a measure of 
corporate governance based on data from Institutional Shareholder Services). 
42 See e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and 
Peril of Corporate Governance Indices (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Working 
Paper No. 89, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1019921; Robert Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the 
Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings? (Arthur and Toni 
Rembe Rock Ctr. For Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 360, 2009), 
available at http://law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/publications_pdf/ 
dg16-26-2008_1.pdf (finding that there is no consistent relation between 
government indices and measures of corporate performance). 
43 Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of 
Corporate Governance Indices. 
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problematic entrenchment devices such as poison pills44—in other words, it 
seems easier to spot “bad governance” structures than it is to effectively 
prescribe “good governance” structures.  
The problems with the corporate governance industry metrics are 
instructive with respect to the particular provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
As we inch closer towards a federally-mandated, one-size-fits-all corporate 
governance framework, companies, investors and regulators may begin to 
treat corporate governance and particular governance structures as an end 
rather than as means.  Should we be surprised then, as ISS must have been, 
when a technically, superficially well-governed company like Enron turns 
out to be a whited sepulcher?  Little faith should be placed in the risk 
management utility of mandatory “good governance” structures, and the 
Dodd-Frank Act provisions require practices and structures which, as will 
be discussed below, have uncertain governance value and potentially 
serious governance disadvantages.  
 
2. Shareholder Power and the Risk Preferences of 
Shareholders 
 
Cheffins has noted that “given the zeitgeist, it is doubtful whether 
any set of corporate governance arrangements could have forestalled the 
financial bandwagon on the loose in the mid-2000s.  Amidst an implicit 
consensus among investors, politicians, regulators, journalists and even 
homebuyers that an overheating financial system was fundamentally sound, 
those preaching caution were marginalized.”45  The irony of the Dodd-
Frank Act is that things may have been worse if the Act were in place prior 
to the Financial Crisis.  Indeed, it is when we analyze the Act’s 
assumptions about shareholder power and shareholder risk preferences that 
we recognize that investors were among those encouraging the banks to 
keep dancing.  
Because shareholders, the residual claimants of the corporation, are 
diversified across markets and often across asset classes, they will often 
push management to swing for the fences. The Dodd-Frank Act assumes 
that shareholders are primarily interested in long-term value creation, but 
this assumption does not square with the behavior of many investors.  
Shareholders may have different risk preferences and attempt to influence 
                                                                                                                                         
44 See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in 
Corporate Governance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD, 783, 787 (2009). 
45 Cheffins, supra note 1, at 38. 
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managers to make decisions in line with those preferences.  As outlined by 
the Aspen Institute’s statement on “Overcoming Short-Termism,”46 signed 
by John Bogle, Warren Buffett and others, the influence of money 
managers, mutual funds and hedge funds “who focus on short-term stock 
price performance, and/or favor high-leverage and high-risk corporate 
strategies designed to produce high short-term returns”47 present several 
problems.  First, many such investors’ preferences work not only against 
other long-term-focused shareholders but against their ultimate investors’ 
interests because high rates of portfolio turnover through frequent trading 
can significantly erode gains.48 Second, fund managers focused on short-
term trading gains “have little reason to care about long-term corporate 
performance or externalities, and so are unlikely to exercise a positive role 
in promoting corporate policies, including appropriate proxy voting and 
corporate governance policies, that are beneficial and sustainable in the 
long-term.”49 Also, managers and board members may harm the interests of 
shareholders seeking long-term growth and sustainable earnings by 
pursuing strategies designed to satisfy short-term investors; “This, in turn, 
may put a corporation’s future at risk.”50  
Deeper shareholder involvement in corporate governance, as 
encouraged by the Dodd-Frank Act’s corporate governance provisions, is 
designed to encourage more vigilant monitoring of managers and more 
prudent risk management. However, the UK experience suggests that this is 
unlikely to be the case. As Cheffins notes: 
 
U.K. company law is, in various respects, more 
“shareholder-friendly” than the equivalent regime in the 
U.S., as U.K. shareholders have greater scope to call 
shareholder meetings, initiate changes to the corporate 
constitution and dismiss directors. . . . Regardless, it does 
not appear that banks were better managed in the U.K. than 
in the U.S. Moreover, bank shareholders apparently made 
                                                                                                                                         
46 THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE 
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2009), 
available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/ 
Overcoming%20Short-termism%20AspenCVSG%2015dec09.pdf. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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little use of the powers available to them. The chief 
executive of the U.K.’s financial markets regulator 
admonished major shareholders for being “too reliant and 
unchallenging” in the run up to Financial Crisis. Lord 
Myners, Financial Services Secretary in the U.K. Treasury, 
similarly chastised institutional shareholders as being 
“absentee landlords”.  The experience in Britain implies 
that even if shareholder rights are increased in the U.S. in 
the aftermath of the stock meltdown of 2008, there is no 
guarantee shareholders will use the powers made available 
to them to forestall a similar future assault on shareholder 
value.51  
 
David Walker, commissioned by the Prime Minister to review UK banks’ 
corporate governance in the wake of the Financial Crisis, makes a similar 
observation, and suggests that in some cases shareholder were complicit in 
excessive risk-taking: 
 
Before the current crisis broke there appears to have been a 
widespread acquiescence by institutional investors and the 
market in the gearing up of banks’ balance sheets as a 
means of boosting returns on equity. This was not 
necessarily irrational from the standpoint of the immediate 
interests of shareholders who, in the leveraged limited 
liability business of a bank, receive all of the potential 
upside whereas their downside is limited to their equity 
stake, however much the bank loses overall in a 
catastrophe. The atmosphere of at least acquiescence in 
high leverage on the part of shareholders will have 
exacerbated critical problems encountered in some 
instances. And, while institutional investors could not have 
prevented the crisis, even major fund managers appear to 
have been slow to act where issues of concern were 
identified in banks in which they were investors, and of 
limited effectiveness in seeking to address them either 
individually or collaboratively. The limited institutional 
efforts at engagement with several UK banks appear to 
have had little impact in restraining management before the 
                                                                                                                                         
51 Cheffins, supra note 1, at 45-46.  
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recent crisis phase, and it is noteworthy that levels of 
voting against bank resolutions rarely exceeded 10 per 
cent.52  
 
Viewed in this light, shareholder power may not only fail to 
remedy risk management problems but also exacerbate them.  If we view 
the Financial Crisis as a governance problem, it is not clear that the crisis is 
attributable to expropriation of principals’ interests by management 
shareholders.  Nestor Advisors, a corporate governance consultancy, argues 
that management does not seem to have short-changed shareholders in the 
Financial Crisis.  Executives’ financial interests were aligned with 
shareholders’ interests.  But in the case of banks, especially, this can be 
problematic: “Regulators, like everyone else, seem to have forgotten that, 
when it comes to firms that are by definition highly geared due to their 
maturity transformation function, full alignment with shareholder interest 
might be the riskiest of all alignments.”53  
At least from the point of view of banks, the shareholder 
empowerment envisioned by the corporate governance section of the Dodd-
Frank Act thus may work at cross-purposes to the risk management 
purposes of the remainder of the Dodd-Frank Act.  But even with non-
financial companies, there is little evidence to support the notion that 
enhanced shareholder power as encouraged by the Dodd-Frank Act will 
improve the risk management function of corporate governance. Indeed, to 
the extent that influential shareholders encourage risk-taking by managers, 
the long-term interests of the corporation may suffer.   
As a final note, consider the performance of Goldman Sachs in the 
Financial Crisis.54 Because of a strong firm culture, Goldman’s 
management was arguably the best-insulated from influential shareholder 
pressure; arguably, their relative success in navigating the crisis lies in the 
fact that Goldman treated risk management as though it were still a 
                                                                                                                                         
52 DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS 
AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES § 5.9 (2009), available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_consultation_160709.pdf; see 
generally id. § 5 (discussing engagement, stewardship, collective action and 
governance). 
53 NESTOR ADVISORS, GOVERNANCE IN CRISIS: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
OF SIX US INVESTMENT BANKS 17 (2009), available at 
http://www.nestoradvisors.co.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/articles/USBank09.pdf. 
54 For a discussion of Goldman in the Financial Crisis, see Nocera, supra note 
12; Sahlman, supra note 4. 
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partnership—with partners internalizing losses as well as gains—rather 
than a corporation influenced by the short-term interests of certain 
investors. 
 
3. The Act’s Provisions: Pernicious or Merely Pointless? 
 
Given the potential higher appetite for risk associated with 
increased shareholder power, the Dodd-Frank Act’s corporate governance 
provisions seem to provide little enhancement to risk management. The 
corporate governance provisions are better understood as not directed 
towards the causes of the Financial Crisis, but rather as simply not letting a 
crisis go to waste55—packaging corporate governance reforms that have 
been long-sought by powerful Democratic constituencies with a bill that 
should be directed solely towards systemic risk management.  More to the 
point, the corporate governance provisions would not be good legislation 
even if they stood alone, unconnected to the questions of risk management 
raised by the Financial Crisis.  In the aggregate, the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
corporate governance provisions are likely to have pernicious56 effects.  
Hopefully they will be merely pointless.   
                                                                                                                                         
55 See Jeff Zeleny & Jackie Calmes, Obama, Assembling Team, Turns to the 
Economy, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008 at A1. 
56 In my symposium remarks, I noted the possibility that the Dodd-Frank Act 
could have pernicious effects on corporate governance, but I was not the only one 
to characterize the provisions in this way. See also Steven M. Bainbridge,  The 
Fruits of Shareholder Activism, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (June 3, 2010, 11:25 
AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/wall-street-
reform/ (Steven Bainbridge provides an excellent analysis of the pernicious 
corporate governance provisions of Dodd-Frank).  
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a) The Potentially Pernicious Effects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act57 
 
Proxy access has generated the most controversy of the two 
adopted provisions, having been the subject of several proposed SEC rules 
that generated thousands of comments.  Like majority voting, proxy access 
is touted by its proponents as a step towards more democratic governance 
of the public corporation (notwithstanding the questionable value of 
democracy as applied to the corporate form58). However, empirical work on 
proxy access suggests that it is more likely to harm than help corporate 
governance.  Grundfest, reviewing recent studies on stock price response to 
the SEC’s earlier proxy access proposals, states that:  
 
The best currently available empirical data thus indicate 
that, given a choice between the current regime and the 
Commission’s proposed proxy access rules, shareholders 
seeking to maximize returns would prefer the status quo 
because the proposed rules appear to destroy shareholder 
wealth. Moreover, if there is to be a proxy access rule, the 
cross-sectional variation in the data suggest that an opt-in 
regime, in which shareholders define for themselves the 
rules governing proxy access on a corporation-by-
                                                                                                                                         
57  As indicated above, the majority voting standard was eliminated from the 
final version of the Act.  This is just as well, because majority voting has been 
enacted at many public companies already, largely as a result of consistent pressure 
from institutional investors and the corporate governance industry in the past 
decade. See William K. Sjostrom & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the 
Election of Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 462 (2007).  A recent study of the 
governance practices of the largest U.S. companies, conducted by Shearman and 
Sterling LLP, showed that 82 out of the top 100 companies had implemented some 
form of majority voting in director elections.  SHEARMAN & STERLING, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE LARGEST US PUBLIC COMPANIES 4 (2010). As 
most of the larger public companies have enacted majority voting provisions, the 
mandatory imposition of majority voting provisions would have affected smaller 
public companies most directly.  For a summary of the arguments against a 
majority voting standard, see Sjostrom & Kim, supra, at 469.  
58 For an extended argument on the merits of democracy in business entities, 
see DINO FALASCHETTI, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE: HOW ACCOUNTABILITY CAN GO TOO FAR IN LAW, POLITICS, AND 
BUSINESS (2009). 
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corporation basis, is likely preferable to an opt-out regime, 
in which the Commission has to guess at an optimal 
default rule, and where the data indicate that the 
Commission’s current best guess destroys a statistically 
significant amount of shareholder wealth.59  
 
Why would at least some shareholders be concerned with greater 
shareholder power?  Because larger shareholders with proxy access may 
use the threat of a proxy fight to extract private benefits from a 
corporation—perhaps merely by using the proxy as a megaphone for the 
shareholder’s causes (imposing what Grundfest calls “megaphone 
externalities”)60—or simply to pursue idiosyncratic corporate governance 
changes that the shareholder (but not management or the majority of the 
other shareholders) believes are necessary.  
Buckberg and Macey provide several arguments against proxy 
access in a report accompanying the Business Roundtable’s comments on 
the SEC’s 2009 proxy access proposal.61 They find that proxy access is 
unnecessary given numerous effective mechanisms to discipline 
management, that proxy contests under the pre-Dodd-Frank rules were not 
prohibitively expensive, and that the SEC’s proposed rules would 
inefficiently allocate benefits and costs of proxy contests and would not 
distinguish between the issues associated with expressing disapproval of an 
incumbent director and the issues associated with identifying, nominating, 
legitimating, and electing an outside insurgent director, among other 
reasons.  They also argue that an increase in proxy-related costs is a 
predictable and inevitable result of proxy access: 
                                                                                                                                         
59 Joseph A. Grundfest, Measurement Issues in the Proxy Access Debate 3-4 
(Rock Ctr. For Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No. 71, Stan. Univ. L. 
Sch. L. and Econ. Olin, Working Paper Series No. 392, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1538630. 
60 Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, 
Economics, and the Law 4 (Rock Ctr. For Corp. Governance, Working Paper 
Series No. 64, Stan. Univ. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper Series No. 386, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491670. 
61 See ELAINE BUCKBERG & JONATHAN MACEY, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF 
PROPOSED SEC RULE 14A-11 ON EFFICIENCY, COMPETITIVENESS AND CAPITAL 
FORMATION IN SUPPORT OF COMMENTS BY BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (2009) (stating 
that risks of the SEC’s proposal include less qualified boards of directors, board 
members whose interests diverge from maximizing shareholder value, a 
disincentive to go public, and increasing the cost of capital for U.S. companies). 
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It is a well-known result in economic theory that when the 
marginal social cost of an activity exceeds its marginal 
private cost, as is the case with any subsidy, more of that 
activity will take place. In the case of the proposed SEC 
rule, the marginal social cost of a shareholder nominating a 
director is higher than the marginal private cost because 
the costs of the contested election are borne in part by the 
issuer, rather than the nominating shareholder. This 
subsidy will inevitably increase the number of director 
nominations by shareholders.62  
 
Lowering the cost of proxy access leads to a pernicious result, 
particularly when the right of access is conditioned upon a relatively low 
level of shareholder ownership: proxy rules give influence to investors with 
less to lose from the poor performance of the company and more to gain 
through private benefits.  Even if the dissident shareholders are interested 
in wealth maximization for all shareholders, Buckberg and Macey present 
evidence that companies with dissident board members significantly 
underperform peer companies without dissident directors.  
Dodd-Frank’s other Subtitle G corporate governance provision, a 
comply-or-explain provision that would require disclosure on the CEO and 
chairman of the board of directors (COB) positions, may also have 
pernicious effects.  The policy justification for splitting the two roles is 
thin.  Oded, Palmon and Wald argue that while a management structure in 
which two executives hold the CEO and COB may facilitate checks and 
balances and thus may mitigate management agency costs, a management 
structure in which one person holds both positions provides a clearer set of 
directives for the companies and facilitates better communication between 
boards and management.63 Results from the UK also show that splitting the 
roles does not appear to produce positive effects.  In a recent study, Dahya, 
Garcia and van Bommel reviewed the performance of publicly listed U.K. 
companies over a period covering the issuance of the Cadbury Committee's 
Code of Best Practice, which advocated splitting the CEO/COB positions.64 
                                                                                                                                         
62 Id. at 8. 
63 Oded Palmon & John K. Wald, Are Two Heads Better than One: The Impact 
of Changes in Management Structure on Performance by Firm Size, 8 J. CORP. 
FIN. 213, 214 (2002). 
64 Jay Dahya, Laura Galguera Garcia & Jos van Bommel, One Man Two Hats: 
What's All the Commotion!, 44 FIN. REV. 179 (2009). 
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They found that companies splitting the combined CEO/COB position did 
not exhibit any absolute or relative improvement in performance when 
compared to various peer-group benchmarks.65 These findings are 
supported by a study by Dey, Engel and Liu.66  They examined the effects 
of US firms that had split the CEO/COB position and ones that had not, and 
noted that there was no significant difference in either the accounting or 
market return performance.  In fact, when firms had a powerful CEO, 
strong information flows and strong governance, in addition to a combined 
CEO/COB position, returns were significantly higher than both combined 
CEO/COB firms without these traits and firms with separate roles for their 
CEO and COB.  They conclude that regulators should be wary about 
implementing a one-size-fits-all requirement for this position, as some 
firms appear to benefit from the combined arrangement.  
This section has addressed the potentially pernicious effects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act as stand-alone provisions, but there is also a general 
concern over what Bainbridge calls the “creeping federalization” of 
corporate law.  Bainbridge argues that: 
 
[T]he uniformity imposed by [the Dodd-Frank Act] will 
preclude experimentation with differing modes of 
regulation. As such, there will be no opportunity for new 
and better regulatory ideas to be developed—no 
“laboratory” of federalism. Instead, we will be stuck with 
rules that may well be wrong from the outset and, in any 
case, may quickly become obsolete.67  
 
With respect to corporate governance, the Dodd-Frank Act’s one-
size-fits-all governance structures will not reduce either company or 
systemic risks, and instead will incrementally reduce the flexibility and 
value of state regulation of public corporation governance.  Ribstein notes 
the irony of establishing a rule that supposedly empowers shareholders, yet 
                                                                                                                                         
65 Id. 
66 Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel, Xiaohui Gloria Liu, Determinants and 
Implications of Board Leadership Structure, UNI. CHI BOOTH SCH. BUS RES. PAP., 
(Jun. 2009).  
67 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Pernicious Corporate Governance 
Provisions of the Dodd Bill, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 22, 2010, 2:07 
PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/04/the-
pernicious-corporate-governance-provisions-of-the-dodd-bill.html. 
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at the same time eliminates their ability to choose something other than a 
federally-mandated proxy structure: 
 
The real problem is that the SEC has barred any possibility 
for the shareholders or state law to provide for less proxy 
access than under the new rule. How can a rule that bars 
shareholders from making certain types of governance 
rules, either directly or by choosing the state of 
incorporation, increase shareholder participation in 
governance?  
 Perhaps the answer is that shareholders shouldn’t 
participate in governance because they are too easily 
manipulated and misled and simply don’t know what’s 
good for them. Rather, the SEC knows best. . . . Consider 
the most obvious anomalies: If the shareholders can’t be 
trusted to decrease proxy access, why should they be 
trusted to increase it? If we fear that managers, even with 
the new proxy rule, can still manipulate shareholders, then 
why trust the shareholders to do anything? And if the 
shareholders can’t be trusted, why should the securities 
laws force firms, at great cost, to inform shareholders so 
they can participate in the proxy process? In other words, 
the rule is fundamentally inconsistent with the whole point 
of the securities laws to provide the disclosure necessary to 
enable the shareholder to be effective governors of their 
firms.68  
 
b) The Pointlessness of the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
Corporate Governance Provisions 
 
Even if one assumes that the Dodd-Frank Act’s corporate 
governance provisions are good policy, given recent trends in state law and 
the private ordering of corporate governance, the provisions appear to be 
pointless, rather than pernicious; reminiscent of Cunningham’s memorable 
                                                                                                                                         
68 Larry Ribstein, The SEC vs. shareholders, TRUTH ON THE MARKET 
(Aug. 30, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/08/30/the-sec-vs-
shareholders/. 
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characterization of the Sarbanes-Oxley ”yawn,”69 the Dodd-Frank Act 
might also represent more rhetoric than reform.  While the corporate 
governance provisions are unlikely to produce any significant benefits (and 
many would argue that Sarbanes-Oxley did not either), the direct costs will 
certainly be less significant than Sarbanes-Oxley’s.  Dodd-Frank’s 
provisions may simply not have much of an effect on corporate 
governance.  
In the case of proxy access, shareholders in the most important 
corporate jurisdiction, Delaware, had the ability prior to the enactment of 
Dodd-Frank to select shareholder proxy for their firms.  Delaware General 
Corporation Law section 112 provides that “[t]he bylaws may provide that 
if the corporation solicits proxies with respect to an election of directors, it 
may be required, to the extent and subject to such procedures or conditions 
as may be provided in the bylaws, to include in its proxy solicitation 
materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), in addition to 
individuals nominated by the board of directors, 1 or more individuals 
nominated by a stockholder.  At least in Delaware, private ordering was 
already possible, making the Dodd-Frank proxy provisions pointless unless 
it is the case that shareholders are impeded from exercising their right to 
nominate shareholders under the DGCL.   In the adopting release for the 
proxy access rules, however, the SEC argued that: 
 
corporate governance is not merely a matter of private 
ordering. Rights, including shareholder rights, are artifacts 
of law, and in the realm of corporate governance some 
rights cannot be bargained away but rather are imposed by 
statute. There is nothing novel about mandated limitations 
on private ordering in corporate governance.   
 
The SEC then argued that private ordering is less desirable 
because a “company-by-company shareholder vote on the applicability of 
Rule 14a-11 would involve substantial direct and indirect, market-wide 
costs.”  A compromise solution—the ability for companies to opt out of 
the proxy access rules—was rejected because “management can draw on 
the full resources of the corporation to promote the adoption of an opt-
out, while disaggregated shareholders have no similarly effective 
platform from which to advocate against an opt-out.” Finally, even where 
                                                                                                                                         
69 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, 
Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003). 
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proxy rights are granted pursuant to a provision like DGCL sec. 112, the 
SEC noted that “the board of directors is ordinarily free, subject to its 
fiduciary duties, to amend or repeal any shareholder-adopted bylaw.”    
Although I do not believe these arguments carry the burden of 
proof that would justify such important mandatory governance changes, 
especially given the pernicious effects outlined by Buckberg and Macey, 
the importance of this change may prove to be less significant than the 
arguments against proxy access have suggested.  Some hope that this may 
be the case comes from the Canadian experience with proxy access. 
Although proxy access is available to investors in Canadian firms, that 
access is rarely used.70 The reason, a Canadian lawyer suggests, is that 
using the corporation’s proxy would put the shareholder activist at “a 
tactical disadvantage.”71 If activists use the corporate proxy, they would 
be limited to the restrictions of the corporate proxy (presumably 
including word limitations).  Effectively, activists tend to view the ability 
to control the message as worth the costs of a proxy solicitation.  The 
hope that investors will only use proxy access as a means of reducing 
managerial agency costs is dampened by the likelihood that even if 
shareholders rarely use proxy access in the U.S, activists may credibly 
use the threat of proxy access as a lever with corporations to extract 
private benefits.  One means of neutralizing this threat is to make clearer 
to other shareholders the effects of this leverage.  Exposing this leverage, 
by requiring enhanced disclosures of shareholder involvement in 
corporate governance matters, may help prevent some of the harmful 
aspects of proxy access predicted by its detractors.72 
The provision on the separation of the CEO and chairman roles 
seems much less likely than proxy access to have an impact on governance 
since it has already been enacted in principle.73 Perhaps like the proxy 
access provision, the CEO-Chairman disclosure provision was included 
simply to provide legislative protection for the SEC’s rulemaking efforts.  
Even if this were a new rule, however, it would likely not have a significant 
                                                                                                                                         
70 Lisa Fairfax, Some Canadian Perspective on Proxy Access, THE 
CONGLOMERATE (Mar. 9, 2010, 1:03 PM), http://www.theconglomerate.org/ 
2010/03/some-canadian-perspective-on-proxy-access.html. 
71 Id. 
72 For a discussion of the effects of shareholder influence and a proposal of 
possible disclosure rules that would address the enhanced shareholder influence 
created by the Dodd-Frank Act, see Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public 
Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355. 
73 Dahya, Galguera, Garcia & van Bommel, supra note 64, at 180. 
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effect.  In some cases, comply-or-explain sorts of provisions tend to have 
the effect of mandatory governance rules because of the costs of non-
compliance (either through burdensome disclosures or because of the 
shaming aspect intended by the disclosure).  This may be the case, for 
example, with the disclosure of a code of ethics required under Section 406 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  In the case of the separation of the CEO and 
chairman roles, however, combining the two roles is not intuitively 
inappropriate; on the other hand, shareholders might reasonably wonder 
why a company would not have a code of ethics.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
This essay has briefly reviewed the connection between risk and 
corporate governance and the specific corporate governance provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.  The corporate governance provisions, covering 
majority voting for director elections, proxy access, and the separation of 
the roles of CEO and chairman of the board, seem likely to have one of two 
possible effects.  On the one hand, the provisions may be pernicious—and 
the proxy access rules seem very likely to fall into this category—in that 
they further enhance shareholder power without a clear justification for 
enhanced shareholder power, but more particularly without a justification 
for shareholder power as a risk management device.  Indeed, the Dodd-
Frank Act’s corporate governance provisions may work at cross-purposes 
to the risk management intent of the remainder of the Dodd-Frank Act: the 
corporate governance provisions operate under the assumption that 
enhanced shareholder power will result in better monitoring of managerial 
behavior, which presumably will help to prevent future crisis, but both 
theory and evidence suggest that diversified shareholders generally prefer 
companies to take risks that other constituencies (including taxpayers) 
would not prefer.  Empowering shareholders further will not change the 
nature of the shareholders’ interest in risk-taking since they are limited in 
their downside risk; if influential shareholders focus on long-term rather 
than short-term gains, it will be because of market forces, not because they 
have been empowered by the Dodd-Frank Act.  
On the other hand, the Dodd-Frank Act may have very little effect 
on investor behavior or risk management.  This is probably the case for the 
CEO/COB split provision.  Increases in shareholder power over the past 
years (fundamentally the result of increased federal regulation) have made 
management responsive—and in some cases probably overly responsive 
to—shareholder concerns over agency costs.  If private ordering is already 
working, what is the point of imposing strict governance constructs across 
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the market as a whole, especially when most of the affected firms are 
victims of, rather than contributors to, the Financial Crisis?  
JUSTIFICATION NORMS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: A 
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
 
Claire A. Hill∗ 
 
 
People making decisions under uncertainty may need to justify those 
decisions to their reputational community.   This Essay considers when and 
how the potential need to justify might lead a decision-maker to employ a 
methodology better suited to yielding a justifiable choice that may not be 
the best choice.  When a decision involves uncertainty, the possible 
outcomes and probabilities are not known.  A broad consensus about a 
methodology that produces a good decision often may not exist.    But 
norms will often arise as to acceptable methodologies—that is, 
methodologies that will be accepted as justifiable if justification is needed.  
The norms instantiate considerable stickiness – after all, the best way to 
demonstrate that something is (typically) “done” is to show that relevant 
others “do it.”  This Essay identifies a particular pathology associated 
with the practice of favoring a justifiable decision over a “good” one, and 
argues that this pathology can have significant negative consequences.  
The main example discussed is the volume of subprime securities 
purchased.  Other examples include the process by which CEOs are 
selected, and decisions regarding contract terms in complex business 
contracts.    
“The acceptability heuristic is, perhaps, the least inspiring strategy for 
coping with accountability.  This strategy does, however, have obvious 
adaptive value for the individual decision-maker.”1 
 
                                                                                                                                         
∗ Professor and 2009-10 Solly Robins Distinguished Research Fellow, 
University of Minnesota Law School.  Thanks to Allan Erbsen, Heidi Kitrosser, 
Bert Kritzer, Art Markman, Brett McDonnell, Janice Nadler, Dan Schwarcz, Larry 
Solan, Richard Warner, and participants at the Gruter Institute conference on Law 
& Behavior, the Regulating Risk conference at the University of Connecticut 
School of Law, and a Squaretable discussion at the University of Minnesota Law 
School.  Thanks to Jamie Kastler, University of Minnesota Law School Class of 
’11, for very helpful research assistance.  
1 Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice: 
Toward a Social Contingency Model, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 331, 348 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992). 
28  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 17:1 
I. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Investors bought enormous quantities of subprime mortgage 
securities when they were the hot new thing; the financial crisis began 
when the securities plummeted in value.  Investors’ reasons for buying the 
securities were not based on a careful appraisal of the securities.2  Rather, 
the investors relied on what others said and did, even when their reliance 
was not warranted.3  If more investors had done their own appraisals, the 
crisis might not be as severe.  Indeed, if enough investors had done their 
own appraisals, the crisis might not have occurred.  This Essay argues that 
the strategy investors followed – reliance on others – was adopted more to 
help them justify to others whatever results their investments yielded than 
to genuinely arrive at the best substantive decision.  This Essay also argues 
that when enough individuals follow such a strategy, society may suffer.   
One might think that the potential need to justify ex post should 
naturally lead to better ex ante decisions.  After all, the better a decision is 
ex ante, the less likely an ex post justification will be needed.  But in a 
class of cases involving decision-making under uncertainty, the potential 
need to justify may not lead to better decisions.  Instead, it may lead to 
decisions that yield negative externalities and other social costs.  It may 
also prevent the accretion of useful information, as well-worn strategies 
that provide justification are used in lieu of strategies aimed directly at 
making the best decision.  The enormous volume of subprime securities 
purchased, and the consequent crisis, provides an important example.  
The phenomenon of focusing as much or more on potentially 
justifying a decision as on making the best decision is exceedingly 
common. This Essay considers when and how the potential need to justify 
might lead a decision-maker to employ a methodology better suited to 
yielding a justifiable choice that may not be the best choice.  The intuition 
is simple to articulate.  When a decision involves uncertainty, the possible 
outcomes and probabilities are not known.  A broad consensus about a 
methodology that produces a good decision often may not exist.    But 
norms will often arise as to acceptable methodologies—that is, 
methodologies that will be accepted as justifiable if justification is needed.4  
                                                                                                                                         
2 See generally, MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010).  
3 See id. 
4 The contrast between decisions supported by “good” justifications and those 
supported by “acceptable” justifications that are not also “good” justifications 
unrealistically assumes that there are clear ways to determine what counts as a 
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The norms instantiate considerable stickiness – after all, the best way to 
demonstrate that something is (typically) “done” is to show that relevant 
others “do it.”  
Justifications may need to be directed to any or all of the 
following: courts, regulators, self-regulatory bodies, colleagues, clients, or 
the “court of public opinion.”  What makes a justification acceptable differs 
for different groups.  This Essay addresses justifications to one’s colleagues 
or clients, or, more broadly, to one’s reputational community, and leaves 
other focuses of justification to later work.  In that regard, the examples 
used in this Essay relate to business decisions.  The phenomenon is not 
confined to business, but business is a convenient port of entry.  Business 
actors are continually judged by their reputational community, including 
people in a position to offer rewards such as promotions or bonuses, or 
punishments such as firing or demotion.  The reputational community of 
such actors has a rich set of norms for acceptable justifications—norms that 
business actors abide by. 
That business actors may “herd” or abide by social norms or 
established practices is a commonplace observation.  This Essay identifies 
a particular pathology associated with that practice, in disparate but 
common contexts, decision-makers’ potential need to justify decisions 
made under uncertainty, and argues that this pathology can have significant 
negative consequences.  The goal of this Essay is to provoke inquiry as to 
the breadth of the problem identified, as well as possible solutions.     
This Essay proceeds as follows:  Section 2 articulates the problem.  
It distinguishes uncertainty from risk, comparing the need for and 
availability of justifications in both cases.  Section 3 discusses the 
motivating example, the purchase of highly-rated subprime securities by 
institutional investors.  Section 4 discusses several additional examples; 
one is the process by which CEOs are selected.  The other examples 
involve decisions regarding contract terms, choice of state of incorporation, 
and the purchase of insurance.  Section 5 considers ways in which law 
contributes to the problem.  Section 6 makes preliminary suggestions for 
solutions.  Section 7 concludes.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
“good” decision and methodology.  While the assumption is ultimately unrealistic, 
it is sufficient for purposes of this Essay. 
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II. ARTICULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
 
A.  UNCERTAINTY DISTINGUISHED FROM RISK 
 
In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Frank Knight famously 
distinguished uncertainty from risk:   
 
…Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct 
from the familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never 
been properly separated.  The term "risk," as loosely used 
in everyday speech and in economic discussion, really 
covers two things which, functionally at least, in their 
causal relations to the phenomena of economic 
organization, are categorically different. . . .  The essential 
fact is that "risk" means in some cases a quantity 
susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is 
something distinctly not of this character; and there are far-
reaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the 
phenomenon depending on which of the two is really 
present and operating. . . .  It will appear that a measurable 
uncertainty, or "risk" proper, as we shall use the term, is so 
far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in 
effect an uncertainty at all.  We shall accordingly restrict 
the term "uncertainty" to cases of the non-quantitative 
type.5  
Knight notes that in conditions of uncertainty, “no valid basis of 
any kind for classifying instances” exists.6  This statement is, in some 
meaningful sense, an exaggeration: there is always some valid basis for 
classification.7   Indeed, a valid basis for classifying instances of 
                                                                                                                                         
5 FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921). 
6 Id at 225. 
7“Classification” as used here is synonymous with “categorization;”the latter 
term is more commonly used in the literatures dealing most directly with the area, 
notably psychology. See generally Arthur B. Markman & Brian H. Ross, Category 
Use and Category Learning, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 592, 592–93 (2003) (providing 
a definition of “categories”)”); Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, 
Categories and Compliance in the Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 
1185–98 (2010) (discussing linguistic and legal categories in the context of 
regulatory regimes); Claire A. Hill, Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of 
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uncertainty exists.  Thus, the difference between risk and uncertainty is, in 
an important respect, quantitative rather than qualitative.  There is a 
continuum of more-or-less valid bases for “classifying instances.”   
At the uncertainty end of the continuum, there are, in Donald 
Rumsfeld’s famous words, “unknown unknowns.”8 At the risk end of the 
continuum, there are (wholly) valid bases for classifying instances: the 
classification yields an identifiable and determinate set of instances as to 
which we know the possible outcomes and associated probabilities.  Thus, 
a risk, in the true sense of the word, can easily be assessed using a 
straightforward arithmetic computation typically known as “expected 
value.”  Few things are at the extreme end of the continuum- an exception 
is the stylized gambles used in experiments.   But many things are close 
enough.  A pool of prime mortgages is (or at least before the financial 
crisis, was) a notable example.  The performance of prime mortgages has 
been tracked extensively for at least the last 40 years.9  Of course, 
notwithstanding its colloquial use to the contrary, “risk” is not synonymous 
with “high risk.”  Treasury securities are technically “risky” although they 
are commonly referred to (and thought of) as being risk-free or nearly so.   
Natural disasters are at the uncertainty end of the continuum.  
Which is the better classification to enable us to make predictions, the 
broader set of natural disasters or a subset of specific such disasters? (And: 
what counts as a natural disaster?) Moreover, even for a classification that 
is straightforward, considerable uncertainty can exist: how well can we 
predict the damage hurricanes will cause in 2012?   Uncertainty makes it 
difficult to assess how much to spend insuring against the possibility of all 
or particular natural disasters, or how much to pay for investments that 
constitute bets on the occurrence of such disasters.10 
In an idealized (and of course highly unrealistic) paradigm of 
decision-making, these difficulties do not arise.  A decision maker can 
                                                                                                                                         
Behavioral Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 563, 573–76 (2004) (discussing 
the relevance of categorization for law and economics and behavioral law and 
economics).    
8 Michael R. Gordon, Rumsfeld, A Force for Change, Did Not Change With 
the Times Amid Iraq Tumult, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, 
9 See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1119 (1996).  
10 Investments that constitute bets on the occurrence of natural disasters are 
called “catastrophe bonds” or colloquially, “cat bonds.” See Glossary of Economic 
and Finance Terms, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/smm/a_f.htm#C. 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2010). 
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perform an accurate expected value computation – she chooses among 
some determinate set of identified options, and knows the possible 
outcomes and associated probabilities for each option. The strategy is a 
good one from a substantive perspective.  For the same reason, it is readily 
justifiable.11   Consider a choice between option A, offering a 10% chance 
of a $200,000 payoff and a 90% chance of a $4,000 payoff, and option B, 
offering a 99.5% chance of a $12,000 payoff and a .5% chance of a $1000 
payoff.  A choice of option A would be easy to justify: (.10x 
$200,000+.90x $4000) > (.995x $12,000 +.005x $1000). 12  Even a choice 
of B is justifiable, especially for a one-time gamble – the decision-maker 
could claim risk-aversion. 13  
Using this strategy requires that the outcomes and probabilities of 
each option are known (and even more heroically, that the options 
                                                                                                                                         
11 See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS 
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 62 (2006). This Essay uses “cost benefit analysis” and 
“expected value” as though they were synonymous; while they clearly are not, for 
purposes of the argument here, they can be treated as such.    
12 Of course such a simple computation won’t often be possible.  Even if a 
computation of this sort is possible, the numbers will almost certainly be open to 
argument.   
13 Of course, proceeding in this manner is not infrequently controversial.  One 
common objection is that this approach is cold or unfeeling, or constitutes trying to 
value something that inherently cannot be valued.  See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA 
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE 
VALUE OF NOTHING 35–40 (2004).  For a discussion of the issue in the context of 
environmental law, see Richard L. Revesz, The green community should mend, not 
work in vain to end, cost-benefit analysis, GRIST, (May 8, 2008, 09:12 AM), 
http://www.grist.org/article/cost-benefit-environmentalism/ (promoting the use of 
cost-benefit analyses in the context of environmental regulation); Lisa Heinzerling, 
Lisa Heinzerling responds to Richard Revesz on cost-benefit analysis, GRIST, (May 
14, 2008, 4:49 PM), http://www.grist.org/article/cost-benefit-environmentalism-
an-oxymoron/ (arguing against the use of cost-benefit analysis in the area of 
environmentalism); Richard L. Revesz, Richard Revesz responds to Lisa 
Heinzerling, defending cost-benefit anaylsis, GRIST, http://www.grist.org/article/a-
tool-in-the-toolbox (June 5, 2008, 06:21 AM) (responding to Lisa Heinzerling’s 
posting on Grist).  A related objection is that quantification makes a decision seem 
more well-supported than it is – to overstate, the inputs into the quantification may 
be “garbage,” such that “garbage in, garbage out.”  See Claire A. Hill,  Law and 
Economics in the Personal Sphere, 29 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 219, 224 (2004).  
But, in principle it is a respectable method, and may come closest to commanding 
the most general conceptual acceptance.  Certainly, there is no obvious competitor.  
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themselves are known), or at least known well enough.  What if they are 
not? How do we know what our choice set consists of? Even if we know 
what the set consists of, how do we assess possible outcomes and the 
associated probabilities for each member of the set?  In fact, we almost 
never “know” the appropriate elements of the canonical expected value 
computation. 14  But not infrequently enough of a consensus exists as to 
those elements, so that the computation can be done and defensibly used.    
Any decision may need justification.  Many factors bear on the 
possibility that justification is required, including the likelihood and nature 
of the possible bad outcomes (or foregone good outcomes).  But closer to 
the risk end of the spectrum, there is, in principle, a good and acceptable 
justification in the form of expected value.  Of course, many decisions raise 
issues about what can and should be quantified, and what kinds of trade-
offs are acceptable.15  Consider decisions about whether to proceed with a 
mass immunization program when the best evidence indicates that some 
small number of people will suffer serious side effects from the 
immunization.16  A particular decision may make a controversial 
assumption about how to quantify the “cost” of the side effects.  But the 
assumption will be used to make the decision and to justify it: the good 
justification and the acceptable justification are one and the same. 
Closer to the uncertainty end of the continuum, we may not have a 
decision methodology that is as accepted or good as expected value.  By 
definition, in cases of uncertainty, we cannot compute probabilities and 
outcomes.  The methodology thus is not available to help make the decision 
or to provide a justification.  How might a decision-maker react?  There is 
voluminous literature demonstrating the existence of “uncertainty 
aversion,” or, as it is sometimes called, “ambiguity aversion.”17  People do 
                                                                                                                                         
14 A computation of risk can be quite complex: we may only know second-
order probabilities, and even those only within certain ranges.  But we may know 
enough to make a computation in which we have significant confidence.  If the 
decision is one of a series of like decisions, we may have considerable confidence 
in the aggregate results. 
15 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 13. 
16 See, e.g., CTRS. See, e.g., UPDATE: VACCINE SIDE EFFECTS, ADVERSE 
REACTIONS, CONTRAINDICATIONS, AND PRECAUTIONS RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES (ACIP), CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (1996), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/00046738.htm. 
17 See, e.g., Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal 
Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2006); Craig R. Fox & Amos 
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not like uncertainty; they will pay money to avoid choosing in conditions 
of uncertainty.18  Business actors do not have this option. They must make 
a choice. 
A decision-maker who faces uncertainty knows she may have to 
justify her decision.  Without a sound decision-making methodology to get 
the best decision, without a way to assess how likely it is that the 
justification will be needed, and especially when the downside of a bad 
decision is potentially high, she will focus significantly on seeking a 
justification that would be accepted by the relevant reference group.   
In the stylized case of risk, there is by hypothesis a known and 
accepted way to make the best substantive decision – expected value.19  
The decision-maker may have to be ready to justify her decision, especially 
if it potentially carries a significant downside risk.  The need to justify does 
not, however, change the decision she makes.  Her decision-making 
methodology should yield the best decision as well as the most justifiable 
decision.   By contrast, in the stylized case of uncertainty, there is no 
known and accepted way to make the best substantive decision. The 
decision-maker cannot accurately assess the probability that she will have 
to justify the decision, but she cannot rule out that it might be high. She 
therefore makes a decision that she is able to justify.  What kinds of 
                                                                                                                                         
Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q.J. ECON. 585, 
585 (1995).  A search on ssrn.com for “ambiguity aversion” in the title, abstract or 
keywords yields 110 papers.   
18 See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 
643 (1961), (the seminal article addressing choices under conditions of 
uncertainty.).  See also Marciano Siniscalchi, Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion, 
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 138 (Steven N. Durlauf & 
Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
19 Of course, there are few cases of pure risk or uncertainty.  Moreover, the 
situations in which an expected value computation is feasible, meaningful and 
sufficiently uncontroversial are few and far between.  Still, expected value is, as a 
matter of rhetoric, a paradigmatic decision-making process in the realm of business 
and has significant force in other realms, as well.  That being said, in the political 
realm—the realm which provides Tetlock’s framework of accountability in 
Tetlock, supra note 1, - expected value might almost never be accepted in the 
broader community to which a politician is accountable because the community is 
intractably heterogeneous, the methodology might be too technical, there exists 
insufficient consensus on the components of the computation, and, probably most 
significantly, there may be many people who are either disingenuous in their non-
acceptance or simply regard the outcome as the only thing of importance, such that 
a bad outcome cannot be justified.  
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decisions would a decision-maker be best able to justify?  Decisions that 
invoke history or authority seem well-suited to become the norm20 for the 
relevant community. 21    Indeed, taking a step back, it should not be 
surprising that such norms develop and persist: Decision-makers in a 
reputational community are similarly situated vís-a-vís one another: they all 
benefit from the existence of norms by which they can minimize their 
expected costs.  The result can be path dependence,22 stickiness,23 herd 
behavior,24 and even groupthink.   
 
B.  JUSTIFICATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE ACCEPTABILITY 
HEURISTIC 
The foregoing discusses how people may justify less-than-good 
outcomes of their decisions.  This Section elaborates on the functions and 
form of a justification.   
                                                                                                                                         
20 On social norms generally, see H. Peyton Young, Social Norms, in THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 647. 
21 What determines community boundaries, and how norms are adopted and 
maintained in communities, are clearly relevant to the issues this Essay addresses, 
but are beyond its scope.  See generally Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language 
and Norms in Complex Business Contracts 77, CHI. KENT. L. REV. 29 (2002) 
(discussing the boundaries of the complex business transacting community).  
22 See e.g., Steven N. Durlauf, Path Dependence, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 18, at 318. 
23The paradigmatic use of the term “stickyness” is in the context of wages and 
prices.  See THE ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/ 
alphabetic.cfm?TERM=STICKY%20PRICES#stickyprices (last visited Sept. 28, 
2010). The term has, however, become broadly used in economics to refer to 
behavior that changes more slowly than the standard forces in economics, such as 
supply and demand, might predict.   
24See Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, 
Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. 
ECON. 992 (1992) (the seminal paper on herding and the related subject of 
information cascades in finance). There is a rich literature on the subject.  See, e.g,  
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Sushil Bikhchandani, Information 
Cascades, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 18; 
Andrea Devenow & Ivo Welch, Rational Herding in Financial Economics, 40 
EUR. ECON. REV. 603 (1996); Torben Lütje, To Be Good Or To Be Better: Asset 
Managers’ Attitudes Towards Herding, 19 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 825 (2009); David 
Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital 
Markets: A Review and Synthesis, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT 25 (2003); Ivo Welch, 
Herding Among Security Analysts, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 369 (2000). 
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Justifications are needed when people are, in Philip’s Tetlock term, 
“accountable.”25  
 
Expectations of accountability are an implicit or explicit 
constraint on virtually everything people do . . . .  Failure 
to act in ways for which one can construct acceptable 
accounts leads to varying degrees of censure, depending on 
the gravity of the offense and the norms of the society.  
Although one can make a powerful case for the 
universality of accountability, the specific norms and 
values to which people are held accountable vary 
dramatically from one culture or time to another.26   
 
Tetlock sets forth a taxonomy of strategies for coping with 
accountability, including use of the “acceptability heuristic.”27  According 
to Tetlock, people “adopt positions likely to gain the favor of those to 
whom they feel accountable (a coping strategy labeled here as the 
acceptability heuristic).”28  The acceptability heuristic is clearly a norm in 
the relevant community. The heuristic has some benefits for both the 
individual and groups to which the individual belongs.29  Moreover, 
individuals are less likely to make certain mistakes if doing so would not 
pass muster with the person to whom they are accountable.30  But it also 
can have some “highly dysfunctional effects, from both an individual and 
an organizational perspective. The acceptability heuristic implies that 
decision-makers can be no better as well as no worse than the 
constituencies to whom they are accountable.”31   
This Essay articulates a particular pathology within the broader 
phenomenon Tetlock describes.  Uncertainty yields a need for justification, 
but precludes “good” justifications.  The community facing decisions made 
under uncertainty develops norms of acceptable justifications (which are 
                                                                                                                                         
25 Tetlock, supra note 1. 
26 Id. at 337 (citations omitted). 
27 See id. at 348–51. 
28 Id. at 340 (explaining why people might adopt the acceptability heuristic, 
Tetlock characterizes it as a “least effort solution” and notes that “[a]ll other things 
being equal, people prefer [such] solutions.”)  
29 Id. at 349.  
30 Id. 
31 Tetlock, supra note 1, at 349. 
2010] JUSTIFICATION NORMS 37 
“acceptability heuristics”).32  These justifications rely too much on history, 
authority, and present practices, which yield bad decisions that perpetuate 
themselves.33  The decisions at issue may be all made in the same time 
period, as was the case with the purchase of subprime securities.  Or they 
may be made at different times, as in the CEO selection example and the 
other examples of “sticky” corporate practices.   There may be many 
individuals involved, or comparatively few.  The individuals may be acting 
in ways that favor their own interests at the expense of that of their 
principal, typically their employer.  Or they may be acting in ways 
congruent with their employer’s interest.    In all of these cases, the 
decisions yield real social costs – sometimes very large ones.   
 
III. THE MOTIVATING EXAMPLE 
 
The example motivating this Essay arises from the financial crisis.  
Money managers bought huge volumes of subprime securities, apparently 
without doing sufficient investigation.      
The decision as to whether an investment is worthwhile necessarily 
involves making assumptions about the future.  There will always be an 
enormous amount we do not know, but we can sometimes have enough 
information to provide a good basis for a decision.  An investor purchasing 
US Treasury securities can be well assured that she will be timely and fully 
repaid. (Given the state of the economy, maybe she shouldn’t be!).  If an 
investor lends money to Bernie Madoff today, while he is in jail and there 
are presumably many superior claims on his assets,34 the investor is 
unlikely to be repaid.  Even though nobody can fully predict the future, it 
can sometimes be predicted well enough to enable a person making an 
investment decision to do so with great confidence.  
An investor making an investment decision assesses how she 
expects the investment to perform.  Canonically, she considers the possible 
outcomes and associated probabilities.35  How much will the investment 
pay off in good and bad states of the world?  How likely are these 
respective states?  It is immediately obvious that the more of a basis one 
has for these determinations, the better one’s valuation will be.  It is also 
                                                                                                                                         
32 See id. at 340. 
33 See id. at 349–50. 
34 See Diana B. Henriques, Claims Total Over 15,400 in Fraud by Madoff, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at B3.  
35 See id. 
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obvious that, all else being equal, the newer and more complex the 
instrument, the less of a basis one is likely to have.  
Subprime mortgage securities and credit default swaps became 
very popular investments in a short period of time, notwithstanding that 
they were new and highly complex instruments.36  This is puzzling. It is 
one thing for consumers to stand in line all night to buy iPhone4,37 but 
sophisticated institutional investors are not supposed to respond to trends 
simply by chasing them.  They also are not supposed to chase trends they 
do not understand.  These investors are now saying, with some plausibility, 
that they never understood the investments.38  A companion paper 
discusses this puzzle and provides an explanation:  
 
Investors bought complex securities they could not 
properly value.  Why did they pay such high prices?  One 
might think that they would instead discount for 
uncertainty and demand a premium to compensate them in 
case they were buying a lemon.  Perhaps investors thought 
the lemon securities had been sweetened because of the 
sellers’ stake in their reputation—sellers, not wanting to 
risk the loss of reputation and future business, would do 
their best not to sell lemon securities.  But an explanation 
relying on the reputational stake of the sellers – the 
investment banks – is insufficient.  The time horizons of 
many individuals selling on behalf of investment banks are 
far shorter than those of their employers.  Investment banks 
have failed to sufficiently constrain the behavior of these 
individuals.  Moreover, it is generally known that the 
investment banks themselves sometimes put their own 
interests ahead of customers’.   
 
Perhaps the investors were simply unfaithful agents 
making investments for others.  They could have made 
                                                                                                                                         
36 See Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007, 3-4, 9, 20-30 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14358, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14358.  
37 Dawn Kawamoto, iPhone 4 Draws Long Lines, Entrepreneurs and 
Expectations of ‘Wow!’, DAILYFINANCE, June 23, 2010, 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/iphone-4-draws-early-lines-entrepreneurs-and-
expectations-of-w/19527671/. 
38 See generally LEWIS, supra note 2. 
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self-interested decisions to get a quick payoff in the form 
of fees or short-term results, calculating that the payoff 
would exceed any long-term financial or reputational cost.  
This explanation does not work either: it leaves 
unanswered the question of why the ultimate investors 
would not have chosen better agents or monitored them 
more carefully…     
 
Perhaps the investors simply relied on the rating agencies’ 
AAA ratings for the securities?  This also seems unlikely, 
given that Enron was scarcely in the distant past, and that 
the securities offered higher yields than other AAA-rated 
securities, indicating that they were of lower quality.  
Moreover, during the latter part of the period in which 
subprime securities were popular investments, the 
securities’ low quality became sufficiently evident that 
reliance on rating-agency ratings became progressively less 
tenable. …  
 
The most satisfactory explanation for why investors did 
not demand a much larger lemons premium lies in the 
incentives for “herding” among agents who made 
investment decisions for others.  Investors (and markets) 
compare investment managers to other investment 
managers.  A manager’s best strategy, therefore, may be to 
do what her peers do regardless of whether the manager 
believes her peers are a reliable source of information 
about the quality of the investment decision.39 
 
These investors could have invested in ultra-conservative 
instruments, but such a choice would lack an “accepted” justification – that 
is not what their peer money managers “do.”  For that matter, it would also 
lack a “good” justification: a justification based on the merits of the 
decision and the methodology used.  Investors were hired for their 
supposed expertise in investment selection – an expertise which was to 
                                                                                                                                         
39 Claire A. Hill, Why Didn’t Subprime Investors Demand A (Much Larger) 
Lemons Premium?, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 102-4 ( 2011) ations 
omitted).   
40  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 17:1 
yield expected returns above those of an insured bank deposit or Treasury 
instrument.     
Doing what their immediate peers (other money managers) did – 
buying an investment crafted by other peers (the big investment banks with 
involvement from their lawyers and vetted by still other peers, the rating 
agencies) – was “accepted.”  The money managers may also have believed 
their peers knew what they were doing, that subprime mortgage securities 
were sufficiently similar to the historically successful prime mortgage 
securities, that housing prices would go up forever, and that brilliant 
financial structuring could vastly minimize risk while keeping reward high.  
Whatever the money managers believed about how the instruments would 
perform, they knew the instruments’ performance (and their own 
performance as money managers) was subject to considerable uncertainty.  
Thus, they cared a great deal about the potential need for justification.  For 
money managers, justifying their decisions on the bases that their peers 
performed no worse would be easier than justifying doing far worse 
because they missed out on the hot new thing.40  We know the outcome of 
these “safe” decisions (for the money managers): the financial crisis.  
 
IV. OTHER EXAMPLES 
 
This section presents several additional examples.  In these 
examples, decision-makers use methodologies that the relevant community 
uses, where there is significant reason to suppose that they do not 
necessarily yield the best substantive decision.  One example is selection of 
the CEO.  The other examples are of choice of state of incorporation, 
providing for remote contingencies in a complex business contract, and 
public company purchases of insurance. I discuss each example below.  In 
a recent article, I discussed another example related to my motivating 
example here: the choice of two (or, in more recent years, two of three) 
particular rating agencies for a debt issuance.   I argued that a “CEO may 
be second guessed if he does not get two ratings [one from Moody’s and 
one from Standard & Poor’s] and the offering is disappointing; a downside 
                                                                                                                                         
40 This ignores the contrarians who made bets against such securities and 
others who simply didn’t get involved on either side.  Such investors existed, but 
there were comparatively few, such that subprime securities came to be 
dangerously overvalued.  See generally LEWIS, supra note 2. 
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for not abiding by the norm is far more likely than any upside from flouting 
it.”41    
 
A.  CEO SELECTION 
 
Another example where accepted justifications are sought as much 
or more than good decisions (with “good” justifications) is the selection of 
CEOs for larger companies – companies watched by the markets because 
market participants have a significant stake in the companies’ performance.  
How such companies will perform is uncertain for many reasons.  The 
economy’s performance is hard to predict, as are other potentially 
significant factors, such as natural and man-made disasters.  Industry-
specific factors and the behavior of a company’s competitors are often 
unpredictable.  If the company does badly, those who selected the CEO 
may be criticized.42  Thus, decision-makers may be highly influenced by 
the potential need to justify when making their decisions as to who will be 
CEO.43 According to Rakesh Khurana, a leading scholar in the field: 
 
[B]oards employ extremely limiting criteria to define the 
pool of eligible candidates.  These criteria, which are 
loosely (if at all) coupled to the specific strategic 
challenges facing the firm, are adopted largely with the 
intention of producing a candidate who will be seen as 
legitimate by external constituents, namely, financial 
analysts and the business media. . . . Because the directors 
and candidates involved in external CEO search are 
embedded in a community of overlapping business and 
social relationships, they are particularly sensitive to 
                                                                                                                                         
41 Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43, 61 
(2004). Fitch also became an acceptable source of one of the two ratings. See 
Claire A. Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such A Bad Job Rating Subprime 
Securities?, 71 PITT. L. REV. 585, 600-602 (2010). 
42 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, At G.M.’s Helm or Going Under?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006 (describing the pressure placed on the board of General 
Motors when their choice for CEO underperformed in the position). 
43 See, e.g., RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE 
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS  29–36 (2002) (discussing the role of 
justification in corporate searches for new CEOs). 
42  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 17:1 
maintaining the appearance of propriety in the conduct of 
the search among their peers.44  
 
Each time a prominent company needs a CEO, it chooses from the 
same small pool of candidates.  This seems to be the accepted modus 
operandi, if the company does badly under the new CEO, it permits those 
involved to point to the process they followed, and be therefore absolved 
from responsibility for the results of their decision.  Khurana seems to 
intimate that good quality is at least a necessary condition to be in the pool 
of candidates.45  But perhaps good quality is not necessary – it may be that 
previously being a CEO is sufficient.46  
One might think that some past performances are so bad that they 
should disqualify a possible candidate.  If that is so, how can we explain 
Robert Nardelli’s selection as the head of Chrysler after his performance at 
Home Depot?47  In 2006, Joe Nocera of the New York Times wrote: 
 
Mr. Nardelli . . . has become this year's version of Mr. 
Overpaid C.E.O.  He's earned this status, in part, by the 
sheer sum of money his board has awarded him in the five 
years since he was recruited from General Electric to take 
over Home Depot: $245 million, including $37.1 million 
just this last year.  At the same time, Home Depot's stock 
has fallen 12 percent, while shares of its chief competitor, 
Lowe's, have risen 173 percent.  You've heard of pay for 
performance?  This is the classic definition of pay for 
pulse.48  
 
                                                                                                                                         
44 Id. at 29, 36. 
45 See id. at 27–30.    
46 This, of course, is an overstatement – a CEO who is discovered committing 
a massive fraud probably is no longer in the pool of acceptable CEOs.  If he is in 
jail, he is probably unavailable.  “Chainsaw Al” Dunlap did not see a great demand 
for his services after his disastrous and criminal stewardship of Sunbeam.  See 
JOHN A. BYRNE, CHAINSAW: THE NOTORIOUS CAREER OF AL DUNLAP IN THE ERA 
OF PROFIT-AT-ANY-PRICE 350 (1999). 
47 See Joe Nocera, The Board Wore Chicken Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006. 
48 Id. 
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Home Depot ousted Mr. Nardelli in January of 2007.49  He became 
head of Chrysler in August of 2007, hired by Chrysler’s owner, the private 
equity fund Cerberus, and resigned in April of 2009 as Chrysler entered 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, returning to Cerberus .50  Of course, Nardelli 
headed Chrysler while the economy was in crisis. We cannot know whether 
he did a good job; perhaps someone else would have done worse.  What is 
important is that previously being the CEO at Home Depot seems to have 
been sufficient for Nardelli to obtain another CEO job notwithstanding that 
he had engendered considerable hostility for his lackluster performance and 
high pay package. 
The strategy of choosing a new CEO from a small pool of present 
or former CEOs is problematic for many reasons.  First, the strategy may 
not yield the best CEO: another person might have been better.51  Second, 
the strategy probably contributes to the high level of CEO compensation 
overall.52  It helps perpetuate the illusion that CEO candidates are scarce,53 
and amplifies the resonance of a new CEO’s argument that he must be 
above the median of his comparison group and therefore should be paid 
                                                                                                                                         
49 See Michael Barbaro, Embattled Chief Executive Resigns at Home Depot, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007. 
50 See Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Chief Says He Believes He Has Saved the 
Automaker, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at B5.  It is interesting, too, that Mr. 
Nardelli’s new employer was a private equity fund whose own financial interests 
were at stake.  Mark Clothier, Chrysler’s Nardelli To Rejoin Cerberus Without 
Golden Parachute, BLOOMBERG, May 1, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aQ.PiZK2OzH0. Who did they need to justify their 
hiring decision to?  In the community that includes private equity funds, there may 
be far more incentive to try to make the best judgment and far less reason to use a 
methodology importantly motivated by its justifiability.  But the fund does have 
some agents too.  They have their own often-large financial stakes, but they may 
face the same constraints as other agents in needing to justify what they do.  The 
fund itself may also need justification to its investors if it does not perform as well 
as its peers. 
51 See KHURANA, supra note 43, at 25.  How the market perceives the new 
CEO and what it says about the company to choose and gain her services, may 
influence how well the company does and hence, how successful the CEO “is” or 
seems to be.  This might seem to complicate the story that the company is losing 
out when it hires the CEO chosen using the accepted strategy rather than the CEO 
who would have been chosen because of his skill set.   Khurana suggests, however, 
that the market perception and its effects will fade over time.   
52 Id. at 30. 
53 See id. at 30 n.18. 
44  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 17:1 
accordingly.54  Third, the strategy perpetuates the reigning narrative that a 
particular person – a “charismatic” CEO, in Khurana’s words – can save 
the company.55  CEOs may have a far smaller effect on the performance of 
their companies than the narrative suggests – the reigning narrative is 
probably a myth.56  Finally, this strategy “restricts access to the CEO 
position to those who fit certain socially defined criteria.”57  
In sum, if this depiction is correct, firms expend considerable 
energy and money chasing a myth.  Firms do this in significant part to play 
to an outside audience.58  Chasing the myth may also serve to perpetuate it.  
Going down this mistaken path also prevents accretion of useful knowledge 
regarding CEO search methodologies and desirable CEO characteristics, as 
the same approach continues to yield what are arguably less than 
satisfactory results.59 
 
B.  PROVIDING FOR REMOTE CONTINGENCIES IN COMPLEX 
BUSINESS CONTRACTS 
 
Complex business contracts are notoriously long and filled with 
legalese.  One significant contributor to their length is provisions relating to 
remote contingencies.   An illustration is found in a memorable 
“melodrama in three acts” in Anatomy of a Merger,60 a book by James 
Freund, a leading mergers and acquisitions lawyer.  In one scene in the 
melodrama, the senior lawyer chastises the junior lawyer’s first draft of an 
acquisition agreement:  
 
                                                                                                                                         
54 See id. at 30.  
55 See id. at 20. 
56 Id. at 21 (“The widespread, firmly held belief in the overriding importance 
of the CEO is all the more noteworthy considering that there is no conclusive 
evidence linking leadership to organizational performance.”). See also Noam 
Wasserman et al., When Does Leadership Matter? The Contingent Opportunities 
View of CEO Leadership 6–7 (Harvard Univ. Strategy Unit, Working Paper No. 
02-04, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=278652 (arguing that the 
potential influence of a CEO fluctuates over time and is situation-specific). 
57 KHURANA, supra note 43, at 49.. 
58 See id. at 20–21. 
59 See id. at 21 (“[B]oards find themselves trapped in an infinite loop of 
dashed expectations and CEO churn.”).  
60 JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES 
FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 479-540 (1975). 
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And then, in the one place you did a little thinking, Pete, it 
seems to me you went too far. I know it’s possible that 
they’ll repeal the Copyright Act some day, but it doesn’t 
really rise to a level of probability sufficient to warrant 
three pages of provisions conditional upon that event.61 
 
In this situation, Pete removes the provision.  The senior lawyer, 
Freund’s alter ego, is in my experience quite idealized.  In my years as a 
lawyer, nobody questioned such provisions, and they were therefore never 
removed.   This is one important reason why contracts have gotten 
appreciably larger over time. The process by which complex business 
contracts are written involves starting with a “form” – a document used in a 
previous transaction.   Contract drafters change only what is inapt; they do 
not remove what is unlikely to be needed.   In Why Contracts Are Written 
in Legalese, I explained that: 
 
[in the course of the transaction or its aftermath,] [t]hings 
may go wrong for many reasons. If they do, clients may 
blame their lawyers, and senior lawyers may blame their 
juniors, regardless of where fault lies. And lawyers may 
worry more than is warranted that things will go wrong 
and that they will be blamed. Finally, because the form is 
one’s point of departure, its provisions necessarily have a 
mantle of correctness; deviations have to be, in a sense, 
“justified.” Things already written down come pre-
legitimized – not just in the political sense that there’s no 
payoff in challenging them, but also in the psychological 
sense that they “look like they belong.” As a result, 
deviations from the form, especially more structural or 
innovative deviations, are disfavored. Necessary changes 
to use the form in the new transaction are more apt to be as 
limited as possible to “do the job.” Deletions generally 
must meet a high threshold of justification: omitting a 
provision because it doesn’t do much, but does clutter up 
                                                                                                                                         
61 Id. at 500-01, also quoted in Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in 
Legalese, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 59, 63 (2001). 
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the form, rarely suffices. But inclusion of new boilerplate 
that doesn’t seem to help but couldn’t hurt requires much 
less justification. Contracts get progressively longer and 
more cumbersome, and usually not to any positive end.62 
 
The social costs of overly long and technical complex business 
contracts are of course much smaller than the social cost of the excess 
purchases of subprime securities.  And they mostly fall on parties who have 
in a sense agreed to bear them.   But the costs are not insignificant.   The 
extra resources spent in drafting, reading, negotiating, printing, and 
reviewing contracts over and above what would be needed if the contracts 
were leaner are fairly large, especially given the billing rates of the lawyers 
at issue and the value of the time of top-level company officials who may 
review them; companies pass these costs onto their customers.  And of 
course the longer and more complicated the contract, the more 
opportunities and costs arise for litigation.  Moreover, litigation costs also 
are borne by taxpayers, who pay for courts.     
 
C.  OTHER EXAMPLES: “STICKY” BUSINESS PRACTICES  
 
Consider the choice to incorporate in Delaware and the choice of a 
public company to buy insurance.  A good argument can be made that the 
decision-makers are influenced more by justification than by trying to 
make the best possible decision from a substantive perspective.   
 
1. Delaware Incorporation 
 
Why do so many companies incorporate in Delaware? Very few 
companies conduct business in Delaware, yet more than half of all public 
companies are incorporated there.63  A great deal of literature exists on this 
subject.64  Other states would like to attract incorporation business; there 
                                                                                                                                         
62 Hill, supra note 61, at 76. 
63 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely 
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 
553, 554 (2002); About Agency, STATE OF DELAWARE, 
http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last updated May 27, 2010). 
64 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen 
Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. 
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have been efforts along those lines, but none that have made an appreciable 
dent in Delaware’s market share.65  One explanation, complementary to 
many of the explanations in the literature, focuses on justification.  At elite 
law firms, incorporating new corporations in Delaware is the default norm.  
A lawyer attempting to deviate from the norm would have to explain and 
justify her decision.  Incorporation is typically done by lower-level 
attorneys.  Thus, the explanation would likely need to be made to the senior 
attorney.  Such firms’ clients tend to include many people who study the 
law firm’s work product carefully; thus, the unusual choice would have to 
be explained and justified to a client as well.  A typical reason given for 
incorporating in Delaware is that the Delaware judiciary is better suited to 
resolving corporate disputes: it is more sophisticated and has a quicker 
timeline.  But very few cases go to court, and many courts follow Delaware 
corporate law. 66  What seems likely is overall “stickiness” based on the 
comfort of everyone involved with Delaware law and procedure.  Decision-
makers do not really investigate alternatives; other states may thus not try 
                                                                                                                                         
L. REV. 1775 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1168 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 
(1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve 
Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); Daniel R. Fischel, The ‘Race to the 
Bottom’ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s 
Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, 
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6  J. LEGAL. STUD. 
251 (1977); Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on 
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Comment]. 
65 How much other states try to get incorporation business is a matter of 
considerable debate.   It is conventionally argued that other states do compete to 
get incorporation business.  See, e.g., Winter, Comment, supra note 63; ROMANO, 
supra note 64; Fischel, supra note 64. Some scholars argue that they do not try 
much to get incorporation business because they know they will not succeed 
against Delaware.  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 63.  One state 
recently attempting to get incorporation business is North Dakota.  See Larry 
Ribstein, The North Dakota Experiment, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 23, 2007, 11:48 PM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/04/23/the-north-dakota-experiment. 
66 See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342, 1345-46 (D. 
Nev. 1997). 
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as hard to provide them,67 potentially setting up a self-reinforcing dynamic.   
In the typical corporate context involving complex business transactions, 
there is virtually no chance of being second-guessed and punished for a 
choice to incorporate in Delaware unless there is a specific, known reason 
to make a different choice.  By contrast, the chance of being second-
guessed and punished for a choice to incorporate in another jurisdiction 
without some affirmative reason for doing so may very well be punished.68    
 
2. Public Company Purchase of Insurance 
 
Why would public companies buy insurance?  A great deal of 
literature exists on the subject.69 The starting point is that such companies 
should be risk-neutral, and therefore should not spend money on insurance 
premiums.  It must cost more to buy insurance than the expected amount of 
any payout the insurance company would make.70  The purchase of 
insurance is therefore a puzzle requiring an explanation.  Many scholars 
have provided explanations, invoking, among other things, risk aversion of 
                                                                                                                                         
67 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 63, at 553-57. 
68 My authority for this paragraph is my extensive practice experience and 
interviews with many other practitioners. See also John C. Coates IV, Explaining 
Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame The Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1304-
05 (2001) (arguing that adoption of particular takeover defenses is importantly 
determined by a particular firm’s practices rather than the client’s needs).   
Coates’s article is in a different context than the one discussed in the text, and 
hypothesizes an “agency cost” in which the law firm’s interests are being pursued 
at the expense of the client’s, but Coates’ argument and the one in this Essay are 
related. Law firms settle on a particular practice and do not revisit it; the 
mechanism by which this occurs is presumably that individual lawyers are 
discouraged from deviating.  In the context of takeover defenses, there is a clear 
better alternative for the client.  For incorporation, there is not.  Perhaps there is a 
better alternative that could be found through research.  Or perhaps one would 
arise if the norm to incorporate in Delaware became less sticky.  
69See David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for 
Insurance, 55 J. BUS. 281 (1982) (an early influential article posing the puzzle); Li-
Ming Han, Managerial Compensation and Corporate Demand for Insurance, 63 J. 
RISK & INS. 381 (1996) (explaining corporate insurance purchases by reference to 
managerial risk aversion); see also Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: 
The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. OF LAW & ECON. 541 (2009), 
available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art22 (giving alternative 
explanations for corporate purchases of insurance). 
70 See Mayers & Smith, supra note 69 at 282. 
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corporate managers,71 expertise by insurance companies,72 or requirements 
of the company’s transacting partners.73  Another explanation may be the 
one offered here for the purchase of subprime securities and CEO selection 
process: that those in charge of making the decisions are looking more to 
justification than to the substance of the decision.  This may involve an 
agency cost, or it may not.  The manager may think that if an event occurs 
that would have triggered a payout and she has not obtained insurance for 
the company, that she will be fired or reprimanded.  But the company’s 
shareholders might also punish the company in such a case; the manager 
might then be serving her company well by obtaining the insurance.  
 
V. LAW AS PART OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The foregoing has discussed a problem: when a decision-maker 
makes a decision intended more to shield her from negative consequences 
than to yield the best possible decision.   Might law provide a solution?  
Law is, unfortunately, often part of the problem.    
Law, especially corporate law, encourages process-based 
justification, even where the process at issue can be followed fairly 
mechanically.74  Consider fiduciary duty law, especially the duty of care 
and the duty of good faith under the duty of loyalty.  Directors and officers 
show that they met their duties by demonstrating that they hired the 
appropriate advisors, and had meetings which lasted a sufficient period of 
time and conducted enough debate and inquiry.75  There may be a formula 
– a true safe harbor, or something close enough – to avoid liability.  Using 
the court-approved process may not yield a worse decision, but it probably 
incurs unnecessary costs in arriving at the decision that probably would 
have been arrived at in any event.  
                                                                                                                                         
71 See Han, supra note 69, at 281-82. 
72 See Goldberg, supra note 68, at 542-43. 
73 Id. at 541. 
74 See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the 
Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 336 
(2009) [hereinafter Hill & McDonnell, Executive Compensation] (characterizing 
the post-Van Gorkom process of approving mergers in Delaware as resulting in 
“full employment” for investment bankers and lawyers); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. 
McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1769, 1772 n.14 (2007).  
75 See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 73, at 1769-72; Hill & McDonnell, 
Executive Compensation, supra note 73, at 336. 
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The emphasis on process reflects that courts do not want to 
micromanage business.  It also reflects a desire to give business people 
certainty – to specify ways of proceeding that insulate a decision and the 
decision-maker from further scrutiny. 76   This ethos echoes, and 
encourages, a mindset favoring justification by formula.77      
The next Section argues that one important solution to the problem 
is to develop and promote norms against the use of justifications that are 
merely acceptable, but not “good.”  These norms should encourage 
business actors to use their own judgment, even if they can not consult a 
formula or an established past or present practice.  As discussed above, law 
has difficulty in preventing people from using safe harbors as refuges from 
doing their own inquiry.  But perhaps law can do something to help the 
problem.  It can allow for more personal liability for business decision-
makers in some cases.  It can marshal dicta to encourage better practices, 
and can outlaw common practices it finds unsatisfactory.  I turn to these 
issues in the next Section. 
 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
 
The foregoing described contexts in which decision-makers made 
decisions that the decision-makers had more reason to think were 
                                                                                                                                         
76 See Hickman & Hill, supra note 7, at 1188.  
77 A recent paper pointing out the extent to which justification can distort 
behavior is Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of 
Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568884. The authors 
discuss how actors’ behavior can be distorted by their need to make the best 
evidentiary case to a court.  Inefficiency may result since a person may, for 
instance, allow behavior that harms her to continue so she can demonstrate that it 
occurred. Parchomovsky and Stein’s paper shares with this Essay the idea that the 
need to get some desired treatment – avoiding professional censure or getting a 
recovery in a lawsuit – can distort behavior and potentially be costly to society.  
Parchomovsky and Stein’s paper has some important differences, though.  First, in 
their scenario, the behavior that does not represent a distortion is known, at least as 
a matter of theory.  This Essay’s analogue– the best decision from a substantive 
point of view – is not known.  This is precisely why the problem arises.  Second, 
demonstrations made to a court are governed by different forces than 
demonstrations or justifications to one’s peers.  In both instances, law and norms 
are relevant.  But, to overstate for expository ease, norms inform law to a court, 
whereas law informs norms to one’s peers.  
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justifiable than were substantively good.   The decisions have varying 
social costs, some quite large and some smaller. 
What kind of solutions might be possible?  If we characterize the 
greater society as having an interest in more critically-minded and less 
formulaic decision-making, one approach might be to align the interests of 
decision-makers with those of the greater society.  One way this might be 
achieved is to make decision-makers personally responsible for their 
decisions.  This might be achieved in several different ways.    
One is to make decision-makers personally liable for their 
decisions.  The liability could arise from the decision’s outcome or from 
the process used to reach the outcome.  Richard Painter and I have argued 
for the former solution in a particular context: highly compensated bankers.  
These bankers made risky decisions that allowed their banks to fail or 
suffer significant losses.  We argued that such bankers should be personally 
liable if their banks fail; we would allow them to retain a million dollars of 
their own wealth, but no more.  Investment banking is a business that can 
impose, and has recently imposed, enormous social costs.  We argue that 
investment banking is presently structured in a manner that rewards 
excessive risk-taking.  Investment bankers had significant equity stakes in 
their banks, and were willing to risk those.  We argue that they might not 
be willing to risk losing amounts they hold outside the firm that enable 
them to maintain their accustomed standard of living.78   
Obvious objections exist to our proposal, mostly notably that it 
may not be politically feasible.79  But this may change given public disgust 
at continuing high banker compensation.80  Even if it does become feasible, 
though, it is only a partial solution for highly compensated people in a field 
that imposes social costs.  Limited liability is a bedrock principle in 
business, and it is simply not realistic to advocate abandoning it wholesale.  
Thus, many decision-makers making decisions more because the decisions 
                                                                                                                                         
78 Claire A. Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder 
Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1173-74 (2010). 
79 Substantive objections include the following: a regulation imposed by the 
U.S. or a state would tempt bankers to work where the regulation did not apply; 
fewer people would want to be investment bankers; bankers would find ways to 
hide their assets; innovation would be stifled as bankers flocked to safety. Id. at 
1196-99. 
80 See, e.g., Eric Dash, Federal Report Faults Banks on Huge Bonuses, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at A1. 
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are justifiable than because they are substantively good could not feasibly 
be made guarantors for their decisions.            
What about trying to increase oversight of process?  If the 
oversight is to be done by courts, this does not seem like a promising 
solution.  As argued in the previous Section, courts, especially those 
deciding matters of corporate law, are notoriously reluctant to 
micromanage process.  Courts are sometimes willing to say directors did 
not think long enough; they are not generally willing to say they did not 
think hard enough.81  But one related avenue might be promising: trying to 
encourage norms and best practices in favor of critical thinking and against 
mechanical and formula based decision-making methodologies.  Corporate 
“law” nowadays very much includes extra-legal forces such as pressure 
imposed by major shareholders, through the proxy process as well as the 
media.82  Such pressure could make it less “safe” for decision-makers to 
follow certain types of established practices.  Law could also have a role: 
decisions could include dicta encouraging more critical-mindedness.  Of 
course, critical-minded decision-making is no panacea.  Formulaic 
decision-making methodologies may at least impose a lower bound on the 
quality of decision-making.83  But it may be realistic to hope that the 
decisions at issue, mostly those made by individuals working in an 
institutional setting, would be constrained by those institutions, thus 
providing a lower bound. 
Law can also play another role.  It may not be good at dictating the 
specifics of good process, but it can be quite good at dictating the specifics 
of bad process.  In that regard, it can have a more direct role in limiting 
“safe harbors.”  It can, for instance, label a particular practice 
“unreasonable” as a matter of law.  By itself, this may not be sufficient.  
Consider that in 1999, the Seventh Circuit characterized reliance on 
Standard and Poor’s rating as unreasonable.84  Eleven years later, reliance 
continues unabated, notwithstanding Enron and the subprime crisis.  But 
                                                                                                                                         
81 See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 241-44 (Del. 2009). 
82 See generally Hill & McDonnell, Executive Compensation, supra note 73, at 
357-64. 
83 See text accompanying note 31. 
84 See Quinn v. McGraw-Hill, 168 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 1999), quoted and 
discussed in Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 
56 (2004). 
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court attempts to specify bad process, making “safe harbors” less safe, is an 
approach with some potential. 
A final approach to consider is that interested parties – perhaps, 
industry groups – might be willing to subsidize research on better decision-
making methodologies.  They might be motivated by their collective 
interest or perhaps by an interest in avoiding regulation.  In cases where 
there is a public interest, government, too, can subsidize such research. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Decisions made under uncertainty may be made more with a view 
towards justification than with a view towards making the best substantive 
decision.  Norms may arise as to justifications the decision-maker’s 
community will accept; the decision-maker will often be guided by these 
norms.  The result may be inferior decisions that impose social costs, 
sometimes significant ones.  This phenomenon matters for law and policy.  
Massive overinvestment in subprime securities is an important example. 
The problem will not be easy to address.  At first blush, law would 
not seem a good place to look.  The problem involves people taking refuge 
in an accepted methodology or practice rather than fully using their critical 
faculties.  Law notoriously judges actions by reference to accepted norms 
in the community; it also notoriously focuses on process rather than 
substance. 
This Essay aims to draw attention to the breadth of the problem, 
showing its roots and manifestations in standard human motivations.  The 
breadth of the problem has not been appreciated.  Might better solutions be 
possible if the problem is viewed at a higher level of abstraction?  This 
Essay aims to raise this possibility, and otherwise inspire new ways of 
looking at what may have seemed like diverse phenomena. 
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CATALYSTS FOR CLARIFICATION:  
MODERN TWISTS ON THE INSURABLE INTEREST 
REQUIREMENT FOR LIFE INSURANCE 
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*** 
The long dormant insurable interest doctrine is being revisited as banks 
and other funds purchase life insurance policies in increasing numbers. 
Some industry commentators have raised objections, accusing Wall Street 
of perpetrating schemes that amount to impermissible gambling on the 
lives, and deaths, of others. In response, Wall Street financiers have 
insisted that they are committed to complying with state insurable interest 
statutes and that their efforts at building a secondary market for life 
insurance policies is expanding consumer options and eliminating the long-
standing monopsony of the insurance companies. A workable compromise 
between the insurance industry and Wall Street positions that will 
modernize the insurable interest doctrine must simultaneously protect the 
free-assignability of life insurance policies and avoid a rekindling of the 
long-despised practice of gambling on lives. Development of such a 
proposal requires comprehensive examinations of the history of the 
insurable interest doctrine, the modern context within which it is being 
applied, and the primary proposals to modernize the doctrine that have 
been offered to date. 
*** 
 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT INSURABLE 
INTEREST DEBATE 
 
The long dormant insurable interest doctrine is now being revisited 
as an outgrowth of the last decade’s halcyon financial markets.1 As banks 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Tax Law at Thomas Jefferson School of Law.  
1 See generally Bryan D. Bolton & Michael P. Cunningham, An Ancient 
Doctrine Confronts Modern Problems, FOR THE DEFENSE (Sep. 2008); Robert B. 
Barnett, Jr. et al., Amended Substitute House Bill 404: Ohio's Definition of 
“Insurable Interest” Unfortunately Remains Largely Uncodified, 19 OHIO PROB. 
L.J. 4 (2008); James C. Magner, Whose Life (Insurance) is it, anyway?, STEVE 
LEIMBERG’S EST. PLAN. EMAIL NEWSL. (Oct. 30, 2007); Jacob Loshin, Insurance 
Law’s Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable Interest Requirement, 117 
YALE L.J. 474 (2007); Robert B. Barnett, Jr. & Jessica B. Kling, The Insurable 
Interest Rule: Who Kicked the Slumbering Bear-and Did it Wake Him Up?, 16 
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and other funds purchase life insurance policies in increasing numbers, 
insurance industry commentators have raised objections, accusing Wall 
Street of perpetrating schemes that amount to impermissible gambling on 
the lives, and deaths, of others. Describing Wall Street’s foray into the 
mortality markets as “death pools” designed to profit on the arrival of the 
Grim Reaper, commentators have characterized this practice as violating 
the spirit, if not the letter, of state insurable interest laws.2  
In objection to such characterizations, Wall Street financiers assure 
the industry that they are committed to complying with state insurable 
interest statutes. They further suggest that their efforts at building a 
secondary market for life insurance policies is expanding consumer options 
and eliminating the insurance companies’ long-standing monopsony.3 Just 
as the viatical markets were created in an effort to help AIDS patients deal 
with end-of-life expenses, they argue, a robust secondary market will 
increase the liquidity and value of consumers’ unwanted insurance 
policies.4  
The enormous demand created by Wall Street's desire to make the 
life insurance market yet another sub-asset class in the greater asset-backed 
securities paradigm has served as the germ seed of some expansive 
interpretations of the insurable interest requirements, thus prompting many 
of the industry commentators’ complaints.5  
As regulators and legislators attempt to refine the insurable interest 
doctrine, this article examines the pitfalls and possibilities presented by 
their efforts to improve upon the policy objectives underlying the insurable 
interest requirement. Specifically, this article examines the insurable 
                                                                                                                          
OHIO PROB. L.J. 171 (2006); Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest 
Requirement for Life Insurance: A Critical Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477 
(2005). 
2 See Jenny Anderson, Wall Street Pursues Profit in Bundles of Life Insurance, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/business/ 
06insurance.html?emc=eta1; http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/business/06insurance
.html?emc=eta1; M. Corey Goldman, ‘Til Death Do us Part, HFM WEEK, Jan. 18-24, 
2007, at 23; Magner, supra note 1. 
3 See, e.g., Natalie Rosenfelt, The Verdict on Monopsony, 20 LOY. CONSUMER 
L. REV. 402, 404 (2008). 
4 Vishaal Bhuyan, LIFE MARKETS: TRADING MORTALITY AND LONGEVITY 
RISK WITH LIFE SETTLEMENTS AND LINKED SECURITIES 14 (John Wiley & Sons 
eds., 2009); Kelly J. Bozanic, An Investment to Die for: From Life Insurance to 
Death Bonds, the Evolution and Legality of the Life Settlement Industry, 113 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 229 (2008). 
5 See e.g. Bolton, supra note 1. 
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interest doctrine and its place in the mixture of separate but interrelated 
issues implicated by STOLI transactions, including: (1) material 
misrepresentations made on the policy application; (2) placement of the 
burden of establishing an insurable interest; and (3) the doctrine’s wider 
interrelationship with the bundle of intangible property rights inherent in a 
modern life insurance contract.  By means of a thorough examination of the 
insurable interest doctrine in the context of these related and intertwined 
issues, this discussion serves as a call for measured restraint as policy 
makers attempt to address market abuses with changes to the long-standing 
insurable interest doctrine.  
Recent commentary decrying STOLI and similar practices has, in 
many cases, focused on violations of the insurable interest doctrine. 
Largely unaltered in British and American law over 230 years, the 
insurable interest doctrine is a natural candidate for upgrade in the morass 
of insurance regulations and common law doctrines implicated by STOLI. 
Destabilization of the doctrine will introduce uncertainty as to the value of 
many life insurance policies.  If potential purchasers can no longer be 
certain of whether a policy will be valid or void for lack of an insurable 
interest, the resulting questions about the enforceability of the contract 
creates a potential shadow looming large over the foundation of consumer 
confidence in life insurance generally. Rather than impinging on the 
insured’s property interest in a life insurance policy by introducing 
uncertainty into the insurable interest requirement, the tangle of socially 
undesirable activities inherent in most STOLI transactions must be 
unwound and individually scrutinized. Violations of the insurable interest 
requirement are an essential element of STOLI, but other elements of the 
transaction are equally offensive. For instance, if the insurer does adequate 
due diligence, asking questions sufficient to ferret out offending policies, 
parties conspiring to purchase a policy as part of a STOLI scheme must, by 
necessity, make misrepresentations on the policy application. These 
misrepresentations are ripe for STOLI enforcement, as they often void the 
contract and also may violate criminal law.   Focusing solely on revising 
the insurable interest doctrine is too narrow an approach to deal with 
modern problems like STOLI. Wholesale revision of the insurable interest 
doctrine is unnecessary, when other less drastic tools for combating STOLI 
and other undesirable practices are available. 
Viewed in its historical context, the insurable interest requirement 
emerges as a relevant, powerful tool to combat unsavory life-insurance 
practices. The continuing relevance of the insurable interest doctrine, and 
the importance of policing misrepresentations on life insurance policies, 
will be explored as follows: Section II maps the development of the 
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insurable interest doctrine, placing it, and the contemporary discussion 
surrounding it, into historical context. Section III examines the effect that 
lack of an insurable interest has on the validity of policy, drawing out one 
of the disincentives the doctrine presents to STOLI participants. Further 
exploring the bar the insurable interest requirement presents to those who 
would purchase a life insurance policy for an improper purpose, section IV 
probes the allocation of the economic and legal burdens of the insurable 
interest requirement between parties to the insurance contract. Section V 
examines the history of life insurance as personal property, encouraging 
circumspect deliberation for those who would restrict the transferability of 
life insurance contracts. Concluding the examination of the transferability 
of life insurance contracts, Section VI surveys the history of the secondary 
market for life insurance. Section VII moves the discussion to recent cases 
illustrating the modern problems taxing the flexibility of the insurable 
interest doctrine. In addition to enunciating the courts’ use of the insurable 
interest requirement, that section also draws out the second facet of the 
courts’ analysis of STOLI, the misrepresentations necessarily made on 
most applications for STOLI policies. Finally, section VIII discusses NAIC 
and NCOIL and their affect on the insurable interest requirement. 
 
II. HISTORY OF THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT 
 
A.  DEFINITION OF THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT FOR 
LIFE INSURANCE 
 
In general, anyone purchasing a life insurance policy must have an 
insurable interest in the life of the insured. The definition of “insurable 
interest” has changed very little from its inception in English life insurance 
law in 17746 to its present manifestation in US statutory and case law.7  
                                                                                                                          
6 See LIFE ASSURANCE ACT, 1774, 14 GEO. 3, c. 48, §§ 1-3 (Eng.). The Act, 
which is still in force, provides as follows: 
 
1. From and after the passing of this Act no insurance shall 
be made by any person or persons, bodies politick or corporate, 
on the life or lives of any person, or persons, or on any other 
event or events whatsoever, wherein the person or persons for 
whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy or policies 
shall be made, shall have no interest, or by way of gaming or 
wagering; and every assurance made contrary to the true intent 
and meaning hereof shall be null and void to all intents and 
purposes whatsoever. 
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In most versions of the insurable interest requirement, a person has 
an insurable interest in the life of an individual based on either (1) “love 
and affection” or (2) a substantial economic interest in the continued life of 
that individual.8  Additionally, an insured generally has an unlimited 
insurable interest in his or her life.9 
                                                                                                                          
2. And it shall not be lawful to make any policy or policies 
on the life or lives of any person or persons, or other event or 
events, without inserting in such policy or policies the person or 
persons name or names interested therein, or for whose use, 
benefit, or on whose account such policy is so made or 
underwrote. 
3. And in all cases where the insured hath interest in such 
life or lives, event or events, no greater sum shall be recovered or 
received from the insurer or insurers than the amount of value of 
the interest of the insured in such life or lives, or other event or 
events.  
7 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104(c)(1)-(2) (2010)(defining 
“insurable interest” as “a substantial interest engendered by love and affection… or 
a lawful and substantial economic interest in having the life, health or bodily safety 
of the individual insured continue, as distinguished from an interest which would 
arise only by, or would be enhanced in value by, the death, disablement or injury 
of the individual insured).”) with Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881) 
(stating that an insurable interest arises “from the relations of the party obtaining 
the insurance, either as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of 
blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or 
benefit from the continuance of his life.”). 
8 See, e.g.., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104(c) (20092010); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 26.1-29-09.1 (2010); ALA. CODE 1975 § 27-14-3(a) (SUPP. I 2009); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(a) (SUPP. I 2009); CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(a) (2005); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103 (c)(1) (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251(3) 
(20091972); But see Halford v. Kymer, 10 B. & C. 724 (1830) (holding that a 
father does not have an insurable interest in the life of his son because, under the 
Life Assurance Act of 1774, a pecuniary interest is essential to find an insurable 
interest.) contra Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 6 Gray 396 (Mass. 1856) 
(stating that, under Massachusetts law, a father has an insurable interest in the life 
of his son); seeSee also Barnes v. London, Edinburgh & Glasgow L. Ins. Co., 1 
Q.B. 864 (1892).); Erskine Hazard Dickson, Insurable Interest in Life, III, 44 AM. 
L. REG. 161 (1896). 
9 See, e.g.., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3(b) (SUPP. I 2009); CAL. INS. CODE § 
10110.1(b);) (2005); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 4 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 
1925); Davis v. Gulf States Ins. Co., 151 So. 167, 168 (Miss. 1933); Hill v. United 
Life Ins. Ass'n, 25 A. 771 (Pa. 1893); Gray v. Nash, 259 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App. 
2008);).  
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The “love and affection” brand of insurable interest is typically 
manifest as a close familial relationship.10 An economic interest in the 
continued life of the insured often exists as a creditor-debtor relationship11, 
but has also been found to exit between partners in a company with respect 
to its employees.12  
The relationships encapsulated by both the “love and affection” 
and “economic interest” types of insurable interest are viewed as giving a 
policy-owner an interest in the insured’s life that exceeds the pecuniary 
benefit the beneficiary will reap from the policy on the insured’s death.13  
Though the foregoing definition of “insurable interest” has 
remained relatively static since its inception, its effectiveness in the face of 
modern variations on life insurance is still the subject of substantial 
disagreement.14 Of particular importance to understanding its application to 
novel, contemporary life insurance arrangements are the policy 
considerations motivating the insurable interest requirement. 
 
B.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS MOTIVATING THE INSURABLE 
INTEREST REQUIREMENT 
 
The insurable interest requirement is motivated by two primary 
policy considerations: (1) the immorality inherent in gambling on the life of 
another human being and (2) the moral hazard created when a beneficiary 
                                                                                                                          
10 See, e.g.., CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(a) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-
103(c)(1)(A);) (2004). 
11 See, e.g., Crotty v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Maine, 144 U.S. 621 (1892); 
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U.S. 498 (1883); Warnock v. Davis, 
104 U.S. at 775. 
12 See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 108 U.S. at 505-06; Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 901 A.2d 106 (Del. 2006); Prime Mortg. USA, 
Inc. v. Nichols, 885 N.E.2d 628, 669-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a 
statute giving an employer an insurable interest in its employees applies whether 
the employer provides the policy to the employee or purchases a policy on its 
employee’s life.).). 
13 See, e.g., Waldman v. Maini, 195 P.3d 850 (Nev. 2008).  
14 Compare Loshin, supra note 1 (arguing  that elimination of the insurable 
interest requirement will free economic forces to police the insurance industry and 
the secondary markets and protect against the abuses the insurable interest 
requirement is intended to assuage) with BOLTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1 
(analyzing the traditional insurable interested requirement as applied to the modern 
phenomenon of stranger-originated life insurance). 
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has a motivation to bring about the death of an insured to accelerate a 
policy’s payout. 15 
Gambling on lives was a relatively common practice in 18th century 
England, where the institution resembled modern day sports betting. While 
this wagering sometimes took place in social settings, the preferred method 
for wagering was the purchase of life insurance contracts, most often on the 
lives of public figures. The value of these speculative contracts floated 
depending on factors affecting the perceived life expectancy of an insured, 
like the turning of tide in war and the progress of capital trials. Though 
public condemnation of the practice in England lagged far behind the rest 
of Europe, by the late-18th century, public sentiment had turned. Gambling 
on lives came to be viewed as blunting human empathy and encouraging 
acts by beneficiaries that would hasten collection of a policy’s death 
benefit.16 
A notorious example often cited as illustrating the moral hazard 
inherent in a life insurance policy issued to one without an insurable 
interest in the insured’s life17 is the case of Thomas Griffiths Wainewright  
(1774-1847).18 Wainewright was an author and dandy with extravagant 
tastes that led him to commit increasingly risky and horrific crimes to 
satisfy his appetites and the debts they accumulated. When forgery and the 
acceleration of an inheritance by his uncle’s suspicious death were 
insufficient to sustain Wainewright’s lavish lifestyle, he turned to life 
insurance as an “investment.” Wainwright insured the life of his sister-in-
law, though he did not have an insurable interest in her life, and soon 
increased the coverage on her life six-fold. She died of poisoning shortly 
thereafter. Wainewright never successfully collected the life insurance 
proceeds, and he as he spent the remainder of his years in jail on a charge 
of forgery.19 Though not as romanticized as the Wainewright case, another 
often cited example of moral hazard is the Weldon case, where a woman 
                                                                                                                          
15 See Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911); Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. at 
778-79; Trinity College v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 18 S.E. 175 (N.C. 1893); Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U.S. 561 (1876); Connecticut MutualMut. Life Insurance 
CompanyIns. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. France, 
94 U.S. 561 (1876); William Reynolds Vance, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF LIFE 
INSURANCE 125-26 (1904); Robert W. Buechner, Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: 
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 19 OHIO PROB. L.J. 7 (2008). 
16GEOFFREY WILSON CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE 
INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, 1695-1775 49-60 (1999). 
17 See, e.g., Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 154-155.  
18 Wainewright wrote under the pseudonym Janus Weathercock. 
19 ALEXANDER COLIN CAMPBELL, INSURANCE AND CRIME 223-38 (1902). 
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purchased a life insurance policy on the life of her two-and-one-half-year-
old niece and then poisoned the child in an effort to accelerate payment of 
the policy’s death benefit.20 
It is worthwhile to note that in both the Wainewright and Weldon 
cases, at the time each crime occurred, both jurisdictions had an insurable 
interest requirement that voided the policies.21 While these example are 
proof that in at least some cases the insurable interest requirement is 
insufficient to eliminate the motivation of an individual with a criminal 
disposition to use life insurance as part of a nefarious scheme, the 
requirement is likely to have at least some deterrent effect by exponentially 
increasing the difficulty of securing a death benefit payout in the absence 
of an insurable interest.22  
 
C.  SNAPSHOT OR CONTINUUM 
 
1. In general 
 
Generally, an insurable interest is required only at the time a life 
insurance policy is issued, unless the policy specifies otherwise.23 This 
stands in contrast to most other types of insurance polices, which require 
beneficial owners of a policy to have an insurable interest in the subject 
matter of the policy both when the policy is issued and when the policy 
pays on a loss.24 
                                                                                                                          
20 Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon, 100 So.2d 696 (Ala. 
1957).); See also MutualMut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886) 
(considering whether the assignee of a life insurance policy is permitted to recover 
the policy’s death benefit. Unsurprisingly, the Court decided against the 
murderer.)..); Ben Kingree & Louise Tanner, Life Insurance as Motive for Murder, 
29 TORT & INS. L.J. 761 (1994). 
21 See LIFE ASSURANCE ACT, 1774, 14 Geo., 3, c. 48 (Eng.); Liberty 
NationalNatt’l Life InsuranceIns. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So.2d 696at 704; Campbell, 
supra note 19, at 225;.  
22 See Kingree & Tanner, supra note 20, at 772. 
23 See, e.g.., MO. REV. STAT. § 5862; Connecticut MutualMut. Life Insurance 
CompanyIns. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 461 (1876); MutualWellhouse v. 
United Paper Co., 29 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1929); Mut. Life InsuranceIns. Co. v. 
Allen, 138 Mass. 24 (1884); Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N.Y. 593 (1881); Bowers v. 
Missouri Mut. Ass'n, 62 S.W.2d 1058 (Mo.,1933);); First-Columbus Nat. Bank v. 
D. S. Pate Lumber Co., 141 So. 767 (Miss. 1932); Appeal of Corson, 6 A. 213 (Pa. 
1886).Hilliard v. Jacobs, 874 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Rawls v. 
American Life Ins. Co., 36 Barb. 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862); 
24 See generally 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 322 (20092010). 
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From the advent of the insurable interest requirement, most 
jurisdictions have followed the modern rule, only requiring an insurable 
interest in the insured’s life at the time the policy is issued and not at any 
time thereafter.25 For example, when a life insurance policy purchased on a 
spouse’s life during marriage names the other spouse as a beneficiary, in 
most jurisdictions, divorce will not terminate an ex-spouse’s right to collect 
policy proceeds even though the ex-spouse’s insurable interest likely died 
with the divorce.26 
 
2. Application of the Insurable Interest Requirement  to 
Policy Assignments 
 
While the insurable interest requirement has generally only applied 
at a policy’s issuance, courts have struggled with the issue of whether an 
insurable interest is also required of an assignee on assignment of the 
policy. While the present rule permitting assignment to a person without an 
insurable interest is fairly uniform across jurisdictions, prior to the 20th 
century, there was a split of authority. In some jurisdictions, an assignment 
of a life insurance policy to a person without an insurable interest in the 
insured’s life was void as a matter of law.27 In other jurisdictions, such an 
assignment was permissible, though not so to the extent it violated the 
prohibition on wager policies.28 
Courts requiring an assignee to have an insurable interest in the life 
of the insured typically reasoned that the public policy rationale for 
                                                                                                                          
25 See, e.g., Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 158 N.Y. at 30 (1899); Appeal of 
Corson, 6 A. at 213. 
26 Connecticut MutualMut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 457; Land v. West Coast 
Life Ins. Co, 270 P.2d 154, 156 (Or. 1954); Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill. App. 278 
(1907). 
27 See, e.g.., Warnock v. Davis, 104 USU.S. 775, 781 (1881); Stevens v. 
Warren, 101 Mass. 564 (1869); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116,  121 
(1872) (refusing to permit assignment of a policy to one without an insurable 
interest on the grounds that “[a]ll the objections that exist against the issuing of a 
policy to one upon the life of another in whose life the former has no insurable 
interest, seem to us to exist against his holding such policy by mere purchase and 
assignment from another. In either case, the holder of such policy is interested in 
the death, rather than the life, of the party assured.)..”). 
28 See e.g. Steinback v. Diepenbrock,28 See, e.g., Midland Nat’l Bank of 
Minneapolis v. Dakota Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 346 (1928); Grigsby, 222 U.S. 149 
(1911); Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886);. Aetna Life Ins Co 
v. France, 94 U.S. 561, 563-64 (1876); Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 52 N.E. at 662.   
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requiring an insurable interest at a policy’s inception apply equally on 
assignment of the policy. They reasoned that the assignee gambles that the 
insured will die sooner rather than later, thus benefitting from the insured’s 
early passing. They also viewed the assignee as motivated to hasten the 
insured’s death to the same extent as a person without an insurable interest 
who purchases a policy on the insured’s life from an insurance company.29  
In jurisdictions requiring assignees to have an insurable interest in 
the insured’s life, an assignee who purchased a policy from the insured was 
treated as the insured’s creditor to the extent of amounts expended by the 
assignee. The assignee was only permitted to recover an amount of the 
death benefit equal to the sum of consideration paid for the assignment and 
any premiums and fees paid by the assignee.30 
By the early 20th century, a majority of jurisdictions generally 
upheld assignment of a life insurance policy to an assignee without 
insurable interest in the insured’s life.31 However, some assignments are 
still impermissible. 
 
3. Prohibited Assignments 
 
Schemes designed to circumvent the insurable interest requirement 
by effectuating an initial purchase of a life insurance policy by a person 
with an insurable interest in the insured’s life and subsequently transferring 
the policy to a party without an insurable interest are not a new 
phenomenon.32 In the late 19th century, jurisdictions requiring an insurable 
interest only at a policy’s inception were aware that permitting assignment 
of life insurance policies made circumventing the insurable interest 
requirement possible but believed that other policy considerations 
outweighed the danger of permitting free-assignment (see infra section 
V).33  
                                                                                                                          
29 Id. 
30 See, e.g., Culver v. Guyer, 29 So. 779 (Ala. 1901); Missouri Valley Life Ins. 
Co. v. Sturgis, 18 Kan. 93 (1877);). 
31 Steinback, 52 N.E. at 663 (considering whether assignment of a policy to an 
assignee without an insurable interest in the insured’s life was permissible, and 
concluding that: “The result of our further examination persuades us that what has 
been understood to be the rule in this state is not only in line with the authorities in 
most jurisdictions upon that subject, but is sound as a matter of public policy.”) 
(emphasis added). 
32 Warnock, 104 US 775 (1881). 
33 Steinback, 158 N. Y. 24 at 31. 
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Even where an insurable interest appears to have existed at a 
policy’s issuance, courts often dig deeper to determine whether the party 
with an insurable interest in the insured’s life purchased the policy with the 
intent to circumvent the prohibition on wager policies.34 The intent of the 
parties to a transaction involving the purchase and assignment of a policy 
controls treatment of the transactions. Regardless of the form of the 
transaction, if the intent of the parties is to effectuate a wager policy, courts 
ignored the intermediate step of the insured purchasing the policy and read 
the transaction as a direct purchase of the policy by the assignee. If the 
assignee did not have an insurable interest in the insured’s life, the policy 
was void for lack of an insurable interest.35 
The modern approach to assignments developed through two U.S. 
Supreme Court cases, Warnock and Grigsby.  
 
4. Warnock 
 
Warnock was an early U.S. Supreme Court case holding that the 
assignment of a life insurance policy to someone without an insurable 
interest was impermissible. In Warnock, the insured purchased a life 
insurance policy and assigned the policy to investors who would pay all 
premiums on the policy, retaining nine-tenths of the policy’s death benefit 
and remitting the remaining ten-percent to the insured’s family.36 
The Supreme Court held that an assignment of a policy to a person 
without an insurable interest in the insured’s life was impermissible 
because it was just as objectionable as purchase of the policy outright by 
that same party. The assignee has, after all, a pecuniary interest in the 
insured’s death.37  
Rather than void the assignment, the Court permitted the assignee 
to recover an amount equal to the assignee’s outlay in the transaction. The 
assignment, and the subsequent payout of the death benefit, was partitioned 
into two components. The first part was an amount equal to sums actually 
advanced by the assignee, with interest.38 This amount was essentially 
                                                                                                                          
34 Conn. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460-63 (1876); Loomis 
v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 6 Gray 396, 398-99 (Mass. 1856). Steinback, 158 
N. Y. at 31; See generally Application of the insurable interest requirement to 
assignments is discussed infra. 
35 Steinback, 158 N. Y. 31-32. 
36 Warnock, 104 U.S. at 775-76; See also Franklin Life Insurance Company v. 
Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116, 117-18 (1872). 
37 See Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779-80. 
38 Id. at 781. 
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deemed to be a loan from the assignee to the insured. As such, the assignee 
has an insurable interest in the insured’s life to the extent of this amount, 
and the assignment is valid to that extent. The second part of the 
assignment, which includes any amount of the payout in addition to the 
first amount, was a payout on an illegal wager policy.39  
Cases decided subsequent to Warnock often focused on the fact 
that the policy at issue in Warnock was taken out under an agreement to 
immediately assign the policy; the policy was purchased to benefit parties 
without an insurable interest in the insured’s life and was clearly a wager 
policy.40  
 
5. Grigsby 
 
The second case, Grigsby, took a more nuanced approach than 
Warnock, holding that assignments factually akin to those in Warnock were 
invalid, but that a blanket prohibition on assignment to a person without an 
insurable interest was too restrictive. While cases decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court prior to Warnock had hinted at the free assignability of life 
insurance policies without an insurable interest requirement,41 it was not 
until the Court’s decision in Grigbsy that the doctrine took its final, modern 
form.42 
In Grigsby, the insured assigned a policy to someone without an 
insurable interest after the policy was purchased and after the insured made 
two premium payments. When the insured was unable to make the third 
                                                                                                                          
39 See id. at 782-83; Cammack, 82 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1872); See also 
Steinback, 158 N.Y. at 32-33. 
40 See Steinback. 158 N. Y. at 32. Without addressing Warnock’s arguments 
against assignability, the court in Steinback v. Diepenbrock (1899) held that 
assignment of a validly issued life insurance policy to a person without an 
insurable interest in the insured’s life is permissible. In discussing Warnock, the 
court emphasized that the transaction at issue in Warnock would be illegal because 
it involved the purchase of a policy with the intent to sell it. They believed it unfair 
to restrict policy holders from selling their policies to attend to their financial 
needs, especially when the insured suffers from an illness that has dramatically 
reduced his or her lifespan. 
41 See e.g. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Fr., 94 U.S. 561, 563-64 (1876) (holding that 
an assignment by the insured to a family member is presumed not to be made as 
“cover for a wager policy,” regardless of the arrangement between the parties for 
payment of premiums.); See also N. Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 
591, 597 (1886) (holding that a validly issued policy is freely assignable.). 
42 Grigsby v Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911). 
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payment, he sold the policy to a Dr. Grigsby to pay for needed surgery. 
There was no allegation that the insured purchased the policy with the 
intent to assign it to a third party.  
Agreeing with Warnock, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that 
Grigsby was only permitted to take the policy’s death benefit to the extent 
of his advances, including the amount he paid for the policy and premium 
payments he made prior to the insured’s death.43 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, overruled the appellate court 
and extended the permissibility of assignments of life insurance policies to 
assignees without an insurable interest in the insured’s life, “where an 
honest contract is sold in good faith.”44 
The Court recognized that in early English cases, the primary 
purpose of the insurable interest requirement was to prohibit wager 
policies. Citing the permissibility of remainders after life estates, the Court 
made the case that the law does not inherently disfavor “pecuniary benefit 
accruing upon a death.”45 The Court recognized that after a policy is validly 
issued, the insured will have the best frame of reference for deciding 
whether to trust a potential assignee.46  
 
III. IMPACT OF THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT 
ON A POLICY’S ENFORCEABILITY 
 
The insurable interest requirement is fundamental to the existence 
of a life insurance contract. Because of the important public policy 
considerations motivating the requirement, an insurance contract issued 
without an insurable interest is in most cases void and cannot be 
resurrected by agreement of the parties or because the of inaction on the 
part of the insurer.47 The taint infecting a policy issued without an insurable 
interest thus follows a policy from its issuance to the insured’s death. 
 
                                                                                                                          
43 Russell v. Grigsby, 168 F. 577 (6th Cir. 1909). 
44 Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. at 156. 
45 Id. at 155-56. 
46 Id. at 155. 
47 See Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 677, 686-88 (Md. 1988); 
Woods v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 113 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938). 
But see Van Zandt v. Morris, 17 So. 2d 435, 436 (Miss. 1944); Rogers v. Atlantic 
Life Ins. Co., 135 S.C. 89 133 S.E. 215, 218 (S.C. 1926). See generally 44 C.J.S. 
Ins. § 378 (2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7, cmt. a (2009) 
(stating that a “’void contract’ is not a contract at all; it is the ‘promise’ or 
‘agreement’ that is void of legal effect”). 
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A.  VOID AND VOIDABLE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
 
A life insurance policy purchased by a person without an insurable 
interest in insured’s life is void ab initio.48 An agreement that is void ab 
initio is unenforceable by either party to the agreement, because either the 
law does not provide a remedy for breach of the agreement or does not 
“recognize a duty of performance.”49 Generally, contracts that are void ab 
initio are missing an element essential for contract formation or are so 
violative of the law or public policy that it would be improper to enforce 
them in the courts.50  
Though often referred to as a “void contract,” an agreement that is 
void ab initio is not a contract and is unenforceable from its inception.51 As 
a result, in most jurisdictions an insurer cannot be required to pay the death 
benefit on a life insurance policy that is void ab initio.52 
In contrast to a void contract, a voidable contract is enforceable, 
but the legal obligations created by the contract may be rescinded at the 
option of one (or, alternatively, all) of the parties to the contract.53 For 
instance, a life insurance contract is voidable by the company who issued 
the policy based on material misrepresentations made by the applicant that 
the insurer relied on when issuing the policy; for instance, when the insured 
fails to disclose serious health problems material to the company’s decision 
whether to issue the policy.54 
 
                                                                                                                          
48 See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104 (2002); CAL INS. CODE § 
10110(e) (1997); Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881); Conn. Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460, 24 L.Ed. 251 (1876); First Penn-Pacific 
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 313 Fed.Appx. 633, 636 (4th Cir. 2009); Wuliger v. Mfrs. 
Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d 787, 796-97 (6th Cir. 2009); Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. 
Fima, 105 F.3d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1997); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity 
Financial Group, LLC, 608 F.Supp.2d 1349 (S.D.Fla. 2009); Ky. Cen. Life Ins. 
Co. v. McNabb, 825 F.Supp. 269, 272 (D. Kan. 1993); Gristy v. Hudgens, 203 P. 
569, 572 (Ariz. 1922); Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 677, 688 
(Md. 1988). 
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7, cmt. a. 
50 See e.g., Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7, cmt a. 
52 See generally 44 C.J.S. Ins. § 352 (2009). 
53 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY void contract (8th Ed. 2004). 
54 3 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 367. See e.g. Gay v. United Benefit Life Ins. 
Co., 96 So.2d 497, 489-99 (La. 1957). 
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B.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE NONENFORCEABILITY OF A POLICY 
ISSUED WITHOUT AN INSURABLE INTEREST 
 
In a small minority of jurisdictions, including Texas, an insurer 
who issues a policy to a party without an insurable interest in the insured’s 
life may nevertheless be required by the court to pay out policy proceeds. 
In such a case, the policy may be void or voidable with respect to the party 
purchasing the policy but can still be given effect by the court. When 
required to pay out on such a policy, the proceeds will generally be 
distributed under equitable principles. In most cases, this rule results in 
payment of policy proceeds to the decedent insured’s estate.55  
The justification for requiring a company to pay on an otherwise 
illegal policy is that the insurer should not be permitted to take shelter in 
failure of the insurable interest requirement when the insurer was in the 
best position to determine whether the requirement was satisfied. The 
insurer is not harmed by being required to pay the set amount it contracted 
to pay under the policy, even though the estate was not a named 
beneficiary. 56 
 
C.  THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT AND CONTESTABILITY 
PERIOD 
 
In a small minority of jurisdictions there are limited circumstances 
under which an insurance company will not be permitted to rescind a 
policy issued without an insurable interest. Most jurisdictions provide for a 
contestability period, after which a life insurance company is not permitted 
to challenge the policy’s enforceability based on the applicant’s fraud or 
misrepresentation. Most states have a two-year contestability period.57  
Generally, an incontestability clause is based on the presumption 
that a valid contract exists. In the case of voidable contracts—such as those 
entered into based on misrepresentations by the applicant—a valid contract 
exists, and the contestability period applies to permit the insurance 
company to challenge payout on the policy.58  
                                                                                                                          
55 See e.g., Steinback v. Diepenbroc, 52 N.E. 662 (N.Y. 1899). 
56 Tamez v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Int’l Accident Facilities 
Inc.,  999 S.W.2d 12, 14-16 (Tex.Ct. App. 1998). 
57 See e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.5(a) (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-7-
102(b) (2010); D.C. CODE § 31-4703 (3)(A)(i) (2005); FLA. STAT. § 627.455 
(2005).  
58 Bryan D. Bolton & Michael P. Cunningham, An Ancient Doctrine Confronts 
Modern Problems, FOR THE DEFENSE 57, 61 (Sept. 2008). 
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Because a contract purchased by a party without an insurable 
interest in the insured’s life is void, and not simply voidable, most states 
permit a life insurance company to challenge the enforceability of a life 
insurance contract on insurable interest grounds even after the close of the 
contestability period,59 on the basis that to disallow a challenge to the 
legality of a contract purchased without an insurable interest would allow 
private parties to subvert public policy by agreement.60  
Only two jurisdictions—Michigan and New York—have barred an 
insurance company from rescinding a policy issued without an insurable 
interest after the contestability period has passed.61  
 
IV. BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING INSURABLE INTEREST 
 
Though the duty to determine whether an insurable interest exists 
when a policy is issued rests at least nominally on the insurer’s shoulders,62 
                                                                                                                          
59 See, e.g., Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Fima, 105 F.3d 490 (9th. Cir. 1997); 
Carter v. Cont'l Life Ins. Co., 115 F. 2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. Hooker, 62 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1933) First Penn Pacific Life Ins. Co. v. Evans,No. 
05-444, 2007 WL 1810707 (D.Md. 2007); Ky. Cent. v. McNabb, 825 F. Supp. 269 
(D.C. Kan. 1969); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 28 So.2d 910 (Ala. 
1947); Home Life v. Masterson, 21 S.W.2d 414 (Ark. 1929);  Foreman v. Great 
United Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 23 N.E. 2d 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1939); Bromley's Adm'r 
v. Wash. Life Ins. Co, 92 S.W. 17 (Ky. 1906); Stevens v. Woodmen of the World, 
71 P.2d 898 (Mont. 1937); Wharton v. Home Sec. Life Ins. Co, 173 S.E. 338 (N.C. 
1934); Brady v Prudential Life Ins. Co, 5 Kulp 505 (1890); Henderson v. Life Ins. 
Co. of Va., 179 S.E. 680 (S.C. 1935). See generally Franklin L. Best Jr., 
Securitization of Life Insurance Policies, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 911 
(2009). 
60 Additionally, most jurisdictions will not allow the use of waiver and 
estoppel to force a life insurance company to pay out on a policy issued without an 
insurable interest or bar an insurer from raising lack of an insurable interest as a 
defense to payment of policy proceeds. See Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. 
McNabb, 825 F.Supp. 269 (D.Kan. 1993); Beard v. American Agency Life Ins. 
Co., 550 A.2d 677 (Md. 1988); Woods v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 113 
S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938). See generally C.J.S. Ins. § 378 (2007). 
61 See e.g. Bogacki v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 253 Mich. 253 (Mi. 1931); 
New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 523 N.Y.S.2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1988), order aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 74 (1989). Note that in Michigan, the decision to bar 
rescission of a contract issued without an insurable interest was based on the fact 
that the state did not have an insurable interest statute. The public policy 
considerations driving the contestability statute were held to prevail over the 
common law insurable interest requirement. Bogacki, 234 N.W. at 866. 
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in effect, the financial burden resulting from failure of the insurable interest 
requirement falls decisively on the policy’s owner and beneficiaries.63 As 
established above, a policy issued in violation of the insurable interest 
requirement is generally void and unenforceable and, regardless of any 
inequity, the insurer will not be required to pay out on the policy to the 
policy’s beneficiaries, the decedent’s family members, or any other party.64 
The purchaser of the policy issued without an insurable interest will, in 
most cases, hold a valueless policy, and beneficiaries will not receive the 
policy’s death benefit if the policy is found to have been issued without an 
insurable interest. Thus, for practical purposes, it is a policy’s owner and 
beneficiaries who bear the economic burden of the insurable interest 
requirement. 
In addition to bearing the financial burden associated with a failure 
of the insurable interest requirement, beneficiaries also have the burden of 
proving the existence of an insurable interest in a lawsuit on a life 
insurance policy.65 The burden is the beneficiary’s regardless of whether 
the beneficiary brings suit to compel the insurance company to pay the 
death benefit to the beneficiary, or if the insurer seeks a declaratory 
judgment stating that the beneficiary has no right to the policy proceeds.66 
                                                                                                                          
62 An insurer who does not conduct due diligence when issuing or paying out 
on a policy may inadvertently pay on a void policy or face the expense of 
challenging a beneficiary’s right to a policy payout. In general, only the insurer has 
the power to raise lack of an insurable interest as a defense to payment on a policy. 
See e.g., National Life Ins. Co. v. Tower, 251 F.Supp. 215 (D. Md. 1966); In re 
Marriage of Day, 74 P.3d 46 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003); Ryan v. Tickle, 316 N.W.2d 
580 (Neb.1982); Moran v. Moran, 346 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).  
63 Beneficiaries have the burden of proving the existence of an insurable 
interest. See Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. McNabb, 825 F.Supp. 269 (D. Kan. 
1993); Rubenstein v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 584 F.Supp. 272 (D.C. 
La. 1984); American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 70 So. 190 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915; 
Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Houseworth, 25 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943).  The 
burden is the beneficiary’s regardless of whether the beneficiary brings suit to 
compel the insurance company to pay the death benefit to the beneficiary, or if the 
insurer seeks a declaratory judgment stating that the beneficiary has no right to the 
policy proceeds. See e.g., Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. 825 F.Supp. at 273. 
64 See supra Part III. 
65  Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. 825 F.Supp. at 269; Rubenstein v. Mutual Life 
Ins. Co. of New York, 584 F.Supp. 272 (D. La.,1984); American Nat. Ins. Co. v. 
Moore, 70 So. 190 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915); Interstate Life & Acc. Co., 25 S.E.2d at 
233. 
66 See e.g. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. McNabb, 825 F.Supp. at 269.  
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Up to this point, the discussion has been limited to claims sounding 
in contract. Though an insurer who carelessly or even intentionally issues a 
policy to a party without an insurable interest in the insured’s life cannot 
usually be compelled to pay the policy’s death benefit, an insurer may be 
held liable in tort for the failure. Insurers have a duty to use reasonable care 
in determining whether the purchaser of a policy has an insurable interest 
in the insured’s life, and can be held liable in a wrongful death suit for 
failing to investigate whether the party purchasing the policy has an 
insurable interest, where the insured is murdered so the policy owner can 
collect on the policy.67  
Regardless of who bears the burden—financial or otherwise—of 
determining whether an insurable interest exists at policy issuance 
ultimately falls upon, in practice, such determination is best made at policy 
issuance based on responses to the policy application. The questions and 
representations requested within a policy application are not static, and the 
insurance carrier has wide latitude to alter these questions to ascertain 
issues pertaining to the existence of a valid insurable interest.  As a result, 
the carrier’s application can serve as a first line of defense against 
undesirable life insurance practices like STOLI. The insurance carriers bear 
some portion of the burden to fortify their policy applications to discover 
whether an insurable interest exists, and ferret out potential abuses, prior to 
policy issuance. The applicant’s contemporaneous burden to be truthful, 
and not make material misrepresentations on an well crafted insurance 
application will serve to ensure the presence of a bona fide insurable 
interest as a life insurance policy is issued.    
 
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE AS PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Life insurance contracts developed from a simple, nontransferable 
contract providing security for the insured’s family into its modern form, 
                                                                                                                          
has been taken out on his life. Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co., 135 S.E.2d 362 
(S.C. 1964). 
67 Overstreet v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1991); Liberty 
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So.2d 696 (Ala. 1958); Life Ins. Co. of Georgia 
v. Lopez, 443 So.2d 947 (Fla. 1983); Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 804 
N.E.2d 519, 533-35 (Ill., 2004). 
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which includes an investment or savings component.68 Life insurance 
contracts are a type of personal property called a “chose in action.”69 A 
chose in action gives the person holding the chose “the liberty of 
proceeding in the courts of law.”  The holder has a right to pursue an action 
in damages or to compel the payment of money due. 
Historically, English law did not recognize the existence of 
intangible personal property. As such, the chose n action was a 
nontransferable right that could be exercised only by its original holder.70 
An attempted assignment of a chose in action gave no rights to the 
assignor.71 But the commercial desirability of permitting the assignability 
of contract rights and the right to sue on those rights eventually prompted 
innovation allowing transferability of the chose in action.  
Initially, an assignment could only be made indirectly, with the 
assignee pursuing a cause of action in the assignor’s name.72 Modern law 
dispenses with this requirement, allowing the assignor to bring suit in his 
own name.73 
 
B.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
AS TRANSFERABLE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
 
Life insurance is a particular form of property subject to a set of 
rules crafted in response to its unique nature. Until the early 1900s, these 
                                                                                                                          
68 See Comment, The Assignment of Life Insurance as Collateral Security for 
Bank Loans, 58 YALE L.J. 743, 743-44 (1949).  
69 See Central Nat. Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195, 207-208 (1888); Warnock v. 
Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 781-82 (1881); Russell v. Grigsby, 168 F. 577 (6th Cir. 
1909). The phrase “chose in action” is a Norman French meaning, essentially, 
“right in action.” The chose in action stands in contrast to the “chose in 
possession,” which refers to a right of possession in movable personal property. 
Joseph James Darlington & Joshua Williams, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 6-11 (T. J.W. Johnson 1891). 
70 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 405 (Baker, Voorhis & 
Co. 1924). The advent of the transferability of the chose in action was stalled by 
the fear that transferability would encourage the offense of maintenance, the 
encouragement of a lawsuit by an uninterested party, here the transferee. See 
Darlington, supra note 69 at 7-9.  
71 See Darlington & Williams, supra note 69 at 6-7. 
72 Id. at 8-10. 
73 Id. at 10-11. 
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peculiarities stalled the development of life insurance as an investment and 
savings vehicle.74 
One of the primary factors that limited or eliminated the 
investment value of pre-20th century life insurance contracts was their 
limited transferability. Although technically transferrable or assignable as 
security for a debt, under American law it was the beneficiary and not the 
insured or purchaser of the policy who had the power to assign the policy.75  
Generally, 19th century life insurance policies were strictly a 
contract providing for a payout to beneficiaries on insured’s death. Life 
insurance afforded protection to the insured’s family should he meet an 
untimely end.76 These policies did not generally allow the insured to 
change the policy’s beneficiary.77  
Policy beneficiaries were deemed to have an irrevocable vested 
interest in the policy, which protected the beneficiary’s interest in the 
policy from the insured’s creditors.78 While the insured was under no 
obligation to continue making premium payment, the beneficiary was 
permitted to keep his or her vested interest in policy proceeds alive by 
making the premium payments.79 
Nineteenth-century insurance contracts, as indicated, did not 
usually provide the insured with an option to change policy beneficiaries;80 
this was true even where the insured kept the policy in his physical 
possession and paid all premiums on the policy.81 And because policies did 
not typically provide for any payout other than a death benefit, an insured 
did not have any power over the policy.82 The insured’s only role was to 
purchase the policy and pay the premiums. After the policy was issued, the 
                                                                                                                          
74 See generally Comment, supra note 68 at 743-44. 
75 See id. at 746. 
76 Charles Kelley Knight, HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
TO 1870, 132-160 (1920) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of 
Pennsylvania) available at http://books.google.com (describing the development of 
life insurance from 1861-1870, a time of innovation that would permanently alter 
the purpose of life insurance). 
77 See Comment, supra note 68, at 746; Douglass v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Soc., 90 So. 834, 835-36 (1922).  See also Vance, supra note 15, at 407. 
78 Yore v. Booth, 42 P. 808, 808 (Cal. 1895). 
79 See Vance, supra note 15 at 201 (noting that payment of premiums by one 
who does not have an interest in the life insurance policy does not confer an 
ownership interest in payor.) 
80 See Comment, supra note 68, at 46-48. 
81 See Yore, 42 P. at 808. See generally Comment, supra note 68, 743-44, n.9.  
82 See Comment, supra note 68, at 745. 
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insured had no further say in the disposition of the policy, other than to cut 
off premium payments. As a result, an assignment of the policy was only 
valid if the beneficiary was a party to the assignment.83 Because the insured 
had no control over a policy once it was issued, the insured did not have an 
interest in the policy that was capable of assignment. Beneficiaries, on the 
other hand, had a vested interest in policy proceeds that was capable of 
transfer or assignment to a third party.  
When a life insurance policy did not reserve the insured’s right to 
change the beneficiary, under the vested interest rule, the policy’s 
beneficiaries had a vested interest in the life insurance policy. A 
beneficiary’s vested interest could not be defeated by action of the insured, 
except to the extent permitted by the policy.84 In contrast, when a policy 
reserved the insured’s right to change the policy’s beneficiary, the insured 
had only an expectancy in policy proceeds.85  
In the late 19th century, insurers began to include provisions in their 
policies granting the insured the right to change the policy beneficiary.86 
This change was made, in part, as a response to the fact that, in most cases, 
the vested interest rule defeated the intent of the insured who purchased life 
insurance. Most insureds purchased policies to protect family members in 
the event of the insured’s death. But the identity of dependent family 
members and their favor with the insured was likely to change during the 
insured’s lifetime. An insured’s ex-spouse, for instance, was a permanent 
beneficiary of the policy regardless of the insured’s wishes or whether the 
ex-spouse continued to rely on the insured for support.87 
In addition to permitting insureds to change policy beneficiaries 
during the life of the policy, life insurance companies also conceived of 
innovations like legal reserve life insurance, which introduced the concept 
of policy surrender value and produced new forms of insurance like whole 
life and universal life insurance.88 These changes transformed life insurance 
                                                                                                                          
83 Id. at 747. 
84 Filley v. Ill. Life Ins. Co., 93 Kan. 193 (Kan. 1914); Van Bibber's Adm'r, & 
Co. v. Van Bibber, 82 Ky. 347, 350 (Ky. 1884). 
85 See Comment, supra note 68, at 48-50. 
86 See N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Daley, 143 P. 1033 (Cal. Ct. App. 1914); 
Douglass v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y., 90 So. 834, 835-36 (La. 1922). 
87 Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 459-63 (1876); Begley v. 
Miller, 137 Ill.App. 278 (1907) Land v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 270 P.2d 154, 
156-57 (Or. 1954). 
88 See Vance, supra note 68 at 344. Whole life insurance has a level premium 
for the life of the insured and accumulates value, permitting the insured to borrow 
against the policy during his or her lifetime. Like whole life insurance, universal 
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from a contract only providing for payment of a death benefit to a full-
featured savings vehicle. With the steady development of rules and industry 
norms that transformed life insurance from simple insurance to an 
investment and savings product, life insurance was soon touted as an 
alternative to other investment products and bank savings accounts.89 
Once these new contracts that permitted the insured to change 
beneficiaries made their way to the courts, the issue arose as to whether the 
insured must replace the beneficiary with the assignee in order to transfer 
the beneficiary’s rights in the contract to the assignee. Most courts quickly 
realized that to withhold the assignee’s rights in the contract where the 
beneficiary of the contract was not changed to reflect the assignment was to 
ignore the reality of the situation. The insured’s right to change 
beneficiaries of a policy came to be viewed as an election by the insured to 
keep beneficial ownership for himself during his lifetime.90 An insured 
with the power to change the policy beneficiary has the power to assign the 
policy, thus effectively cutting off any interest the original beneficiary had 
in the policy. Many courts viewed assignment of a policy as, in effect, an 
exercise of the insured’s power to change the policy’s beneficiary.91    
 
C.  MODERN APPROACH TO ASSIGNMENT 
 
Today, most states permit the assignment of a life insurance policy 
as long as the assignment is not entered into as cover for a wager policy.92 
A validly issued life insurance policy, purchased by the insured, is 
absolutely assignable, whether as collateral for a loan or in an absolute sale, 
without restriction. As such, a validly issued policy may be assigned to a 
person without an insurable interest in the insured’s life.93 
In spite of the assignability of life insurance policies, a minority of 
jurisdictions limit the amount of a policy’s death benefit that is payable to a 
                                                                                                                          
life insurance also accumulate internal value. In contrast to a whole life policy,  a 
portion of each universal life policy premium is allocated to cost of insurance, with 
the remainder being allocated to policy buildup . BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 805 
(6th ed. 1990).  
89 See Comment, supra note 68, at 344. 
90 See id. at 749. 
91 Rawls v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 36 Barb. 357 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1862); See 
Comment, supra note 68, at 49 n. 46. 
92 See supra Part II. 
93 See e.g., Russell v. Grigsby, 168 F. 577 (6th Cir. 1909); Corning Bank & 
Trust. Co. v. Foster, 74 S.W.2d 797 (Ark. 1934); Lanier v. Shuman, 24 S.E.2d 55 
(Ga. 1943). See generally 30 A.L.R. 2d 1310 § 16 (2009). 
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creditor of the insured. Because a life insurance policy is often 
irreplaceable, such as when the insured is elderly or in poor health,94 many 
jurisdictions restrict the extent to which a creditor is permitted to collect the 
policy’s death benefit. When a policy is assigned to a creditor as security 
for a debt, the creditor’s interest in the policy’s proceeds cannot exceed the 
debt owed by the insured to the creditor. But full-assignment or sale of a 
policy does not result in a mere creditor’s interest in policy proceeds. The 
assignee is entitled to full payment of the policy’s death benefit.95 
 
VI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECONDARY LIFE INSURANCE 
MARKET 
 
A.  GENESIS OF VIATICAL AND LIFE SETTLEMENTS 
 
Life insurance developed from an unassignable right to payment of 
a death benefit into its present form as a full-featured savings vehicle. For 
most of its history, life insurance was intended primarily to provide 
security for the insured’s family after the insured’s death. Recent 
developments, however, are “turning life insurance on its head.”96 With 
$26 trillion in life insurance policies in force in the US, it was only a matter 
of time before investors sought out ways to tap into this uncorrelated asset 
class.97  
Prior to the 1980s, the business of buying and selling life insurance 
policies was not a robust industry. While life insurance policies were 
regularly bought and sold, the transactions did not take place in a 
developed market but occurred in relative isolation. The AIDS crisis of the 
1980s and 90s, however, generated substantial interest in the purchase and 
sale of life insurance policies. With limited treatment options, individuals 
diagnosed with AIDS had radically reduced life spans, dramatically 
increasing the value of their life insurance policies. Viatical settlement 
companies sprang up, willing to purchase policies from the terminally ill 
insured for prices far in excess of the policy’s surrender values, but at a 
price low enough to net the company a profit when the insured died. When 
                                                                                                                          
94 See Comment, supra note 68, at 745. 
95 See St. John v. Am. Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 13 N.Y. 31 (N.Y. 1855). 
96  See Robert S. Bloink, Premium Financed Surprises: Cancellation of 
Indebtedness Income and Financed Life Insurance, 63 THE TAX LAWYER 283, 286 
(2010).  
97 See Anderson, supra note 2. The value of a life insurance policy is 
uncorrelated to the performance of other markets, so life insurance offers a 
measure of perceived stability in the current tumultuous financial environment. 
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antiretroviral drugs began to extend the life expectancy of people infected 
with HIV, viatical settlements quickly expanded to include terminal 
illnesses other than AIDS.98 
 
B.  THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE INSURANCE 
 
Sensing the nearly endless supply of life insurance policies sitting 
idle in the hands of insureds and their families, the viatical settlement 
industry rapidly expanded into the life settlement market, offering elderly 
insureds who are not terminally ill the option of selling their life insurance 
policies for cash in excess of the surrender value of the policy.  
The life settlement industry provides a steady stream of new 
policies for the secondary market, but demand for investor-owned life 
insurance policies far exceeds supply. This mismatch generated a demand 
for policies not purchased through life settlement channels. Banks, hedge 
funds and private equity groups saw the viatical markets and its 
permutations as a door into the profitable longevity of risk markets that had 
largely been the exclusive domain of insurance carriers for centuries.99  
Wall Street imposed an asset backed securities100 paradigm upon 
secondary life settlements and viatical markets with the hope the market 
would grow and develop as the mortgage market had developed 20 years 
                                                                                                                          
98 See generally Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Bloink, supra note 96; Alexander D. Eremia, Viatical Settlement and Accelerated 
Death Benefit Law: Helping Terminal, but not Chronically Ill Patients, 1 DEPAUL 
J. HEALTH CARE L. 773 (1997).  
99 See Anderson, supra note 2. Life settlement and viatical settlement involve 
the sale of a life insurance policy to a third party for less than the face value of the 
policy and prior to its maturity. The settlement amount is generally greater than the 
total amount of premiums and fees paid by the insured. In both types of settlement 
the purchaser will receive payment of death benefits on the policy. Life settlement 
is the sale of a life insurance policy on the life of a party who is not “terminally or 
chronically ill.” In viatical settlement, the insured is usually “terminally or 
chronically ill,” resulting in a shorter life expectancy than predicted by mortality 
tables. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1497 (9th ed. 2009). See generally Patrick D. 
Dolan, Securitization of Life Settlements, Structured Settlements, and Lottery 
Awards, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZAITON 2008 (Practicing Law Institute, 
Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 14108, 
2008). 
100 Asset backed securities are securities that are secured by pooled, generally 
illiquid, assets such as mortgages, life insurance policies, or student loans. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1476 (9th ed. 2009). 
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earlier.101 The investment calculus turned on mitigating the actuarial risk by 
aggregating large pools of insurance policies and an endless supply of 
cheap money to fund the ongoing premium obligations. Obtaining these 
large portfolios of insurance policies containing the right mix of premium 
costs and insureds’ predicted mortality became an increasing problem.102  
To generate a pool of policies significant enough to satisfy demand 
and to smooth the actuarial risk inherent in smaller pools, the market 
developed strategies designed to cut the insured out of the process. For 
investors, the ideal would be to directly purchase life insurance policies 
without the insured’s involvement; however, the insurable interest 
requirement necessitated the crafting of complex strategies designed to 
utilize an insured’s unlimited insurable interest in his own life to purchase 
policies that could not be issued directly to the investor. Stranger-owned 
life insurance is one of those strategies. 
 
VII. STRANGER-OWNED LIFE INSURANCE (STOLI) 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Stranger-owned life insurance (STOLI) refers to the practice of 
purchasing a life insurance policy with the intent to transfer the policy to a 
third party.103 STOLI takes many forms, but in general, it is an arrangement 
designed to acquire and transfer a life insurance policy to investors.104  
Typically, a STOLI arrangement is initiated by someone other than 
the insured, such as an insurance broker, attorney, or other third party who 
approaches the insured and initiates the insured’s involvement in the 
program. Though stranger or investor initiation of the purchase of the 
policy is typical it is not universal.105 
Investors and third parties secure the participation of insureds with 
incentives and promises of profits when the policy is sold. Incentives may 
include a lump-sum payment at the policy’s purchase, partial payment of 
                                                                                                                          
101 See Anderson, supra note 2; Rachel Emma Silverman, Letting an Investor 
Bet on When You’ll Die: New Insurance Deals Aimed At Wealthy Raise Concerns; 
Surviving a Two-Year Window, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2005, at D1. 
102 See Bloink, supra note 96. 
103 See Best, supra note 59, at 912-13. 
104 See Stephan R. Leimberg, Stranger Originated Life Insurance (STOLI): 
What Counsel (and What Every Advisor) Must Absolutely Positively Know!, 
SP037 ALI-ABA 573 (2009). 
105 See id. 
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policy proceeds to the insured’s family, or “free” insurance for the duration 
of the contestability period.106 
STOLI arrangements often delay transfer of ownership of the life 
insurance policy or ILIT from the insured to investors until after the 
policy’s incontestability period has passed, believing that the 
incontestability clause will shield the STOLI policy from challenge by the 
insurer.107  
Insureds will generally be unwilling or unable to pay the premiums 
and other fees necessary to keep a high-value policy in force until the 
policy’s incontestability period has passed. While investors may directly 
pay fees and premiums, premium financing—the use of borrowed funds to 
finance life insurance premiums—is the preferred method for making 
premium payments on a STOLI policy. In a premium financing 
arrangement, the premium finance lender—which may be a company 
specializing in such lending, a traditional lending institution like a bank, or 
even an insurance company—pays policy premiums on behalf of the 
borrower-insured. The cost of the loan, including interest and fees, may be 
billed to the insured or rolled into the loan.108 
At the close of the premium finance loan period—which may range 
from a year to policy maturity—the insured must either: (1) repay the loan, 
including interest and fees, (2) roll the premium finance loan into a new 
loan, or (3) surrender the policy (and any additional collateral supplied by 
the borrower) to the premium finance lender.109 
Premium finance makes it unnecessary for investors to directly pay 
premiums and fees to the insurance company, which may alert the 
company that the policy is part of a STOLI arrangement and trigger an 
investigation that could end in rescission of the policy. Premium finance 
also facilitates separation between investors and the insured by providing 
putative cover for the true nature of the arrangement.110 
In traditional premium finance, the insured debtor generally intends 
on holding the insurance policy until its maturity. Traditional premium 
finance facilitates estate liquidity for wealthy insureds. Typically the 
                                                                                                                          
106 See id. An incontestability clause specifies a time limit on the insurer’s 
right to revoke a policy based on the insured’s misrepresentations. All jurisdictions 
require life insurance contracts to include an incontestability clause, most requiring 
an incontestability period no longer than two years from the date the policy is 
issued. Id. 
107 See id. 
108 See Bloink, supra note 96, at 284. 
109 See id. at 284-85. 
110 See Id, at 287. 
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premium finance loan is secured by the insurance policy and is fully 
recourse as to the insured. In contrast, when used in a STOLI arrangement, 
a premium finance loan will often be nonrecourse to the insured. STOLI-
based nonrecourse premium finance was sold as essentially riskless for the 
insured, but insurance company pushback and insurable interest concerns 
have drastically reduced the availability of nonrecourse premium 
financing.111 Partial-recourse premium financing (e.g. a premium finance 
loan that is 25% recourse to the insured) has generally replaced 
nonrecourse premium finance; but partial-recourse premium finance is not 
always used to facilitate STOLI arrangements. Regardless of the type of 
premium finance used, in a STOLI arrangement the insured does not intend 
on purchasing long term life insurance coverage but only intends to hold 
the policy for the duration of the contestability period. After the 
contestability period, the insured expects to sell the policy at a profit.112  
When premium financing is used to fund a STOLI policy, the 
insured is given three options at the close of the contestability period: 
 
(1) The insured can take ownership of the policy by 
paying off the loan, including principal, interest and 
fees. The loan can be refinanced with another lender or 
paid off in cash.  
(2) The policy can be sold on the secondary market. The 
insured will retain any profit on the sale after the 
premium finance loan and fees are paid off. 
(3) The insured can surrender the policy to the lender in 
satisfaction of the loan. The lender will then sell the 
policy on the secondary market. 
 
The insured is very unlikely to take the first option since the 
insured was probably not in the market for a life insurance policy when 
entering into the arrangement.  Because the first option is effectively off-
limits to the insured, the real purpose of the arrangement—moving the life 
insurance policy into the secondary market—is essentially guaranteed by 
the STOLI plan. 
 
                                                                                                                          
111 See id.  See also Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d 882, 
884-86 (D. N.J. 2009); Eryn Mathews, Notes and Commentaries, STOLI on the 
Rocks: Why States Should Eliminate the Abusive Practice of Stranger-Owned Life 
Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 521, 525-37 (2008). 
112 See Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d 885. 
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B.  USE OF IRREVOCABLE LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS IN STOLI 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
STOLI policies are often purchased through an irrevocable life 
insurance trust (ILIT). A premium finance loan will be made to the ILIT, 
which owns the policy from issuance to maturity. Rather than directly 
transferring ownership of the policy to investors, the trustee of the ILIT is 
changed to a trustee chosen by the premium finance company. The 
beneficiary is also changed so that beneficial ownership and control of the 
policy passes to the investors without signaling the change to the company 
that issued the policy. 
 
C.  IMPACT OF STOLI ON THE INSURABLE INTEREST 
REQUIREMENT  
 
A central concern with STOLI arrangements is their relationship 
with the insurable interest requirement. As discussed in sections II and III, 
the insurable interest requirement exists to limit the issuance of wager 
policies and prevent the moral hazard due to the beneficial owner’s 
financial interest in the insured’s premature death. In STOLI transactions, 
the party who is ultimately intended as the beneficial owner of the policy 
will not have an insurable interest in the insured’s life at the time the policy 
is issued.113 
In tension with the insurable interest requirement is the well-settled 
principle that a life insurance policy is freely transferrable once the policy 
is validly issued. This principle permits an insured to purchase a policy of 
life insurance and transfer the policy to any person, including someone 
without an insurable interest, subject to very few restrictions. At first 
glance, the free transferability of life insurance would seem to vindicate 
STOLI as a legitimate practice. After all, the insured, who has an unlimited 
insurable interest in his own life, purchases the policy and exercises his 
legal right to transfer the policy to whomever he chooses.114 But the foray 
                                                                                                                          
113 Although STOLI has received significant bad press in recent years, it is 
worth noting that the better-received life settlements implicate the same policy 
concerns motivating the backlash against STOLI arrangements. After all, an 
investor purchasing a policy in a life settlement has the same incentive to see the 
insured meet an early death as the investor purchasing a policy issued directly into 
a STOLI arrangement. 
114 In a small minority of jurisdiction (e.g. New York), lack of an insurable 
interest does not void a policy, but triggers a procedure for equitable distribution of 
policy proceeds, the lawsuit will be between investors and the insured decedent’s 
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of the capital markets into life insurance has exploited the tension between 
the competing policy considerations affecting the insurable interest 
requirement and has stretched the requirement to the point of breaking. 
 
D.  RECENT STOLI CASES 
 
1. Phoenix Life v. Lasalle Bank 
 
In the typical modern insurable interest case, an insurance carrier is 
asking the court to issue a declaration that a life insurance policy held by an 
investment group is void ab initio for lack of an insurable interest. For 
instance, in Phoenix Life v. Lasalle Bank, a decision handed down in 2009 
by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, a life 
insurance policy was assigned to a lender as security for a nonrecourse 
premium finance loan. Phoenix, who issued the policy, sought a declaratory 
judgment that the policy was void ab initio for lack of an insurable interest. 
Coventry, the investment group, argued that Phoenix’s motion should be 
dismissed because, in their view, Phoenix’s insurable interest argument was 
based entirely on the fact that the policy premiums were paid by a premium 
finance loan. Coventry argued that this fact was insufficient as a matter of 
law to establish that the policies were issued without an insurable interest. 
The court disagreed, holding that Phoenix’s allegation that the insured 
purchased the policy with the intent to absolutely assign the policy to 
Coventry was sufficient to “state a claim for rescission based on the lack of 
an insurable interest.” Under Michigan law, assignment of a validly issued 
life insurance policy to someone without an insurable interest is permitted. 
But a complete assignment of an insurance policy made simultaneous with 
issuance of the policy violates the insurable interest requirement. Such an 
assignment is void because the assignment is made in bad faith for the 
purpose of circumventing the insurable interest requirement.115 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
estate. See e.g. Life Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F.Supp.2d 646. See supra 
text accompanying notes 55-56. 
115 Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. LaSalle Bank N.A., Nos. 2:07-cv-15324, 2009 WL 
877684, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2009). See also AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. 
v. Infinity Financial Group, LLC, 608 F.Supp.2d 1349, 1352-53, 1356-57 (S.D.Fla. 
2009) (holding that an assignment of a life insurance policy may not be made 
where an agreement to assign the policy existed prior to the issuance of the policy 
or contemporaneously therewith.)  
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2. Sun Life v. Paulson 
 
Sun Life v. Paulson, a 2008 Federal District Court of Minnesota 
case, involved facts similar to those in Phoenix Life v. Lasalle. Sun Life 
brought suit for a declaratory judgment that the policy issued on Paulson’s 
life and subsequently purchased by Coventry was void for lack of an 
insurable interest. Sun Life’s claim was based on their assertion that at the 
time the insured purchased the policy, he intended to sell the policy to a 
third party without an insurable interest in Paulson’s life. As in Phoenix 
Life, the court considered a motion to dismiss by Coventry.116  
Assuming the facts of the plaintiff’s complaint to be true, including 
the plaintiff’s assertion that the insured purchased the policy with the intent 
to transfer it to a person without an insurable interest, the court found that 
the policy was not void for lack of insurable interest.117 Of primary 
importance to the court was the fact that there was no evidence that Paulson 
colluded with anyone else when purchasing the policy. In the court’s view, 
in order for a life insurance policy to be void ab initio for lack of an 
insurable interest, not only must the insured purchase the policy with the 
intent to transfer the policy to a party without an insurable interest in 
violation of the good faith requirement, but the policy must be “procured 
under a scheme, purpose, or agreement to transfer or assign the policy to a 
person without an insurable interest in order to evade the law against 
wagering contracts.” As a result, if an insured purchases an insurance 
policy with the intent to transfer the policy to a person without an insurable 
interest in the insured’s life, but the insured has not identified a particular 
purchaser for the policy, the policy is not void and the transfer is valid. In 
the district court’s view: 
 
Paulson’s intent is… irrelevant without facts or allegations 
suggesting that a third party lacking an insurable interest 
intended, at the time Paulson procured the [policy], to 
acquire the policy upon expiration of the contestability 
period. Likewise, Coventry’s later acquisition of the 
[policy] is irrelevant without similar facts or allegations 
regarding its intent at the time Paulson procured the 
insurance.118 
                                                                                                                          
116 Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Paulson, No. 07-3877, 2008 WL 451054, 
at *1 (D. Minn. 2008). 
117 Id. at *2. 
118 Id.  
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3. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Calhoun 
 
Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Calhoun, arose under facts 
similar to those in Paulson and Lasalle. As in Paulson, the insured 
purchased a high-value policy with the intent to sell the policy on the 
secondary market. The court did not arrive at a holding with respect to 
whether a scheme is necessary for a policy to be found void ab initio for 
lack of an insurable interest. But, in contrast to Paulson, the court denied 
the defendant’s motion for dismissal. The court viewed New Jersey law as 
unsettled on the question of whether mutual intent—of the insured and a 
third party without an insurable interest in the insured’s life—is necessary 
for a policy to be found void for lack of an insurable interest or whether 
unilateral intent of the insured is sufficient. Recognizing that “compelling 
policy considerations are raised by either position,” the court viewed 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim as premature because, the court said, the 
issues of intent implicated by the case were better decided after the plaintiff 
had further opportunity to discover whether Calhoun had an arrangement 
with a particular purchaser when he bought the policy. If Calhoun had an 
arrangement with a third-party purchaser at the time he purchased the 
policy, it would be unnecessary for the court to decide the question of 
whether unilateral intent is sufficient to void the policy since, in that case, 
mutual intent would be present.119 
 
4. Summary of the Typical Contemporary Case 
 
Though each of the preceding three cases were decided on motions 
to dismiss rather than at trial, the decisions are important because they 
examine the insurable interest requirement in the face of uniquely modern 
factual allegations while simultaneously reaffirming the importance of the 
traditional doctrine. Lasalle takes the tradition tack, looking for facts 
indicating that the arrangement was entered into, and the policy purchased, 
for the purpose of subverting the prohibition on wager policies.120 Paulson, 
like Lasalle, looks for facts indicating that the policy was a wager policy, 
but narrows the traditional rule by including an additional constraint on its 
application—the requirement that the policy be issued as part of scheme 
involving the insured and another person.121 In light of the policy 
                                                                                                                          
119 Lincoln Nat’l. Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d 882, 890 (D. N.J. 
2009). 
120 LaSalle Bank N.A., 2009 WL 877684, at *7. 
121 See Paulson, 2008 WL 451054, at *2. 
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considerations driving the insurable interest requirement, the court in 
Paulson may narrow the insurable interest requirement too far. A policy 
issued to an insured who, from the beginning, intends on selling the policy 
to someone without an insurable interest implicates the insurable interest 
requirement and runs afoul of the prohibition on wager policies to the same 
extent as policies purchased as part of a “scheme.”  
In most of these recent cases, courts have not had to expand the 
scope of the insurable interest requirement or otherwise alter its 
applicability to successfully target and strike down STOLI transactions. 
The courts have, for the most part, stuck to the narrow historical definition 
of insurable interest, though Paulson did put a new spin on the insurable 
interest requirement by substantially narrowing it when applied to a STOLI 
policy. With the exception of the Parduhn case, discussed below, courts 
have consistently required the existence of an insurable interest at a single 
point in time, issuance of the policy, rather than requiring the existence of 
an insurable interest on a continuum running from issuance of the policy to 
its maturity. 
 
5. An Anomalous Case —Insurable Interest Required 
from Policy Issuance to Maturity 
 
a. Parduhn v. Bennett 
 
Parduhn v. Bennett and the Utah insurable interest statute under 
which the case was decided are an anomaly in modern insurable interest 
law.122 Rather than requiring an insurable interest only at a policy’s 
issuance, the Supreme Court of Utah interpreted Utah’s insurable interest 
statute to require a policy’s beneficial owners to have an insurable interest 
at all times during a policy’s existence, from issuance to maturity.  
The case involved partners in a partnership with a buy-sell 
agreement in place. Under the agreement, if one partner died, the other 
partner was required to purchase the decedent partner’s partnership interest. 
The buy-sell agreement was to be funded by proceeds of a life insurance 
contract. The partners sold their business to a third party without the buy-
sell agreement ever being activated and ceased doing business as a 
partnership. When one partner died, the other partner filed suit to establish 
his right to the insurance proceeds. In opposition to the surviving partner, 
the decedent partner’s wife argued that she had a right to the insurance 
proceeds. 
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In many jurisdictions, each partner would likely have had an 
insurable interest in the other partner’s life at the time the insurance 
contract was purchased, based on their economic relationship. The Utah 
insurable interest law in force at the time Parduhn was decided not only 
required an insurable interest at the time the policy was issued, but also at 
the time a policy is transferred to a third party and when the policy 
matured. The Utah Code stated that “[a] person may not knowingly 
procure, directly, by assignment, or otherwise, an interest in the proceeds of 
an insurance policy unless that person has or expects to have an insurable 
interest in the subject of the insurance.”123 This provision was interpreted to 
mean that a person is not permitted to have an interest in insurance policy 
proceeds unless that person has an insurable interest in the insured’s life.124 
In addition to requiring an insurable interest at the time at transfer 
and at maturity, the statute specifically limited a partner’s insurable interest 
in another partner’s life to situations involving a legitimate buy-sell 
agreement. Without a buy-sell agreement, there was no insurable interest, 
regardless of any other economic relationship between the partners.125  
Based on the Utah insurable interest statute in force at the time the 
case was decided, the Utah Supreme Court held that the surviving partner 
was not entitled to the life insurance policy’s death benefit because the 
buy-sell agreement was no longer in place when the policy reached 
maturity, and the partner was not permitted to receive the death benefit 
without an insurable interest in the deceased partner’s life. By so holding, 
the Utah court broke with the common law and statutes in force in every 
other jurisdiction by effectively requiring the existence of an insurable 
interest on a continuum from issuance of the policy to its maturity. 
The impact of Parduhn’s anomalous holding was limited fairly 
quickly by the Utah state legislature, which brought the state’s insurable 
interest law into conformity with the rest of the country. 
                                                                                                                          
123 UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(1)(b) (2005) (current version at UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104 (Supp. 2010)). 
124 See Parduhn v. Bennett, 61 P.3d 982, 986-87 (Utah 2002); See also Harbor 
Funds, LLC, Utah Div. Sec., No-Action or Interpretive Letter, 2002 WL 
31746494, at *2 (Nov. 6, 2002) (opinion rescinded Oct. 4, 2010 to reflect 
subsequent amendments to the Utah Uniform Securities Act that classify life 
settlements as securities even  before they are sold in the secondary market). 
125 UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(1)(b), (2)(a) (2005) (current version at 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104 (Supp. 2010)). Note that in Utah, a policy issued 
without an insurable interest is not void or even voidable, but the death benefit will 
not be paid to the named beneficiary. Rather, policy proceeds will be equitably 
distributed by the court. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(6)(b) (Supp. 2010). 
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b. Utah’s Amended Insurable Interest Statute 
 
The situation in Parduhn would not likely have the same result if 
the case were decided under the current Utah insurable interest statute. A 
2007 amendment to Utah’s insurable interest law126 specifies that, in the 
case of a life insurance policy, an insurable interest need only exist on the 
date the policy is issued and at any later time when an interest in the policy 
is transferred or assigned. The insurable interest requirement need not be 
met at the time the policy proceeds are payable. Because Parduhn had an 
insurable interest in his partner’s life and the policy was never transferred 
or assigned, Parduhn would not be required to have an insurable interest in 
his partner’s life at the time the death benefit was paid and the payment 
could properly be made to Parduhn. 
The statute probably also eliminates the absolute restriction on a 
partner’s insurable interest to situations where a legitimate buy-sell 
agreement exists. While that restriction was formerly included in the 
definition of “insurable interest,” the amended statute indicates that the 
former restriction is now part of a nonexclusive list of situations where an 
insurable interest exists. In other words, a partner’s insurable interest based 
on a legitimate buy-sell agreement is only one example of a situation where 
a partner would have an insurable interest in another partner’s life. Other 
circumstances presenting an insurable interest in a partners life certainly 
exist. 
 
VIII. MISREPRESENTATIONS ON THE POLICY APPLICATION 
 
Though a significant portion of the dialog surrounding STOLI has 
centered on the insurable interest requirement, other issues are often 
litigated together, creating a mélange of related but distinct concepts and 
prohibitions affecting the validity of a life insurance contract. In addition to 
an insurer’s claims for rescission due to lack of an insurable interest, 
carriers also typically seek rescission of the policy based on intentional 
misrepresentations made on the policy application. Many recent STOLI 
cases raise the issue of misrepresentation on the policy application in 
addition to lack of an insurable interest. Other than the insurable interest 
requirement, an insurer’s right to rescind a life insurance contract based on 
misrepresentations made on the policy application remains the strongest 
enforcement mechanism available to combat STOLI. 
                                                                                                                          
126 Utah’s insurable interest statute explicitly permits viatical and life 
settlements. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(7) (Supp. 2010). 
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An insurer who becomes aware of a misrepresentation made on a 
policy application may generally rescind the policy by notifying the insured 
of the rescission and refunding any premiums paid.127 An insurer may also 
sue for rescission of the policy or assert the rescission as a defense to an 
action on the policy. In the alternative, an insurer may also assert 
misrepresentation as a defense against a beneficiary’s suit seeking payment 
of the policy death benefit after the insured death.128 
Generally, a life insurance policy is voidable by the carrier if the 
insured made material misrepresentations on the application for insurance. 
An innocent misrepresentation is sufficient grounds for rescission of a 
policy; it is not necessary that the misrepresentation be made intentionally 
or  in bad faith.129 A misrepresentation or omission is “material” if the 
misrepresentation or omission “can be understood to reasonably affect an 
insurer’s decision to enter into the insurance contract.”130 In other words, 
the test for materiality is subjective; a misrepresentation is material if it 
affects the insurer’s risk in entering into the contract or the amount of 
premiums to be charged on the policy is material.131 Materiality is not 
determined under an objective, reasonable insurer standard.132  
The policy application and the questions included therein by the 
insurer may be probative of materiality, since the insurer presumably chose 
the questions for the purpose of gauging risk and setting policy premiums. 
Because “[m]ateriality is determined solely by the probable and reasonable 
effect which truthful answers would have had upon the insurer[, t]he fact 
that the insurer has demanded answers to specific questions in an 
application for insurance is in itself usually sufficient to establish 
materiality as a matter of law.”133 
                                                                                                                          
127 N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 23 F.2d 225, 225 (5th Cir. 1928). 
128 Erie Ins. Exch. v. Lake, 671 A.2d 681, 686-87 (Pa. 1996); Feierman v. 
Eureka Life Ins. Co.,124 A. 171, 171-72, (Pa. 1924). 
129 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weisman, 27 F.3d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 
1994) (applying New Mexico law). 
130Id. at 506; Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d 882, 887 
(D.N.J. 2009). 
131 Calhoun, 596 F.Supp.2d at 887-88. 
132  Matilla v. Farmers New World Life Ins., 960 F. Supp. 223, 226 (N.D. Cal. 
1997), aff'd, 133 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 1997). See also ALLEN D. WINDT, INSURANCE 
CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 2:26, at 110-19 (5th ed. 2007). 
133 Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973). See 
also LA Sound USA, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 4th 
1259, 1266-69, Cal. Rptr.3d 917, 920-24 (2007). See generally WINDT, supra note 
132, at 110-117. 
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Issues of misrepresentation are often intertwined with the insurable 
interest issue because carriers frequently include questions on policy 
applications that are intended to ferret out STOLI transactions that are 
formulated to do an end-run around the insurable interest requirement.134 
For instance, the application on which the policy in Phoenix Life v. Lasalle 
(discussed supra) was issued included four such questions:135 
 
(1) Is “non-recourse premium financing or any other 
method being utilized to pay premiums in order to 
facilitate a current or future transfer, assignment or 
other action with respect to the benefits provided under 
the policy being applied for”?  
(2) Is there “an intent to finance any of the premiums”? 
(3) Is “the current intent… to sell the policy in the future”? 
(4) Has there “been any inducement to enter into this 
transaction”? 
 
Each of the preceding four questions seeks to determine whether 
the insured is purchasing the policy as part of a STOLI arrangement by 
looking for signals that the policy is being purchased with an intent to 
obfuscate a violation of the insurable interest requirement. An insured who 
purchases a policy as part of a STOLI transaction will be forced to make a 
misrepresentation when answering these questions or face rejection of his 
or her application by the insurer. The insurer can avoid the policy at 
issuance by declining to issue the policy if the insured answers the 
questions truthfully, and may avoid the policy after issuance by rescinding 
the policy if the insured makes misrepresentations on the application.  
The insurer is in the best position to determine whether a policy is 
being issued in violation of the insurable interest requirement. As discussed 
above, in most cases, an insurer has the opportunity to rescind a policy or 
seek a determination that the policy is void throughout the entire life of the 
policy—from the date the policy is issued to after the insured’s death. And 
                                                                                                                          
134 Though the insurable interest requirement is often intertwined with claims 
of misrepresentation, the two issues are distinct. Of particular importance is the 
fact that an insurer is time barred from suing for rescission based on 
misrepresentation when the contestability period has passed, but is not time barred 
from seeking a declaration that the policy is void for lack of an insurable interest. 
See supra text accompanying notes 58-62. 
135 Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. LaSalle Bank N.A., 2009 WL 877864, at *1 
(E.D.Mich. Mar. 30, 2009). 
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the insurer has tremendous power to craft policy applications to discover 
whether an insured is purchasing a policy for an improper purpose.  
Determination that a policy was issued without an insurable 
interest has a devastating effect on the property rights of the insured, 
transferees and beneficiaries: such failure voids the policy, extinguishing it 
as if it never existed.136 Tampering with the insurable interest requirement 
thus impacts all policy owners, introducing a level of uncertainty into a 
policy purchase. In contrast, aiming anti-STOLI enforcement efforts at the 
misrepresentations necessarily made on a well-crafted policy application 
when a policy is being purchased as part of a STOLI transaction targets 
only those parties making misrepresentations. As such, policymakers 
should be reticent about strengthening or otherwise altering the insurable 
interest requirement when other enforcement mechanisms—a well-
designed policy application and misrepresentation detection—offer a 
targeted, flexible approach to combating STOLI. 
 
IX. NAIC AND NCOIL MODEL CODES AND THEIR AFFECT ON 
THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT 
 
States have been increasingly interested in supplementing 
established insurable interest law with statutes designed to identify and 
prohibit nascent types of transactions that violate the spirit, if not the letter, 
of the insurable interest requirement.137 Two model statutes, both regulating 
life and viatical settlements, have been recently amended to supplement 
and strengthen this requirement. Prompted by increased attention on 
STOLI, the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)138 amended their 
respective model codes in 2007. Each model act has been adopted by a 
number of states, with some states choosing to adopt a hybrid approach 
incorporating elements from both acts.139  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
136 See supra Part III. 
137 See Leimberg, supra note 104, at 3. 
138 The NAIC has published hundreds of model laws covering every aspect of 
life insurance regulation, many of which have been enacted by state legislatures.  
139 Ariella Gasner, Note, Your Death: The Royal Flush of Wall Street’s 
Gamble, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 599, 626-628 (2008-2009). 
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A.  NCOIL’S VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT 
 
NCOIL adopted the Life Settlements Model Act in 2000 as an 
alternative to the NAIC model and amended the act in 2007 to address 
concerns with STOLI.140 The NCOIL model includes three primary 
components: (1) a recommendation that states amend their insurable 
interest laws to cover modern permutations on the wager policy, (2) a 
definition and prohibition of STOLI, and (3) a moratorium on life 
settlements running two years after issuance of a policy. 
 
1. Amend State Insurable Interest Statutes 
 
NCOIL’s approach to STOLI strengthens and uses traditional tools 
to combat wager policies, including the insurable interest requirement. 
Some commentators have expressed concern that the traditional insurable 
interest requirement is ill-suited to the modern environment in which 
STOLI has sprung up. Recognizing this potential weakness , a drafting note 
to the NCOIL 2007 Life Settlements Model Act recommends that states 
“amend their insurable interest laws, if necessary, to provide additional 
protection against trust-initiated STOLI and other schemes involving a 
cloak.” The model act goes on to suggest a proposed statutory amendment 
that would specifically strike at premium financing arrangements intended 
to effectuate investor ownership of a life insurance policy:141 
 
In accordance with Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, it 
shall be a violation of insurable interest for any person 
or entity without insurable interest to provide or 
arrange for the funding ultimately used to pay 
premiums, or the majority of premiums, on a life 
insurance policy, and, at policy inception have an 
arrangement for such person or entity to have an 
ownership interest in the majority of the death benefit 
of that life insurance policy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
140 Press Release, Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators,  NCOIL Closes In On 
Illegal STOLI, Unanimously Adopts Amended Model Act (Nov. 20, 2007), 
available at http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2007/LifeSettlementsPR.pdf. 
141 LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, (Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators, 
Drafting Note 2007). 
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2. STOLI Definition 
 
Like the NAIC model act and the traditional prohibition on wager 
policies, the NCOIL model act prohibits anyone from entering into a life 
settlement142 prior to issuance of the policy and provides for a period 
during which most life settlements are prohibited.143 
In contrast to the NAIC model, which does not mention STOLI by 
name and does not define it, the nucleus of the NCOIL model is its 
definition of STOLI. The model act defines “STOLI” as follows: “STOLI 
is a practice or plan to initiate a life insurance policy for the benefit of a 
third party investor who, at the time of policy origination, has no insurable 
interest in the insured.”144 
This definition essentially restates the black-letter law (see supra) 
prohibiting arrangements intended to subvert the insurable interest 
requirement. Going further, NCOIL’s definition also ropes in some 
transactions that are not explicitly covered by traditional insurable interest 
cases and statutes:145 
 
                                                                                                                          
142 The NCOIL model act defines “life settlement contract” in essentially the 
same way as the NAIC model act defines “viatical settlement contract” with some 
minor differences. Compare LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(L) (Nat’l Council 
of Ins. Legislators  2007) (defining “life settlement contract” as “a written 
agreement entered into between a Provider and an Owner, establishing the terms 
under which compensation or any thing of value will be paid, which compensation 
or thing of value is less than the expected death benefit of the insurance policy or 
certificate, in return for the owner’s assignment, transfer, sale, devise or bequest of 
the death benefit or any portion of an insurance policy or certificate of insurance 
for compensation, provided, however, that the minimum value for a Life 
Settlement Contract shall be greater than a cash surrender value or accelerated 
death benefit available at the time of an application for a Life Settlement 
Contract.”), with VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT  § 2(N)(1) (Nat’l Ass’n of 
Ins. Comm’rs 2010)  (defining “viatical settlement contract“ as “a written 
agreement establishing the terms under which compensation or anything of value is 
or will be paid, which compensation or value is less than the expected death 
benefits of the policy , in return for the viator’s present or future assignment, 
transfer, sale, devise or bequest of the death benefit or ownership of any portion of 
the insurance policy or certificate of insurance.”). 
143 LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(N) (Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators 
2007). 
144 LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(Y) (Nat’l Council of Ins. Legislators 
2007).  
145 Id. 
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STOLI practices include but are not limited to cases in 
which life insurance is purchased with resources or 
guarantees from or through a person, or entity, who, at the 
time of policy inception, could not lawfully initiate the 
policy themselves, and where, at the time of inception, 
there is an arrangement or agreement, whether verbal or 
written, to directly or indirectly transfer the ownership of 
the policy and/or the policy benefits to a third party. 
  
This definition sharpens the insurable interest requirement by 
covering indirect arrangements intended to shift a policy from an 
insured to investors, like nonrecourse premium financing. 
 
3. Two-Year Moratorium on Life Settlements 
 
The NCOIL model’s two-year moratorium prohibits life settlement 
transactions for a two year period following issuance of the policy. This 
two-year ban on transfers is significantly shorter than the NAIC’s five-year 
ban. Like the NAIC model, the NCOIL model provides exceptions to the 
two-year moratorium.146  
 
B.  THE NAIC VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT 
 
The NAIC issued the Viatical Settlements Model Act147 in 1993 in 
response to perceived abuses in the viatical settlement industry. 
Subsequently, in 2007 the NAIC adopted a revised model act  to take into 
account significant changes in the industry, including the increasing 
prevalence of STOLI. In contrast NCOIL’s targeted approach, which 
defines and prohibits STOLI, NAIC’s model act attempts to strike at the 
economic foundations of STOLI transactions. 
Rather than define “STOLI,” the NAIC model act defines “viatical 
settlement” and proscribes a set of “prohibited practices” with respect to 
those viatical settlements. The model act defines “viatical settlement 
contract” as:148 
 
                                                                                                                          
146 Id. § 11(N). 
147 Originally the model was entitled "Living Benefits Model Act." The 
working group decided to change the title to "Viatical Settlements Model Act." 
148 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT  § 2(N)(1) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs 2010). 
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[A] written agreement establishing the terms under which 
compensation or anything of value is or will be paid, which 
compensation or value is less than the expected death 
benefits of the policy, in return for the viator’s present or 
future assignment, transfer, sale, devise or bequest of the 
death benefit or ownership of any portion of the insurance 
policy or certificate of insurance. 
  
By definition, “viatical settlement contract” thus includes 
not only what are traditionally known as viatical settlements, but 
also life settlements and STOLI arrangements. Many premium 
finance transactions are also explicitly categorized as viatical 
settlements under the act.149 
The first layer of defense against STOLI in the NAIC model act is 
its prohibition of any person from entering “into a viatical settlement at any 
time prior to the application or issuance of a policy which is the subject of 
viatical settlement contract.”150 This provision is essentially a statutory 
enactment of the long-standing law in most jurisdictions: Entering into an 
agreement to purchase and assign a policy is an attempt to subvert the 
insurable interest requirement and amounts to a prohibited wager policy.151 
The second, and most controversial, component of the model act’s 
anti-STOLI provisions is its moratorium on life settlements in the five 
years after a policy’s issuance. This component essentially supplements the 
insurable interest requirement by attacking the economic incentives driving 
investment in STOLI policies. Requiring a five-year wait before 
assignment of a policy increases the mortality risk inherent in the policy, 
thus reducing investors’ rates of return and diminishing their incentive to 
use STOLI to enter the mortality markets.152  
                                                                                                                          
149 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §1(N)(2) . (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs 2010). Covered premium finance loans includes loans made where (1) 
proceeds of the loan are not used solely to cover the policy’s premiums and fees, 
(2) the loan includes a guaranteed future viatical settlement value for the policy, or 
(3) the viator or insured agrees at the time the policy is issued to sell the policy at 
some future date. 
150 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §11(A) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 
2010). 
151 See e.g. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, at 779 (1881); Cammack v. 
Lewis, 82 U.S. 643, at 648 (1872). 
152 Life Ins. Settlement Ass’n, NAIC Model Act, 
http://www.lisassociation.org/lifesettlementtruth/NAIC.html (last visited Sept. 15, 
2010). 
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Recognizing that a blanket five-year prohibition on life settlements 
could harm consumers who develop a need to sell a policy during that five-
year period, the Viatical Settlements Model Act includes a number of 
exceptions to the five-year moratorium on life-settlements. The first 
category of exceptions permits a life settlement in a number of situations 
involving major life changes, such as when the insured is “terminally or 
chronically ill,” when the insured’s marriage ends due to death or divorce, 
or when the insured retires from full-time employment.153 The model act 
also permits a settlement two years after a policy is issued as long as the 
insured has not been evaluated for settlement during the two-year period 
and, if applicable, only traditional premium finance was used to fund 
premium payments and fees associated with the policy.154 
 
C.  RESPONSE TO THE MODEL ACTS 
 
Some commentators and industry groups, like the Life Insurance 
Settlement Association (LISA) and NCOIL, worry that the NAIC approach 
amounts to an interference with the well-established property rights 
associated with life insurance policies. They worry that the exceptions to 
the five-year moratorium on life settlements do not go far enough to 
exempt legitimate settlement transactions from being categorized as 
impermissible life settlements.155 This, they argue, undercuts the insured’s 
property right in the policy and harms an insured who experiences 
unexpected financial difficulty in the two-year period following issuance of 
the policy. An insured who does not satisfy one of the exceptions to the 
five-year moratorium will be unable to sell the policy in the first two years 
after the policy is issued and will be forced to let the policy lapse or accept 
                                                                                                                          
153 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §11(A)(2) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs 2010).. 
154 Id. §11(A)(3). A third exception to the five-year moratorium on settlements 
is for policies issued as a result of the insured’s exercise of conversion rights in a 
policy. Id. §11 (A)(1). 
155 Life Ins. Settlement Ass’n, NAIC Model Act, 
http://www.lisassociation.org/lifesettlementtruth/NAIC.html (last visited Jan. 7, 
2010). A legitimate life settlement transaction is a transaction entered into by an 
insured who, sometime after purchasing a life insurance policy to satisfy the his or 
her need for life insurance, transfers the policy to a third-party because the policy 
is no longer needed or because other financial needs outweigh the insured’s need 
for a life insurance policy. Transfer of a policy to a third party when the policy was 
purchased with the intent to transfer it to a third party is, under the Model Act, not 
a legitimate life settlement transaction. 
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the surrender value of the policy.156 This, they argue, severely undercuts the 
utility of a policy in the initial years of its existence.157  
The NAIC model act has also been characterized as an attack on 
the entire secondary market rather than a focused approach to eliminating 
STOLI. NCOIL has characterized the NAIC model act as creating “harsh 
barriers for consumers seeking to sell their policies and burdens for life 
settlement companies seeking to act in the life settlement market.”158 
Critics view the model act as condemning all premium financed policies 
and life settlements but then exempting some transactions from the group 
of prohibited transactions. This exceptions-based approach is also criticized 
as providing “opportunities” to circumvent the law by crafting STOLI 
transactions that satisfy the exceptions.159 
Other commentators have dismissed criticisms of the NAIC model 
act as exaggerations of a few isolated instances where an insured will not 
be permitted to engage in what would otherwise be a life settlement. In 
                                                                                                                          
156 One suggested amendments to the NAIC model act includes a provision 
explicitly exempting insureds from the five-year moratorium if the insured has 
experienced a sudden decrease in net worth. This amendment has not been 
incorporated into the act. 
157 In a letter to NCOIL, Doug Head, LISA Executive Director, stated that the 
solution to the STOLI problem lies in state insurable interest statutes rather than in 
upturning established law. He also expressed concerns with the five-year 
moratorium, believing that it “harms legitimate life settlements” while failing to 
address STOLI. In his view, the NAIC model paints with too broad a brush, not 
only catching legitimate life settlement transactions, but also missing a significant 
number of STOLI transactions. Also commenting on the NCOIL approach, 
Representative George J. Keiser, of the North Dakota State Legislature, stated that 
“STOLI occurs at the front-end of a life insurance sale. By defining STOLI, and 
strengthening reporting requirements and penalties for participating in STOLI, the 
NCOIL model gets at the heart of what needs to change. We hope that states 
considering amendments to existing laws, or new life settlements statutes, will be 
well-served by the NCOIL proposal.” Press Release, Nat’l Conference of Ins. 
Legislators, NCOIL Closes in on Illegal STOLI, Unanimously Adopts Amended 
Model Act (Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2007/ 
LifeSettlementsPR.pdf. 
158 Nat’l Conference of Ins. Legislators, Effective Methods to Stop STOLI, 
http://www.lisassociation.org/lifesettlementtruth/ban_STOLI.html (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2010). 
159 Laura Graesser, What's Going On in the Life Insurance Business: 
Regulating Life Settlements, LIFE INS. SELLING, apr. 2008, at 8, available at 
http://www.lifeinsuranceselling.com/Issues/2008/4/Pages/What-s-Going-On-
Regulating-Life-Settlements.aspx . 
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their view, the five-year moratorium is an absolute bar that will instantly 
eliminate most STOLI transactions. They argue that the right to sell or 
assign a life insurance policy has never been absolute, and that the right to 
transfer a life insurance policy has always been weighed against the 
potential harm created by permitting such an assignment. Any restriction 
on an insured’s rights to assign a policy must be weighed against the harm 
caused by STOLI, they argue, and any harm created by the NAIC approach 
is far outweighed by its benefits.160  
The recent enactment of NCOIL-influenced statutes by New 
York161 and California162 may signal a momentum shift from the NAIC 
model to the NCOIL model, but the dust is still settling. Regardless of how 
the battle between the two predominant model codes plays out, the coming 
decade is likely to see a further honing of insurable interest statutes as state 
legislatures wrestle with STOLI and its progeny. Like the mid 19th century, 
the early 21st century is likely to be viewed as a seminal, innovative period 
for life insurance and the laws shaping and defining its boundaries. 
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
The current debate over the insurable interest requirement has too 
often transmuted the moral hazard of the eighteenth century scoundrel, 
Wainewright, into the latest object of Wall Street’s insatiable greed. The 
historic context within which the insurable interest doctrine formed cannot 
so simply be analogized to the current policy discussions. Though the 
Grisby Court’s forward-thinking enunciation of the insurable interest 
doctrine has been black-letter law for nearly a century, Justice Holmes 
certainly could not have foreseen the radical changes in the life insurance 
industry or imagined the emergence of the asset-backed securities markets.  
At the beginning of the 20th   century, life insurance products 
consisted of little more than straight forward life insurance and the basic 
annuities. The vast expansion of property rights unleashed by Grisby’s 
clarification of assignment principles applied to insurance products has 
inured to the benefit of both insurers and insureds in the form of much 
more marketable products that have savings components and free 
alienability.   
                                                                                                                          
160 Adam S. Flood, Stranger-Originated Life Insurance: How the NAIC Tamed 
an Old Dog with a New Trick (2008), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1162492. 
161 N.Y. LEGIS. Law § 78 (2010). 
162 CAL.INS.CODE §§ 10113.1(g)(1)(B), (w) (West Supp. 2010).  
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Recent initiatives addressing the abuses of the historic insurable 
interest concept as life insurance has been morphed into a capital markets 
product must be viewed in the context of the vastly different bundle of 
rights modern insurance policies commonly contain.  Any proposal to 
modify insurable interest statutes that too greatly abrogates consumers’ 
property rights in their insurance policies must be viewed as circumspect, if 
those same initiatives can also be construed as protecting insurance 
companies’ monopsonistic pricing power.  
While the Grisby court understood financial institutions such as 
insurance companies would profit from insured’s living long, and also from 
earlier death in the case of annuities, any legislative proposals should not 
weaken insurable interest concepts so as to leave insured’s exposed to the 
moral failings of modern-day Wainewright.  Nor can the new profit motive 
injected into the insurance markets by Wall Street’s securitization markets 
be allowed to create new incentives to push and parse the boundaries of 
insurable interest statutes.  New insurable interest legislation must 
incorporate a restrained and balanced effort to reign in abuses of the 
insurable interest doctrine, and the fraudulent practices effectuating those 
abuses, without unduly curtailing the advantages of modern insurance 
products. 
Some efforts to curb STOLI abuses, such as NCOIL’s Viatical 
Settlements Model Act, and many recent court cases have  taken a 
restrained approach to the insurable interest requirement, recognizing that a 
radical expansion of the insurable interest requirement is unnecessary, even 
in the face of modern insurance products and transactions (e.g. STOLI) 
without analogue at the doctrine’s inception. This conservative approach to 
the insurable interest requirement is wise considering the drastic effect a 
failure of the insurable interest has on a policy, voiding it and entirely 
eliminating its value. Moreover, the careful crafting policy applications in 
an effort to expose abusive transactions or force the policy owners to make 
a material misrepresentation and risk holding a void or voidable policy 
needs to be used as an equal tool in combating such abuses.  This restrained 
and multi-faceted approach has the further benefit of targeting offending 
transactions without affecting the property rights of other policy owners. 
The insurable interest requirement has existed for over two centuries, but is 
still well-equipped to serve the purpose for which it was intended: 
eliminating wager policies and curbing the moral hazard inherent when 
speculators insure the lives of unrelated third parties. 
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RATING DEPENDENT REGULATION OF INSURANCE 
 
John Patrick Hunt* 
 
 
Solvency regulation lies at the heart of insurance regulation and, at 
least for now, credit ratings lie at the heart of solvency regulation.  
Insurance regulators in the United States have used credit ratings 
extensively to determine what types of investments insurance companies 
can make and to determine how risky insurers’ investments are.  Because 
the insurance regulation system has been so dependent on ratings, high 
ratings allowed insurers in several different contexts to invest in novel 
financial products.  When these products suffered rating downgrades and 
losses, the insurers suffered results ranging from stressful  (the life 
insurance industry’s need to raise billions of dollars in additional capital) 
to disastrous (the collapse of AIG and the entire bond insurance industry).  
Indeed, the latter set of events presented a serious challenge to the 
conventional wisdom that insurers do not pose systemic risk. 
Complete removal of credit ratings or analogous private credit 
assessments from insurance regulation is difficult for both political and 
substantive reasons.  This Article suggests an alternative approach:  a 
“seasoning requirement” for credit ratings on novel products, under which 
credit ratings on novel products would not be given regulatory effect for 
some period of time, perhaps one economic cycle.  Given that many novel 
financial products failed immediately in the recent downturn, a seasoning 
requirement would have avoided the most serious drawbacks of rating-
dependent regulation while presenting much less significant political, 
theoretical, and practical challenges than approaches that rely on 
completely eliminating dependence on credit ratings or analogous 
measures. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The apparent failure of credit ratings on novel products and 
insurance regulators’ response to that failure highlights the limits of 
regulators’ will and desire to wean themselves from credit ratings, as well 
as the limits of capital regulation itself.  After an overview of the 
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background, this Article surveys the regulatory response as of early April 
2011 to the perceived failure of ratings in the recent financial crisis, 
identifying a persistent conflict between insurance regulators – who want to 
rely heavily on credit ratings – and rating-agency reformers, who want to 
eliminate rating-dependent regulation.  The National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners apparently intends to retain rating-dependent 
regulation, at least in some form, while the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, enacted in July 2010, directs federal 
regulators to eliminate their reliance on ratings. .  Absent a Congressional 
takeover of this historically state-dominated area, the conflict is likely to 
persist, and so is a high level of rating-dependent in the insurance industry.  
This is important, not least because insurers are arguably the most 
important single segment of investors in credit-rated instruments:  As of 
mid-2010, insurers owned about half the dollar value of corporate bonds 
outstanding in the United States.1 
The Article then turns to some specific areas in which ratings are 
perceived to have failed – ratings on exposures taken by AIG and bond 
insurers, and ratings on residential mortgage-backed securities held by life 
insurance corporations.  In the former case, rating failure led to systemic 
risk.  In the latter, it led to a “rule bailout” – a change in the rules in the 
midst of a financial crisis undertaken in response to industry requests to aid 
its position.  Both have implications for the broader debate beyond rating-
dependent regulation – the broad-ranging consequences of the AIG and 
bond insurer failures challenge the premise that insurers do not pose 
systemic risks.  The rule bailout illustrates important fundamental limits on 
capital regulation that should be taken into account in designing capital 
requirements.  Apart from these broader lessons, these situations have 
implications for rating-dependent regulation of insurance.  In both cases, 
regulators’ practice of giving immediate effect to ratings on novel products 
contributed to the problems.   
A seasoning period—a period in which ratings on a new product 
are not given regulatory effect – is a measured approach to addressing the 
problems with rating-dependent regulation. It recognizes regulators’ and 
regulated parties’ interests in rating reliance and the adequacy of most 
ratings for regulatory tasks, while avoiding the most serious problems that 
rating-dependent regulation apparently has produced. 
 
                                                                                                                 
1 Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, “Flow of 
Funds Accounts of the United States,” June 10, 2010. 
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II. WHAT IS SOLVENCY REGULATION AND WHY DOES THE 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY NEED IT? 
 
Insurance works because people believe insurers’ promises to pay.  
When insurers become insolvent, those promises are likely to be broken, 
undermining the purpose and function of the industry.  Solvency regulation 
can in principle reduce the harm from insurer insolvencies, both by 
reducing the number of insolvencies and mitigating the effects of 
insolvencies that do occur.   
 
A.   OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE SOLVENCY REGULATION 
 
Solvency regulation lies at the heart of insurance regulation.2  The 
1794 statute establishing the first U.S. insurer organized as a stock 
corporation limited the new company to investment in specified 
government bonds.  Massachusetts adopted a general financial reporting 
requirement for insurers, aimed at helping customers avoid companies at 
risk of insolvency, in 1818,3 and NAIC’s first mission after its creation in 
1871 was to work on nationally uniform standards for financial reporting to 
state commissioners.4  Rules for reserves to cover policy losses followed by 
the 1870s,5 and solvency-related limits on investments began to appear as 
early as 1906.6  Increases in the stringency of solvency regulation typically 
                                                                                                                 
2 See EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK 
AND INSURANCE 106 (10th ed. 2008) (“Clearly, a primary focus of insurance 
regulation is on insurer solvency.  Indeed, it has been argued that this should be the 
primary function of regulation.”); ALBERT H. MOWBRAY ET AL., INSURANCE:  ITS 
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 519 (6th ed. 1969) (“The prime 
purpose of governmental supervision [of insurance] is solvency, the continuing 
financial ability of insurers to meet their contractual obligations.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
3 See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION:  THE 
CASE OF INSURANCE 51 (1988). 
4 Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, The Future of Insurance Regulation: in 
THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1., 32  (Martin F. 
Grace and Robert W. Klein eds., 2009). 
5 See MEIER, supra note 23, at 56. 
6 Id. at 58 (describing New York’s adoption of investment limits in response to 
1906 Armstrong Report).  The first investment limits for insurance companies 
appeared even earlier:  The 1794 Pennsylvania statute establishing the first 
insurance stock corporation in the United States required the insurer to invest only 
in government bonds, but this requirement may have had to do with shoring up 
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followed high-profile insolvency episodes, such as the mass failure of 
insurers after the 1871 Chicago Fire and 1872 Boston Fire.7 
Solvency regulation as currently constituted includes several 
interlocking areas.8  Insurers are required to file quarterly and annual 
reports on their financial condition to regulators, using specially prescribed 
statutory accounting standards to do so.  Insurance regulators scrutinize 
these financial statements using special tools9 and confidential financial 
tests, and additionally conduct periodic on-site inspections of insurers’ 
operations.  Insurers are required to maintain reserves to pay claims and, in 
addition, are required to meet capital requirements intended to make sure 
that the insurer has a financial cushion against various misfortunes, such as 
greater-than-expected insurance losses and adverse interest rates moves.  
Solvency regulation attempts to limit the negative effects of insolvency by 
requiring prompt regulatory action to close insolvent insurers before their 
problems deepen and by providing for state-level guarantee funds to 
compensate disappointed policyholders for at least a portion of their 
insolvency-related losses.  
Insurers invest the premiums they receive in order to be able to pay 
claims and make profits, and insurer investment activities are central to 
solvency regulation.  The likelihood of investment losses figures into the 
size of the required capital cushion and state investment laws outright 
forbid investments that are judged too risky. 10  Currently, credit ratings are 
used extensively in both contexts, as described below.   
 
B.   JUSTIFICATION FOR SOLVENCY REGULATION 
 
Manufacturing firms, restaurants, and law firms are not subject to 
solvency regulation.  One might assume that insurers generally wish to 
remain in business and thus have strong incentives to remain solvent on 
their own.  Why should insurers be regulated for solvency? 
When phrased in economic terms, the answer usually is put in 
                                                                                                                 
shaky post-Revolution public finances than protecting the company’s solvency. 
7 Id. at 52. 
8 See generally VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 21, at 106-09; Grace & 
Klein, supra note 43, at 38-40. 
9 The “Financial Analysis Solvency Tools” developed by NAIC are one 
example.  See Martin Eling & Ines Holzmüller, An Overview and Comparison of 
Risk-Based Capital Standards, 26 J INS. REG. 31, 34 (2008).  
10 See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance 
Regulation?: Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1707, 1736 (2010), Id. at 1736 & n.131. 
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terms of “information asymmetries” (the insurer knows better than the 
policyholder whether it is solvent, particularly if policyholders are on the 
whole unsophisticated)11 exacerbated by an “inverted production cycle” 
(the insurer can collect premiums for a long time before enough claims 
materialize to reveal that the firm is insolvent).12  These characteristics 
combine with a “collective action problem” (a large group of policyholders 
is in a poor position to negotiate with the insurer the level of risk of 
insolvency the policyholders will tolerate for any given premium level).13   
Solvency regulation can, in principle, address this issue by requiring 
management to hold enough capital to reduce the risk of insolvency to the 
point to which the policyholders would reduce it if they were capable of 
effectively representing their interests.14   
The point might also be phrased in historical terms:  Unregulated 
insurers apparently have shown a tendency to go bust and disappoint 
policyholders, suggesting that unregulated markets don’t function 
optimally.   No matter how the justification is phrased, solvency regulation 
historically has been based on consumer protection, broadly construed.15  
                                                                                                                 
11 See Grace & Klein, The Future of Insurance Regulation, supra note 34, at 
26 
12 See id. at 27; GUILLAME PLANTIN & JEAN CHARLES ROCHET, WHEN 
INSURERS GO BUST, 42, That in turn means that the managers of firms that are 
getting into trouble have a window of opportunity to employ risky strategies to try 
to return to survival, even though these strategies have a high probability of 
imposing large losses on policyholders by increasing the consequences of 
insolvency.  Id. at 44-45.  Shareholders would not be expected to police such 
behavior because they have no incentive to care about how much the policyholders 
receive if the shareholders are wiped out.  Id. at 56. 
13 See Grace & Klein, supra note 34, at 26; PLANTIN & ROCHET, supra note 
121, at 57. 
14 Economists (and regulators) stress that the goal of solvency regulation is not 
to reduce defaults to zero.  See, e.g., Grace & Klein, The Future of Insurance 
Regulation, supra note 34, at 28 (goal is to “minimize the social cost of defaults”). 
15 See, e.g., Patricia Munch & Dennis E. Smallwood, Solvency Regulation in 
the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Empirical Evidence, 11 BELL. J. ECON. 
261, 261 (1980) (“The rationale for solvency regulation is to protect the interests of 
policyholders, third-party liability claimants and other firms (to whom the 
obligations of an insolvent firm are shifted by guaranty fund arrangements).”).  
The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act can be seen as affirming this.  The Act does recognize the possibility that an 
insurer, together with its affiliates, could become systemically significant and thus 
suitable for regulation as a “nonbank financial company supervised by the Board 
of Governors,” see 31 U.S.C. § 313(c)(1)(C) (added by § 502 of Dodd-Frank), but 
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Indeed, an industry representative recently testified to Congress that 
solvency is “the most important consumer protection of all.”16   
Historically, the justification for insurance solvency regulation has 
not been that insurers’ activities create “systemic risk,” a term that has no 
universally accepted meaning but that will be defined broadly here as the 
imposition of significant costs on actors that are not owners or creditors of 
the firm via effects of insolvency on the financial system as a whole.  
Insurance companies have not been seen as posing systemic risk the way 
that banks (or investment banks in the “shadow banking” system) have 
done.17  The financial crisis has changed this perception to some extent, as 
discussed in Part III, below. 
Despite its venerable age, solvency regulation has been criticized.  
Some authors conclude that if consumers are fully informed of the risk of 
insolvency, then insurers will retain sufficient capital.  This suggests that 
disclosure rather than a prescriptive capital requirement is the appropriate 
policy.18  It is also argued that regulatory costs fall heavily on smaller, 
                                                                                                                 
it shows great solicitude for the importance of consumer protection.  One of the 
main purposes of the Act’s insurance-related provisions is to authorize the 
negotiation of international agreements regarding prudential measures with respect 
to the business of insurance, id. § 314(a), and it limits the agreements it covers to 
those that achieve “a level of protection for insurance or reinsurance consumers 
that is substantially equivalent to the level of protection achieved under State 
insurance or reinsurance regulation.”  Id. § 313(r)(2)(B). 
16 Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products 
Regulation:  Hearing Before the H.. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 
55-57 (2009) (statement of Gary E. Hughes, Executive Vice President. & General 
Counsel, American Council of Life Insurers). 
17 See, e.g., MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 26 (2009) (classifying insurance companies as “non-
systemic large” entities that “need full micro-prudential regulation, but no 
additional macro-prudential regulation.”); Schwarcz, supra note 109, at 1736; 
Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, 
Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND 
BASEL:  BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 15, 23 (Hal S. Scott ed. 2005) 
(“[T]here has been no evidence of the failure of an insurance company being a 
significant source of systemic risk.”); Scott E. Harrington, Capital Adequacy in 
Insurance and Reinsurance, in  CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL, supra, 87, 92 
(Hal S. Scott ed. 2005) (“It generally is agreed that systemic risk is relatively low 
in insurance markets compared with banking, especially for nonlife insurance.”); 
JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 112-14 (3d ed. 
2001). 
18 See Ray Rees et al., Regulation of Insurance Markets, 24 GENEVA PAPERS 
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specialized insurers19 and that any reduction in insolvencies due to 
regulation arises from the fact that these costs reduce the number of small 
firms in the market.  Still other authors criticize the specific measures of 
insolvency risk that U.S. regulators have adopted.20  While these criticisms 
are interesting and provocative, evaluating them is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  The Article proceeds on the assumption that it is unlikely that the 
immediately foreseeable future will bring a revision of the consensus view 
among policymakers that solvency regulation of insurance is appropriate. 
 
C.   THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF SOLVENCY REGULATION:  
STATES AND THE NAIC 
 
Insurance in the United States historically has been and currently is 
regulated at the state level.21  Generally, state insurance regulators are 
                                                                                                                 
ON RISK AND INS.  THEORY 55, 56, 67 (1999); see also Eling & Holzmüller, supra 
note 98, at 32.   The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance are published by The 
Geneva Association, which describes itself as the “ leading international ’think 
tank’ of the insurance industry.”  The Geneva Association,  
http://www.genevaassociation.org/About_Us/Introduction.aspx, (last visited Oct. 
14. 2010). 
19 Anton van Rossum, Regulation and Insurance Economics, 30(1) GENEVA 
PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 43 (2005).  One older study of  capital requirements, 
which apparently examined the effect only of fixed, absolute capital levels, 
generated results that the authors interpreted as supporting the proposition that 
“[m]inimum capital requirements appear to reduce insolvencies by reducing the 
number of small, domestic firms.”   Munch & Smallwood, supra note 154, at 261. 
20 See, e.g., Steven W. Pottier & David W. Sommer, The Effectiveness of 
Public and Private Sector Summary Risk Measures in Predicting Insurer 
Insolvencies, 21 J. FIN. SERV.. RES. 101, 114 (2002) (finding the NAIC’s risk-
based capital ratios and financial analysis solvency tools (FAST) to be worse at 
predicting insolvency than capital adequacy ratios and ratings produced by the 
private credit rating agency A.M. Best, which specializes in insurance). 
21 In Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183, (1868), decided shortly after the birth 
of state-level insurance regulation, the Supreme Court decided that the federal 
government lacked authority to regulate insurance.  The Court reversed its position 
in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).  
In 1945, Congress adopted the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which affirmed the 
primacy of state regulation by declaring “the continued regulation and taxation by 
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that 
silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the 
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.”  15 U.S.C. § 1011.  
See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States:  Regulatory 
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given authority over insurers’ ability to incorporate or conduct business in 
the state in question, and are charged with enforcing requirements created 
by state statutes, which typically include minimum capital levels.22  
Primary responsibility for insurer capital regulation is delegated to the state 
in which the insurer is domiciled, with nondomiciliary states typically 
staying their hands unless the domiciliary state is falling down on the job.23  
It is said that state insurance regulators in the United States typically 
discharge their responsibilities via a rules-based, rather than a principles-
based, approach.24   
The Dodd-Frank Act does not expressly change the federal-state 
balance of power.  Although the Act creates a new Federal Insurance 
Office within the Department of the Treasury, 25 it expressly provides that 
nothing in the provisions establishing and granting authority to the Office 
“shall be construed to establish or provide the Office or the Department of 
the Treasury with general supervisory or regulatory authority over the 
business of insurance.”26  The Act does contemplate international 
harmonization of prudential standards via bilateral or multilateral 
agreements,27 but specifically saves state capital and solvency standards 
from being preempted by such agreements (or otherwise) unless the state 
standards discriminate against non-U.S. insurers.28  In other words, it 
                                                                                                                 
Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 625, 629-34 (1999), for an account of these events.   
22 Grace & Klein, supra note 34, at 38. 
23 Id.  at 39. 
24 Id. at 38. 
25 The Dodd-Frank Act adds new sections 313 and 314 to Title 31 of the U.S. 
Code.  See H.R. 4173. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act  § 1, 31 U.S.C. § 313-14. Section 313(a) establishes the Federal Insurance 
Office within the Department of the Treasury, 31 U.S.C. § 313(a), authorizes the 
Office to monitor the insurance industry and advise the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, id. § 313(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C), (c)(3), and directs the Office to 
report annually to Congress on the industry, id. § 313(n).      
26 Id. § 313(k).  
27 See id. § 314(a) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury and the U.S. 
Trade Representative to negotiate “covered agreements”); id. § 313(r)(2) (defining 
a “covered agreement” as “a written bilateral or multilateral agreement regarding 
prudential measures with respect to the business of insurance or reinsurance that” 
is international and “relates to the recognition of prudential measures with respect 
to the business of insurance or reinsurance that achieves a level of protection for 
insurance or reinsurance consumers that is substantially equivalent to the level of 
protection achieved under State insurance or reinsurance regulation.”).  
28 See id. § 313(j)(1)(D) (as added by Dodd-Frank)  (no preemption of “any 
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appears that a state may maintain whatever capital and solvency regime is 
in place as long as the state treats non-U.S. insurers subject to international 
solvency agreements the same as it treats insurers domiciled in the state. 
Although the state legislatures and insurance regulators have the 
final say in most areas of insurance regulation, that does not mean that 
there are 50 different, independent versions of each regulatory requirement.  
States coordinate their regulatory efforts – at least to some extent – through 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a voluntary 
association of the insurance commissioners of the 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, and the U.S. territories.29 The NAIC has had an important role in 
proposing uniform rules and standards ever since its formation in 1871.30  
In general, the history of the NAIC reflects the tension between state 
regulators’ desire to preserve a state-centric regulatory system and the 
desire to minimize unnecessary contradiction and duplication in regulating 
an increasingly national and international industry.31 
One result of this ongoing tension is a regulatory system that is 
more uniform in some areas than in others.  Solvency regulation is an area 
where substantive standards are “relatively uniform,”32 largely because 
state insurance regulators use the risk-based capital framework that the 
NAIC has developed.33  Although the state of domicile has primary 
regulatory responsibility for the financial condition of any given insurer, 
the use of a common capital regulation framework reduces state-by-state 
variation in how that responsibility is carried out.  One important solvency-
related area in which the NAIC’s efforts have not brought about uniformity 
is in state investment laws, as discussed in Part II.B, below. 
                                                                                                                 
State insurance measure covering the capital or solvency of an insurer, except to 
the extent that such State insurance measure results in less favorable treatment of a 
non-U.S. insurer than a U.S. insurer.”); see also id. § 313(f)(1) (state insurance 
measures preempted only if Director determines that measure results in less 
favorable treatment of a non-U.S. insurer “domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction that 
is subject to a covered agreement” than a U.S. insurer admitted in the state and “is 
inconsistent with a covered agreement.”). 
29 Randall, supra note 210, at 629. 
30 Randall, supra note20Id., at 631-32; see also Paul Walker-Bright, Reed 
Smith LLP on the Potential for Future Regulation of Insurance in Light of AIG, 
Inc.’s Financial Collapse, 2008 LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES 3091.. 
31 See generally Randall, supra note 2021, at 634-40. 
32 Grace & Klein, supra note 43, at 2.  
33 Therese M. Vaughan, The Economic Crisis and Lessons from (and for) U.S 
Insurance Regulation, 9 (unpublished working paper) (on-file with NAIC Journal 
of Insurance Regulation).  
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The NAIC is involved not just in setting standards for insurance 
companies, but also in oversight of the insurers’ operations.  The NAIC’s 
Financial Analysis Division carries out ongoing oversight of all “nationally 
significant insurers” and reports unusual findings to a college of regulators, 
the Financial Analysis Working Group.34  The Working Group, which has 
16 members who have been described as among “the most experienced 
financial regulators in the system of U.S. insurance regulation,” reviews 
companies that have been identified by the Financial Analysis Division and 
discusses such companies’ status with the primary regulator.35  It is said 
that the NAIC uses this process to address problems created by some states 
which tend to be lax in regulating their home insurers.  NAIC’s 
coordination of solvency oversight can help nudge the domiciliary state to 
move if it is not being stringent enough.36   
Since 1990, the NAIC has attempted to promote a minimum level 
of regulatory effectiveness in all states by running an accreditation 
program.  A NAIC accreditation team reviews each state’s laws, 
regulations, and operations every five years, and makes suggestions along 
with recommendations to the other states, who decide whether the state’s 
accreditation should be continued.37  It appears that all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia are now accredited under this program.38 
 
III. CREDIT RATINGS IN U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION 
 
As an NAIC working group recently concluded, “[r]atings are used 
extensively in insurance regulation,” and such reliance is “often required by 
statute.”39  This Part surveys the current role of credit ratings in U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
34 Id. at 10. 
35 Id. 
36 Grace & Klein, supra note 43, at 39. 
37 Vaughan, supra note 33,2, at 11; Grace & Klein, supra note 34, at 39 (in 
addition to state-level financial monitoring, NAIC reviews insurer financial reports 
for larger companies that write business in a significant number of states). 
38 See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 12, at 109 (as of 2007, all states but 
New York were accredited); Press Release, New York State  Ins. Dep’t, Sept. 22, 
2009 (announcing accreditation of New York), available at 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/press/2009/p0909221.htm.  The fact that New York, 
which historically has been viewed as one of the most sophisticated state 
regulators, was unaccredited for so long has been interpreted by some as evidence 
of deficiencies in the accreditation program itself.  See Randall, supra note 2021, at 
663-64. 
39 NAIC RATING AGENCY WORKING GROUP, EVALUATING THE RISKS 
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insurance regulation. 
 
A.   CREDIT RISK, CREDIT RATINGS, AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
Insurers face both fixed and risk-based capital requirements.  Each 
state has a fixed capital requirement for insurers; the requirements range 
from $500,000 to $6 million.40  These numbers suggest that the fixed-
capital requirements are significant only for the smallest insurance 
companies.   
The more important capital requirements are the risk-based capital 
requirements that follow the NAIC framework introduced in the 1990s.41  
The system, which is designed to force insurers that take greater risks to 
hold more capital, is composed of two elements: 42  The first is a risk-based 
capital formula, which establishes the minimum capital level, and the 
second is a model law that authorizes the state insurance regulator to take 
specific action when an insurer’s capital falls below prescribed levels.43  
Under current NAIC rules, credit ratings determine the amount of capital 
insurers must hold. 
 
1. Overview of the Risk-Based Capital Framework 
 
In general outline, an insurer’s risk-based capital (RBC) 
requirement is computed by (1) attempting to quantify “risk charges” and 
various risks the company faces; and (2) combining the resulting risk 
charges for the individual risks into a total capital requirement in a way that 
very roughly takes into account whether the risks are correlated or 
independent. 
Different RBC formulas are used for different types of insurers – 
life, property and casualty, and health -- reflecting differences in the risks 
the insurers face.  A life insurance company’s risk-based capital is used as 
                                                                                                                 
ASSOCIATED WITH NAIC RELIANCE ON NRSRO CREDIT RATINGS – FINAL REPORT 
OF THE RAWG TO THE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS COMMITTEE, 2 (2010) [hereinafter 
RAWG FINAL REPORT]. 
40 Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 89, at 34. 
41 See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 12, at 107 (RBC standards for life 
insurers introduced in 1992, for property and liability insurers in 1993, and for 
health insurers in1997). 
42 National Association of Insurance Commissioners,, Risk-Based Capital 
General Overview (July 15, 2009). 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_capad_RBCoverview.pdf. 
43 NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 312-1, (2007) 
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an example.44 
Consider four risks that a life insurance company faces:45  the risk 
of subsidiaries’ loss due to defaults on their investments (affiliate risk), 
credit risk on the insurer’s investments, interest rate risk, and insurance risk 
(the risk of greater-than-expected losses because of a need to pay out on 
policies).  The losses are combined as follows:46 
 
 
 
As the example shows, some risks are added directly and some are 
added in squares.  This reflects an implicit decision to model the risks that 
are directly added as perfectly correlated, and those that are added in 
squares as independent.47  The example therefore illustrates a determination 
that credit risk and rate risk are perfectly correlated with one another and 
independent of insurance risk.  The risk arising from the combination of 
credit risk, rate risk, and insurance risk is considered perfectly correlated 
with affiliate risk.  Insurance regulators have been taken to task over the 
years for this crude treatment of the correlation of risk.48 
Most risk charges are quantified by applying factors to items on the 
balance sheet.49  For example, according to a document on the Society of 
Actuaries website, insurance risk in the example above is equal to total life 
insurance in force, less reserves (which cover the expected loss from policy 
payouts), multiplied by a factor determined by regulators.50  Computation 
                                                                                                                 
44 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 421, at 2. 
45 The risk-based capital formula takes account of other risks, see id. at 4, but 
they are omitted for ease of exposition.   
46 Id .at 4; Craig F. Likkel & Lloyd M. Spencer, Jr., 2004 Valuation Actuary 
Symposium Boston, Session 14 PD:  Risk-Based Capital (2004), 
http://www.soa.org/files/pdf/14_combo-valact04.pdf.  
47 See PLANTIN & ROCHET, supra note 121, at 34-37. 
48 See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The NAIC Model Investment Law:  A Missed 
Opportunity, in THE STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY:  
ASSET/LIABILITY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 41, 41  (Edward I. Altman & Irwin T. 
Vanderhoof, eds. 1996) . 
49 Nancy Bennett, Panel Discussion, Use of Rating Agency Ratings in State 
Insurance Regulation, RATING AGENCY (E) WORKING GROUP HEARING, Sept. 24, 
2009, 
http:www.naic.org/committees_e_rating_agency_090924_hearing_panel1.htm.  
50 Fred Tavan, Society of Actuaries, Risk-Based Capital, (Feb 28, 2007), 
http://www.soa.org/files/pdf/03-RMTF-RiskBasedCap.pdf.  According to the cited 
document, the factor is 0.1495% for the first $500 million in risk and 0.0975% for 
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of the risk charge for the credit risk of insurer investments is described in 
detail in Part III, below. 
 
2. Regulatory Action Under the Risk-Based Capital 
Framework 
 
The second major component of the risk-based capital framework 
is a risk-based capital model law that authorizes the state insurance 
authorities to take action when the insurer’s capital falls short of prescribed 
levels.51    Whether capital is impaired depends on a comparison of the 
company’s actual capital52 to the minimum required risk-based capital 
derived from the formula discussed above.  Conceptually, the insurer’s 
capital is equal to assets minus liabilities; the rules elaborate on this 
concept in more detail.53 
The minimum risk based capital is also called the “authorized 
control level,” and regulatory actions are keyed to actual capital as a 
percentage of authorized control level.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Regulatory Actions Under NAIC Model Act 31254 
 
Percentage of Regulatory Action 
                                                                                                                 
amounts above $500 million. 
51 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 421, at 1., 
There are two NAIC model laws; one that covers property-casualty insurers and 
life insurers, and one that applies to health insurance companies.  Id. 
52 Grace & Klein, supra note 43, at 39; Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 89, at 
35 (insurer’s “total available capital” is its “statutory capital and surplus”). 
53 For life insurance companies, total adjusted capital is equal to unassigned 
surplus plus asset valuation reserve plus half of dividend liability.  Bennett, supra 
note 498.  The “asset valuation reserve” is an amount deducted from the total 
assets to reflect risks, including default risk.  Id.  “Surplus” is assets minus 
liabilities, and the “asset valuation reserve” is “assigned surplus.”  Id. 
54 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 421, at 4-
5. 
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Authorized Control 
Level 
>200% No action.
150-200% Company Action Level: Insurer must report to 
regulator on what contributed to the company’s 
condition.  Insurer’s plan must contain proposals 
to correct the problems and provide projections 
of financial condition, both with and without the 
corrections, identifying assumptions underlying 
the projections and problems with the insurer’s 
business.
100-150% Regulatory Action Level:  Insurer must file an 
action plan, and state insurance commissioner 
must perform any examinations or analyses of 
the insurer’s business and operations that he or 
she deems necessary, and must issue appropriate 
corrective orders.
70-100% Authorized Control Level:  Regulatory is 
authorized to take control of the insurer. 
<70% Mandatory Control Level:  Regulator is required 
to take steps to place the insurer under control 
 
3. Use of Credit Ratings in Assessing Credit Risk 
 
Insurers of every type are subject to capital charges for credit 
risk.55  The capital charge for a given fixed-income investment, such as a 
bond, note, or mortgage-backed security, is determined by multiplying the 
book value of the investment56 by a “quality coefficient” designed to 
measure the investment’s riskiness.57  Quality coefficients are based on the 
investment’s classification into one of six categories, NAIC-1 to NAIC-6, 
with NAIC-1 corresponding to the lowest credit risk and NAIC-6 the 
highest. 
The default rule has been that insurers must file fixed-income 
                                                                                                                 
55 See id. at 2.(“asset risk – other” is a capital charge for all insurer types); 
Bennett, supra note 498, at 7 (“asset risk – other” include the risk of investment 
defaults). 
56 Investments are carried at acquisition price unless “impaired” (meaning that 
the company does not anticipate that the instrument will perform as agreed).  
Impaired instruments are carried at market value.  Bennett, supra note 498, at 8. 
57 Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 98, at 34. 
2010] RATING DEPENDENT REGULATION  115  
 
 
 
securities they own with the Securities Valuation Office (“SVO”) of the 
NAIC, which assigns each security to one of the six categories and charges 
the insurer for this service. In 2004, however, the NAIC exempted from 
this requirement securities with ratings from recognized rating agencies, as 
discussed in more detail in Part IV.A.1 below.58   
The NAIC rating of a rated security is determined by its agency 
rating, according to fixed mapping between the two schemes, set out 
below.  If the security is rated by just one agency, that agency’s rating is 
used.59  If the security is rated by two agencies, the lower of the two ratings 
is used,60 If the security is rated by more than two agencies, the security’s 
second-lowest rating is used.61 
The upshot is that if a recognized rating agency chooses to issue a 
rating on a debt instrument, the capital charge is based on the agency’s 
rating. 
 
 
Table 2:  NAIC Classifications and Agency Ratings62 
 
                                                                                                                 
58 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Understanding the NAIC 
Filing Exemption (FE) Rule 1, (Feb. 25, 2004), 
http://www.naic.org/documents/svo_FE_FAQ.pdf. The NAIC maintains a list of 
“approved rating organizations” (AROs) whose ratings count for regulatory 
purposes.  The SEC also maintains a list of “nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations” (NRSROs), which is probably more widely known.  The NAIC’s 
AROs appear to be a subset of the SEC’s NRSROs.  rating agencies that the SEC 
has designated “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations” (NRSROs).    
Compare NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, PURPOSES 
AND PROCEDURES MANUAL OF THE NAIC SECURITIES VALUATION OFFICE 36 
(Dec. 31, 2009) (NAIC list of six approved rating organizations) with SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 3-4 (Jan. 2011) (SEC list of ten NRSROs). 
59 See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Request for 
Proposal Pertaining to Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Owned by U.S.-
Domiciled Companies, 12 (Oct. 23, 2009) 
http://www.naic.org/documents/svo_rmbs_rfp_102309.pdf. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 Sholom Feldblum, NAIC Property/Casualty Insurance Company Risk-Based 
Capital Requirements,83 PROCS. CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC’Y, 297, 304-05 (1996); 
Chris Evangel, Panel Discussion, Use of Rating Agency Ratings in State Insurance 
Regulation RATING AGENCY (E) WORKING GROUP HEARING, (Sept. 24, 2009) 
http://www.naic.org/committees_e_rating_090924_hearing_panel1.htm. 
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NAIC Class Bond RBC 
Factor 
Preferred Stock 
RBC Factor 
Agency 
Rating 
Equivalent 
Federal 
Government 
Bonds 
0.0% NA  
1:  Highest Quality 0.3% 2.3% AAA to A- 
2:  High Quality 1.0% 3.0% BBB+ to 
BBB- 
3:  Medium 
Quality 
2.0% 4.0% BB+ to BB- 
4:  Low Quality 4.5% 6.5% B+ to B- 
5:  Lower Quality 10.0% 12.0% CCC+ to 
CCC- 
6:  In or Near 
Default 
30.0% 30.0% CC+ to D 
 
B.   RATING DEPENDENCE AND INVESTMENT LAWS 
 
All states have laws that directly govern the types of investments 
insurers can make.  Unlike capital requirements, which require only that 
insurers maintain a larger financial cushion for riskier investments, state 
investment laws directly govern investment – for example by authorizing 
only certain types of investments and forbidding all others, or by requiring 
that only a certain percentage of investments fall below a credit-rating 
threshold.  State investment laws are also unlike capital requirements in 
that they are quite heterogeneous. As described below, different states 
impose very different requirements, despite an effort at NAIC to 
standardize these rules.   
State requirements of the form “X investment is prohibited absent a 
rating higher than Y” are relatively uncommon, although they do exist, as 
described below.  Ratings also come into play in some states in determining 
whether insurers have excessive exposure to risky assets or excessively 
concentrated portfolios. In aggregate, state investment laws give 
significance to a rating agency’s decision to issue a rating – particularly a 
high one. 
 
1. NAIC’s Model Investment Laws 
 
In 1991, the NAIC created a working group to devise a model law 
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governing all insurer investments.63  Over the course of several years, the 
working group developed a proposal that was based on enumerating the 
specific types of assets an insurer could hold.  This proposal ultimately 
became the Investments of Insurers Model Act (Defined Limits Version),64  
adopted by NAIC in 1996.65  According to NAIC staff annotations, this 
version of the Model Act has been adopted in seven states and the District 
of Columbia.66  According to contemporary accounts, insurers strongly 
resisted the Defined Limits Version, preferring a more open-ended 
investment law that did not enumerate permissible investments in detail, 
but instead permitted any investment that met a general standard of 
prudence.67  This idea became the basis of the Investments of Insurers 
Model Act (Defined Standards Version),68 adopted by NAIC in 1997.69  
The NAIC staff annotations indicate that Georgia, Missouri, and South 
Dakota acted in some respect on the Defined Standards Version of the 
                                                                                                                 
63 See HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 446 (1999). 
64 NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 280-1, §§ 1-32 
(1996) [hereinafter Model Investment Act (Defined Limits Version).] 
65 Id. § 32. 
66 Id. § State Adoption.  According to the NAIC staff, the Defined Limits 
Version of the Model Investment Act has been adopted in Alaska, the District of 
Columbia, Illinois, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, South Carolina, and West 
Virginia. 
67 See Robert M. Ferm & Jon M. Moellenberg, Recent Developments in the 
Public Regulation of Insurance Law, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 447, 460 (1996); Noreen 
J. Parrett & Steven M. Schindhelm, Recent Developments in the Public Regulation 
of Insurance Law, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 553, 564-65 (1997); Mark R. Goodman, 
Recent Developments in the Public Regulation of Insurance Law, 33 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 681, 691(1998). 
68 NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 283-1, §§ 1-19 
[hereinafter Model Investment Act (Defined Standards Version)].  Section 4.B sets 
out the prudency standard in familiar language, providing that the board of 
directors “shall exercise the judgment and care, under the circumstances then 
prevailing, that persons of reasonable prudence, discretion, and intelligence 
exercise in the management of a like enterprise, not in regard to speculating but in 
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income 
as well as the probable safety of their capital.”  Id. at §  4.B. In keeping with the 
general push to take diversification into account in financial regulation, the 
Defined Standards Version expressly directs insurer boards of directors in Section 
5.E to “consider … [t]he extent of the diversification of the insurer’s investments.”  
Id. at § 5.E. 
69  Id. at § 19. 
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Model Investment Act.70 
The Defined Limits Version of the Act relies heavily on the 
NAIC’s six-tier classification system to define permitted investments.  It 
provides that insurers generally may hold only “rated” credit instruments,71  
and restricts an insurer’s holdings of “medium and lower grade 
investments” to specified fractions of the insurer’s total admitted assets.72  
“Medium and lower grade investments” are defined in terms of credit 
ratings.73   
The Defined Limits Version provides that property and casualty 
insurers may invest in investment pools that in turn invest only in 
obligations with NAIC-1 or NAIC-2 ratings, money market funds, or 
securities lending or repurchase transactions.74 
                                                                                                                 
70 Id. at § State Adoption. 
71 See Model Investment Act (Defined Limits Version) § 3.A (“Investments 
not conforming to this Act shall not be admitted investments”); id. Id. at §  11 
(subject to certain limitations,  life and health insurers “may acquire rated credit 
instruments”); id §§ 21, 24 (subject to certain limitations, property and casualty, 
financial guaranty, and mortgage guaranty insurers “may acquire rated credit 
instruments”)/).  In turn, a “rated credit instrument”is defined as a credit instrument 
that meets one of the following tests:  (1) “rated or required to be rated by the 
SVO”; (2) has a maturity of 397 days or less, and issued by an entity that is rated 
by the SVO or an NRSRO recognized by the SVO; (3) has a maturity of 90 days or 
less and is issued by an adequately capitalized bank; (4) is a share of a money 
market mutual fund; or (5) is a share of a class one bond mutual fund.  See id. §§ 
RRR.  Notably, the last two categories are implicitly rating-dependent.  Money-
market funds are required to invest in instruments that have high NRSRO ratings 
or the equivalent.  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)(i), (a)(10).    SEC Investment 
Company Act Rule 2a-7.  Class one bond mutual funds are required to “maintain 
the highest credit quality rating given by an NAIC ARO.”  NAIC PRACS. & PROCS. 
MAN., Part 6, § 2(b)(iii), at 201 (2009). 
72   Model Investment Act (Defined Limits Version) §§ 10 (life and health 
insurers), 23 (property, casualty, and financial and mortgage guaranty insurers).  
NAIC-6 securities may make up only 1% of admitted assets; NAIC-5 and -6 
securities together may make up only 3% of assets; “lower grade investments” may 
make up only 10% of assets, and “medium and lower grade investments” may 
make up only 20% of assets.  Id.   
73 Id. § 1.BBB ( stating that “Medium grade investments” are those rated 
NAIC-3); id. § 1.Z (stating that  “Lower grade investments” are those rated NAIC-
4, -5, and -6).  
74 Id § 25.A.  Recall that money-market funds themselves are required to 
invest only in instruments carrying certain ratings.  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(12)(i), 
(c)(3) 
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Although the Model Investment Act itself has not been widely 
adopted (in either version), it appears that every state has a law governing 
insurance-company investments.75 
 
2. Rating Dependence in State Insurance Investment 
Laws 
 
Apart from the jurisdictions that have adopted the Model 
Investment Act (Defined Limits Version) – Alaska, the District of 
Columbia, Illinois,76 Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey,77 and West Virginia 
– a number of other states’ investment laws rely expressly on ratings.   
This section presents the results of a survey of investment laws of 
several states that are particularly important to insurance regulation, 
specifically California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, and New York.78  The purpose of the survey was to determine the 
extent of rating-dependent regulation in each state.  Most state investment 
laws enumerate specified permitted types of investments and forbid all 
others, although some allow any “prudent” investments.  Laws of the 
former type frequently include rating-based criteria for permitted 
investments.  In addition, credit ratings are used to specify permitted 
investment-pool investments, aggregate exposure limits, and derivative 
counterparty exposures. 
 
a. Direct Authorization 
 
i. Corporate Debt 
 
Most states do not impose direct rating requirements for 
                                                                                                                 
75 Id. § State Adoption (indicating that every state has “related state activity” 
for the Model Investment Act). 
76 Illinois is the domicile of major insurance subsidiaries of Allstate, and is the 
site of the corporate headquarters of State Farm. 
77  It appears that New Jersey has adopted the Model Investment Act only in 
part.  Its provisions are discussed in more detail in the text.  Prudential Insurance is 
domiciled in New Jersey and its principal regulatory authority is the New Jersey 
Department of Banking and Insurance. 
78 The list of states was developed by reviewing the reports of the ten largest 
insurance groups in the United States and determining the principal regulator of 
each group’s major insurance subsidiaries.  This list was supplemented by 
consulting with other academics to identify states that generally are considered 
important insurance regulators. 
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investments in corporate bonds, although there are some exceptions.  One 
important exception is New York, whose investment laws for most non-life 
insurers79 (including financial guaranty insurers) define permitted U.S. 
investments by credit rating, although the rules for life insurers generally 
do not.80 
Minnesota’s general law for life insurers81 provides that 
investments in preferred stock82 and corporate bonds,83 must meet 
minimum rating requirements.  Certain large, well-capitalized life insurers 
are subject to a different requirement. 
 
 
ii. Mortgage-Backed Securities 
 
Mortgage-backed securities are an important exception to the 
general rules that states regulate the instruments in which insurers are 
permitted to invest.  The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act 
(“SMMEA”),84 enacted in 1984, has required state regulators to treat 
mortgage-backed securities that receive high credit ratings85 as the 
                                                                                                                 
79 The provision discussed applies to insurers other than life insurers, nonprofit 
medical/dental insurers, title insurers, and domestic charitable annuity societies.  
N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 1403(a), (c) (McKinney 2006). 
80 N.Y. INS. LAW § 1404(a)(2) (McKinney 2006) (permitting investment in 
obligations of U.S. institutions that are secured or that are “rated A or higher by a 
securities rating agency recognized by the superintendent” or insured by an insurer 
“with a Aaa rating from a securities rating agency recognized by the 
superintendent” or that “have been given the highest quality designation by the 
Securities Valuation Office of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners.”).  The rules for acquiring interests in loans secured by real estate, 
apparently including mortgage-backed securities, are not rating-dependent.  Id. § 
1404(a)(4). The statute does not clearly authorize purchases of ABS. 
81 Minnesota is the domiciliary state for major insurance subsidiaries of The 
Travelers Group. 
82 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.28, subdiv. 6(b)(3) (West 2005) (forbidding 
investments in preferred stock “rated in the four lowest categories” established by 
the SVO). 
83 Id. subdiv. 6(e)(2) (West 2005)(permitting investments in bonds, 
obligations, and notes that are rated in the four highest categories by at least one 
NRSRO, or in one of the two highest categories by SVO).  Id. subdiv. 6(f) (Non-
investment grade obligations must meet an earnings test to be eligible for 
investment).  
84 PUB. L. 98-440, effective Oct. 3, 1984. 
85 15 U.S.C. § 78c(1)(41). 
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equivalent of U.S. government obligations.86  Because insurers are 
universally permitted to invest in U.S. government obligations, SMMEA 
has effectively required states to permit insurers to invest in high-rated 
mortgage-backed securities.  Dodd-Frank repeals the provision of SMMEA 
that tied the preferential treatment of MBS to high credit ratings,87 but the 
repeal does not go into effect until July 2012.88 
SMMEA did provide for a seven-year period in which states could 
affirmatively opt out of its requirement that high-rated MBS be treated the 
same as Treasury bonds.89  It appears that ten states opted out of SMMEA’s 
preemption provisions for insurance,90 including two states that are major 
insurance regulators, Connecticut91 and New York.92  
Even states that did not opt out of SMMEA do have rules 
permitting insurer investment in specified mortgage-backed securities.  
These rules do not refer to ratings, and instead depend on characteristics of 
the mortgages themselves, such as loan priority, loan-to-value ratio, 
whether the mortgages are covered by mortgage insurance, and the 
amortization period of the loans. 93  In light of SMMEA’s requirement that 
insurers be permitted to invest in high-rated mortgage-backed securities, it 
seems that these statutes expand the category of mortgage-backed securities 
in which insurers can invest.   
     
                                                                                                                 
86 15 U.S.C. §77r-1(a)(1) 
87 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,  PUB. L. 
111-203, July 21, 2010. § 939(e). 
88 Id. §939(g). 
89 15 U.S.C. § 77r-1(b). 
90 JASON H.P. KRAVITT ET AL., SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (2010) 
§ 17.05 n.386. 
91 CONN. GEN. ST. ANN. § 38a-102i.  Connecticut permits insurers to make any 
investments that are “prudent in respect of the business of [the] insurance company 
and diversification considerations,” Id. §38a-102(a), subject to limits on the 
percentage of assets that may be invested in the portion of mortgages that exceeds 
a 75% loan to value ratio.  Id. § 38a-102c(f) 
92 N.Y. INS. L. § 1401(c).  New York permits insurers to invest in notes backed 
by first and second mortgages meeting specified loan-to-value thresholds.  See 
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1404(a)(4). 
93 See, e.g.,  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.28, subd. 3; N.J. STAT. ANN. §17B:20-
1(c); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1177 (non-excess funds -- notes backed by insured 
mortgages), 1194.81-82 (excess funds -- notes backed by first or second mortgages 
that meet combination of loan-to-value, mortgage insurance, and amortization 
requirements); N..J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(c) (mortgages meeting combination of 
loan-to-value, agency guarantee, and amortization requirements). 
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iii. Structured Products Other than 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 
 
Minnesota and California have rating-based rules that expressly 
govern insurers’ investments in structured or asset-backed securities.94  
Other states, such as Massachusetts,95 have rating-dependent provisions 
that are drafted broadly enough to cover such investments, even if the term 
“asset-backed” or “structured” is not used.  Still others, such as New York, 
permit insurers to invest in obligations with high ratings issued by 
“institutions” without defining that term.96 
 
iv. Non-U.S Investments 
 
Ratings determine the eligibility of non-U.S. investments for 
insurer investment in New York, 97 Minnesota, 98 and New Jersey. 99   
                                                                                                                 
94 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.28, subdiv.. 8(b) (West 2005) (permitting 
investment in asset-backed arrangements in which at least 90 percent of the dollar 
value of the assets are eligible for direct investment or that have a rating in the top 
four categories from at least one NRSRO or in the top two categories from SVO); 
CAL. INS. CODE §1192.10(a)(3) (West 2005) (permitting asset-backed security 
investments that have ratings in one of three highest categories by at least one 
NRSRO and one of the two highest NAIC categories).  Such investments are 
limited to 10% of an insurer’s total admitted assets.  Id. § 1192.10(b). 
95 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175 § 63(14G) (supp. 2010).  Section 14G 
permits investment in obligations of U.S. and Canadian “institutions,” as defined in 
§63A(1) subject to rating requirements.  Section 63A(1) in turn defines 
“institution” as “a corporation, a joint-stock company, an association, a trust, a 
business partnership, a business joint venture or similar entity.”  This definition is 
broad enough to include typical structured products, which are issued by trusts.  
The specific rating requirement of Section 63(14G) is that the product initially be 
rated “at least BBB- or Baa3 or the equivalent thereof” by an NRSRO recognized 
by SVO and receive an initial or provisional rating of in the top two categories 
from SVO directly or via a filing exemption.  Id. § 63(14G)((1)-(3).  California 
likewise defines “institution” broadly to include business trusts.  See CAL. INS. 
CODE § 1192 (West 2005) (authorizing investment in “interest-bearing obligations 
issued by a nonaffiliate institution”); id. §1196.1(f)(5) (defining “institution” to 
include “business trust”).  See infra note 92 and note 113, (Although California 
does not impose a rating threshold on individual investments, it does limit 
aggregate investments in low-rated obligations of “institutions.”). 
96 N.Y. INS. LAW § 1404(a)(2). (McKinney 2006). 
97 See id., § 1404(a)(6) (permitting non-life insurers to make foreign 
investments “substantially of the same … investment grades as those eligible for 
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b. Aggregate Exposure Limits 
 
Even when state laws do not use ratings to specify permitted 
investments, they often require insurers’ portfolios to satisfy rating 
requirements in the aggregate.  For example, in Minnesota, insurers other 
than life insurers may invest only up to 15 percent of total admitted assets 
in noninvestment grade obligations,100 which are defined in terms of 
ratings.101         California102 and Massachusetts103 impose the same rating-
based limits on aggregate holdings of medium- and low-quality 
investments as the Model Act. Connecticut limits the percentage of assets 
                                                                                                                 
investment under other provisions of this section”); § 1405(a)(7)(C)(i)(I) 
(permitting life insurers to make foreign investments in governments or institutions 
of countries “rated in one of the three highest rating categories by an independent, 
nationally recognized United States rating agency”). 
98 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.29, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2005) (requiring that 
sovereign debt have a rating in the top two categories from an NRSRO to be 
eligible for investment); id. subdiv.. 2(b) (requiring that obligations of a foreign 
business entity have a rating in the four highest categories from an NRSRO “or by 
a similarly recognized statistical rating organization, as approved by the 
commissioner, in the country where the investment is made,” or have a rating in 
the highest two categories from SVO); id. § 60A.11, subdiv.. 14(a)(ii) (permitting 
life insurers to invest in obligations of non-U.S. banks only if the debtor bank “has 
a long-term deposit rating or a long-term debt rating of at least Aa2 as found in the 
current monthly publication of Moody’s Credit Opinions or its equivalent.”). 
99 See N..J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(e)(1)(a) (West 2006) (limiting investments 
to those in obligations of institutions or governments of jurisdictions “rated in one 
of the two highest categories by an independent, nationally recognized United 
States rating agency.”); id. 17B:20-1(e) (A life insurer may invest up to 3% of 
aggregate assets in aggregate in countries that do not meet the rating standard).  
100 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60A.11, subdiv.. 17(d) (West 2005). 
101 See id. § 60A.11, subdiv.. 10(i) (defining “noninvestment grade 
obligations” as “obligations which, at the time of acquisition, were rated below 
Baa/BBB or the equivalent by a securities rating agency or which, at the time of 
acquisition, were not in one of the two highest categories” established by SVO). 
102 See CAL. INS. CODE § 1196.1(a)(6) (West 2005) Compare id. § 1196.1(a) 
with  NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGUALTIONS, AND GUIDELINES 280-1 § 10.B (2001).  
California law also provides that affiliated insurers may invest in “cash 
management pools” that hold corporate debt obligations, as long as the obligations 
have a maturity of less than one year and carry an NAIC-1 or NAIC-2 rating.   
103 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175 § 63A(1) (West 1998) (defining “medium grade 
obligation” and “lower grade obligations” in terms of NAIC ratings); id. § 63A(2) 
(limits on investment in medium and lower-grade bonds). 
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that can be invested in “high yield obligations,”104 as defined by ratings.105 
 
c. Concentration Limits  
 
Most states’ laws prohibit insurers from investing more than a 
specified fraction of their assets in any one particular entity.  For example, 
New York law prohibits insurers from investing more than 10 percent of 
admitted assets in securities of any one institution.106  Here again, ratings 
may come into play.  In New York. “mortgage-related securities” – defined 
by rating107 -- are simply exempted from the concentration-limit rule.108   
 
d. Pool Requirements 
 
Most states authorize insurers to participate in investment pools.  
Some insurance groups pool investments from multiple regulated insurance 
subsidiaries, presumably to exploit economies of scale.  AIG’s securities-
lending travails arose from such pooling activity.109  Such insurance pools 
are often subject to rating-dependent regulation and often are required to 
invest only in instruments that the insurers contributing the funds could 
invest in.   
New Jersey generally does not impose rating-dependent investment 
limits on property and casualty insurers, although it has adopted Section 25 
of the Model Investment Act (Defined Limits Version), dealing with 
investment pools.110  Notably, it appears that New Jersey law generally 
                                                                                                                 
104 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-102c(c) (2007) (limiting high-yield investments to 
10% of admitted assets). 
105 Id. § 38a-102b(c) (2007) (defining “high yield obligations” as those that 
“are not rated as investment grade by any nationally recognized United States 
rating agency” or NAIC). 
106 N.Y. INS. LAW § 1409(a) (McKineey 2006) (“[N]o domestic insurer shall 
have more than 10 percent of its admitted assets…invested in, or loaned upon, the 
securities…of any one institution.”).  New York’s rating-based definition of a 
mortgage-related security parallels the federal definition.  Compare 15 U.S.C. 
§78c(1)(41). 
107 Id. § 1401(a)(2) (“’Mortgage-related security’ means an obligation that is 
rated AA or higher (or the equivalent thereto) by a nationally recognized securities 
rating agency” and meets other criteria). 
108 Id. § 1409(c) (10 percent limit does not apply to “mortgage-related 
securities” or securities issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac). 
109 See infra note 269. 
110 See N..J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:24-28 to -36. (West 2007). 
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does not authorize property and casualty insurers to invest in corporate 
bonds or asset-backed securities other than mortgage-backed securities, 
which are not defined in terms of ratings.111   
 
e. Derivative Exposures 
 
Ratings also play a role under New York law in defining the parties 
with whom insurers can enter into derivatives transactions.  Insurers are 
prohibited from amassing derivative exposure of more than 3 percent to 
parties other than “qualified counterparties.”112  “Qualified counterparties” 
are “qualified banks,” “qualified broker-dealers” and other counterparties 
“rated AA-/Aa3 or higher by a nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization” and approved by the Superintendent of Insurance.113  A 
“qualified bank” in turn is defined as one that is AA-rated.114  Although 
“qualified broker-dealer” is defined in terms of size and not rating,115 
ratings also are relevant in that any derivative exposure to a counterparty is 
treated as an obligation of that counterparty,116 so that non-life insurers 
apparently can take derivative exposure only to counterparties meeting 
rating requirements according to the rules for investment in obligations of 
U.S. companies. 
 
 
f. Non-Rating-Based Authorizations 
 
State statutes often will authorize investments without regard to 
ratings.  In addition to the common practice of permitting mortgage-backed 
security investments without regard to ratings described above, 
California,117 Connecticut,118 New Jersey,119 Massachusetts,120 
                                                                                                                 
111 See id.. § 17:24-1. 
112 N.Y. INS. LAW § 1410(f)(2)(A) McKinney 2006). 
113  Id § 1410(f)(3)(A). 
114 Id  § 1410(f)(3)(C)(iv). 
115 Id  § 1410(f)(3)(B). 
116 Id. § 1410(f)(1). 
117 See Cal. Ins. Code § 1192(a) (West 2005) (corporate bonds);  
118 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-102(a) (2010) (Insurers may make all such 
investments “as are prudent in respect of the business … and diversification 
consideration.”) 
119 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:20-1(d) (West 2005) (authorizing New Jersey life 
insurers to invest in corporate bonds without regard to ratings).  The law does not 
appear to specify any standard of creditworthiness for these investments.  See id. 
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Minnesota,121 and New York122 all expressly permit certain types of 
investments without regard to rating.    When ratings are not required for 
individual investments, the statute often provides that the insurer must 
make only “prudent”123 or “sound”124 investments.   
g. Catch-all Provisions 
 
Even when rating-dependent requirements limit insurer 
investments, state investment laws typically provide “catch-all provisions” 
that permit investments of relatively modest size in instruments that do not 
meet other requirements. 125 
                                                                                                                 
120 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175 § 63(7) (West 2010) (real-estate loans); id. § 
63(14A) (corporate bonds).  MassMutual and its two principal insurance 
subsidiaries, C.M. Life and MML Bay State Life, are domiciled in Massachusetts.   
121 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60L.02 (West 2010) (requiring $2 billion in 
admitted assets, NRSRO rating in one of the three highest categories, plus other 
criteria, for exemption eligibility) 
122 New York is the principal regulator for the New York Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company, as well as for insurance subsidiaries of AIG.  N.Y. INS. LAW § 
1405(a)(2) (McKinney 2010) (preferred stock); id. § 1405(a)(3) (obligations 
secured by real property); id. § 1405(a)(5) (obligations secured by personal 
property). 
123 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-102(a) (insurers may make all such investments 
“as are prudent in respect of the business … and diversification consideration.”); 
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1405(c) (requiring directors and officers to use “that degree of 
care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances” in making investments); see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60L.04, subdivs. 
1-2 (authorizing insurer exempt from default investment rules to “loan or invest its 
funds … to the same extent as any other corporation or person under the laws of 
this state or the United States,” but requiring that board of directors “exercise the 
judgment and care … that persons of reasonable prudence, discretion, and 
intelligence exercise in the management of a like enterprise”); id. § 60L.05(5) 
(establishing “the extent of the diversification of the insurer’s investments” as a 
criterion for evaluating prudence of investment).  Connecticut is the domiciliary 
state for major insurance subsidiaries of The Travelers Group and The Hartford.   
124 CAL. INS. CODE § 1196(a) (West 2005).  California is the domiciliary state 
for the major insurance subsidiaries of Farmers Group, Inc. (which are organized 
as inter-insurance exchanges under California law), as well as of a major insurance 
subsidiary of Allstate 
125 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.28, subdiv.. 12; CAL. INS. CODE §1210. 
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IV. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FAILURE OF RATINGS 
ON NOVEL, UNSEASONED PRODUCTS 
 
The way in which ratings were incorporated into the regulatory 
system made it possible for insurers to take on exposures to novel financial 
products such as subprime and Alt-A residential mortgage-backed 
securities and collateralized debt obligations.    The capital requirements 
regime was built around agency credit ratings, and in many instances state 
investment laws directly required high ratings for insurer investment in 
novel instruments.   
During the financial crisis that started in 2007, these products also 
suffered a high incidence of large credit-rating downgrades that can be 
described as unexpected, even unprecedented.  Although it will always be 
possible to argue that the ratings did not “fail” in some sense, all the major 
credit rating agencies have conceded that their ratings on novel products 
did not perform as well as intended during the financial crisis. 
Although the solvency-rated U.S. insurance industry reportedly 
fared better in the financial crisis starting in 2007 than the banking 
industry, the poor performance of formerly high-rated novel products did 
create some important problems for the industry.  The underperformance of 
such products was quite important to the failure of the bond insurance 
industry and of AIG, although it can be argued that the latter case does not 
impugn the existing capital and investment requirements for regulated 
insurers as the fatal exposures were undertaken by an unregulated affiliate 
of the insurance companies.  The poor performance of life insurers’ novel-
product investments also put stress on that segment of the industry, leading 
to regulatory changes as described in Part IV, below. 
 
A. Subprime and Alt-A RMBS and CDOs Are Novel 
 
1. Subprime and Alt-A RMBS 
 
Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) are not 
particularly novel – the first private-label securitization dates to 1983 – but 
MBS backed by subprime and “Alt-A” mortgages extended to borrowers 
with poor credit are of more recent vintage.  A 2007 study put it thus:  
“Until very recently, the origination of mortgages and the issuance of 
mortgage-backed securities was dominated by loans to prime borrowers 
conforming to underwriting standards set by the Government Sponsored 
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Agencies.”126 
One highly influential account, by Gary Gorton, describes 
subprime and Alt-A mortgages as reflecting a distinctive, novel security 
design for a distinctive purpose:  enabling the lender to lend profitably to 
borrowers with poor credit risk.127  He emphasizes the prepayment penalty 
and interest step-up features of subprime RMBS in describing such 
mortgages as effectively creating “compound options” on the underlying 
property for the lender, thereby increasing the lender’s exposure to home 
price appreciation.128  Whether one accepts this specific explanation or not, 
secured lending based on collateral value rather than the borrower’s ability 
to repay has to increase the lender’s sensitivity to collateral price changes.  
Rating conclusions based on the history of prime RMBS thus were less 
relevant to these securities.129 
The scale of subprime and Alt-A issuance is certainly a novel 
phenomenon.  As recently as 2001, subprime and Alt-A securitization 
totaled $98.5 billion, as compared to $1,087.6 billion for agency-backed 
securitizations and total mortgage origination of $2,100 billion.130  By 
2006, subprime and Alt-A securitization was $814.3 billion, as compared to 
$904.6 billion in securitizations by government-sponsored entities, such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.131  This reflected a massive expansion in the 
extent of subprime mortgage origination132 and a doubling in the 
                                                                                                                 
126 Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Scheuermann, Understanding the Securitization of 
Subprime Mortgage Credit, 2 (March 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York). 
127 Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic,  4 (Yale Int’l Ctr. For Fin. , Working 
Paper No. 08-25, 2008)  
128 Id. at 5. 
129 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT 118 (2011) (“Moody’s did not even develop a model specifically to take 
into account the layered risks of subprime mortgages until late 2006, after it had 
already rated nearly 19,000 subprime securities”)l id. at 120-21 (describing 
evolution of Moody’s models).  Although for of the ten members of the Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission dissented from the report in two separate dissent, none 
of dissenters contested the majority’s findings about ratings on subprime RMBS, 
and the dissent in which three of the four dissenting commissioners joined stated 
that one of the “ten essential causes” of the crisis was “failures in credit ratings and 
securitization.”  Id. at 418. 
130 Ashcraft & Scheuermann, supra note 1216, at 7 (jumbo originations, i.e. 
mortgages to prime borrowers that were too large to meet GSE guidelines -- and 
originations that were not securitized made up the difference). 
131 Id. at 7 
132 Jie He , Jun Qian & Philip E. Strahan.  Credit Rating and the Evolution of 
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percentage of subprime mortgages that were securitized. 133 Although there 
is no universally accepted definition of a “subprime” mortgage, one 
estimate is that total origination of subprime mortgages increased from $65 
billion in the late 1990s to over $600 billion in 2006, with subprime 
accounting for about a third of total mortgage volume in 2006.134   
 
2. Growth of the CDO Market 
 
CDOs can be defined as structured finance securities in which the 
cash flows from a pool of assets are divided into senior and junior debt 
classes, called “tranches.”135  The CDO market exploded in the years 
leading up to the crisis, with global CDO issuance going from $157.4 
billion in 2004 to $551.7 billion in 2006.136  The number of CDO tranches 
issued nearly doubled from 2005 (4,708 tranches) to 2006 (9,278 
tranches).137 
 
B.   EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THAT RATINGS ON RMBS AND CDOS 
FAILED 
 
                                                                                                                 
the Mortgage-backed Securities Market, 6 (March 2010) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with Boston College Department of Finance) (subprime origination 
increased from $65 billion around the turn of the century to over $600 billion in 
2006).  Subprime reportedly accounted for 13% of total mortgage origination in 
2007.  HAL S. SCOTT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (2009). 
133 SCOTT, supra note 121132, at 3 (proportion of subprime mortgages 
securitized rose from 46% to 93% from turn of the century to 2006)/  
134 He, Qian & Strahan, supra note 121 132 at 6; SCOTT, supra note 121132, at 
2. 
135 Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Credit Rating Crisis 6; (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15045); see also Dan Luo, Dragon 
Yong Tang & Sarah Qian Wang, A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing: Data 
History, Model Uncertainty, and CDO (Mis-)Pricing 4 (November 15, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the School of Economics and Finance, 
University of Hong Kong) available at www.fma.org/iamen/BayesianCDO.pdf 
(CDO issuance grew from $17 billion in 1997 to over $500 billion in 2006-07).  
Some commentators use a more general definition of CDO  that would include 
non-tranched structures.  “CDOs entail the use of securitisation techniques to 
create structured exposure to portfolios of multiple reference entities.”  SATYAJIT 
DAS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES, CDOS & STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS 305-06 (3d 
ed. 2005). 
136 Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 13524, at 7. 
137 Id. at 7. 
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Structured products in general suffered a high rate of severe 
downgrades in 2007 and 2008.  7.2% and 6.7% of tranches rated by 
Moody’s were downgraded in 2007 and 2008 respectively, and the average 
downgrade was 4.7 and 5.6 notches.138  This compares to an average rate of 
downgrade on structured-finance securities of 1-2% per year.139  The 
majority of the downgrades were on securities backed by first mortgages, 
home equity loans (a category that apparently includes subprime loans), 
and CDOs of ABS.140 
One leading commentator puts it as follows:  “Events since mid-
2007 have demonstrated that the major [rating agencies] grossly 
underestimated the risk of loss associated with several types of structured 
financial products that lay at the heart of the financial crisis.”141 
 
1. RMBS 
 
About 90% of rated RMBS value issued in the U.S. from 2003 to 
2006 received AAA ratings, and 99.76% of rated issuance received 
investment-grade ratings.142  Between December 2007 and September 
2008, these securities experienced an extraordinarily high downgrade rate.  
Adelino studies a sample covering 80% of RMBS issued in the U.S. 
between 2003 and 2007,143 documenting the rapid growth of the market 
during this period.144 Adelino does not distinguish between subprime/Alt-A 
and conventional RMBS.  The proportion of AAA-rated securities that had 
been downgraded went from 0.5% to 16.2%, with equally dramatic 
increases in downgrades among the lower rating classes.145  AAA-rated 
RMBS had not yet been hit by a high level of default at the time of 
Adelino’s study, although there were a few defaults even in this 
category.146  Nevertheless, the level of downgrades was significant.  
                                                                                                                 
138 Id. at 24. 
139 Id. at 24. 
140 Id. at 25. 
141 SCOTT, supra note 13221, at 125. 
142 See Manuel Adelino, Do Investors Rely Only on Ratings? The Case of 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 13, 42 tbl.1 (Nov. 24, 2009) (unpublished working 
paper) (on file with author). 
143 Id. at 10. 
144 Id. at 42 tbl.1 (RMBS issuance covered by sample increased for $496.5 
billion in 2003 to $1,080.4 billion in 2006). 
145 Id. at 43 tbl.2. 
146 Id. at 43 tbl.3 (0.4% of 2006-issued AAA RMBS had defaulted by 
September 2008). 
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Ratings are designed to be stable through the credit cycle, so mass 
downgrades are themselves a sign of trouble.  As Adelino points out, the 
16% downgrade rated for AAA-rated RMBS issued between 2003 and 
2006 contrasts with a historical one-year probability of downgrade on 
triple-A structured finance instruments is less than 1 percent.147  By June 
2009, Bank of America Merrill Lynch reported that over 64% of all AAA 
rated non-agency RMBS had been downgraded to below investment grade 
by at least one rating agency.148 
Ashcraft catalogues a series of what he describes as “honest 
mistakes” in rating RMBS, including underestimating the severity of the 
housing cycle and model error brought on by “the lack of comprehensive 
historical data,” particularly with respect to subprime mortgages, for which 
historical data was “largely confined to a relatively benign economic 
environment with very little data on periods of significant negative home 
price appreciation.”149 
 
2. CDOs 
 
CDOs experienced a large number of severe downgrades in 2007 
and 2008, accounting for 13% of structured-finance downgrades in 2007 
and 22% in 2008.150   
The performance of ABS CDOs – CDOs where structured products 
such as CDOs and MBS make up the underlying pool of assets – is of 
particular interest because of ABS CDOs’ role in the collapse of monoline 
insurers.  By January 2008, 17.35% of ABS CDOs insured by MBIA and 
Ambac had been downgraded at least once, with only 3.63% upgraded.151  
Barnett-Hart’s examination of a different sample of ABS CDOs reveals 
that AAA tranches from 2005, 2006, and 2007 had been downgraded to 
average ratings of BBB, B-, and CCC+ respectively by June 2009.152 
Many CDOs were made out of RMBS – for example, around 70% 
of ABS CDOs insured by Ambac and MBIA had RMBS or home equity as 
                                                                                                                 
147 Id. at 15. 
148 Letter from John Bruins and Andrew Melnyk, ACLI, to Lou Felice and 
Michael Moriarty, NAIC (Sept. 10, 2009) (on file with NAIC). 
149 Adam B. Ashcraft, Discussion of Alchemy of CDO Ratings, 56 J. OF 
MONETARY ECONOMICS 635, 637 (2009). 
150 Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 124135, at 33 tbl.4. 
151 Id. at 18. 
152 Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown:  
An Empirical Analysis 24 fig.10 (Mar. 19, 2009) (unpublished A.B. honors thesis, 
Harvard College) (on file with Harvard College). 
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collateral153 – and for those CDOs any errors in rating RMBS would have 
been compounded.154 
Because of the tranched structure common to CDOs, a critical 
aspect of CDO rating and pricing is the correlation of defaults among the 
underlying assets of the CDO.  If raters rate the correlation too low, then 
the ratings will be too high.  If market participants assess the correlation as 
too low, then the tranche prices will be too high.  Default correlation, 
however, is difficult to estimate accurately because defaults are generally 
relatively rare events.   It is widely believed that rating agencies and the 
market assessed CDOs assets’ correlation as too low, resulting in over-
rated and over-priced CDOs.155  For example, a national decline in real-
estate prices would result in a lot of homeowners defaulting on their 
mortgages at once (i.e., in a highly correlated fashion).  Some researchers 
have argued that CDOs were inherently difficult for any market participant 
to evaluate because of limited data156 and fundamentally flawed models,157 
so that ratings were more or less destined to be of low quality.  More 
jaundiced observers point to the fact that one rating agency’s model for 
CDOs based on corporate bonds assumed no correlation between 
companies in different industries.158 
 
3. Other Examples of Novel-Product Rating Failure 
 
It is sometimes argued that the underlying problem with ratings on 
novel products in the financial crisis was a generally unanticipated national 
decline in house prices.  Although this certainly contributed to the collapse 
of RMBS and CDO valuations, there are examples of rating failure on 
                                                                                                                 
153 Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 124135, at 15. 
154 See Ashcraft, supra note 13498, at 638 (arguing that CDO investors did not 
“look through” credit ratings on RMBS to underlying collateral, instead “focusing 
on Monte Carlo simulations which took the CRAs’ view of nonprime RMBS as 
given.”). 
155 See, e.g., Luo et al., supra note 13524, at 5. 
156 Id. at 2 (“Because defaults are rare and credit cycles take a long time to 
materialize . . . a short data history, say, five years of month[ly] observations, will 
significantly underestimate the tail distribution of the credit portfolio and default 
correlation.”). 
157 Id. at 3.  Luo et al.’s comment about model error reflects their view that a 
very specific model change (to incorporate a “frailty factor”) is highly desirable.  
The authors’ point about short data histories survives and is independent of this 
very specific and contestable view about appropriate models.  Id. 
158 Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 124135, at 20. 
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specific novel products that are not tied to housing or real estate.  For 
example, the market for CPDOs (“collateralized proportional debt 
obligation”), a novel product introduced in 2006, collapsed in 2007 after a 
wave of downgrades.  The underlying asset for a CPDO is an index of 
corporate credit spreads and the product has no direct connection to real 
estate.159   The rise and fall of collateralized bond obligations (CBOs) tells 
a similar story.  Issuance of this product rose from approximately zero in 
1994 to $25 billion in 2000.  By 2003, issuance was back to zero after a 
rash of downgrades.  The CBO market had recovered to the $3-$5 billion 
level by 2007-08, suggesting the possibility that market participants had 
recovered confidence on ratings on this product.160 
 
C.   LOSSES ON RMBS AND CDOS HARMED INSURERS 
 
1. Financial Guaranty Insurers 
 
The exposure of financial guaranty insurers such as Ambac and 
MBIA to ABS CDOs is a well-known part of the story of their downfall.  
Monoline insurers apparently took on a large proportion of the credit 
exposures created by high-rated CDO tranches.  S&P estimated that FGI 
firms backed $127 billion in CDOs with some subprime loan exposure.161  
Gorton estimates that FGIs held 26% of AAA CDO tranches.162  The two 
largest bond insurers, Ambac and MBIA, had each sold CDS protection on 
around $30 billion of CDO exposure by 2007.163  These CDO exposures, 
which have been described as the “principal reason for Ambac’s significant 
losses” during the financial crisis, led to mark-to-market losses of $5.9 
billion in 2007 and $4.0 billion in 2008 and created a $10 billion liability 
                                                                                                                 
159 John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit 
Crisis”:  The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for 
Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 123 (2009) [hereinafter Hunt, CRAs 
and the WWCC]. 
160 See Benmelech & Dlugosz, supra note 124135, at 24, fig.6a. 
161 SCOTT, supra note 121132, at 5. 
162 See Pamela Peterson Drake & Faith Roberts Neale, Financial Guarantee 
Insurance and the Failures in Risk Management 17 n.60 (May 2010) (unpublished 
working paper) (citing Gorton). 
163 Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket:  A Case 
Study of Derivative Diclosures During the Financial Crisis 5 (UC Berkeley Public 
Law Research Paper No. 1585953, Mar. 15, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585953.  
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on the company’s balance sheet.164  By March 2010, MBIA had actually 
paid $3.8 billion in claims on RMBS exposures and had a negative 
unassigned surplus, which prevented it from writing new business.165 
 
2. AIG 
 
AIG had written CDS protection on $61.4 billion on multi-sector 
CDOs with subprime housing exposure by 2007.166  AIG suffered write-
downs to its CDS portfolio totaling $11 billion in 2007 and $20 billion in 
the first nine months of 2008.167  Under the CDS agreements, AIG was 
required to post collateral on account of the write-downs, and collateral 
calls in July and August 2008 totaled $6 billion, or about 1/3 of the cash 
AIG had on hand as of July 1.168 When AIG lost its AAA credit rating on 
September 15, 2008, this triggered a further $20 billion in collateral calls 
under the agreements, plunging AIG into distress and leading to its 
government bailout the next day.169 
 AIG also had cash difficulties arising from its securities lending 
program, because it received cash collateral in exchange for lending out 
high-quality securities and invested that cash in RMBS.  When AIG’s 
counterparties became concerned about AIG’s situation, returned the lent 
securities, and demanded return of the cash collateral, AIG was not able to 
sell the RMBS, so that its cash was further drained, to the tune of $3.3 
billion through August 31, 2008.170 
 
3. Life Insurers  
 
Life insurers held substantial amounts of non-agency RMBS -- 
$145 billion as of year-end 2008.171 
 
                                                                                                                 
164  Id. at 27. 
165 Moody’s Comments on MBIA’s Fourth Quarter Earnings and Ongoing 
Litigations, (Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://www.mbia.com/investor/ratings/Moodys_030510.pdf. 
166 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE. L REV. 943, 
959 (2009).  
167 See id. at 960. 
168 Id. at 961. 
169 Id. at 962. 
170 Id. at 962–63. 
171 ACLI Letter, supra note 137148, at 3. 
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D.   RATING FAILURE, RATING AGENCY FAULT, AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF SEASONING 
 
The debate over whether rating agencies are at fault for poor-
quality ratings, by committing a species of fraud or otherwise, focuses 
attention on whether agency ratings were as good as could be reasonably 
expected.172  But even if ratings were as good as could be expected, that 
does not necessarily mean that they were good enough for any and all 
purposes.  If ratings on novel products are unreliable because of a lack of 
data on the products’ performance and experience in modeling the 
products, then permitting an regulated insurer to invest in that product on 
the basis of the rating is a questionable decision, even if the rating agency 
did as well as it could have done or as well as the average or above-average 
investor could have done.  
 A corollary to this is that one would expect ratings to become 
more reliable over time with the accumulation of data and experience.  
Indeed, the major rating agencies already have comprehensively revamped 
their rating methodologies for RMBS and CDOs as a result of the crisis.  It 
seems to make more sense to give regulatory effect to ratings after the end 
of an appropriate seasoning period than to do so immediately and without 
regard to whether ratings on the product have proven themselves reliable. 
 
V. THE NAIC’S RATING AGENCY WORKING GROUP:  FIXING 
RATINGS VERSUS REGULATING INSURANCE  
 
The NAIC’s risk-based capital framework and federal and state 
                                                                                                                 
172 See,e.g., Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 2011 WL 1134321 
(N.D. Cal. March 27, 2011) (denying rating agencies’ motion to dismiss negligent 
misrepresentation claims based on agencies’ award of AAA ratings to auction-rate 
securities); In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. Secs. Litig., 2011 WL 321142 (Feb. 1, 
2011) ; King County v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying rating agencies’ motion to dismiss common-law fraud 
claims based on agencies’ award of AAA ratings securities issued by Rhinebridge 
SIV (structured investment vehicle)); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan 
Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying rating agencies’ 
motion to dismiss common-law fraud claims based on agencies’ award of AAA 
ratings to securities issued by Cheyne SIV (structured investment vehicle)); 
California Public Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Moody’s Corp. (Cal. Super. Ct. 
May 24, 2010) (overruling rating agencies’ demurrer to claim for negligent 
misrepresentation based on award of AAA ratings to Cheyne, Stanfield Victoria, 
and Sigma Finance SIVs (structured investment vehicles)). 
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investment laws have conferred an important gatekeeping role on credit 
ratings.  In many cases, a recognized rating agency’s decision to rate an 
investment product authorizes insurers to invest in that product.173  This is 
important because insurers are responsible for a large fraction of fixed-
income investment.  Some rating-dependent rules rely on high ratings, as 
explained above, and thus may encourage ratings inflation.  But all rating-
dependent rules depend on the fact of receiving a rating, and none 
expressly distinguishes between ratings that are likely to be reliable and 
ratings that are less likely to be reliable.174  This is curious, because the 
reliability of a rating ought to be as important for regulation as how high 
the rating is.   
The apparent failure of ratings on a number of products175 has led 
state insurance regulators to reexamine the role of ratings in their 
regulations.  Although this reexamination was initially quite broad-ranging, 
it has narrowed significantly in scope.  It now seems unlikely that the 
NAIC will abandon credit ratings completely.  Credit ratings offer insurers 
and their regulators credit assessments at low cost, and historically ratings 
from the major agencies have enjoyed a fairly high degree of market 
acceptance.  The insurers who foot the bill for regulatory credit 
determinations historically have liked the arrangement, citing its low cost.  
Regulators may not want the large, difficult and unrewarding task of 
making credit assessments on thousands of different financial instruments.  
Most importantly, there are no terribly appealing alternatives to rating-
dependent regulation or something very much like it.176   
Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that the NAIC does not 
seem to be on a path to complete elimination of ratings from its regulations.  
The NAIC is not alone among regulators in its reluctance to follow that 
                                                                                                                 
173 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
174 The fact that only ratings from approved agencies “count” 
 under NAIC rules, see supra note 658, attempts to distinguish between reputable 
and nonrepuatable rating agencies, but no finer distinction appears in the NAIC 
rules.  The rules do not contemplate the possibility that an agency might do a good 
job on some ratings and not others.  
175 See discussion supra Part III. 
176 Although the NAIC has replaced credit ratings on some structured financial 
products with outsourced assessments provided by private parties that are not 
rating agencies, see discussion infra  Part IV.B.3, the new arrangement seems to 
exhibit many of the same benefits and potential problems are rating-dependent 
regulation. It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that the shift is better 
understood as a change in the form of rating-dependent regulation than as a move 
away from rating-dependent regulation to something else. 
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path to its end – for example, the  SEC also tabled reforms of rating-
dependent regulation until commanded by Congress to eliminate ratings.  
Rating-agency reformers, by contrast, are often quite eager to 
eliminate credit ratings from regulation, pointing to the way in which 
ratings warp agencies’ incentives and arguing that ratings are generally 
uninformative.  (Indeed, the two largest rating agencies themselves voice 
agreement with the first statement, although not the second.)  It seems that 
there is a persistent conflict between capital regulators and rating-agency 
reformers on this score. 
The rating-agency reformers won out in the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which seems to require 
elimination of credit ratings from federal regulation, and which removes a 
number of federal statutory requirements that incorporate credit ratings into 
financial regulation177 – including the provision of SMMEA that requires 
state insurance regulators to permit insurers to hold high-rated mortgage-
backed securities178.  As one might anticipate, federal regulators are 
resisting this mandate.  Even apart from that, state insurance regulators’ 
reluctance to give up on rating-dependent regulation threatens to undermine 
the federal goal of improving rating agencies’ incentives by eliminating 
rating-dependent regulation.  The use of ratings in capital regulation 
threatens to become a source of tension in the ongoing struggle between 
state and federal authority in the regulation of insurance. 
If regulators were to rely only on ratings on seasoned products – 
products in existence long enough for analysts to have a good sense of how 
the product is likely to perform under various economic conditions – that 
would accommodate the most important interests both of those who want to 
rely on credit ratings and of rating-agency reformers who want to minimize 
reliance on such ratings.  Regulators and regulated parties could continue to 
rely on ratings for traditional products, preserving the low cost of the 
rating-dependent system and addressing any concerns regulators might 
have about being made responsible for routine credit determinations.   
A seasoning requirement therefore is a feasible solution to the 
conflict between regulators and rating-agency reformers.  A seasoning 
requirement also would mitigate the major problems with rating-dependent 
regulation.  The worst-performing ratings have been on novel products, as 
one might expect given the agencies’ lack of experience with them.  And it 
is in the context of certifying novel products for acceptance that rating-
dependent regulation has its worst effects on agency incentives for quality. 
                                                                                                                 
177 PUB. L. 111-203 (July 21, 2010) §939. 
178 PUB. L. 111-203 (July 21, 2010) §939(e). 
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A. THE NAIC’S USE OF RATINGS:  A CASE STUDY IN 
REGULATORY OUTSOURCING 
 
1. The “Filing Exempt” Rule 
 
The NAIC adopted the “filing exempt” rule (“FE Rule”), effective 
January 1, 2004.179  The Rule provides that bonds and preferred stock that 
have a current, monitored rating by an NRSRO do not have to be filed with 
the NAIC’s Securities Valuation Office.180  In effect, the Rule permits 
insurers to decide to delegate the SVO’s credit assessment function to the 
credit rating agencies, at least for issues that the agencies decide to rate.  If 
an insurer chooses to have the issue rated by the SVO, the insurer must pay 
a fee.181 
Unsurprisingly, insurers prefer to use rating agencies:  They use 
ratings from the rating agencies rather than the SVO for about 80% of their 
holdings,182 and SVO personnel confirm that insurers use SVO ratings 
primarily when the rating agencies do not issue ratings on the instrument in 
question.183 
It appears that the NAIC adopted the Rule in response to concerns 
that the SVO did not have the funding to conduct high-quality credit 
analysis for the entire universe of bonds held by insurers.  An NAIC-
commissioned 1998 report by KPMG Peat Marwick concluded that that the 
“SVO has difficulty completing an in-depth analysis on the more complex 
non-rated issues that due to the large volume of submissions it receives, as 
well limited, qualified, trained staff available to perform the analyses.”184  
The consultants found that there was “a need to either change the mission 
of the SVO and perform much less credit analysis, or to update its 
standards and dramatically increase its resources to improve the quality of 
credit analysis performed.”185   
                                                                                                                 
179 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Understanding the 
NAIC Filing Exemption Rule, supra note 5758, at 1. 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 1-2. 
182 See Evangel, supra note 61, at 11 (percentage computed by author). 
183 Interview with Chris Evangel, Managing Director, Sec. Valuation Office 
(June 29, 2010) 
184 PEAT MARWICK, KPMG, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DUE DILIGENCE 
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES OF THE SECURITIES VALUATION OFFICE 2 (June 
1998) [hereinafter SVO REVIEW]. 
185 Id. at 2. 
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As between those two choices, KPMG recommended the former, 
arguing that there was “little opportunity for the SVO to add value by 
conducting detailed independent credit reviews where an NRSRO or 
insurance company has, or should have, already undertaken such 
analysis.”186  For rated securities, KPMG recommended that the NAIC rely 
on the credit rating to assign the security to one of the six categories;187 for 
unrated securities, KPMG recommended that the NAIC “accept the ratings 
assigned by insurers,”188 at least as to insurers that “comply with a 
comprehensive set of credit rating criteria, credit rating procedures and 
related documentation.”189  In 2000, the NAIC took one step in the 
direction the consultants recommended; it adopted a provisional exemption 
under which corporate and municipal securities that received high ratings 
from credit rating agencies no longer had to be filed with the SVO.190  In 
2004, with the adoption of Rule FE, the exemption became permanent and 
was expanded to all bonds and preferred stock rated by recognized rating 
agencies.191 
 
2. Reexamination of Rating-Dependent Regulation in the 
Financial Crisis of 2007-09 
 
The financial crisis and the attendant criticism of ratings provided 
an occasion for NAIC to reconsider whether to strengthen the role of SVO 
and reduce that of private credit rating agencies.192   In February 2009, the 
NAIC empaneled a Rating Agency Working Group (“RAWG”) to 
reexamine the use of private credit ratings in insurance regulation.  The list 
of issues that RAWG was to address began with “the problems inherent in 
reliance on ratings.”193 Observers expected that the SVO’s role would be 
                                                                                                                 
186 Id.  at 3. 
187 Id.  at 30. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Chris Evangel, Statement and Testimony Befote the NAIC’s Working 
Group Public Hearing, Nov. 18, 2010. 
191 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Understanding the 
NAIC Filing Exemption Rule, supra note 58, at 1.NAIC, Understanding the NAIC 
Filing Exemption (FE) Rule (draft Feb. 25, 2004) , at 1.  “Recognized” agencies in 
this context are those that the SEC has designated “nationally recognized statistical 
rating organizations.”Id. 
192 Vaughan, supra note 323, at 14 (U.S. regulators “revisiting their reliance 
on rating agencies in the risk-based capital system”). 
193 RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398, at 1. 
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upgraded significantly and that the NAIC might even go so far as to set up 
its own credit rating agency.194 
The RAWG held a public hearing in September 2009 and produced 
a draft report in December 2009.195  After receiving a significant number of 
comments and revising the draft, the RAWG presented its final report on 
April 28, 2010.196   The RAWG summarized its recommendations to 
regulators as follows: 
 
• “[E]xplore how reliance on ARO ratings can be reduced 
when evaluating new, structured, or alternative asset 
classes, particularly by introducing additional or alternative 
ways to measure risk;” 
• “Consider alternatives for regulators’ assessment of 
insurers’ investment risk, including expanding the role of 
the NAIC Securities Valuation Office;” and 
• “[T]ake[] into account” “the steps taken by the NRSROs in 
correcting the causes that led to the recent rating 
shortfalls.”197 
 
The final report’s recommendations reject the complete elimination 
of rating-dependent regulation recommended by some commenters and 
apparently embraced by Congress in the Dodd-Frank bill, stating that 
agency ratings “have a role in regulation.”198  At the same time, the RAWG 
does express a commitment to reducing reliance on credit ratings, finding 
that “NAIC policy on the use of [credit] ratings should be highly selective.” 
199 
The RAWG’s specific proposals for changing the use of ratings 
focus on new and structured products.  Consistent with this Article’s 
recommendation that regulators require a seasoning period before 
permitting regulatory use of ratings on novel products200, the Final Report 
                                                                                                                 
194 See Sean P. Carr, NAIC Seeks to Form Its Own Rating Agency, BESTWIRE, 
Oct. 20, 2008, at 1. 
195 NAIC RATING AGENCY WORKING GRP., EVALUATING THE RISKS 
ASSOCIATED WITH NAIC RELIANCE ON NRSRO CREDIT RATINGS – DRAFT FINAL 
REPORT 6 (Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT]. 
196 RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398. 
197 Id. at 1. 
198 Id. at 5. 
199 Id. 
200 See infra Part VIII. 
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recommends that the Valuation of Securities Task Force consider whether 
new investment products “should be ineligible for filing exemption and/or 
instead be subject to regulatory evaluation.”201  For structured products, the 
recommendation is that the NAIC “develop[] alternative methodologies for 
assessing structured security risks,” and render structured products 
ineligible for filing exemption “where an alternative method is adopted.”202  
The merits of this approach are discussed more fully in Part __, below. 
The decision to focus on new and structured finance ratings in 
reforming rating dependent regulation apparently reflects recognition that 
municipal, corporate, and structured finance ratings are not fully 
comparable,203 and in particular that agency ratings are more reliable for 
traditional instruments such as corporate and municipal bonds.   
Accordingly, the Final Report recommends further study to confirm if use 
of ratings in solvency regulation should “differ for municipal, corporate 
and structured securities as general asset classes,”204 and the Report’s 
recommendations on municipal bonds contemplate retention of rating-
dependent regulation in that context.205  The distinction also reflects the 
weight of opinion in the comment letters that the RAWG received.   
Such a distinction makes sense not just in light of the immediate 
history of the performance of novel-product ratings in the financial crisis, 
but also from a theoretical standpoint.  Scholarly treatment of rating 
agencies has emphasized the importance of reputational capital in giving 
agencies incentives to issue only high-quality ratings:  Agencies arguably 
would not risk their reputations for high quality by producing low-quality 
ratings.206  But no agency has an existing reputation for high quality in 
rating novel products, so reputation should not be as effective in this 
                                                                                                                 
201 Id. at 6. 
202 Id. at 6.  The Report also recommends that NAIC continue to “evaluat[e] 
the merit of an alternative method to determine the NAIC designations to 
structured securities, in addition to RMBS,” in an apparent reference to the special 
valuation method NAIC adopted for RMBS.  Id. at 7. 
203 See RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398, at 2-3. 
204 Id. at 4. 
205 Id. at 4-5. 
206 See, e.g., Fabian Dittrich, The Credit Rating Industry:  Competition and 
Regulation 155-54 (July 13, 2007) (unpublished dissertation, University of 
Cologne); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets:  The Rating 
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1-2; Gregory Husisian, Note, What 
Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest Editorials?:  An Analysis of 
Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 426-27 (1990). 
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context.207  
There is but lukewarm support for the idea of upgrading the SVO’s 
role in the Final Report.  A draft recommended that the NAIC “consider the 
possibility of establishing an SVO-like entity as a not-for-profit rating 
agency,”208 but the Final Report adds the critical qualification “where 
[rating agency] rating coverage is not adequate.”209  Given that complaints 
about agency ratings have focused on reliability and quality, rather than 
“coverage,” the Final Report’s language seems to signal abandonment of 
the idea of an NAIC-sponsored rating agency.  Enthusiasm for expanding 
SVO’s role also appears to be waning even in areas that would not require 
NAIC to set up its own rating agency.  For example, the draft report called 
on NAIC to use SVO in developing alternatives to ratings “if supportive of 
consumer protection objectives,”210  but the Final Report omits this 
recommendation.   
Momentum is against shifting against eliminating credit ratings in 
other respects as well.  The December 2009 draft recommended that rating 
agency ratings “should no longer be used to set RBC [risk-based capital] 
for structured securities,” in part because structured securities are 
vulnerable to market risk and are highly illiquid.211  The Final Report states 
instead that NAIC should “develop tools to better address market and 
liquidity risk in structured securities.”212  The December 2009 draft of the 
Report grouped some recommendations under the heading “Eliminate or 
Modify the Filing Exempt Rule”;213 the Final Report’s heading is simply 
“Modify the Filing Exempt Rule.”214   
Although the RAWG’s Final Report seems to reject complete 
elimination of credit ratings from the NAIC’s rules, it does signal a desire 
to reduce the use of credit ratings.  It states that NAIC’s “policy on the use 
of ARO [credit] ratings should be highly selective”215 and identifies ten 
issues for further study by the NAIC.  As of early April 2011, units within 
NAIC have completed a number of such studies,216 although it does not 
                                                                                                                 
207 Hunt, CRAs and the WWCC, supra note 159148, at 112. 
208 RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 175195, at 6. 
209 RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398, at 5.  The Final Report also 
eliminates the term “SVO-like.”  See id. 
210 RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 175195, at 5. 
211 Id. at 7-8. 
212 RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 3938, at 6. 
213 RAWG EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 1975, at 7. 
214 RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra  note 398, at 6. 
215 RAWG FINAL REPORT, supra note 398, at 5. 
216 See Proposed Methodology to Assess the Reliability of NRSRO Credit 
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appear that further action has been taken. 
But even if the NAIC reduces reliance on credit ratings, it may not 
reduce its reliance on regulatory outsourcing in general:  The NAIC does 
not seem interested in expanding the SVO’s role, as discussed above.  And 
in the one area where the NAIC has rejected reliance on ratings – credit 
assessments for mortgage-backed securities – the NAIC has continued to 
outsource credit determinations to private entities.217  The next section 
takes up why the NAIC and other financial regulators may want to 
outsource responsibility for credit determinations. 
 
B. WHY IS OUTSOURCED REGULATION SO POPULAR? 
 
The NAIC and other financial regulators are reluctant to abandon 
rating-dependent regulation altogether, and to the extent NAIC is moving 
away from rating-dependent regulation, the substitute is to have credit risk 
assessed by private entities that are not rating agencies.  This section 
proposes two explanations for financial regulators’ desire to outsource 
credit-risk determinations. 
 
1. The Desire for Rating-Dependent Regulation 
Transcends Insurance 
 
The NAIC’s experience fits into a broader pattern of regulatory 
desire to outsource regulatory decisions – in particular, to outsource them 
to rating agencies.  Although the full extent of rating-dependent regulation 
has never been documented,218 regulators have incorporated credit ratings 
in widely varying areas, including the basic capital rules for broker-
dealers,219 some capital rules for banks,220 deposit-insurance assessments,221 
                                                                                                                 
Ratings, Memorandum from Bob Carcano, SVO, to Matti Peltonen, Chair, 
Valuation of Securities Task Force, Oct. 8, 2010; Analysis of the Performance of 
NRSRO Credit Ratings and Implications of Default Statistics Associated with 
NAIC Designations, Memorandum from Bob Carcano and Wes Beal, SVO, to 
Matti Peltonen, Chair, Valuation of Securities Task Force, Oct. 10, 2010; 
Alternatives and Supplements to the Use of NRSRO Credit Ratings, Memorandum 
from Bob Carcano and Wes Beal, SVO, to Matti Peltonen, Chair, Valuation of 
Securities Task Force, Oct. 8, 2010. 
217 See discussion infra Parts VI.A & VI.B. 
218 The most comprehensive survey appears to be JOINT FORUM, BANK FOR 
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STOCKTAKING ON THE USE OF CREDIT RATINGS (2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf. 
219 See SEC Net Capital Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2010).  It is worth 
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and limits on the permitted investments of national banks,222 money market 
funds,223 and federal thrifts.224  Regulators also seem to use high credit 
ratings as a proxy for the absence of conflicts of interest:  the Department 
of Labor has granted an exemption to ERISA conflict-of-interest rules that 
permits underwriters to sell structured securities to an ERISA plan to which 
the underwriter provides services – as long as the securities have high 
credit ratings and other requirements are met.225 
Financial regulators other than NAIC have started to act to reduce 
their reliance on ratings since the beginning of the financial crisis, but 
progress has been fitful.  For example, in summer 2008 the SEC proposed a 
three-part set of rules that would have sharply reduced the agency’s 
reliance on credit ratings.226  The SEC tabled most of the reductions in 
2009227 and adopting new rules embracing the use of credit ratings in 
                                                                                                                 
noting that the major Wall Street banks were not covered by this particular rule in 
the period immediately leading up to the crisis.  Instead, they had all opted into an 
alternative capital regulation system that was part of the “Consolidated 
Supervisory Entity” program.  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, SEC'S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARN’S AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE 
CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM iv-v (2008), available at 
http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Auditsinspections/2008/446-a.pdf 
220 See 12 C.F.R. Part 3 App. A §§ 3(a)(4)(iii), 3(b), 3(a)(2)(xiii)(C) (2010). 
221 See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 327.8(i), 327.9(d)(2) 
(2010). 
222 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.2-1.3 (2010). 
223 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010). 
224 12 C.F.R. §§ 560.40(a)(1)-(2), 560.42 (2010). 
225 Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 2000-58, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 54,487 (Aug. 22, 2002). 
226 References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (proposed July 11, 2008); Security Ratings, 73 
Fed. Reg. 40,106 (proposed July 11, 2008); References to Ratings of Nationally 
Recognized Securities Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124 (proposed July 
11, 2008).   
227 In October 2009, the SEC adopted a final rule removing some references to 
credit ratings from its rules, References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,358 (Oct. 9, 2009), but reopened 
the comment period on the other, more significant, proposed changes.  References 
to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 
52,374 (Oct. 9, 2009). Separately, the SEC in May 2010 proposed – but has not 
adopted – a further rule that would eliminate reliance on ratings in determining 
whether asset-backed securities are “shelf eligible.”  Asset-Backed Securities, 75 
Fed. Reg. 23,328, 23,331 (proposed May 3, 2010). 
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2010.228  Only in 2011 – after the Dodd-Frank Act ordered federal financial 
regulators to remove ratings from their rules – did the SEC once again take 
up proposals to remove ratings from its rules.229  Even those proposals, 
which were still pending as of early April 2011, would not repeal the use of 
credit ratings in some important areas, such as in calculating the net capital 
of smaller broker-dealers.230   
 
2. A Political Explanation:  Stakeholder Interests and 
Rating-Dependent Regulation of Insurance 
 
The leading scholarly approach to understanding insurance 
regulation is to consider how the various stakeholder groups, including 
regulators themselves, interact to produce a policy result.231  Rating-
                                                                                                                 
228 See Money Market Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060 (Mar. 4, 2010) 
(amending 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7).  The SEC continued to define “Eligible 
Securities” as those that receive high credit ratings or that are of “comparable 
quality” to those receiving high ratings. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(12), 75 Fed. Reg. 
at 10,110, and requires money-market fund boards to take action when rating 
agencies downgrade securities below certain levels.  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(7), 75 
Fed. Reg. at 10,114.  The SEC’s continuing reliance on credit ratings in this 
context has come in for academic criticism.  See William A. Birdthistle, Breaking 
Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155, 1185-87 (describing 
SEC’s continued reliance on rating agencies in the Final Rule as “[p]erhaps the 
most curious decision of the SEC in response to all that has occurred in the past 
two years”).  The SEC recently proposed eliminating the express references to 
credit ratings in its money-market rule.  See References to Credit Ratings in 
Certain Investment Company Act Rules and Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,896, 12,897 
(March 9, 2011).. 
229 See References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act 
Rules and Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,896 (March 9, 2011); Security Ratings, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 8,946 (Feb. 16, 2011). 
230 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1), 240.15c3-1(c)(2) (defining net capital and 
providing that high-rated securities count more toward satisfying net-capital 
requirement than low-rated ones).  The largest broker-dealers all have opted to use 
an alternative method for net capital that relies on internal models rather than credit 
ratings.  See Charles Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
323, 343 n.107 (2011).  This method continues to be used , although the SEC has 
been reexamining it in the wake of criticism since the financial crisis.  See Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, “Testimony Concerning the State of the Financial Crisis 
Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,” at 12-13 (Jan. 14, 2010). 
231 See MEIER, supra note 23, at 167 (“The political economy of insurance 
regulation results from a complex interaction of industry groups, consumer 
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dependent regulation is fairly easy to understand under this approach, 
because the leading stakeholders – insurers and regulators – have strong 
incentives to prefer rating-dependent regulation.   
The industry has an incentive to support rating-dependent 
regulation because it does not want to pay for the SVO to perform the 
function, as discussed above.232  Certainly, it appears that insurers led the 
charge to water down the NAIC’s draft report calling for reduced reliance 
on credit ratings.233  Moreover, insurers may want to benefit from the 
liability shield of rating reliance:  If regulators rely on the ratings, the 
argument goes, who could fault the industry for doing the same?  One 
might also expect the industry to be more comfortable with the rating 
agencies’ private bureaucracies than the public bureaucracy of NAIC.   
On the other hand, if the industry exerts a strong influence on the 
NAIC, as one leading study concludes,234 then why is it that insurers show 
so little interest in keeping the rating function within that organization, 
where it can be controlled?  A partial answer may lie in the availability of 
                                                                                                                 
interests, regulatory bureaucrats, and political elites”); Randall, supra note 201, at 
670-86 (explaining states’ authority over insurance industry and role of NAIC in 
terms of stakeholder preferences); Schwarcz, supra note 910, at 1715 (introducing 
framework in which industry as regulatory “buyer,” regulator as regulatory 
“seller,”  and regulatory “regulator” would interact under conditions of regulatory 
competition). 
232 See supra Part IV. A.1 [describing industry reluctance to pay for SVO] 
233 See NAIC PROCEEDINGS – SPRING 2010, at 10-38 to 10-45 (comment 
letters from American Council of Life Insurers expressing opposition to 
precipitous repeal of filing exempt rule and taking issue with RAWG draft report’s 
characterization of rating agency performance as overly negative).  Another 
constituency for rating-dependent regulation in the SEC and NAIC cases is the 
regulated entities themselves.  The Securities Industry and Financial Market 
Association opposed the SEC’s proposal to eliminate references to credit ratings in 
its Net Capital Rule for broker-dealers.  See Fed. Reg. 52,377-78 nn.35-36 (Oct. 9, 
2009); Fed. Reg. 52,379-81 (Oct. 9, 2009) (the money-market industry criticized 
the SEC’s move away from rating-dependent regulation).  The Department of 
Labor’s reliance on ratings in the context of ERISA exemptions for structured 
products also appears to originate with an industry proposal.  Exemptions 
Allowing Previously Prohibited Transactions Under ERISA and the I.R.C. of 1986, 
55 Fed. Reg.  21455-01(May 24, 1990). 
234 Randall, supra note 201, at 669 (“[T]he history of the NAIC suggests . . . a 
systematic bias in favor of the industry.”); Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1763 (“[I]n 
the aggregate, ordinary ‘monopolistic’ insurance regulation is more frequently 
subject to substantial regulatory capture that produces underregulation as opposed 
to excessive regulation.”). 
2010] RATING DEPENDENT REGULATION  147  
 
 
 
rule bailouts, as discussed below.  If the industry can change the rules in 
midstream on an ad hoc basis235 when the rating agencies produce results 
insurers do not like, that reduces the value of paying to maintain the SVO 
function year in and year out. 
State regulators have an incentive to support rating-dependent 
regulation because it permits them to avoid blame for poor credit 
determinations236 without sacrificing broader authority to set general 
policy.237  More fundamentally, no real alternative has emerged, as 
discussed below.238   
The rating agencies themselves might be expected to support 
regulatory use of ratings, as this increases demand for their products.239  
Indeed, it has been suggested that rating-dependent regulation is the basis 
of the rating agencies’ business.240  In fact, the rating industry’s position is 
more complicated.  The largest rating agencies, Moody’s241 and Standard & 
                                                                                                                 
235 See infra Part IV. 
236 See Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard:  How 
Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 839 (2010) (identifying “blame avoidance” as a 
persistent regulatory bias); Richard Scott Carnell, Regulator’s Incentives, in MAKE 
MARKETS BE MARKETS 35, 37 (ROOSEVELT INST., ED. 2010) (identifying 
regulatory incentive to avoid blame by trying to ensure that problems become 
apparent during successors’ tenure). 
237 Compare Randall, supra note 201, at 684-85 (arguing that Congress has an 
incentive to leave insurance regulation in the hands of the states in the context of 
regulatory changes permitting greater financial services integration:  “By 
preserving the existing regulatory structures, Congress may be able to take credit 
for modernizing financial services and enhancing the international competitiveness 
of U.S. firms while avoiding blame for the inevitable problems that will 
accompany the changes.”). 
238 See infra Part IV.B.3 
239 See Thomas J. McGuire, Exec. Vice President and Dir., Moody’s Corporate 
Dep’t, Ratings in Regulation:  A Petition to the Gorillas, Speech at Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Apr. 28, 1995) (Moody’s executive stating that “[f]rom a financial 
perspective, I believe that regulation has increased the revenues of the rating 
industry and contributed to the growth” of rating agencies). 
240 See Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING 
AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65, 74 (Richard M. Levich et al. 
eds. 2001).  
241 See Testimony of Raymond M. McDaniel, Testimony Before the Fin. Crisis 
Inquiry Comm’n, 6 (June 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0602-McDaniel.pdf (stating that 
“Moody’s has also continuously advocated for the elimination of the regulatory use 
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Poor’s,242 take the position that regulators should not rely on credit ratings 
in their rules, while the next-tier rating agencies, Fitch243 and DBRS,244 are 
far more sympathetic to rating-dependent regulation. The suspicion arises 
that competitive position drives the rating agencies’ views on this issue:  
Moody’s and S&P seek to protect their position as market leaders, while 
the smaller agencies see regulatory recognition of their ratings as an 
opportunity to boost share.245 
                                                                                                                 
of ratings”);  McGuire, supra note 23912,  at 1 (“Moody’s . . . recommends that 
use of ratings be phased out of financial regulation, such that the sole judge of the 
quality of rating opinions will again  be the investors who bear the risks of fixed-
income investment.”). 
242  Chris Atkins, Letter to the Editor from S&P Vice President of 
Communications, Credit Ratings Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/opinion/lweb15ratings.html (“[W]e 
emphatically support legislative proposals that use of ratings should not be 
mandated through government regulation.”); Deven Sharma, Letter to the Editor 
from S&P President, Why Rating Requirements Don’t Make Sense, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 19, 2010 ( “We support removing investor rating requirements and believe the 
market – not government mandates – should decide the value of our work.”). 
243 See Fitch Ratings, Inc., Submitted Statement of Fitch Ratings (Sept. 24, 
2009) reprinted in NAIC PROCEEDINGS – SPRING 2010, at 10-79 to 10-80 
(“Ratings have been used constructively in many places in regulation, as they are 
an important common benchmark.  From a regulatory point of view, the question 
of what would be used in place of credit ratings is rarely answered satisfactorily.”); 
Reforming Credit Rating Agencies:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Capital 
Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 111th Cong. 17-18 (2009) (statement of 
Stephen W. Joynt)(“[R]atings have been used effectively in regulation in many 
places as independent benchmarks – a position that has been supported by many 
market participants – and we continue to suggest an in depth case-by-case review 
of any removal to determine whether such a course of action is appropriate.  The 
question of what would replace ratings also remains unanswered – or at least 
without a thorough understanding of the specific pros and cons, and unintended 
consequences.”).  
244 DBRS also seems to support rating-dependent regulation to a greater extent 
than Moody’s and S&P.  See Letter from Mary Keogh, Managing Director, 
Regulatory Affairs, DBRS to Richard Newman, Bob Carcano & Dan Daveline, 
NAIC (Jan. 6, 2010), reprinted in NAIC PROCEEDINGS – SPRING 2010, at 10-57 
(“DBRS understands that the use of ARO credit ratings by the market increased 
over time due to the ARO’s historical expertise in the field of credit analysis.  This 
expertise was gained through the skills and experience of its credit analysts that 
takes years to build.”).  
245 See Fitch Ratings, Inc., supra note 21643, at 10-80 (“[I]f you eliminate the 
use of ‘NRSRO’ ratings in regulation, company and industry participants will 
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Whatever the agencies’ motives, the leading agencies’ opposition 
to rating-dependent regulation seems to have had little effect on insurance 
regulation specifically.  Fundamentally, the agencies have little ability to 
control how their ratings are used.246  Moreover, despite general 
expressions of opposition to rating-dependent insurance regulation,247 the 
agencies’ recent statements of support for changing the system seem tepid.  
Moody’s statements in opposition to rating-dependent regulation in the 
recent NAIC proceeding were heavily qualified248 and S&P’s more so,249 
despite the agencies’ strong contemporary statements to more general 
audiences opposing rating-dependent regulation in general.250   
Consumers, for their part, generally show up as relatively weak 
stakeholders in studies of insurance regulation, due to their dispersion and 
the low salience and high complexity of insurance regulation issues.251  
Organized consumer groups do not appear to have had much impact on the 
use of credit ratings in insurance solvency regulation, although one such 
group expressed opposition to rating-dependent insurance regulation in the 
                                                                                                                 
likely develop or maintain their own guidelines and use credit ratings anyway.  We 
believe they will default to the largest ‘brand name’ rating agencies (Moody’s and 
S&P) . . . .”. 
246 Letter from Raymond W. McDaniel, President, Moody’s Investors Serv. to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 28, 2003), available at 
http://sec.gov/rules/concept/s71203/moodys072803.htm (rating’s status as a 
‘public good’ “led to their adoption by various authorities for certain public policy 
objectives.”). 
247 See McGuire, supra note 21239, at 8 (NAIC’s use of ratings in capital 
regulation “has inadvertently created a very pernicious set of economic incentives 
for the rating agency industry”). 
248 See David Teicher, Written Statement of David Teicher, Managing Dir., 
Moody’s Investors Serv. Before the NAIC Rating Agency Working Grp. Meeting,  
Sept. 24, 2009, at 9 (“Moody’s supports efforts to discontinue or limit the use of 
ratings in regulation . . . We also recognize, however, that in light of current 
market conditions, eliminating or reducing ratings-based criteria should be pursued 
judiciously ….”). 
249 See Grace Osborne, Written Statement of Grace Osborne, Managing Dir. 
and Lead Analytical Mgr. for N. Amm Ins. Ratings Before the Meeting of the 
Rating Agency Working Grp. Of the NAIC, Sept. 24, 2009, at 6 (“[I]f regulators 
and policymakers choose to incorporate ratings in their rules as benchmarks, the 
use of additional benchmarks may also be warranted.”). 
250  See supra notes 214-15. 
251 See Randall, supra note 201, at 670-72; MEIER, supra note 23, at 139 
(describing difficulty in creating a measure of the importance of consumer groups 
because of the paucity of such groups). 
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recent NAIC proceeding.252   
A question that emerges from this analysis is why NAIC ever 
relied at all on SVO rather than the rating agencies.  After all, the analysis 
above suggests that the balance of stakeholder interests seems to favor 
rating-dependent regulation overwhelmingly.  One possible explanation is 
that the NAIC solvency program was born in the 1990s in response to a 
spate of highly publicized insolvencies,253 so that there was a high premium 
on demonstrating regulatory independence from industry at that time.  As 
memory faded, the importance of showing independence decreased.  
NAIC’s reliance on credit ratings simply hasn’t attracted comparable 
attention in the current financial crisis,254 so no comparable need to take 
action arose. 
 
3. A Substantive Explanation:  The Need for a Measure 
of Credit Risk and the Absence of Compelling 
Alternatives  
 
a. The Need for a Measure of Credit Risk 
 
I have argued elsewhere that a pure measure of credit risk is 
appropriate in any “asset-by-asset” capital regulation system.255  An asset-
by-asset system is one in which capital requirements are determined by 
combining the risks to which each of the regulated firm’s assets are subject, 
                                                                                                                 
252 Birny Birnbaum, Testimony of Birny Birnbaum, Ctr. for Econ. Justice, 
Before the NAIC Rating Agency Working Grp., Sept. 24, 2009, at 1 (“[S]tate 
insurance regulators should not be delegating their regulatory responsibilities to 
private entities, particularly to private entities whose incentives are not aligned 
with those of the public function.”).  No consumer groups submitted comments in 
the NAIC’s rating-agency proceeding. See NAIC PROCEEDINGS – SPRING 2010, at 
10-37.  Although a consumer-group representative participated in the September 
24 public meeting, his comments focused exclusively on the RMBS revaluation 
proposal.   
253 See Danielle F. Waterfield, Insurers Jump on Train for Federal Insurance 
Regulation:  Is It What They Really Want or Need?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 300–04 
(2002) (describing proposals for federal regulation of insurance solvency in 
response to high-profile failures and such proposals’ ultimate failure in response to 
opposition from industry and state regulators). 
254 See supra Part III.C.2.   
255 John Patrick Hunt, One Cheer for Credit Rating Agencies:  How the Mark-
to-Market Accounting Debate Highlights the Case for Rating-Dependent Capital 
Regulation, 60 S.C. L. REV. 749, 775-77 (2009) [hereinafter Hunt, One Cheer].   
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such as the current U.S. insurance and banking capital regulation regimes.   
The reason is that there is at least some probability that a firm will 
not have to liquidate all its assets.  That means that a measure of how well 
the assets will perform if held to maturity is needed, and that entails a 
measure of credit risk over the life of the assets.  The argument may apply 
with even greater force to insurance companies than to banks, because  
insurance companies may be more exposed to the risk that an asset will not 
pay over the long term, and less exposed to the risk that it will have to be 
sold for a fire-sale price.   
After all, “maturity transformation” – long-term lending funded by 
short-term borrowing – is central to the business model of commercial 
banks.256  And investment banks came to rely heavily on short-term 
borrowing, not necessarily to fund long-term, illiquid assets, but rather to 
fund short-term assets that were supposed to be liquid.  When the market 
turned so that those were not liquid, disaster ensued.257 
By contrast, the core business of an insurance company is 
transferring and pooling risk.258  If premiums are prepaid, this does not 
necessarily entail any short-term borrowing.  That means that the risk that 
an insurance company will have to sell large quantities of assets is smaller.  
This is not to say that insurance companies face no liquidity risk at all.  
AIG faced a severe liquidity problem, not just in its parent company, but 
apparently also in its regulated life insurance subsidiaries.259  And it has 
been recognized for some time that life insurers that issue policies that 
accumulate large surrender values can become vulnerable to runs.260  But it 
seems that liquidity risk – the great villain of the recent crisis – is  a larger 
concern for banks than for insurance companies.261  That suggests that 
credit risk is a relatively bigger problem  for an insurance company than a 
bank. 
 
                                                                                                                 
256 See XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, MICROECONOMICS OF 
BANKING 4-5 (1997). 
257 See GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND:  THE PANIC OF 
2007 47-50 (2010) (describing how decreased willingness to accept structured debt 
as collateral led to asset sales, falling prices, and systemic insolvency). 
258 See JEFFREY CARMICHAEL & MICHAEL POMERLEANO, THE DEVELOPMENT 
AND REGULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 81 (2002). 
259 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
260 See VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 1, at 274-75. 
261 See GUILLAUME PLANTIN & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, WHEN INSURERS GO 
BUST 2 (2007). 
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b. The Absence of Compelling Alternatives 
 
Federal regulators working on alternatives to credit ratings for bank 
capital recently told the national media that the absence of strong 
alternatives to the ratings was a major obstacle to replacing private credit 
ratings.262  Although replacing private credit ratings certainly does not 
appear impossible, each of the alternatives has practical, substantive, or 
political problems that apparently have not been carefully evaluated. 
 
i. Alternative 1:  Government Provision 
 
One alternative is government provision of credit ratings.  The 
regulator is supposed to regulate, so why not let it regulate?  Observers 
have been making this point for a long time, and the idea has been 
gathering some momentum in academic circles recently.263   
The recent NAIC experience described above is instructive here.  
The SVO effectively was a government credit rater, and it was perceived as 
underfunded and heavily reliant on private ratings.  Even after the high-
profile failure of many private credit ratings, there was little appetite to 
restore SVO’s function.  Of course, this case study just describes how 
events actually did unfold; it certainly does not prove that government 
credit raters can never receive stable, ample funding and do a good job 
without pressure from trying to please customers who buy or sell financial 
instruments.  But the history, in combination with the stakeholder analysis 
above, suggests difficulties in creating and sustaining a high-quality 
government rater throughout market cycles.  Indeed, cyclical rise and 
decline in regulatory vigor has been identified as a problem for financial 
regulation generally.264  It may be difficult for whoever is paying the bills 
                                                                                                                 
262 See Michael R. Crittenden, Financial Overhaul Stymies Top Regulators – 
New Law Might Need Altering Already, as Implementing Its Restrictions on the 
Use of Credit Ratings Stirs Concerns, WALL.  ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, at C1 (quoting 
FDIC Chair Sheila Bair as saying “some of the more likely replacements . . . are 
far from perfect”). 
263 See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry:  An Industrial 
Organization Analysis, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 41, 41-42, 51-57 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002); Milosz 
Gudzowski, Mortgage Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis:  The Need for a 
State-run Mortgage Security Credit Rating Agency, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
245 (2010). 
264 See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic:  Bubbles and the Growth 
and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 420-22 (2006) 
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to continue to see the benefit of replicating over 1 million credit ratings265 
that are otherwise available free after the memory of the most recent crisis 
has faded. 
 
ii. Alternative 2:  Self-Regulation and 
“Dynamic Risk Modeling” 
 
A second alternative to rating agencies is self-regulation.  This is 
the core of the Basel II banking regulation framework’s “advanced 
approaches,” which call for banks to develop internal credit ratings and 
which base the credit-risk portion of the capital charge on these ratings.  
Apart from the many criticisms that have been leveled against this 
approach in the context of banking,266 and apart from the fact that the 
continued viability of the Basel II framework is in some doubt, self-
regulation is quite dubious as applied to the insurance industry.  The 
fundamental justification for capital regulation is often said to be consumer 
protection.267  If the fox is going to put in charge of the henhouse, why 
bother? 
Suggestions that the current system be replaced with dynamic risk-
management approaches drawn from quantitative finance seem to fall into 
the same category.268  For example, Martin Grace and Robert Klein argue 
that the existing accounting-based approach is inappropriately “backward-
looking” and argue that it should be replaced with a “forward-looking” 
approach based on such techniques.  Because the present system is based 
on accounting numbers, it allegedly embodies a “static approach” based on 
                                                                                                                 
(describing deregulatory pressures imposed by upward stage of cycles of 
macroeconomic activity and investor trust); Richard Scott Carnell, Regulator’s 
Incentives, in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS (Roosevelt Inst. ed., 2010), 35, 36-37 
(arguing that the “dynamics of interest-group politics” help explain why regulators 
fail to strengthen regulatory standards during an economic boom). 
265 This is the number of credit ratings maintained by the two largest private 
credit rating agencies.  See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Annual Report on Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 9 
(2009),http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency/nrsroannrep0909.pdf. 
266 See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source:  The 
Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial 
Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 186–89 (2009).  
267 See supra notes 14-15.and accompanying text. 
268 See Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, Insurance Regulation:  The Need 
for Policy Reform, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 117, 118-19 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009). 
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“historic, reported” values and does not “look forward to consider how an 
insurer might fare under future scenarios.”269 They couple this argument 
with a call for “principles-based” regulation as practiced in the E.U., rather 
than the “rules-based” regulation that state regulators in the U.S. employ.270  
Although this risk management approach enthralled Alan Greenspan,271 its 
theoretical foundations have been attacked by Nicholas Taleb272 and others. 
Setting aside the theoretical debate, this kind of dynamic risk 
management approach seems inextricably tied to self-regulation.  Certainly, 
Grace & Klein conclude that “[d]ynamic modeling is best performed by 
each insurer, using an internal model subject to regulatory review.”273  
Given the complexity of such approaches, it is difficult to see how 
regulators could implement it without extensive reliance on the regulated 
parties’ judgments of risk.   
 
iii. Alternative 3:  Market-Based 
Regulation 
 
Another leading alternative to rating-dependent regulation is 
market-based regulation.  One might simply look at credit spreads – that is, 
at market prices – to assess credit risk. 274  The problem here, as I have 
argued at length elsewhere,275 is that market prices result from the 
interaction of many different factors, not just credit risk.   Credit risk 
cannot simply be read off a price chart.  Although market prices 
undoubtedly can be useful inputs into any assessment of credit risk – 
whether performed by rating agencies, regulators, or someone else, market-
based regulation is not an independent alternative to rating-dependent 
regulation. 
 
                                                                                                                 
269 Id. at 121–22. 
270 Id. at 118, 120. 
271 See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Red. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the 2003 
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, (May 8, 2003) (“The use of a 
growing array of derivatives and the related application of more-sophisticated 
methods for measuring and managing risk are key factors underpinning the 
enhanced resilience of our largest financial intermediaries.”). 
272 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN:  THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY 
IMPROBABLE 274-85 (2007). 
273 Grace & Klein, supra note 240, at 127. 
274 Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?:  Two Thumbs 
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH U.L.Q. 619, 624–25 (1999). 
275 Hunt, One Cheer, supra note 228, at 772-75. 
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iv. Alternative 4:  Private Providers That 
Are Not Credit Rating Agencies 
 
A final alternative, one that NAIC has embraced in the context of 
RMBS as described in further detail below,276 is the idea of having credit 
assessments for regulatory purposes be provided by private entities that are 
not rating agencies.  A threshold question is whether this is truly an 
“alternative” at all.  After all, regardless of whether a credit rating agency 
such as Moody’s or a non-credit-rating-agency analytical organization such 
as PIMCO Advisory or BlackRock is performing the credit analysis, the 
regulator is outsourcing its decisions to a private third party.   
Putting that question to one side, the decision to employ private 
non-agency credit assessors may respond to either or both of two criticisms 
of credit rating agencies and their ratings.  First, credit ratings embody the 
agency’s determination in a single three-letter symbol on an ordinal scale.  
A “BBB” rating on an instrument tells the user only that the agency thinks 
that an instrument has more “credit risk” than an “A” instrument and less 
“credit risk” than a “BB” instrument.  The rating does not give a 
quantitative estimate of any aspect of risk.  Moreover, exactly what is 
captured in “credit risk” may vary from agency to agency.  For example, 
Standard & Poor’s main credit ratings are based on the instrument’s 
probability of default, without taking into account how much the 
instrument is likely to lose if it does default.  Moody’s ratings take both 
probability of default and loss in the event of default into account, but the 
firm does not specify how these factors are weighted in general. 
Alternative risk assessments offer the possibility of quantitative 
and much more detailed estimates of credit risk.  For example, such an 
assessment might state that there is a 40% chance of default and an 
expected 20% loss in the event of default.  Or they might state that there is 
a 10% chance of a default resulting in a 60% loss and a 30% chance of a 
default resulting in a 7% loss.  
Although these more precise and detailed assessments might well 
be useful, particularly in constructing numerical capital requirements, the 
difference between this type of assessment and what the rating agencies 
provide is superficial.  There is no reason in principle why rating agencies 
cannot provide such information, and the agencies have started to offer 
separate “recovery ratings,” which reflect the likely severity of default, in 
addition to their main credit ratings on many instruments. 
The second major reason for favoring alternative providers is that 
                                                                                                                 
276 See discussion infra Parts VI.A-B. 
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there may be some difference between an alternative provider and a credit 
rating agency that suggests that the alternative provider will do a better job.  
Certainly, some companies may produce better products than others, but it 
seems odd to assume ex ante that, say, PIMCO Advisory will do a better 
job than, say, Moody’s without evidence to this effect unless there is a 
fundamental structural difference that supports that assumption.  
The issuer-pays conflict might be such a difference.  If alternative 
providers are paid by the regulator for high-quality ratings, then they don’t 
face the conflicts of interest that raters that are paid by the rating by parties 
who want high ratings face.  The importance of the issuer-pays conflict is a 
matter of continuing debate and will not be resolved here.  But even if we 
assume that alternative providers have this advantage, it puts them in the 
same class as the SVO.  They are paid by the regulatory system for their 
ratings, and in the context of insurance that means they are paid by the 
industry.  Apart from the potential conflict of interest that introduces, 
reliance on alternative providers faces the same problem as reliance on the 
SVO:  insurers are unlikely to continue wanting to pay for credit 
assessments when rating agencies are doing the job for free. 
Even if one were to conclude that alternative private providers are 
better than rating agencies, there would still be a significant political-
economy problem with regulatory reliance on them. 
 
C.   THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FINANCIAL REGULATION AND 
RATING-AGENCY REFORM 
 
If regulators have a persistent desire to outsource credit risk 
assessment regulation to rating agencies or other third parties, then they 
would be expected to resist legislative mandates to eliminate such 
regulation.  Indeed, there are already signs that regulators are resisting 
Dodd-Frank in this respect.  The Acting Comptroller of the Currency, John 
Walsh, testified to Congress in February 2011 that “In [the] context of 
enhanced regulation that Dodd-Frank provides, the absolute prohibition 
against any references to ratings under Section 939A goes further than is 
reasonably necessary.”277  Financial regulators’ desire to outsource puts 
                                                                                                                 
277 John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Testimony Before the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, at 11 (Feb. 17, 2011). 
see also Crittenden, supra note 234 (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John 
Dugan as stating that “[i]t might be worth Congress taking a second look” at its 
expression of desire to remove private credit ratings from federal financial 
regulation). 
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them in conflict with rating-agency reformers, who focus on the perceived 
negative effects of rating-dependent regulation on the quality of the ratings 
themselves.  Thus, Congress’ effort to expunge private credit ratings 
completely is understandable, if precipitous:  If regulators will not purge 
credit ratings themselves, someone needs to force them to do it or it will 
not happen.   
But state insurance regulators’ continued reliance on credit ratings 
stands to frustrate Congress’s purpose to a substantial extent.  If rating-
dependent regulation gives agencies incentives to rate every product or to 
give inflated ratings, then retaining rating-dependent regulation for the 
huge insurer market in credit-risky securities retains those poor incentives 
to a large extent.  The regulatory use of credit ratings stands to become 
another point of conflict in the ongoing debate over the proper roles of 
federal and state insurance regulators. 
 
1. Why Rating-Agency Reformers Oppose Rating-
Dependent Regulation 
 
Even if ratings are the best available alternative for capital 
regulators, rating-dependent regulation may still be a problem because of 
its effect on the quality of credit ratings themselves.  The idea is that 
because issuers or investors need particular credit ratings in order to satisfy 
regulatory requirements, there is a source of demand for agency ratings that 
has nothing to do with quality.  In the legal academic literature, this line of 
argument dates to Frank Partnoy’s 1999 article The Siskel and Ebert of 
Financial Markets?:  Two Thumbs Down for the Rating Agencies.278  
The idea that rating-dependent regulation is an important force 
driving ratings toward low quality initially met with resistance, in particular 
from authors who believe that rating agencies have significant reputational 
capital that they would not be willing to risk by producing low-quality 
ratings.279  As the years have passed, the movement against rating-
dependent regulation has gathered steam,280 and Section 939A of the Dodd-
                                                                                                                 
278 Partnoy, supra 246, at 623-24. 
279 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 14-15; Dittrich, supra note 185, at 
149-55. 
280 See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, Credit Rating Agencies & Regulation:  Why 
Less Is More, in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 43 (Roosevelt Inst. ed., 2010); 
Christian C. Opp et al., Rating Agencies in the Face of Regulation:  Rating 
Inflation and Regulatory Arbitrage (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540099 (presenting 
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Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act seems to embody 
a desire to eliminate federal regulatory agencies’ dependence on credit 
ratings.281  Section 939A requires “each Federal agency” to review their use 
of credit ratings within one year282 and to “remove any reference to or 
requirement of reliance on credit ratings.”283 
Rating-dependent regulation may reduce rating quality not just 
because it independently reduces agencies’ incentives to produce high-
quality work, but also because regulatory reliance on ratings is likely to 
complicate or frustrate other efforts to improve rating-agency quality.   
For example, the major premise of the 2006 Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act is that increased competition will help rating-agency 
performance,284 but rating-dependent regulation may cause competition to 
be bad for the market.  If issuers just need to get one or two285 ratings of a 
certain level to accomplish what they want to accomplish, then competition 
may take the form of jockeying to give inflated ratings – competition in 
laxity.286  Moreover, with rating-dependent regulation, it’s not just issuers 
who demand high credit ratings.  We would expect investors to demand 
them as well:  Higher ratings help regulated investors such as insurance 
companies and banks in satisfying regulatory requirements, as we saw 
above.   
From the standpoint of increasing rating quality, the argument for 
reducing regulatory dependence on agency ratings is certainly logical.  But 
an important premise – that rating-dependent regulation is an important 
force driving rating-agency behavior – has never really been tested.  
Indeed, only recently have we started to see the first comprehensive 
surveys that allow us to understand what the extent of regulatory 
dependence on agency ratings actually is.287   
                                                                                                                 
theoretical model indicating that regulatory use of ratings may produce complete 
breakdown of ratings’ informational content under some circumstances). 
281 H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, at 521-22 (2010). 
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284 See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, S. 3850, 109th Cong. § 
2(5) (enrolled bill as passed by Senate and House, Sept. 29, 2006) (“the 2 largest 
credit rating agencies serve the vast majority of the market, and additional 
competition is in the public interest.”). 
285 See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 43, 
73 (2004) (discussing importance of “two-rating norm”). 
286 See, e.g., Hunt, CRAs and the WWCC, supra note , at 136. 
287 See JOINT FORUM, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STOCKTAKING ON THE 
USE OF CREDIT RATINGS (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf. 
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2. The Dodd-Frank Bill and the Conflict Between 
Financial Regulators and Rating-Agency Reformers 
 
Reformers who seek to eliminate ratings from financial regulation 
enjoyed their greatest success to date in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  Section 939A of the Act instructs 
each federal agency “to the extent applicable” to review and remove its 
rating-dependent regulations.288  It seems to reflect a Congressional desire 
to eliminate federal rating-dependent regulation, though the extent to which 
is actually a command to the agencies do so is open to question.  The 
meaning of “to the extent applicable” is not clear – there is nothing in the 
statute that expressly makes clear what would make Section 939A 
applicable or inapplicable.  One interpretation would be that Section 939A 
is “applicable” to all financial regulatory agencies, but agencies who wish 
to continue using ratings might argue that “to the extent applicable” confers 
discretion on them in this respect. 
Even if a Congressional mandate to eliminate federal rating-
dependent regulation in a year is precipitous in light of the discussion 
above, such a mandate would be understandable from the standpoint of 
rating-agency reform if regulators have a consistent tendency to want to 
                                                                                                                 
288 Section 939A provides in its entirety: 
(a) Agency Review.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
this subtitle, each Federal agency shall, to the extent applicable, review— 
(1) any regulation issued by such agency that requires the use of an assessment 
of the credit-worthiness of a security or money market instrument; and 
(2) any references to or requirements in such regulations regarding credit 
ratings. 
(b) Modifications Required.—Each such agency shall modify any such 
regulations identified by the review conducted under subsection (a) to remove any 
reference to or requirement of reliance on credit ratings and to substitute in such 
regulations such standard of credit-worthiness as each respective agency shall 
determine as appropriate for such regulations. In making such determination, such 
agencies shall seek to establish, to the extent feasible, uniform standards of credit-
worthiness for use by each such agency, taking into account the entities regulated 
by each such agency and the purposes for which such entities would rely on such 
standards of credit-worthiness. 
(c) Report.—Upon conclusion of the review required under subsection (a), 
each Federal agency shall transmit a report to Congress containing a description of 
any modification of any regulation such agency made pursuant to subsection (b). 
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rely on ratings, whether arising from legitimate if parochial needs, their 
own biases, or pressures from those they regulate.  Simply put, someone 
has to force them to do it.   
But even if the federal agencies cooperate – and early signs suggest 
they may not – state insurance regulators’ continued reliance on credit 
ratings seems like an important obstacle to improving the market by 
reducing rating-dependent regulation.  This is because insurance companies 
are such a large segment of the overall bond market:  U.S. insurer holdings 
of nonfinancial corporate bonds are equal to about half the total outstanding 
principal of such bonds from U.S. issuers; their holdings of municipal 
bonds are equal to about 15% of the outstanding principal in that market.  
The U.S. insurance sector currently owns around $2.2 trillion in corporate 
bonds;289 for comparison, the total amount of U.S. nonfarm nonfinancial 
corporate bonds outstanding as of the first quarter of 2010 was $4.25 
trillion.290  As of year-end 2008, insurers held $432 billion in municipal 
bonds,291 and the total amount outstanding was $2.7 trillion.292 
Thus, even complete elimination of credit ratings from federal 
regulatory requirements may not have the desired effect on rating-agency 
incentives.  Of course, Congress probably has the power to preempt state 
regulation of insurance in this area, and the extent to which it should 
exercise that power is an ongoing subject of debate.  Unless Congress 
retreats from its objective of complete elimination of rating-dependent 
regulation, or the risk measures the  federal regulators are to devise 
persuade state insurance officials to abandon rating-dependent regulation, 
this subject promises to become another area of tension in the historically 
                                                                                                                 
289 Sapna Maheshwari, Insurers ‘Live and Die’ with $2.2 Trillion in Corporate 
Bonds,  BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 28, 2010, 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-28/insurers-live-and-die-with-2-2-
trillion-in-corporate-bonds.html. 
290 FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1:  FLOW 
OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 65 (June 10, 2010).  The cited 
figures mean that U.S. insurers hold bonds equal in magnitude to about half the 
U.S. corporate bond market, but don’t necessarily imply that insurers own half of 
U.S. corporate bonds – insurers hold non-U.S. bonds.  NAIC’s figures tell a similar 
story:  U.S. insurers held $1.9 trillion in nonfinancial corporate bonds at the end of 
2008, when total nonfinancial nonfarm corporate bonds outstanding were about 
$3.8 trillion.  Evangel, supra note 164, at 11. 
291 Evangel, supra note 164, at 11. 
292 SIFMA, Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt (2008), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/research/pdf/Overall_Outstanding.pdf. 
research/research.aspx?ID=10806. 
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vexed relationship between state and federal authority over insurance. 
 
VI. AIG, THE BOND INSURERS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
The far-reaching effects of the failures of AIG and the bond 
insurers during the financial crisis challenged the notion that insurers do 
not pose systemic risk.  Credit ratings served a gatekeeping function for 
both AIG’s and the bond insurers’ investments in novel products, 
investments that contributed to their failure.  Nevertheless, the New York 
State Department of Insurance, which has principal responsibility for 
regulating the bond insurance industry showed even less interest in 
reducing rating dependence for bond insurers than the RAWG did for the 
rest of the industry.  Instead, it imposed a series of outright bans on risky 
activities.   
If there is tradeoff between safety and conservatism on the one 
hand and efficiency, dynamism, or innovation on the other, then 
recognizing previously unrecognized systemic risk pushes the optimal 
tradeoff toward safety.  Although efforts are under way to reduce any 
systemic risk posed by insurers, the possibility of such a risk nevertheless 
supports an effort to make certain insurers safer, even if there are costs to 
doing so.  A seasoning requirement for ratings on novel products offers a 
way of accomplishing this that actually seems less intrusive than the 
apparently permanent activity bans the New York Department of Insurance 
has put in place. 
 
A.   THE FAILURES OF AIG AND BOND INSURERS CHALLENGE THE 
CONSENSUS THAT INSURERS DO NOT POSE SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
Until the financial crisis, the prevailing view was that insurance 
companies did not pose a systemic risk.  Two leading commentators 
summed up the conventional wisdom in 2005:  “Systemic risk has not been 
a major preoccupation of insurance regulators, and there has been no 
evidence of the failure of an insurance company being a significant source 
of systemic risk.”293  This viewpoint makes a good deal of sense.  As 
discussed above, insurance companies generally do not rely on short-term 
funding to the same extent banks do, so they are less vulnerable to panics 
                                                                                                                 
293 Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in 
Banks, Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
BEYOND BASEL 15, 23 (Hal S. Scott ed. 2005). 
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and bank runs.294  Moreover, the consequences of panics are likely to be 
less severe:  Unlike banks, insurance companies do not operate the 
payment system.  Nor do they originate many loans. 
But the failures of AIG and the bond insurers in the financial crisis 
seemed to create or threaten systemic consequences.  Major banks had 
large exposures to AIG through its CDS activities and lending operations.  
The bond insurers’ difficulties apparently increased uncertainty about the 
novel products they insured and therefore deepened the problems of the 
institutions that owned those products.  Moreover, bond insurers’ problems 
apparently contributed to liquidity problems in the municipal bond market 
and interfered with municipalities’ ability to borrow, because many 
municipal bond issues depended on bond insurance coverage.  The 
proposition that the failures actually created a systemic risk is still 
disputed,295 and it is true that some of the more damaging exposures were 
taken on by insurance-company affiliates rather than regulated insurers.  
But the idea that capital-regulated insurance companies pose a systemic 
risk can no longer be dismissed out of hand. 
 
1. AIG 
 
The perception that the insurance group AIG was  
                                                                                                                 
294 Id. at 24. 
295 See MARY A. WEISS, SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE U.S. INSURANCE SECTOR 2 
(2010), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_weiss_systemic_risk_100223.pdf (“[T]he 
analysis suggests that insurers are not instigators or the cause of systemic risk”); 
THE GENEVA ASS’N, SYSTEMIC RISK IN INSURANCE:  AN ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE 
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.genevaassociation.org/Portals/0/Geneva_Association_Systemic_Risk_i
n_Insurance_Report_March2010.pdf (“Applying the FSB [Financial Stability 
Board] criteria to the main activities of insurers and reinsurers, we conclude that 
none pose a systemic risk”); BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 24 
(classifying insurance companies as “non-systemic large and not highly levered” 
institutions); Charles Goodhart, Procyclicality and Financial Regulation, 16 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA INFORME DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA 11, 15 (2009) (same).  
These analyses are not altogether consistent.  For example, Brunnermeier and 
Goodhart both seem to assume that life insurance companies are not leveraged.  
See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 24; Goodhart, supra, at 15.  But 
Weiss’ examination of data leads her to conclude that life insurers’ leverage is 
comparable to that of commercial banks.  See Weiss, supra, at 30.  She does find 
that “[p]roperty-casualty insurers are much less highly leveraged than either life-
health insurers or banks”).  Id. 
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“systemically important”296 was the articulated basis for the U.S. 
government’s decision to put at least $182.5 billion297 at risk starting in 
September 2008 to save the firm from disorderly failure.   
The perception seems to have stemmed primarily from CDS 
positions taken by AIG’s trading subsidiary, AIG Financial Products Corp., 
which had sold credit protection to major banks on a large volume of multi-
sector CDOs, many of which were exposed to subprime mortgages.298  AIG 
Financial Products Corp. is not an insurance company and is not subject to 
solvency regulation as described in this Article.299   
Although regulators have been adamant that AIG’s regulated life 
insurance companies did not face a solvency threat,300 these entities did 
                                                                                                                 
296 See Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 
U.S., Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce 
Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan (March 2, 2009) (announcing aid to AIG 
“in order to stabilize this systemically important company”); see also Brady 
Dennis, Bernanke Blasts AIG for ‘Irresponsible Bets’ That Led to Bailouts, WASH. 
POST, March 4, 2009 (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke as 
testifying to Senate committee, “[W]e’re not doing this to bail out AIG or their 
shareholders, certainly.  We’re doing this to protect our financial system and to 
avoid a much more severe crisis in our global economy.”). 
297 William K. Sjostrom, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 945, 
975 (2009). 
298 See id. at 959, 979-81. 
299See American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, 
Government Intervention, and Implications for Future Regulation; Testimony to 
the U.S. Sen. Comm. On Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, March 5, 2009, at 3 
(Statement of Eric Dinallo, Superintendent, New York State Ins. Dep’t, “AIG 
Financial Products is not alicensed insurance company.  It was not regulated by 
New York State or any state.”; Dennis, supra note 264, (quoting Bernanke, “There 
was no oversight of the Financial Products division.  This was a hedge fund, 
basically, that was attached to a large and stable insurance company….”).   
300 See Sjostrom, supra note 266, at 978; auses and Effects of AIG Bailout: H. 
Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (written testimony 
of eric Dinallo, Superintendent of Insurance, New York State Ins. Dep’t). available 
at 
http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option+com_content&task=view&id=3375&
Itemid=2.(stating that New York regulated insurance companies were solvent).  
Certainly, insurance regulators have been adamant that policyholders were not at 
risk.  See Dinallo, New York State Ins. Dep’t, Testimony to the U.S. Sen. Comm. 
on Housing, Banking & Urban Affairs, March 5, 2009, at 6 (“[E]ven if there had 
been a run on the securities lending program with no federal rescue, our detailed 
analysis suggests that the AIG life insurance companies would not have been 
insolvent.”); Joel Ario, Insurance Comm’r, Pennsylvania Ins. Dep’t, Testimony of 
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experience difficulty as counterparties in securities lending transactions 
demanded the return of cash collateral, which apparently would have been 
difficult to accomplish because much of the collateral had been invested in 
highly rated mortgage-backed securities301 which had declined in value and 
couldn’t readily be sold.302  These counterparties were in many cases 
important financial intermediaries,303 so this modern-day bank run could 
have had systemic consequences.   
State insurance regulators argue that the threat to AIG’s life 
insurers and the financial system would never have arisen if the company’s 
CDS losses hadn’t sparked a bank run.304  The AIG life insurers’ securities-
lending troubles may have been a matter of liquidity rather than 
solvency,305 although this is disputed.306  The evidence suggests – although 
                                                                                                                 
the NAIC Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored 
Enters., U.S. House of Reps., March 18, 2009, at 6, 11. 
301 Dinallo, supra note 269, at 5 (AIG’s securities lending program 
investments were “almost exclusively in the highest-rated securities” and 
mortgage-backed securities made up “60 percent of the collateral pool.”); Ario, 
supra note 269, at 10 (29% of AIG collateral pool was composed of subprime 
MBS). 
302 Sjostrom, supra note 266, at 961-62.  It is not clear what prevented AIG 
from selling the securities returned to in the unwind of the lending transactions, as 
these apparently were government bonds, which remained liquid throughout the 
crisis. 
303 Press Release, American Int’l Group, Inc., AIG Discloses Counterparties to 
CDS, GIA, and Securities Lending Transactions, Att. D. (March 15, 2009), 
(disclosing fourth-quarter 2008 payments of $1 billion or more from direct Fed 
support to securities lending counterparties Barclays, Deutsche Bank, BNP 
Paribas, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, HSBC, Citigroup, Dresdner Kleinwort, 
Merrill Lynch, UBS, and ING). 
304 See Dinallo, supra note 269, at 4 (“If there had been no Financial Products 
unit and only the securities lending program as it was, we would not be here 
today”); Ario, supra note 269, at 8 (“[S]ecurities lending did not pose 
unmanageable systemic risk and was not the reason for federal intervention.  AIG 
Financial Products was the source of federal intervention.”). 
305 Dinallo, supra  note 269, at 6 (absent “run on the securities lending 
program,” regulators “would have continued to work with AIG to unwind its 
program and any losses would have been manageable … [E]ven if there had been a 
run on the securities lending program with no federal rescue, our detailed analysis 
indicates that the AIG life insurance companies would not have been insolvent.”). 
306 See Scott E. Harrington, The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the 
Future of Insurance Regulation, Sept. 2009, at 11, available at 
www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_namic.pdf.. 
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it does not conclusively establish – that the securities lending activities of 
AIG’s life-insurance subsidiaries posed a systemic risk. 
 
2. Bond Insurers 
 
a. Industry Background 
 
Bond insurers, also called “financial guaranty insurers” or 
“monoline insurers,” insure against default losses on debt obligations.  As 
of 2008, the industry accounted for about $3 billion in direct premiums,307 
and eight firms accounted for about 99% of direct premiums written 
between 2001 and 2008.308  The basic premise of the bond insurance 
industry is that the guaranty insurer maintains very strong credit, so that by 
insuring a debt obligation it reduces the credit risk on that obligation.  The 
lower credit risk because of the insurance “wrapper” allows the issuer to 
sell the debt at a lower yield, so that the interest savings at least cover the 
cost of the insurance premium.309  How this industry would add value in a 
truly efficient market is not immediately intuitive, although theoretical 
arguments based on asymmetric information have been advanced to justify 
its existence.310 
The bond insurance business originated in311 the municipal debt 
market and continued to be important to that market until the financial 
crisis.  From the mid-1990s until 2008, around half of new municipal bond 
issuances were covered by bond insurance.312  Starting in the 1980s, bond 
insurers expanded into insurance of financial products other than municipal 
debt.313 The first expansion was to guarantees of public project finance 
                                                                                                                 
307 See Pamela Drake & Faith Neale: Financial Gaurantee Insurance: 
Arrogance of Ingnorance in an Era of Exuberance (Aug. 2009) (unpublished 
working paper) (on file with author) at 9. 
308 See id. at 9-10. 
309 See JAN JOB DE VRIES ROBBÉ, SECURITIZATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE 
FACE OF THE CREDIT CRUNCH 69 (2009). 
310 See Anjan Thakor, An Exploration of Competitive Signaling Equilibria with 
“Third Party” Information Production:  The Case of Debt Insurance, 37 J. FIN. 
717 (1982). 
311 See James P. McNichols, Monoline Insurance and Financial Guaranty 
Reserving 231, 233 (2003) available at 
www.casact.org/pubs/forum/03fforum/03ff231.pdf.. 
312 See Drake & Neale, supra note 276, at 30 Fig. 2. 
313 See id. at  276, at 25 Tbl. 1; Circular Ltr. 19, at 2. 
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bonds, starting in the late 1980s.314  Later, bond insurers began to take on 
credit risk associated with more novel and complex financial products.  
They insured notes issued by CDOs,315 created special purpose vehicles to 
sell credit protection on CDOs by entering into credit default swaps,316 and 
invested in CDOs.317    This activity eventually grew to account for a large 
proportion of the bond insurers’ business.318   
 
b. Industry Failure and Systemic Effects 
 
As described in greater detail above, downgrades, collateral calls, 
and defaults on novel financial products led to severe financial problems 
for the bond insurers.319  Losses that call solvency into question are, of 
course, significant for any insurer, but superior credit is by definition the 
stock in trade of financial guaranty insurers.  Bond insurers operated with 
high leverage to begin with because of the perceived safety of their 
exposures, and the financial crisis caused most bond insurers to suffer 
serious rating downgrades and to be unable to meet regulatory capital 
                                                                                                                 
314 See Bartlett, supra note 152, at 9. 
315 See id. at 9. 
316 See Drake & Neale, supra note 276, at 6 (outstanding notional value of 
monoline CDS was $550 billion as of March 2008) 
317 See id.,at 17. 
318 Drake & Neale report that structured finance “compris[ed] up to half the 
insurance portfolio of several [financial guaranty] insurers.”  Id. at 6. 
319 See, e.g., Helen Remeza, Financial Guaranty Insurance Industry 2009 
Review and 2010 Outlook, MOODY’S SPECIAL REP., at 2 (Feb. 2010) (Moody’s 
report asserting that financial guaranty insurers saw their resources “severely 
depleted as a result of claims, mostly from direct mortgage exposures and 
leveraged exposures through ABS CDOs, but also through stress in their insured 
asset-management business.”).  Although the extent of financial insurers’ exposure 
to actual default losses on insured novel products is not clear, and although it is 
argued that prices on such instruments during the crisis were reduced below fair 
value due to market liquidity issues and investor panic, Bartlett documents the 
existence of actual losses on highly rated notes issued by CDOs and insured by 
monoline insurers.  See e.g., Robert Bartlett III, Inefficiencies in the Information 
Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis at 48-
49 (2010) available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract/=1585953 (liquidation of 
Kleros Preferred Funding VI Ltd. CDO in late 2009 resulted in a $2 billion 
principal deficiency on $2.4 trillion of Class A-1S notes insured by Ambac).  The 
Class A-1S notes carried an initial rating of AAA. See  Kleros Preferred Funding 
VI Ltd. Offering Circular at 1, (June 6, 2007) available at 
http://www.ise.ie/debt_documents/kleros_5756.pdf 
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requirements.320  By 2010, only one bond insurer was writing new 
business.321   
The failure of the bond insurers naturally affected their 
counterparties and the markets for the products they insured.  The failure of 
CDS and insurance policies on novel products seems to have imperiled the 
bond insurers’ counterparties in the same way AIG’s failure might have. 322  
The fact that the insurance coverage for such exposures had been called 
into question presumably increased uncertainty and decreased confidence, 
further reducing liquidity for RMBS and CDOs.  Even municipal bonds, 
historically seen as quite safe, were seriously affected.  Prices plunged and 
municipalities reportedly found it difficult to issue debt.323 
B.   Rating-Dependent Regulation of Bond Insurance and Systemic 
Risk 
 
The experience of the financial guaranty insurance industry 
illustrates the problems with rating-agency gatekeeping of insurance-
company exposures.  The exposures in this case arose from the bond 
insurers’ decisions to invest in novel products, and even more importantly 
from their decision to insure novel assets in various ways.  The financial 
guarantors were allowed to insure novel products because rating agencies 
had given those products investment-grade ratings.   
The regulatory response to the state of the FGI industry did not 
seriously question rating-dependent regulation, providing yet another 
example of regulators’ reluctance to abandon ratings altogether.  In fact, the 
New York State Department of Insurance increased its reliance on credit 
ratings, and its efforts to prevent recurrence of the FGI industry’s plight 
took the form of outright, apparently permanent bars on certain FGI 
activities.  Here again, a seasoning requirement for giving regulatory effect 
to credit ratings would have averted the problem – a problem that in this 
case apparently contributed to systemic crisis.  Moreover, a seasoning 
requirement would be less intrusive in some respects than the approach the 
                                                                                                                 
320 Remeza, supra note 288, at 3. 
321 See id. at 2. 
322 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 288 at 51 (“Like AIG Financial Products, 
monoline insurers stood at the center of the Financial Crisis in light of their key 
role insuring the super-senior tranches of multi-sector CDOs tied to residential 
mortgages.”). 
323 See Marc Levinson, Financial Regulation’s Fatal Flaw COUNS. OF 
FOREIGN AFF. (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/21263/financial_regulaitons_fatal_flaw.html. 
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Department of Insurance eventually adopted.   
 
1. Pre-Crisis Rating-Dependent Regulation of Bond 
Insurers 
 
Credit risk is central to the financial guaranty insurance industry.  
Credit risk doesn’t just affect the performance of the guarantors’ 
investments; it also determines the amount they are required to pay out in 
claims.  Unsurprisingly, credit ratings come up frequently in discussions of 
the industry.   
A bond insurer’s credit rating is important to its business.  One 
recent study declares that “the value of a monoline financial guarantee 
insurer is directly tied to its credit rating.”324  This is probably due in large 
part to the fact that certain obligations that New York-regulated insurers 
otherwise cannot purchase can become eligible for investment if they are 
covered by bond insurance – but only if the bond insurer maintains a AAA 
rating.325 
The credit ratings of individual instruments are central to the 
regulation of bond insurers.  The New York State Department of Insurance 
apparently is the most important capital regulator for financial guaranty 
insurers,326  and New York’s pre-crisis solvency rules for financial guaranty 
insurers were heavily rating-dependent: 
Policyholders’ surplus: Financial guaranty insurers must maintain 
a policyholder’s surplus (excess of admitted assets over liabilities)327 of $65 
million.328  Only specified types of assets can be used to satisfy this 
                                                                                                                 
324 Drake & Neale, supra note 276, at 21; see also McNichols, supra note 280, 
at 257 (“the monoline’s highest priority is maintenance of its AAA ratings”). 
325 N.Y. INS. LAW § 1404(a)(2)(iii) (McKinney 2006). 
326 It appears that even when financial guaranty insurers are domiciled in states 
other than New York, the state of domicile will look to New York for capital 
standards.  See, e.g., Office of the Comm’r of Ins., State of Wisconsin, Report of 
the Examination of Ambac Assurance Corporation (Aug. 31, 2007), at 34-35 
(noting that Wisconsin-domiciled Ambac “is also subject to the minimum capital 
requirements of the New York Insurance Laws, which are more restrictive than 
Wisconsin requirements for certain segments of the financial guaranty business.  
The New York aggregate risk limitation requirement serves as an industry standard 
for the evaluation of minimum capital requirements of a financial guaranty insurer 
and is used as the minimum standard in Wisconsin.”).  
327 N.Y. INS. LAW § 107(a)(42) (McKinney 2006). 
328 Id. § 6902(b)(1).  (McKinney 2009) The New York State Department of 
Insurance stated in 2008 that it would seek to increase this “to a figure in excess of 
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requirement,329 and one of those types is municipal bonds – as long as they 
carry high ratings.330  
Contingency reserves:  Financial guaranty insurers must maintain 
contingency reserves to cover losses on insured instruments.  For bonds 
other than municipal obligations and special revenue bonds, the amount of 
the required contingency reserve depends on the credit rating of the insured 
instrument:  Insurers must hold 1-1.5% of guaranteed principal against 
investment-grade obligations,331 and 2-2.5% of guaranteed principal against 
non-investment grade obligations,332 where “investment grade” is a rating-
dependent determination.333 
Aggregate risk limitations: Financial guaranty insurers must 
maintain surplus to policyholders and contingency reserves334 against the 
unpaid principal, interest, and other obligations of guaranteed obligations, 
net of reinsurance ceded and collateral.335  The amount of surplus and 
reserves that has to be held against an insured obligation under this rule 
generally depends on the obligation’s rating.  For example, the insurer must 
hold reserves and surplus equal to 1-1.5% of the insured amount of most 
investment-grade obligations336 and 2-4% of the insured amount of most 
non-investment-grade obligations.337 
Overall investment-grade limit: At least 95% of the insurer’s 
aggregate net liability on municipal obligation bonds, special revenue 
bonds, and industrial revenue bonds must be on investment-grade 
                                                                                                                 
$150 million.”  Circ. Ltr. No. 19, at 10, available at 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/circltr/2008/c108_19.htm. 
329 See N. Y. INS. LAW § 1402 (McKinney 2006) (setting forth general rules 
for what assets can be used to satisfy policyholders’ surplus requirement) 
330 See N. Y. INS. LAW (McKinney 2009) § 6902(b)(3).     
331 Id. § 6903(a)(4)(B)(i)-(ii). 
332 Id.. LAW § 6903(a)(4)(B)(iii)-(v) 
333 Id.  § 6901(n) (investment-grade obligation is one rated in the “top four 
generic lettered rating classifications by a securities rating agency acceptable to the 
superintendent,” identified in writing by such a rating agency to be of investment 
grade quality, or rated NAIC-1 or -2 by SVO. 
334 Id. § 6904(c). 
335 Id.  § 6901(d) (defining “aggregate net liability” in these terms). 
336 N.Y. INS. LAW § 6904(c)(1)(C)-(D) (McKinney 2009). 
337 Id. §6904(c)(1)(E)-(G).  Notably, municipal bonds are subject to the same 
(low) capital requirement regardless of credit ratings.  See id. § 6904(c)(1)(A) 
(requirement to hold 0.333% of principal value of municipal bonds in reserves and 
surplus). 
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instruments.338 
Although the aggregate insurance risk limitations mentioned above 
could be considered a form of risk-based capital requirement, the New 
York State Department of Insurance apparently does not impose risk-based 
capital standards based on exposures.339   
Bond insurers apparently played a large role in securing acceptance 
of novel products.340  Because bond insurers’ own ability to take on 
exposures was rating-dependent, this created an indirect form of rating-
dependent regulation.  A potential investor that would not or could not 
invest in a product based on the product’s rating might invest based on the 
bond insurance – insurance enabled by the existence of a rating. 
 
2. The New York State Department of Insurance Deepens 
Its Reliance on Ratings in Response to the Crisis 
 
The failure of bond insurers in the financial crisis has led some 
commenters to conclude that “[s]olvency procedures currently used by 
regulators are not sufficient to monitor the solvency of bond insurers, due 
in part to the lack of risk-based capital standards and the deviation of FGIs 
away from their core business.”341 
                                                                                                                 
338 Id. § 6904(b)(2). 
339 See Drake & Neale, supra note 276,  at 12-13 & n.45.  Drake and Neale 
report that financial guaranty insurers are all regulated by the State of New York, 
which has adopted a separate regulatory regime for these insurers that does not 
incorporate NAIC’s risk-based capital guidelines.  Id. 
340 See Bartlett, supra note 288, at 9 (securitized products “typically required 
some form of external credit enhancement in order for the senior notes … to 
receive an investment grade credit rating” and financial guaranty insurers were 
well positioned to provide enhancement because “no monoline insurer had ever 
experienced a single ratings downgrade.”); McNichols, supra note 280, at 257 
(estimating that 1/3 of all asset-backed security transactions are wrapped by AAA 
insurers); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Joint Forum, Credit Risk 
Transfer 21 (March 2005)  (“To a great extent, their role appears to be to provide 
an additional layer of bonded due diligence (beyond that provided by the rating 
agencies) that enables CDO tranche buyers to become comfortable with purchasing 
instruments that they themselves are uncertain how to evaluate fully”). On the 
explosion of novel securitized products, see, e.g., Yongheng Deng et al., CDO 
Market Implosion and the Pricing of Subprime Mortage-Backed Securities 3-4 
(March 2009) (global CDO issuance expanded from $300 billion to $2 trillion 
from 1997 to 2006, subprime asset-backed CDO issuance increased from $10 
billion in 2000 to $50 billion in 2006). 
341 Drake & Neale, supra note 276, at 42. 
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The New York Department of Insurance has taken action to 
address such concerns. On September 22, 2008, the Department issued 
Circular Letter Number 19, which provided new guidance for financial 
guaranty insurers in response to the declines in the structured-finance 
market and the rating agency downgrades of the leading bond insurers.342  
Circular Letter 19 did not directly reduce the role of rating agencies.  
Indeed, New York deepened its commitment to rating-dependent 
regulation.  Circular Letter 19 includes a statement that the Department 
expects that FGIs’ entire portfolios will be invested in investment grade 
assets, with “investment grade”343 determined by rating.  Circular Letter 19 
also forbids financial guaranty insurers to insure non-agency CDOs of ABS 
absent special permission from the Superintendent – or a policy provision 
that the insurer holds an unsubordinated senior position with a rating of A 
or better.344 
By enacting what appears to be a permanent ban on insuring ABS 
CDOs under certain conditions, Circular Letter 19 imposes a requirement 
that is more onerous and intrusive than a seasoning requirement would 
have been. 
 
C.   IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM 
 
The difficulties that apparently systemically important regulated 
insurers faced after highly rated novel products failed to perform as 
anticipated highlight the importance of rating reliability.  The failure of a 
systemically important institution has important consequences, so if all else 
is equal, systemically important institutions should be regulated more 
conservatively than institutions that lack systemic importance.  The pre-
crisis rating-dependent bond insurance regulations described above did not 
distinguish appropriately between ratings that could be expected to be 
highly reliable and those that could be expected to be less reliable.  Ratings 
on financial products with a long history are likely to be more reliable than 
ratings on novel products.  This is true even if the novel-product ratings are 
as good as anyone has a right to expect,345 and regulatory conservatism is 
                                                                                                                 
342 Circ. Ltr. No. 19.  Circular Letter No. 19 took effect January 1, 2009. 
343 See id. at 9 (the “95% investment grade” rule previously had covered only 
municipal, special revenue, and industrial development bonds). 
344 Id., at 5. 
345 The same observation applies to the bond insurers’ internal assessments of 
credit risk, which contemporary analysts regarded as first-rate.  See Joint Forum, 
Credit Risk Transfer 37 (March 2005) (“At this stage, the Working Group has not 
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even more strongly indicated if the market cannot fully digest the extent 
and nature of an insurer’s exposures to novel products, as appears to have 
been the case for the bond insurers.346 
A seasoning requirement – a determination that ratings will not be 
given regulatory effect until the rated product has been in existence long 
enough to permit reliable ratings – is a simple way of achieving regulatory 
conservatism.  It appears less intrusive and restrictive than imposing 
permanent bars on taking exposures to novel products, as New York’s 
insurance department apparently has done. 
 
VII. RMBS, RULE BAILOUTS, AND THE LIMITS OF CAPITAL 
REGULATION 
 
As the RAWG and the New York State Department of Insurance 
were illustrating the difficulty of abandoning rating-dependent regulation in 
general, a separate NAIC proceeding was illustrating the difficulty of 
sticking to rating-dependent regulation – or any ex ante capital rules – in 
the midst of a financial crisis.  Rating-agency downgrades of RMBS during 
the financial crisis would have required insurers to raise large additional 
amounts of capital under the risk-based capital rules.  In response, the 
NAIC abandoned its rating-dependent rules for RMBS and substituted an 
alternative third-party credit risk assessor.  The NAIC’s action resembles 
the move away from mark-to-market accounting in banking around the 
same time, which apparently was motivated by a desire to provide capital 
relief in that sector.  Both actions can be described as “rule bailouts” – 
changes to the rules in the midst of a crisis at the behest of a regulated 
industry in order to avoid the need to raise capital or be found insolvent.   
                                                                                                                 
found evidence of hidden concentrations of credit risk.  Nevertheless, there are 
some non-bank firms whose primary business model focuses on taking on credit 
risk. These include the monoline financial guarantors and the specialized CDS 
entity described above. Other market participants are fully aware of the nature of 
these firms. In the case of the monolines, credit risk has always been their primary 
business activity and thus they have invested heavily in obtaining expertise in the 
analysis of credit risk. The rating agencies also obtain significant data on 
individual transactions entered into by the monolines. While it is clearly possible 
that one of these firms could experience unanticipated problems or otherwise 
misjudge the risks involved, such problems are not likely to be the result of having 
entered into the business of CRT activity lightly. Given their orientation toward 
super senior risk, the monolines exhibit more exposure concentration rather than 
risk concentration.”) 
346 See Bartlett, supra note 288, at 1-4. 
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Rule bailouts may be justified on their own terms when they 
happen.  The life insurance industry presented a well-reasoned argument 
for the change – albeit an argument that did not rest on anything specific to 
the financial crisis and that could have been raised years earlier.  Almost 
any rule bailout can be characterized either as a justified response to the 
failure of preexisting rules devised by fallible humans to work in a 
financial crisis or as an unjustified example of regulatory forbearance – 
reflecting perhaps the fact that regulators want to believe, along with their 
regulated charges that things will turn around somehow, or at least that 
failure can be staved off until a new regulator is on the watch.   
Whether any particular rule bailout was justified or unjustified on 
the merits, the tendency to engage in rule bailouts has implications for the 
design of capital rules.  For example, regulators might consider limiting 
reliance on rigorous, painful enforcement of existing rules in a financial 
crisis, which in turn counsels conservative requirements to build up 
institutions’ cushions when a crisis is not occurring.  Relatedly, rule 
bailouts impart a kind of shadow countercyclicality to capital requirements 
that might be considered in designing a macroprudential regulatory system. 
High capital requirements are not as procyclical as they might appear if 
they are likely to be relaxed in crisis.  And the unexpected failure of ratings 
that depended on correlation measures, which triggered the pressure for a 
rule bailout, suggests that regulators should be cautious in approaching 
regulatory-reform suggestions that would increase reliance on accurate 
forecasts of correlation. 
The tendency toward rule bailouts is characteristic of capital 
regulation generally, not just of rating-dependent regulation.  But rating-
dependent regulation as practiced by insurance regulators helped create the 
conditions for a rule bailout by making it easy for insurers to amass large 
exposures to novel assets that performed unpredictably in a financial crisis.  
A seasoning requirement would have helped avoid that situation.  
Moreover, a seasoning requirement is less vulnerable to the forces that 
produce rule bailouts than, say, a requirement that regulators take prompt 
corrective action to resolve endangered institutions, because the seasoning 
requirement does not rely on regulators to make painful decisions in the 
midst of a financial crisis. 
 
A. RMBS REVALUATION IN THE CRISIS OF 2007-09 
 
In the wake of the crisis, the NAIC changed its approach to 
solvency regulation of residential mortgage-backed securities.  Instead of 
relying on agency ratings, NAIC now relies on models developed by 
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PIMCO Advisory to place each RMBS into one of the six NAIC 
categories.347  The RAWG report states that this change, “(1) identifies the 
actual risks presented by RMBS; (2) quantifies the severity of possible 
losses; (3) provides a better measure of losses against which surplus must 
be kept; and (4) when appropriate, frees up capital, in particular for 
securities held at a discount.”348  
This decision generally follows a proposal that the American 
Council of Life Insurers advanced in August 2009 after a wave of 
downgrades to the credit ratings of RMBS. 349  ACLI argued that the rating-
based capital rules required the insurers to hold too much capital.350  In 
particular, ACLI argued that agency ratings were based “primarily on the 
likelihood of the first dollar of loss,”351 so that the ratings did not 
“distinguish between securities that are projected to experience a total loss 
and securities that are projected to experience minor losses.”352  Thus, a 
10% chance of default produced the same rating, regardless of whether the 
bond was likely to lose 1% or 100% of its value on default.  Although 
Moody’s apparently did not submit formal comments on the ACLI 
proposal before it was adopted, Moody’s later argued that this was an 
unfair characterization of its ratings; for securities were expected to incur a 
loss (usually those rated below B), Moody’s stated it was an unfair 
characterization because its ratings were based on anticipated recovery.353  
Moody’s also argued that its recovery estimates on subprime RMBS were 
no lower than those implied by market prices.354 
                                                                                                                 
347 RAWG Final Report, supra note 38, at 4. 
348 Id. at 4. 
349 Letter from John Bruins, Senior Actuary, Am. Council of Life Insurers 
(ACLI) & Andrew Melnyk, Managing Director, ACLI to Michael Moriarty, Chair, 
Valuation of Securities Task Force, NAIC & Lou Felice, Chair, Capital Adequacy 
Task Force, NAIC (Aug, 10, 2009) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.naic.org [hereinafter “ACLI Aug. 10, 2009 Letter”]. 
350 Id. at 1. (“unwarranted impact on RBC being experienced by the industry” 
as a result of rating agency RMBS downgrades). 
351 Id., at 1. 
352 Id. at 3. 
353 Debash Chatterjee et al., Moody’s Ratings on U.S. RMBS Reflect Expected 
Recoveries:  Ratings on Impaired Securities Do Not Overstate Risk, Final Report 
of the RAWG to the Fiancial Conditions (E) Committee: Comment Letters 1,2 
(Nov. 6, 2009) available at http://www.naic.org/scommittees_e_rating_agency.htm 
(click on “Rating Agency WG Final Report”; then proceed to section 8 of Moody’s 
pdf),  
354 Id. at 2. 
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ACLI argued that this was inappropriate because the risk-based 
capital system was calibrated to levels of loss given default typical of 
corporate bonds, while RMBS were likely to suffer much less loss given 
default than corporate bonds.355  Thus it arguably was inappropriate to 
make an insurer hold as much capital against a B-rated RMBS as against a 
B-rated corporate bond.   
This was a serious issue for the insurers; ACLI cited a report 
finding that at least 64% of AAA-rated non-agency RMBS had been 
downgraded to below investment grade by at least one rating agency by 
June 2009.356  ACLI estimated the credit-risk capital component of their 
capital requirement attributable to RMBS increased from $2 billion as of 
the end of 2008 to $11 billion by the end of 2009 as a result of the RMBS 
downgrades.357 
ACLI’s proposal was adopted with little formal comment; NAIC’s 
records reveal only two official comments, both friendly to the ACLI 
proposal.358  The NAIC adopted special rules under which a third-party 
                                                                                                                 
355 ACLI Sept. 10, 2009 Letter, supra note 318, at 4.  In particular, ACLI 
argued that in the event of a corporate default, corporate bond indentures typically 
terminate interest payments and accelerate maturity of the principal, effectively 
terminating the security on default.  ACLI argued that RMBS structure, by 
contrast, allow securities to continue receiving principal and interest even after an 
event of default.  Id.  Thus, ACLI argued, “In the case of senior RMBS tranches, 
the ability to receive several years of coupon payments alone dramatically 
improves expected economic recoveries relative to a typical corporate bond.”  Id.  
ACLI’s letters proposing the change in methodology did not present any 
quantitative data backing this analysis, and it does not appear that any such data 
was presented in the course of NAIC’s consideration of ACLI’s proposal. 
356 Id. at 3. 
357 ACLI Sept. 10, 2009 Letter, supra note 318, at 3.  Apparently the actual 
increase in the amount of capital the industry would have to hold would be 
somewhat less than the $9 billion difference between these two numbers because 
of the way the risk-based capital formula combines the different risks to arrive at a 
total risk-based capital requirement – a process called “taking correlation into 
account.” See supra Part __.  For example, if a company had a $2 billion capital 
charge for interest rate risk, a $2 billion capital charge for credit risk, and a $10 
billion capital charge for insurance risk, then total risk-based capital would be 
around $10.8 billion.  If the credit-risk component of the charge were to increase 
from $2 billion to $11 billion, then total risk-based capital would be $16.4 billion, 
an increase of $5.6 billion, not $9 billion.  The formula guarantees that the increase 
in total capital will be less than the increase in the credit risk charge unless the 
company has no insurance risk. 
358 One comment was from a provider of analytical tools for RMBS that would 
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evaluator would establish a price range for each RMBS for each of the six 
NAIC designations, and those ranges would be used instead of credit 
ratings to establish the amount of capital that the insurers were obliged to 
hold.359  
The change apparently had the intended effect; NAIC estimated 
that the change in valuation method reduced the credit-risk capital charge 
for life insurance companies’ RMBS holdings from $10.8 billion to $3.5 
billion – a 68% reduction.360   
The rating agencies resisted the notion that their rating downgrades 
were responsible for the industry’s straits.  Moody’s suggested that most of 
the reduction in required capital came from the decision to give insurers the 
benefit of bargain purchases and write-downs, rather than the change in 
who was doing the assessment.361  For its part, Fitch pointedly commented 
that its ratings “are expressly not designed to effect a pre-determined 
regulatory outcome, such as ‘free[ing] up capital.’”362 
                                                                                                                 
have been a potential candidate to be hired to carry out the third-party valuation 
exercise.  See Letter from Andrew Davidson, Pres., Andrew Davidson & Co. to 
Michael Moriarty, Chair, Valuation of Securities Task Force, NAIC, & Lou Felice, 
Chair, Capital Adequacy Task Force, NAIC (Sept. 30, 2009) (on file with the 
author) available at 
http:www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_091014_materials.pdf..  The other 
was from a life insurance company that suggested technical changes to the process 
for valuing the RMBS.  See E-mail from Andy Hopping, Exec. Vice Pres. & CFO, 
Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. to Richard Newman, NAIC (Sept. 30, 2009) (on file 
with author) http:// naic.org/documents/committees_e_091014_materials.pdf..  . 
359 See NAIC, Re: RFP 1344 – Assessment of Residential Mortgage Backed 
Securities (RMBS)  13 ) (Oct.23, 2009) 
http://naic.org/documents/svo_rmbs_rfp_102309.pdf. _ 
360 Estimated RBC Impact from the RMBS Initiative 1 (Apr. 8, 2010), available 
at http://www.naic.org/rmbs/100408_rbs_impact_estimate.pdf.    The values are 
for the year-end 2009 risk-based capital requirement.  After taking correlation into 
account, the reduction was smaller in absolute terms but about the same in 
percentage terms:  the change reduced the amount of life insurers’ post-correlation 
capital  charge attributable to RMBS credit risk from $8.4 billion to $3.0 billion, or 
65%.  (total life insurer capital charge from NAIC par value is about $178 billion 
and book adjusted carrying value about $ 151 billion). 
361 Scott Robinson, Most U.S. Life Insurers RMBS Capital Relief from Change 
in Computation, Not Switch to PIMCO, Final Report of the RAWG to the 
Financial Conditions (E) Committee: Comment Letters 1, 1 (Jan. 11, 2010), 
available at http://www.naic.org/committees_e_rating_agency.htm (click on 
“rating Agency WG Final Report:” then proceed to Section 8 of pdf).  
362 Letter from Charles Brown, General Counsel, Fitch Ratings to Richard 
2010] RATING DEPENDENT REGULATION  177  
 
 
 
 
B.   THE RULE BAILOUT IN CONTEXT 
 
It seems that the problem ACLI identified with the regulators’ use 
of ratings to assess the risk of RMBS, assuming it was a problem at all, 
existed before the crisis and was not a product of the crisis.  Whatever the 
merits of the underlying argument about recovery values on RMBS versus 
corporate bonds, this episode illustrates the willingness of regulators to 
adjust capital requirements to fit the interests of regulated parties during a 
systemic crisis.  ACLI expressly justified its request on the basis of the old 
rules’ “unwarranted” and “severe” impact on required capital.363  It 
parallels other examples of departure from established rules and customs 
during the crisis, such as the dubiously legal abandonment of long-standing 
Federal Reserve practices to make unprecedented loans,364 and the bank-
friendly amendment of fair value (or “mark-to-market”) accounting rules in 
March 2009, by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).365 
The mark-to-market changes were widely viewed as a form of 
regulatory “forbearance.”366  Although mark-to-market rules have their 
critics, including some who are known more for trust in markets than 
doubts about them,367 the sudden discovery in the midst of a crisis that 
                                                                                                                 
Newman, NAIC, Bob Carcano, NAIC, & Dan Daveline, NAIC, Final Report of the 
RAWG to the Financial Conditions (E) Committee: Comment Letters 1, 4 (Jan 5, 
2010) (on file with author) available at 
http://www.naic.org/committees_e_rating_agency.htm (click on “Rating Agency 
WG Final Report:” then proceed to Section 6 Fitch Ratings of pdf).  
363 See ACLI Aug. 10, 2009 Letter, supra note 318, at 2. 
364 See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The 
Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L REV. 463, 477 
(2009).  
365 See Kara Scannell, FASB Eases Mark-to-Market Rules, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
3, 2009 (describing banking industry’s argument for changing rule and FASB’s 
decision to do so). 
366 Jonathan Weil, Suing Wall Street Banks Never Looked So Shady, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 24, 2010.  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-02-
24/suing-wall-street-banks-never-looked-so-shady-jonathan-weil.html.  See also 
James Chanos, We Need Honest Accounting, WALL. ST. J., March 24, 2009 
(characterizing relaxation of capital requirements as an alternative, and superior, 
method of providing regulatory relief as compared to changing mark-to-market 
rules). 
367 See Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Marking to Market:  The 
Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 22-23 (U. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin 
Wokring Paper No. 458, 2009), , available at 
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these rules are “procyclical” – a fact that apparently had gone unnoticed by 
those in a position to make or influence policy when marking to market 
was, presumably, procyclically inflating a bubble – suggests that the mark-
to-market relief was indeed a form of “rule bailout.”  Certainly, the banking 
industry – in both its GSE368 and private369 segments – supported the 
changes, although some commentators questioned whether the game was 
worth the candle for the banks, given the relatively small percentage of 
their assets that was even subject to mark-to-market accounting.370 
                                                                                                                 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1385382. 
368 See Letter from Michael Guttau, Chmn., & John L. von Seggern, Pres. & 
CEO, Council of Fed. Home Loan Banks to Russell G. Golden, Technical Dir., 
Fin. Acct. Standards. Bd., 1 (March 27, 2009) (on file with author) (proposed 
changes to FAS 157 “an improvement over existing guidance”) available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blo
bkey=id&blobwhere=1175818328874&blobheader=application/pdf [hereinafter 
Council Letter 132]; Letter from Michael Guttau, Chmn., Council of Fed. Home 
Loan Banks & John L. von Seggern, President & CEO, Council of Fed. Home 
Loan Banks to Russell G. Golden, Technical Dir., Fin. Acct. Standards. Bd., 1 
(March 27, 2009) (on file with author) (proposed changes to FAS 115, 125, and 
EITF 99-200 “an improvement” over existing guidance, but do not go far enough) 
available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blo
bkey=id&blobwhere=1175818329600&blobheader=application/pdf, (hereinafter 
Council Letter 98). 
369 See Letter from Donna Fisher, Sr. Vice President , Am. Bankers Ass’n to 
Russell Golden, Technical Dir., Fin. Acct. Standards. Bd., (March 30, 2009) (on 
file with author) (“We strongly support” proposed changes to FAS 157), available 
at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blo
bkey=id&blobwhere=1175818331124&blobheader=application/pdf [hereinafter 
ABA Letter 31A]; Letter from Donna Fisher, Sr. Vice President., Am. Bankers 
Ass’n to Russell Golden, Technical Dir., Fin. Acct. Standards. Bd. (March 30, 
2009) (“Overall,  
ABA supports the proposed” changes to FAS 115, 124, and  
EITF 99-20-b), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blo
bkey=id&blobwhere=1175818430414&blobheader=application/pdf (herinafter 
ABA Letter 31). 
370 David Reilly, Commentary, Elvis Lives, and Mark-to-Market Rules Fuel 
Crisis, BLOOMBERG.COM, March 11, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sis=aD11FOjLK1y4 
(reporting analysis of company data finding that only 29% of assets of the 12 
largest banks were held in mark-to-market categories at year-end 2008).  Of 
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C.   IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL REGULATION 
 
The insurance industry’s experience with rating failure on RMBS 
and the resulting rule bailout has three major implications for capital 
regulation.  First, the tendency toward rule bailouts causes capital 
regulations to be less pro-cyclical than they otherwise would be.  Second, if 
regulators have a tendency toward rule bailouts in financial crises, that 
suggests that policymakers should not put too much stock in prompt 
corrective action requirements that order regulators to take ailing 
companies into receivership.  Both these points seem to weigh in favor of 
higher capital requirements than would otherwise be justified.  Finally, the 
failure of correlation-sensitive ratings on RMBS suggests caution in 
adopting suggestions that entail greater regulatory reliance on correlation 
measures. 
 
1. Built-in Countercyclicality and Regulatory 
Forbearance 
 
There has been acute interest in macro-prudential regulation since 
the crisis began.  Macro-prudential regulation “concerns itself with factors 
that affect the stability of the financial system as a whole.”371  One type of 
macro-prudential regulation is adopting countercyclical capital adequacy 
requirements – requiring that firms hold more capital in a boom and less in 
a crisis.372  Another proposal for macro-prudential regulation would be 
permitting institutions with access to long-term funding – perhaps 
including insurers – to value their assets using long-term third party 
valuations rather than market prices.373  As described in Part IV374, the 
                                                                                                                 
course, a highly leveraged institution could be rendered insolvent by losses on a 
relatively small percentage of its holdings.  
371 MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 167, at viii. 
372 Id. at 29 (capital regulation measures “have to be counter-cyclical, i.e., 
tough during a credit boom and more relaxed during a crisis”). 
373 See, e.g., Avinash D. Persaud, The Rise and Apparent Fall of Macro-
Prudential Regulation, VOXEU.ORG, June 24, 
2009,,http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3694; Avinash D. Persaud, 
Regulation, Valuation, and Systemic Liquidity, 12 BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. 
STABILITY REV. 75, 79 (2008).  As explained, insurance regulation in the United 
States already follows this prescription for capital regulation, as non-impaired 
insurer assets are not marked to market for regulatory purposes. [check] 
374 Goodhart, supra note 264, at 14-15 (previously viewed as having little, or 
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consensus not long ago was that insurance companies did not pose a 
systemic risk.  Although that consensus has come under pressure because 
of the financial crisis, proponents of macro-prudential regulation tend to 
believe that because of this, insurance companies need only micro-
prudential regulation.375 
As described above, recent events have challenged the assumption 
that insurers pose no systemic risk, so macro-prudential regulation, at least 
of certain insurers, may be appropriate.  If so, the possibility of rule 
bailouts affects the extent to which a given capital requirement is 
procyclical.  Capital requirements are said to be procyclical in part because 
they can prompt cycles of fire sales when prices are low.  Asset prices go 
down, forcing entities to sell assets to satisfy capital requirements, which 
drives prices down more.  The capital requirement deepens the downward 
leg of the cycle.  Rule bailouts mitigate this effect because regulators find 
ways not to require the forced sales just described.   
At the same time, rule bailouts seem to embody a kind of 
unprincipled forbearance.  The tendency to forbear seems to reflect the 
worst incentives of regulators:  to hope for the best, or at least that the 
worst will not happen on the regulator’s watch.  Such a tendency to push 
problems off into the future would be consistent with insurance regulators’ 
reported tendency to underprice ex ante premiums for guarantee funds.376 
Unbridled regulatory forbearance can in some circumstances be a 
very bad idea– that is typically understood to be one of the central lessons 
of the S&L crisis.  Regulators may decline to take aggressive action to 
wind up an insolvent firm, hoping along with the firm’s management that 
the firm will turn itself around.377 In the meantime, the firm takes greater 
and greater risks in an effort to extricate itself from insolvency.378  This pas 
de deux can increase the ultimate cost of resolution dramatically.379  The 
                                                                                                                 
no, leverage” suggesting to the need for “micro-prudential regulation”). 
375 See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 24; Goodhart, supra note 264, 
at 15. 
376 See David Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the  
Premiums to Meet the Practice, in PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 1, 34 (Robert 
E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2004). ] 
377 See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance 
Regulation?  Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1707, 1763 – 1764  n.256 (2010). 
378 See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 294-95 (8th ed. 2007). 
379 See Martin F. Grace et al., Insurance Company Failures:  Why Do They 
Cost So Much?, Ga. State Univ. Working Paper 03-1 (Oct. 30, 2003), at 29, 
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insurance industry and its regulators380 were accused of behaving similarly 
to S&Ls and their regulators during the era of the S&L crisis, which also 
saw several high-profile insurance insolvencies.381  Thrift and insurance 
regulators both became subject to “prompt corrective action” (PCA) 
requirements during this period.  As described in Part II.A.2 above, PCA 
requirements direct the regulator to take action when capital levels fall 
below specified thresholds.  They are designed to prevent forbearance.  
Rule bailouts illustrate a problem with a system that relies on PCA 
requirements to force regulators to take unpleasant actions during a crisis.  
The regulators can just change the rules to circumvent the requirements.382   
Before being too hard on regulators for their rule bailouts, we 
should remember that no massive wave of insolvencies has appeared in the 
insurance sector in the current crisis– at least to date.383  And NAIC’s CEO 
reminds us that some scholars believe that NAIC’s changes to asset 
valuation rules in the 1930s helped insurance companies survive the Great 
                                                                                                                 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=463103 (reporting 
the results of an empirical study finding that there are three main components of 
resolution costs:  “the pre-insolvency condition of the firm; the degree of 
regulatory forbearance; and the transparency of post-insolvency administration”). 
380 See STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., FAILED PROMISES:  
INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES 6 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter FAILED 
PROMISES] (“The same patterns of industry and regulatory conduct [as in the S&L 
industry] have emerged from the Subcommittee’s recent investigations of 
insurance company insolvencies.”); see also STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 
103D CONG., WISHFUL THINKING:  A WORLD VIEW OF INSURANCE SOLVENCY 
REGULATION 6 (Comm. Print 1994) (“The single, overriding weakness plaguing 
the supervision of domestic and foreign insurance companies is the widespread 
practice of wishful thinking by regulatory officials.”). 
381 See FAILED PROMISES, supra note 349, at 2 (“The Subcommittee examined 
in great detail the failures of Mission Insurance Co., Integrity Insurance Co., 
Transit Casualty Co., and Anglo-American Insurance Co.  Collectively, these four 
failures are projected to cost the American public more than $5 billion...”).  
382 Cf. Brunnermeier et al., supra note 16, at 33-34 (arguing that 
macroprudential regulation should be implemented by rules rather than regulatory 
discretion:  Otherwise, few regulator/supervisors will actually dare to face the 
odium of tightening in boom conditions.). 
383 See Martin Grace, A Reexamination of Federal Regulation in the Insurance 
Industry, at 1-2, Networks Financial Insititute Policy Brief No. 2009-PB-02 (Feb. 
2009).  available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=135053 
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Depression with only modest insolvencies and policyholder losses.384  
Although we would expect any such wave would appear only after a lag, 
the general recovery in credit markets since 2008 and early 2009 suggests 
that the very large credit spreads in those periods did not forecast 
corresponding high levels of credit loss, perhaps because they reflected 
high risk aversion and an absence of liquidity.  So perhaps this particular 
rule bailout will turn out to have been justified, at least from a short-term 
perspective. 
Whether any specific rule bailout was justified or not, the 
possibility of rule bailouts seems to weigh in favor of higher capital 
requirements.  The negative consequences of a high requirement are 
smaller, because there is less chance of forced fire sales during a crisis, and 
the benefits of a high requirement are greater, because rule bailouts and 
forbearance increase the costs of distress, placing a higher premium on 
staying out of distress.   
 
2. Ratings in Crisis and the Asset-by-Asset Debate 
 
The RMBS experience sheds light on another debate in capital 
regulation, the asset-by-asset debate.  The RBC formula has been attacked 
for years on the ground that it does not give enough credit to ideas from 
financial economics about the value of diversification.385  The RBC 
formula, so we have been told, fails to take a portfolio approach to 
assessing risk.  The Model Investment Law, at least in its Defined Limits 
Version, has come in for equally severe criticism.386  These criticisms do 
                                                                                                                 
384 Therese M. Vaughan, The Implications of Solvency II for U.S. Insurance 
Regulation 18 & n.25, Networks Financial Institute Policy Brief 2009-PB-03 (Feb. 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1350539 
(noting that NAIC altered asset valuation rules not just in the 1930s, but also in 
“periods of market turmoil in 1907, 1914, and 1917-21”). 
385 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 346, at 1765 (RBC formula “does a poor 
job accounting for insurers’ diversification and  risk mitigation measures, 
employing a simple covariance formula that does not credit standard hedging 
techniques, much less sophisticated portfolio design.”). 
386 See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The NAIC Investment Law:  A Missed 
Opportunity, in THE STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY:  
ASSET/LIABILITY MANAGEMENT ISSUES (Edward I. Altman & Irwin T. 
Vanderhoof, eds. 1996) 41, 41 (arguing that NAIC’s draft Model Investment Law 
misses a “once-in-a-generation” opportunity by “adopt[ing] a ‘pigeon-hole 
approach that addresses categories of risk assets (and activities) on a standalone 
basis, ignoring portfolio effects and the potential for offsetting interactions among 
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deserve to be taken seriously, as I have argued elsewhere.387 
The value of diversification depends on how the assets in the 
portfolio move together.  The idea of co-movement is usually expressed 
using the term “correlation,” a numerical measure of co-movement that 
ranges from   -1 to 1.   The lower the correlation between each pair of 
assets, the greater the diversification benefit of each pair of assets.  The 
criticism of the RBC system and Model Investment Law is that it does not 
give enough credit for diversification.  In fact, as explained in Part II.A.1 
above, the RBC system assumes that credit risks have a correlation of 1 – 
that is, that there is no diversification benefit. 
Under normal circumstances most assets are not perfectly 
correlated with one another so the perfect-correlation assumption is too 
conservative, just as critics claim.  But it is a common saying in the 
financial community that “in a crisis, all correlations go to one.”388  And in 
fact defaults on the mortgages underlying RMBS turned out to be more 
correlated during the crisis than rating agencies or many investors 
anticipated.  Indeed, the high ratings and subsequent downgrades on the 
RMBS in question were based in large part on diversification benefits that 
failed to materialize in the crisis.   
If a capital regulation system is to be designed so that the regulated 
companies meet specified probabilities of survival during a financial crisis, 
the assumption that credit risks are perfectly correlated looks more like a 
prudent, conservative design feature than a technologically retrograde 
failure to keep up with contemporary thought.  The failure of ratings on 
novel products counsels caution about importing higher levels of 
sophistication into the capital regulation system, at least without sufficient 
testing of the underlying assumptions. 
 
VIII. THE CASE FOR A RATINGS SEASONING REQUIREMENT 
IN REGULATION 
 
The performance of insurance solvency regulation during the 
financial crisis mapped to the performance of the ratings on which 
regulators’ solvency determinations are based.  Regulated life and property 
& casualty insurers were not heavily exposed to products on which ratings 
                                                                                                                 
the categories.”). 
387 See Hunt, supra note 255, at 776-77.. 
388 RICHARD M. BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, 
HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FIANCIAL INNOVATION 26 9John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. eds., 2007)..                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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failed, and they by and large escaped insolvency.  AIG and financial 
guaranty insurers were heavily exposed to products on which ratings failed, 
and they did suffer insolvency. 
The ratings that failed were ratings on novel products.  Substantial 
evidence indicates that agencies simply did not know what they were doing 
in rating these products.  Although rating agencies have sometimes been 
successful in rating novel products right out of the box, it seems hard to 
dispute that ratings on novel products are less reliable than ratings on more 
seasoned products. 
Rating failure on novel products may or may not indict rating 
agencies.  Perhaps their performance was as good as anyone had a right to 
expect.  The experience does highlight a potential problem with the design 
of the regulatory system, though.  Rating-dependent regulation of the 
insurance industry treats all ratings, on novel and traditional products, as 
the same.  But they are not the same, because ratings on novel products can 
be expected to be less reliable. As a simplifying device, imagine two 
ratings, one on a traditional industrial corporate bond and one on a novel 
structured product.  Assume for the sake of argument that each rating 
corresponds to a 75% chance of default and that 75% is in fact the best 
estimate of the chance of default for each obligation.389  But the corporate-
bond rating may be more reliable:  Think of a 75% +/- 5% chance of 
default for that bond, as opposed to a 75% +/- 25% chance of default for 
the novel bond.  A regulatory system that wants insurers to hold only bonds 
with a chance of default reasonably close to 75% might well admit the first 
rating and not the second. 
If all bond ratings should not be treated equally, how should 
regulators decide which ratings to credit?  A simple seasoning requirement 
could be used to distinguish between reliable and less-reliable ratings.  For 
example, if ratings on novel products did not “count” for regulatory 
purposes until a substantial volume of the product had been on the market 
for some period designed to correspond to the length of the credit cycle, 
perhaps 5-7 years, this would allow regulators and credit rating agencies to 
observe the product’s performance under varying economic and market 
conditions, so that final ratings would be more reliable.390 
                                                                                                                 
389 As discussed, rating agencies state that ratings do not correspond to 
specified default probabilities, although some researchers have concluded that 
S&P’s CDO ratings were designed to achieve just such probabilities. 
390 A seasoning requirement for giving regulatory effect to ratings is in some 
respects a partial substitute for a more general system for deterring issuance of 
low-quality ratings on novel products.  For example, if a rule requiring 
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Such a seasoning requirement would be a more narrowly tailored 
change to rating-dependent regulation than other proposals that are under 
consideration or that have been adopted.  For example, the first-draft 
RAWG proposal to eliminate rating-dependent regulation on structured 
products seems to give short shrift to rating agencies’ ability to learn from 
mistakes.  Dodd-Frank’s requirement that rating-dependent regulation be 
eliminated at the federal level is even more sweeping. 
The strongest argument for sweeping elimination of rating-
dependent regulation is that RDR damages rating quality.  But the heavily 
rating-dependent regulatory system apparently has not degraded rating 
quality to unacceptable levels for traditional obligations.  Although 
scholars have argued that ratings do not add value in the sense of 
improving on what anyone with access to the financial press could 
accomplish,391 that level of quality seems “good enough for government 
work,”392 as other scholars have argued.  Rating-agency critiques of the 
pernicious effect of rating-dependent regulation on agency incentives 
likewise focus on RDR’s effects in the context of novel products.  
A seasoning requirement for rating-dependent regulation could 
conceivably impede the development of novel financial products, as rating-
regulated investors would effectively be barred from purchasing such 
products.  Of course, the overall social utility of financial-product 
innovation is the subject of an unresolved debate, and in that sense it is 
unclear that this objection has any force at all.  In any event, hedge funds 
and accredited individual investors are not subject to rating-dependent 
regulations and would be able to purchase novel products.  And under 
Dodd-Frank, ratings are to be excised from federal regulations anyway, 
creating another potential market for unrated products. 
From a political-economy point of view, a seasoning requirement 
is more feasible than more aggressive RDR-reduction measures.  The 
seasoning requirement could be implemented by NAIC via a change to 
Rule FE, so that a state-by-state effort is unnecessary.  Industry is spared 
the expense of paying for efforts that duplicate reliable rating-agency 
efforts.  The seasoning requirement addresses Moody’s and S&P’s major 
                                                                                                                 
disgorgement of profits on low-quality profits were adopted, see Hunt, Credit 
Rating Agencies, supra note 148, at 53, then we might expect agencies not to issue 
low-quality ratings on novel products, so that no seasoning requirement would be 
needed.  
391 Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 246, at 509. 
392 Claire A. Hill, Why Did Anyone Listen to the Rating Agencies After 
Enron?, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 283, 283 (2009). 
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criticisms of RDR, and the other rating agencies have adopted essentially 
an agnostic line.  By adopting a bright-line seasoning rule, regulators would 
avoid taking responsibility for each and every decision to permit insurers to 
make investments.  At the same time, seasoning reduces one potentially 
harmful political-economy effect:  rule bailouts.  If rating performance is 
more reliable, it is less likely that ratings will perform in unexpectedly 
negative ways that result in industry’s demanding a rule bailout.  
Given NAIC’s evident lack of interest in complete eradication of 
RDR at this time, an effort to do so seems likely to require a costly state-
by-state battle.  Congress could take action, but states have successfully 
resisted federal efforts to encroach on their authority for nearly 70 years.  
Arguments based on systemic risk might provide some traction, but they 
don’t really apply to core insurance activities, with the possible exception 
of financial guaranty insurance, which effectively has a single regulator 
already. 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
Rating-agency reformers have good arguments for removing 
private credit ratings from the regulatory system.  At the same time, 
financial regulators have both good reasons and strong incentives to 
continue relying on private credit ratings or something very much like 
them.  Congress’ recent expression of desire to eliminate credit ratings 
from financial regulation, taken together with state insurance regulators’ 
reaffirmation of the role of ratings in regulation, sets the stage for a 
confrontation on this score.   
One approach to addressing the problem of rating-dependent 
regulation would be for regulators to stop relying on “unseasoned” ratings 
– that is, ratings on novel financial products without a significant history of 
market experience.  Such ratings should be less reliable than ratings on 
traditional products.  Recent events with CDOs and subprime RMBS 
suggest that that was the case, and that regulatory reliance on novel product 
ratings created systemic risk and pressure for rule bailouts that reliance on 
traditional ratings did not.  Selectively reducing rating reliance by focusing 
on unseasoned ratings preserves the benefits that regulators and the 
regulated industry derive from the present system while addressing the 
most serious problems with rating-dependent regulation. 
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METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY V. GLENN:  
WILL THE SUPREME COURT DECISION REDUCE 
CONFUSION AFTER FIRESTONE? 
 
Ryan M. LoRusso* 
*** 
A recent report to the United States Congress indicated that about 
131 million Americans are currently enrolled in employee benefit 
plans which fall under the jurisdiction of the Employee Retirement 
Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  Some plans are 
structured so that the plan administrator will be paying benefits out 
of the firm’s profits.  The possibility exists that the administrator may 
be swayed to decide in favor of the company in an effort to protect 
the financial health of the company which employs him.  Recently, in 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn, the Supreme Court 
addressed the questions of whether a plan administrator that pays 
benefits out of company profits is acting under a conflict of interest, 
and if so, how the conflict of interest should be taken into account 
upon review by a court.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Glenn, the circuit courts had been employing a variety of approaches 
in taking this apparent conflict into account.   
 
This note begins by providing an overview of the areas of trust law 
impacting the Court’s decision and then reviews the case-law prior 
to the Supreme Court decision.   The note then discusses the decision 
in Glenn and the case law that has developed following the Court’s 
decision.  This comment argues that the Supreme Court made the 
correct decision by holding that this scenario did constitute a conflict 
of interest, and by allowing the circuit courts to take the conflict into 
account by weighing it among a variety of other factors.  
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A recent report to the United States Congress indicated that 
about 131 million Americans1 are currently enrolled in employee 
                                                                                                                 
* J.D. candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2011.  
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190 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1  
 
benefit plans which fall under the jurisdiction of the Employee 
Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2 In some 
plans, the plan administrator will be paying benefits out of the same 
pool of money as profits are derived.  Recently, in Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company v. Glenn, an employee enrolled in an employee 
benefit plan falling under the jurisdiction of ERISA was denied 
benefits by a plan administrator.  The administrator would have paid 
the benefits out of the same funds as which profits are derived.  The 
employee appealed the denial and the question was presented to the 
Supreme Court of whether an insurer that pays benefits out of the 
same funds as its profits are derived is acting under a conflict of 
interest under ERISA.3  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Glenn, the circuit courts had been employing a variety of approaches 
in taking this apparent conflict into account.  This paper reviews the 
law prior the Supreme Court decision and the case law that has 
developed following the Supreme Court’s decision in Glenn.  This 
paper argues that the Supreme Court made the correct decision by 
stating that this scenario did constitute a conflict of interest, and by 
allowing the circuit courts to take the conflict into account by 
weighing it among a variety of other factors.  
 
II. HISTORY 
 
A.  TRUST LAW AS APPLIED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that principles of trust law 
must guide the courts in determining the appropriate standard of 
                                                                                                                 
throughout law school and in writing this comment.  Also, thanks to 
Professor McCoy for your help in revising this comment. 
1 CONG. RES. SERVICE, ERISA Regulation of Health Plans: Fact 
Sheet, available at http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/ 
erisaregulationofhealthplans-114.pdf. 
2  See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). 
3  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008). 
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review of a denial of benefit claims under ERISA.4  Therefore, a 
short discussion of the relevant trust law principles may be helpful.  
First, a trust as defined by the Restatement (Third) of Trusts is a 
fiduciary relationship with respect to property, and subjects the 
trustee to the duty to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries.5  As 
applied in the context of this case, the Supreme Court stated that 
those administering employee-benefit plans must be guided by 
principles of trust law.6  To begin, trust law generally prohibits a 
fiduciary from acting under a conflict of interest.7  However, an 
exception exists if the trustee was appointed by a settler who is aware 
of the trustee’s conflict of interest.8  The Restatement takes the 
position that a conflict of interest alone is not enough to remove a 
trustee, but when “conflict of interest situations exist, the conduct of 
the trustee in the administration of the trust will be subject to 
especially carefully scrutiny.9  Furthermore, when a conflict of 
interest situation is approved by the settler, the “trustee-beneficiary’s 
conduct is to be closely scrutinized for abuse, including abuse by less 
than appropriate regard for the duty of partiality.”10  The Restatement 
also provides guidance to determine when an abuse of discretion may 
exist and lists several factors including: “the existence or 
nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with that of the 
beneficiaries.”11  A leading treatise concurs stating that the extent of 
discretion conferred upon the trustee and any conflict of interest with 
                                                                                                                 
4 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 
(1989). 
5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). 
6 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110-11. 
7 George Gleason Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 534 (1993). 
8 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS §107.1 (4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 2001). 
9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. F, illus. (1) (2003). 
10 Id. at § 79 cmt. B, illus. (1). 
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959). 
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the beneficiaries must be taken into account in determining an abuse 
of discretion.12 
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn (Glenn),13 
the trustee was given discretionary powers in administering the trust.  
Generally, this means that a court will not interfere with a trustee’s 
exercise of a discretionary power when that exercise is reasonable 
and not based on an improper interpretation.14  But, what constitutes 
an abuse of discretion is not a rigid, constant standard.  The point at 
which an abuse of discretion is reached will vary, depending upon 
the basic fiduciary duties and the terms of the trust, including the 
amount of discretion given to the trustee.15  Of course, acting on the 
basis of an improper motive is a factor that can be considered by a 
court when determining if a trustee abused his discretion.16  Also, it is 
important to note that “abuse of discretion” is a legal conclusion that 
the trustee has exceeded the amount of discretion given to him in the 
trust, and not the standard under which a court reviews the trustee’s 
actions. 
 
B.  THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 
1974 
 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) plays a central role in MetLife v. Glenn; therefore, a limited 
discussion of ERISA will be helpful.  ERISA was enacted by 
Congress to protect the interests of employee-benefit plan 
participants by requiring the disclosure of relevant financial 
information to beneficiaries, by establishing standards of conduct, 
responsibility, and obligations for fiduciaries of employee-benefit 
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and 
                                                                                                                 
12 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS §187 (4th ed. 1987). 
13 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008). 
14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. a (2003). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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ready access to the federal courts.17  Also, ERISA preempts virtually 
all state laws in conflict with it, and no other federal law 
systematically regulates employee benefit plans.18 
Before ERISA was enacted, employee benefit and pension 
plans operated with no substantial federal regulation.19  There were 
various bodies of state law which would act to protect employees 
prior to ERISA, but Congress determined this type of piecemeal 
approach to be insufficient to protect employees’ interests and 
expectations.20  Specifically, Congress found that the minimum 
standards governing then existing plans to be insufficient; that plan 
funds were inadequate to pay promised benefits; and that plans 
terminated before accumulating enough funds to pay employees their 
expected benefits.21  Accordingly, the stated purposes of the law 
include establishing a uniform source of law to govern the 
administration of employee-benefit plans, and promoting and 
protecting employee’s interests and expectations in the plans.  In 
addition to those purposes cited by the statute itself, there are 
numerous judicially-declared purposes to the statute.22  Some of the 
most relevant include encouraging employers’ to adopt employee 
benefit plans,23 while also giving employers a degree of flexibility in 
administering the plans.24  To further encourage plan creation, 
Congress intended to minimize the administrative burdens imposed 
                                                                                                                 
17 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions § 1 (2003). 
18 Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 575, 576 (1992).  See also Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review 
in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1098-1109 (2001) (for an 
in depth discussion of case-law pre-Firestone). 
19 Kevin Walker Beatty, Commentary, A Decade of Confusion: 
The Standard of Review for ERISA Benefit Denial Claims as 
Established by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 733 (2000). 
20 Id. 
21 60A AM. JUR. 2d Pensions § 1 (2003). 
22 Id. § 2. 
23 Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, 47 F.3d 498, 505 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
24 Id. at 501. 
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on employers by creating a standardized set of procedures.25  The 
Court in Glenn noted that Congress believed that removing the 
unpredictability that resulted from the application of various state 
laws would encourage the creation of employee benefit plans, but the 
unpredictability that results from an opaque standard of review could 
also impede Congress’s goal of encouraging plan creation.  Also, the 
Supreme Court has stated that the principal goal of ERISA is to 
protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries.26  Courts 
have also stated that ERISA was enacted to protect employees from 
employers who could pursue their own interests in the management 
of the retirement plan.27 
To ensure the realization of its stated goals, ERISA provides 
that a fiduciary “shall discharge his duties with respect with respect 
to a plan solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries and 
for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and 
their beneficiaries”28  while using the care, skill, diligence, and 
prudence of prudent man in a similar situation.29  To ensure the 
statutory goals are enforced, ERISA allows a plan participant or 
beneficiary to bring a civil suit in Federal Court to recover benefits 
due to him, enforce his rights under the plan, or clarify his right to 
future benefits under the plan.30 
Despite its length, ERISA leaves many important issues to be 
interpreted by the courts.31  So while Congress intended to provide a 
statutory grounding to employee-benefit law, the deference to the 
courts was partly a recognition by Congress that the law surrounding 
benefit plans had long been part of the common law.32  Also, the gaps 
                                                                                                                 
25 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001). 
26 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 834 (1997). 
27NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 333 (1981); Reich v. 
Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 837 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993).  
28 See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006). 
29 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)B (2006). 
30 § 1132 (a)(1)B. 
31 Conison, supra note 18, at 576. 
32 Id. 
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in the statute reflect Congress’s intent for the courts to experiment 
and refine the law surrounding benefit plans.  There were no models 
for Congress to draw on when enacting ERISA, so in an effort not to 
upset settled law, Congress deferred to the courts on some of the 
more important parts of the law in this regard, including of course, 
the relevant standard of review. 
 
C.  FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. V. BRUCH 
 
The Court’s decision in Firestone plays an important role in 
shaping the outcome of the Glenn.  In Firestone, the Court addressed 
the appropriate standard of review of benefit determinations by 
fiduciaries or plan administrators under ERISA.33  Firestone acted as 
the fiduciary of an employee-benefit plan which stated that workers 
were entitled to receive benefits if the workforce was reduced.34  
When Firestone sold three of its plants to another company, the 
workers brought suit under ERISA claiming that a reduction in 
workforce occurred entitling them to benefits.35  Firestone denied the 
claim citing the fact that all of the workers were hired by the new 
company at the same positions and wages.   
The Court in Firestone noted that ERISA sets out no standard 
of review under 1132(a)(1)(b) which allows a participant to 
challenge benefit determinations.36  The Supreme Court noted that 
the federal courts had adopted the “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
to fill the gap left by the statute, mainly by analogizing the ERISA 
statute to the Labor Management Relations Act and borrowing its 
standard.37  However, the Supreme Court found the adoption of this 
standard was inappropriate because of differences in the statutes—
mainly the fact that courts used the standard to gain a jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                 
33 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 
(1989). 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 109. 
37 Id. 
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basis over the LMRA suits was not present because ERISA explicitly 
authorizes such suits.38  
The Court held that when a court reviews a fiduciary’s denial 
of benefits under ERISA, the court should be guided by principles of 
trust law.39  The Court’s conclusion was based upon the fact that the 
ERISA statute, while not setting forth a standard of review, 
“abounded” with language borrowed from the body of trust law.40  
The Court also found support for this conclusion in the legislative 
history.41   The Court also noted that Congress wanted the courts to 
develop a federal common law in regards to the standard of review.42 
Having settled that trust law principles should guide courts in 
the review of a fiduciary’s denial of benefits, the Court then stated 
how these trust law principles should be applied. In Firestone, the 
plan administrator was not vested with any discretion when 
determining employees’ benefits.43  The Court looked to trust law 
and determined that when a fiduciary is not vested with any 
discretion, a de novo standard of review should apply.44  
However, the Court continued at length on the appropriate 
standard of review when a fiduciary is given discretion, even though 
this was not essential to the decision.  The Court cites the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts for the principle that a deferential 
standard is appropriate if a trustee is given discretion in 
administering the trust.45  The Court also stated in dicta: “Of course, 
                                                                                                                 
38 Id. at 109-10. 
39 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110-11. 
40 Id. at 110. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 112-13. 
44 Id. at 112-15. 
45 Some courts would regard this deferential approach as a review 
for abuse of discretion and some courts would review under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard.  The First Circuit stated that 
“abuse of discretion”, “arbitrary and capricious”, and 
“reasonableness” were functionally equivalent in the ERISA context.  
Denmark v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 566 F.3d 1, 7 (1st 
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if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who 
is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed 
as ‘factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.’”46  
The Court’s statement in Firestone is dictum because the facts did 
not present a fiduciary that was given any discretion in administering 
the trust.  It is likely that the Court’s statement regarding fiduciaries 
with discretion was intended to provide guidance to the federal 
courts on the appropriate standard of review in those cases.   
Given ERISA’s statutory goal of providing increased 
protection to employees, a de novo standard of review seems 
appropriate.  However, under Firestone a plan can receive deferential 
review if it vests the fiduciary with discretion.  Because most plans 
contain such language or can easily be made to contain such 
language, “the court . . . essentially nullified applying the standard 
that it deems most appropriate.”47  Despite Firestone’s efforts to 
speak on the topic, the Circuit Courts would split on the appropriate 
way to determine if a conflict of interest constituted an abuse of 
discretion by a plan administrator.  
 
D.  DIFFERING CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES AFTER 
FIRESTONE 
 
Because Firestone did not clearly state how this conflict 
should be taken into account, the circuit courts subsequently 
developed several different approaches for taking a conflict of 
interest into account under ERISA.   
 
1. The “Presumptively Void” Approach 
 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 2009).  The Seventh Circuit also stated that there is no difference 
between a review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard and 
“abuse of discretion....”  Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term 
Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856, 861 n.8 (7th Cir. 2009). 
46 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. 
47 Beatty, supra note 19, at 739. 
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The presumptively void test has been adopted by the 
Eleventh Circuit and Ninth, with the Ninth later overruling it as 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.48  In Brown v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield, the Eleventh Circuit stated that when a conflict 
of interest exists, a conflicted fiduciary may favor, perhaps even 
unconsciously, his own interests over that of the beneficiaries.49   The 
court reasoned that this would leave the beneficiaries unprotected 
unless the burden of proof shifted to the administrator to demonstrate 
that the conflict did not affect his decision.50  Accordingly, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that when a “plan beneficiary demonstrates a 
substantial conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary responsible 
for benefits terminations, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove 
that its interpretation of plan provisions committed to its discretion 
was not tainted by self-interest.”51  If the fiduciary carries that 
burden, a court should review the fiduciary’s decision with deference 
and not under a de novo standard of review.52   
The Ninth Circuit applied a “presumptively void” approach in 
Atwood53 before overruling Atwood in Abatie v. Aetna Health and 
Life Ins. Co. in 2006.54  In Atwood, the Ninth Circuit applied a 
traditional abuse of discretion standard to the decision of a conflicted 
trustee, unless the affected beneficiary produced some evidence that 
conflicted interest caused the fiduciary to breach a duty.55  Under that 
method, a beneficiary was required to bring forth evidence showing 
that the conflict of interest affected the decision.56  If no evidence 
                                                                                                                 
48 See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th 
Cir. 1995); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 
898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990).  
49 Brown, 898 F.2d at 1565. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1566. 
52 Id. at 1568. 
53 Atwood, 45 F.3d 1317. 
54 Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 966-69  
(9th Cir. 2006)  
55 Id. at 1322-23. 
56 Id. at 1323. 
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other than the bare existence of the conflict existed, no heightened 
review was undertaken.57  If evidence was brought forth, the court 
would be “very skeptical” in deferring to the decision of trustee with 
discretion.58  The court deferred to trust law for the principle that an 
action taken by a fiduciary in violation of his duties is 
“presumptively void”, and so the trustee had the burden of proving 
the conflict did not affect his decision.59  This approach is interesting 
because the presence of a conflict is not taken into account without 
evidence it affected the trustee’s decision and the standard of review 
remains the same.  However, Firestone states that the conflict should 
be taken into account whether or not there is evidence to suggest it 
affected the trustee’s decision.  In Abatie, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized that the approach of Atwood was not completely 
consistent with Firestone and overruled that approach60. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The Sliding Scale Test 
 
The Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have adopted 
the “sliding scale” approach.61  Under the sliding scale approach, a 
court will always apply an arbitrary and capricious standard, but a 
court will decrease the level of deference given to the conflicted 
                                                                                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966-69. 
61 See Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 
1993); Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974  F.2d. 631, 638-42 (5th 
Cir. 1992); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 
F.2d. 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987); Chambers v. Family Health 
Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 824-27 (10th Cir. 1996).  
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administrator’s decision in proportion to the seriousness of the 
conflict.62 
In Van Boxel, the Seventh Circuit stated that it is necessary to 
maintain flexibility when reviewing a benefit denial by a plan 
administrator.63  To this end, a “sliding scale” of review is most 
appropriate – the review is more searching and extensive the greater 
the suspicion of partiality.64  Also, the court argued that this approach 
squares with the practice of judges to engage in a more extensive 
review when they believe there is a greater risk of the fiduciary being 
partial.65  The Tenth Circuit has also that the “sliding scale” approach 
was more consistent with the flexible standard articulated in 
Firestone.66 Implicitly, it seems that the court is arguing the courts 
have always employed a “sliding scale” approach—the courts would 
simply adjust the amount of deference they accorded under the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard based on the presence of a 
conflict.  
 
3. “Combination of Factors” Test 
 
The “combination of factors” approach was adopted by the 
Sixth Circuit in Calvert.67  In that case, the court stated that a 
“conflict of interest” was to be considered and weighed by a 
reviewing court among any other relevant factors that could lead to a 
finding of an abuse of discretion.68  This approach was used to review 
Glenn’s denial of benefits, and was upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Glenn.69 
 
4. Eleventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
62 Chambers, 100 F.3d at 825. 
63 Van Boxel, 836 F.2d. at 1052. 
64 Id. at 1052-53. 
65 Id. 
66 Chambers, 100 F.3d. at 826-27. 
67 Calvert v. Firstar Fin., Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 295 (6th Cir. 2005). 
68 Id. 
69 Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008). 
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Following Firestone, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a six-step 
burden shifting approach in Williams to take a conflict of interest 
into account.70  If the plan administrator was vested with discretion, 
his decision would be upheld if it was not “arbitrary and 
capricious”.71  If a conflict of interest existed, then the court would 
then review under a “heightened arbitrary and capricious” standard.72  
The court stated this standard fell between “de novo” and a regular 
“arbitrary and capricious” review, although the court could not 
define exactly where.73  To deal with this, the court adopted a two-
step approach where the burden was on the beneficiary to prove the 
administrator had a conflict of interest.74  If proved that he did, the 
administrator then had the burden of proving that his decision was 
not tainted by self- interest.75  The case does seem compatible with 
Firestone, but there is some vagueness to the test because the court 
did not define a precise standard of review.  Of course, this vests the 
judge with great leeway in making a decision.  
 
III. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY V. 
GLENN 
 
The standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Firestone 
had proved inadequate in providing clear guidance to the circuit 
courts on how to take a conflict of interest into account when 
reviewing a plan administrator’s discretionary decision to deny a 
claimant benefits.  This resulted in several different approaches by 
the circuit courts in apparent contravention of some of ERISA’s main 
goals—creating uniformity and predictability in the law surrounding 
                                                                                                                 
70 Williams v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1137-
38 (11th Cir. 2004). 
71 Williams, 373 F.3d. at 1137-38. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1138. 
75 Id. 
202 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1  
 
employee benefit plans.  When the Supreme Court heard Glenn, it 
was against this background that the case was considered.   
 
A.  ISSUE 
 
The Supreme Court decided Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company v. Glenn on June 19, 2008.76  This case presented two 
questions to the court: (1) whether a plan administrator that both 
evaluates and pays claims operates under a conflict of interest, and 
(2) how any such conflict should be taken into account on judicial 
review of a discretionary benefit determination.77  The facts of the 
case are set forth below. 
 
B.  FACTS 
 
In this case, the plaintiff, Wanda Glenn (hereinafter Glenn), 
was an employee of Sears Roebuck & Company.78  Sears provided its 
employees with the option of enrolling in a Group Long-Term 
Disability Plan, in which Glenn participated.79  The Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company (MetLife) acted as the plan’s fiduciary, and 
made decisions regarding which employees were entitled to 
benefits.80  Under the plan, MetLife both reviewed and paid claims.  
Sears is the plan sponsor and administrator.81   
In April 2000, Glenn was diagnosed with severe dilated 
cardiomyopathy, the symptoms of which include fatigue and 
shortness of breath.82  Prior to suffering the disease, Glenn had 
worked as a sales manager from 1994 through 2000.83  The District 
                                                                                                                 
76 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S, 105, 105 (2008). 
77 Id. at 2347. 
78 Glenn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:2003CV0572, 2005 WL 
1364625, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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Court found that this job involved a considerable amount of standing 
and walking, as well as some lifting.84   Because of the 
cardiomyopathy, Glenn stopped working in April 2000 and applied 
for disability benefits in June 2000.85  MetLife approved her claim 
for disability benefits, which were awarded for a twenty-four month 
period.86  These benefits were based on a finding that the employee 
was “completely and continuously unable to perform the material 
duties of her regular job.”87  After the twenty-four month period 
ended, the employee would have to meet a considerably stricter 
standard to continue to maintain unemployment benefits: the 
employee would have to demonstrate that she was “completely and 
continuously unable to perform the duties of any gainful work or 
service for which she is reasonably qualified taking into 
consideration her training, experience, education, and past earning.”88  
Glenn filed for social security disability benefits, but this provided 
her little relief.89   
In March 2002, MetLife had Dr. Patel meet with Glenn to 
reevaluate her status as disabled.90  After the meeting, the doctor 
stated that Glenn was capable of performing sedentary work, i.e. 
work as an office clerk or secretary.91  Another doctor was consulted 
                                                                                                                 
84 Glenn, 2005 WL 1364625, at *1. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Glenn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 461 F.3d 660, 662 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
88 Id.  
89 In August 2000, Glenn filed for Social Security disability 
benefits on the suggestion of the plan administrators.  Her request 
was initially denied but eventually approved by an administrative 
law judge.  She received about $13,000 from Social Security, but 
seventy-five percent was recovered by MetLife for “overpayment of 
benefits” and the other twenty-five percent was recovered by her 
lawyers.  Id. at 663. 
90 Id. at 664. 
91 Id. 
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and agreed with the assessment by Dr. Patel.92  Based on this finding, 
MetLife did not grant Glenn’s request for benefits after the twenty-
four month period because it was determined that she was capable of 
performing some work, and thus, could not meet the standard under 
the second test which required: not only that she was not able to 
perform her previous job, but also that she was not able to perform 
any job for which she was reasonably qualified.93   
Glenn asked MetLife to reconsider its decision.94  After 
meeting again with Dr. Patel, he stated that it was his opinion that 
Glenn was still having “significant difficulty” returning to any type 
of work because the emotional stress of the job exacerbated her 
condition.95  MetLife again decided to discontinue benefits as of 
September 2002.96  Interestingly, MetLife seemed to disregard Dr. 
Patel’s findings as of the second meeting and based its opinion on his 
previous statements that Glenn was able to work.  In February 2003, 
Glenn again appealed submitting a new report from Dr. Patel, dated 
February 12, 2003, that Glenn was unable to work.  MetLife referred 
Glenn to another doctor who stated that Glenn may be able to work, 
but if emotional stress exacerbates her condition then permanent 
disability would be appropriate.97  Again, MetLife decided to 
terminate benefits based upon a finding that there was some work 
that Glenn would be able to perform.98   
 
C.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) permits a person that is denied benefits to challenge the 
denial in federal court.99  The plan in which Glenn participated fell 
                                                                                                                 
92 Id.  
93 Glenn, 461 F.3d at 664. 
94 Id. at 665. 
95 Id. at 664-65. 
96 Id. at 664. 
97 Id. at 665. 
98 Id. 
99 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).  See supra notes 24-26. 
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under the jurisdiction of ERISA allowing Glenn to bring suit in a 
federal court.  
After her requests for benefits were denied by MetLife, Glenn 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio in 2005.100  Glenn sought reinstatement of her 
disability benefits under ERISA.101  Both Glenn and MetLife moved 
for summary judgment and the court entered judgment in favor of 
MetLife.102   
In reaching its decision, the court began by establishing the 
appropriate standard of review when reviewing an administrator’s 
denial of benefits under ERISA.103  The court began by applying 
Firestone and determined that the administrator was granted 
discretionary authority.104  Under Firestone, if the plan grants the 
administrator deferential authority, the denial of benefits is reviewed 
under the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.105  In 
addition to the standard of review, another issue, one that would 
eventually be presented to the Supreme Court, was raised in the 
District Court: how to factor in the “conflict of interest” which is 
present when administrator is both deciding whether an employee is 
eligible for benefits and is the one paying the benefits.106 The district 
court stated that a conflict of interest is a factor that must be 
considered under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.107  In 
granting summary judgment for MetLife, the district court stated that 
the administrator had not acted “arbitrarily or capriciously” in 
denying benefits because there were doctor’s reports that indicated 
that Glenn was capable of working.108  Also, the court stated that it 
                                                                                                                 
100 Glenn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:2003CV0572, 2005 WL 
1364625, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at *3-4. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Glenn, 2005 WL 1364625, at *4. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at *7. 
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was not arbitrary and capricious to look skeptically on a doctor’s 
report that recanted a previous statement.109  Based on this finding, 
the court found that there was a reasoned basis for the 
administrator’s decision and upheld the denial of benefits. 
After being denied benefits by the district court, Glenn 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the 
District Court, stating that the decision of the plan administrator was 
arbitrary and capricious.110  The Court of Appeals used the 
“combination of factors” approach in which a conflict of interest is 
considered among many other factors in determining if there is an 
abuse of discretion.111  The Court first noted that the District Court 
correctly stated that the plan administrator’s conflict of interest was a 
factor that should be weighed in its decision, but that the District 
Court seemed to disregard this factor by giving it no weight in its 
decision.112  The Court of Appeals also noted that the contrary 
finding by the Social Security administrator that Glenn was totally 
disabled should have been given more weight by the District Court 
and plan administrator.113  The Court of Appeals noted that MetLife 
used this finding to deduct the benefits it had paid to Glenn, and then 
demanded a refund from her which was paid out of her Social 
Security benefits.114  The Court of Appeals stated that it was unfair, 
and inconsistent for MetLife to then give the Social Security 
administrator’s determination no weight in finding that Glenn was 
not totally disabled.115  The Court also found that the District Court 
did not properly consider all of the medical evidence before it and 
the plan administrator’s finding in regard to the medical evidence 
                                                                                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Glenn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 461 F.3d 660, 674-75 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
111 Id. at 665-67. 
112 Id. at 666. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 667. 
115 Id. 
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was an abuse of discretion.116  Essentially, the Court found that the 
conflict alone was not determinative.117  It accorded it some weight, 
but relied on other factors in determining that the plan administrator 
abused his discretion.118  Therefore, the Court reversed finding the 
decision of the plan administrator “arbitrary and capricious” under 
the “combination of factors” test.119  
 
D.  SUPREME COURT DECISION 
 
After the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Glenn, MetLife 
sought certiorari requesting that the Supreme Court determine if a 
plan administrator who is responsible for determining benefits and 
paying claims operates under a conflict of interest.120  Upon 
suggestion of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court also 
considered how any conflict of interest should be taken into account 
upon judicial review of a discretionary benefit determination.121 
The case was decided on June 19, 2008 and the opinion was 
delivered by Justice Breyer, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Alito joined.122  Chief Justice Roberts concurred in 
part and concurred in the judgment.123  Justice Kennedy also filed an 
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.124  Justice 
Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice 
Thomas.125 
In answering the questions addressed to the Court, the Court 
first cited to its decision in Firestone.126  The Court noted that 
                                                                                                                 
116 Glenn, 461 F.3d at 669. 
117 Id. at 674.  
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 674-75. 
120 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 110 (2008). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 107. 
123 Id. at 119 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
124 Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
125 Id. at 127 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting). 
126 Metro. Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 110. 
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Firestone required that the Court analyze the fiduciary’s decision in 
light of trust law principles.127  The Court set forth four criteria that a 
court must consider under Firestone.128  First, a court should be 
guided by principles of trust law.  As applicable here, that means that 
a court should draw an analogy between a plan administrator and the 
trustee of a common-law trust, in which common-law trustees have a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to those in the trust.129  The plan 
administrator’s actions must be analyzed in light of the duty of 
loyalty.  Second, principles of trust law require a court to review a 
denial of plan benefits under a de novo standard, unless the plan 
provides to the contrary.130  Third, a plan can provide to the contrary 
by granting to the administrator a fiduciary discretionary authority to 
determine benefits.131  Of course, the administrator is still bound by 
the duty of loyalty.  If the administrator possesses discretion, the 
denial of benefits will be reviewed under a deferential standard.132  
Fourth, if a conflict of interest exists, the conflict of interest must be 
weighed as a factor in considering whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion.133   
 
E.  CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
 
In the lower court decisions, the conflict of interest issue was 
expressly addressed.  First, both the district court and Court of 
Appeals agreed that there was a conflict of interest in this case based 
on MetLife’s role in both determining and paying benefits.  Second, 
the District Court and Court of Appeals both agreed as to the 
appropriate standard to apply to the facts.  Both courts stated that if 
there is a conflict of interest, it is to be weighed as a factor in 
                                                                                                                 
127 Id. at 111.   
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. 
132 Metro. Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 111. 
133 Id. 
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determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.134  
However, the lower courts differed in their application of the 
standard.  The Court of Appeals stated that the District Court did not 
apply any weight to MetLife’s conflict of interest.135  This was an 
important factor in the Court of Appeals reversal of the district court 
decision.   
In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court first stated that a 
“conflict of interest” does occur when an administrator is responsible 
for both determining benefits and paying benefits.136  The Court 
noted that the conflict of interest results from the administrator being 
torn between fulfilling its fiduciary duty of loyalty to the plan 
beneficiaries and protecting the company’s financial interest.137  The 
administrator has a duty of loyalty to grant all claims to which the 
beneficiaries are entitled.138  But, every dollar paid in benefits comes 
out of the administrator’s profits.  Therefore, the court reasoned, in 
close calls especially, the administrator would be torn between 
fulfilling both of these interests.139  The Court also stated, in keeping 
with Firestone’s holding of analogizing to trust law principles, that 
this was the type of conflict a court would take into account when 
reviewing the discretionary acts of a trustee.140    
In arguing that the plan administrator was not conflicted, 
MetLife raised various arguments.  First, MetLife argued that an 
employer who creates a plan where the administrator will act in the 
dual role of determining and dispensing benefits foresees this 
potential conflict, and implicitly approves it.141  The Court disposed 
of this argument rather quickly, by analogizing to trust law, stating 
                                                                                                                 
134 See supra notes 92-109. 
135 See supra notes 102-109. 
136 Metro. Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 112. 
137 Id. 
138  Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 112-13. 
141 Id. 
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that even when the settlor knows the trustee is conflicted, the 
reviewing court must still take account of the conflict.142  
Second, MetLife argues that the court is not required to 
follow principles of trust law if it conflicts with the language, 
structure, or purpose of the governing statute, in this case ERISA.143  
MetLife stated that finding a conflict is inconsistent with the statute’s 
objectives because it would result in increased litigation through 
complex review proceedings, deter employers from creating plans, 
and interfere with employer’s right to administer their own plans in 
violation of ERISA.144 Again, the Court dismissed these concerns 
rather quickly stating that they were not inconsistent with the 
statute.145 The Court noted that trust law “functions well with a 
similar standard”, and there was no evidence that the rule adopted by 
the Court would have a chilling effect on benefit plans.146  
Ultimately, the Court relied on Congress’ desire to offer employees 
increased protection for work-related benefits147 to offset the factors 
named by MetLife. 
The Court did give considerable attention to MetLife’s 
argument that the conflict was acceptable because any business has 
to make decisions regarding a trade-off between profit and service, 
and insurance companies should not be an exception.  MetLife 
argued that the market, as well as regulators, provides sufficient 
checks on MetLife’s handling of discretionary claims.148  If MetLife 
were to deny too many claims, it would only be hurting itself as 
employers and employees would switch to the service of a different 
company.  The Court did not explicitly reject this argument; 
however, it found that a conflict of interest did exist under ERISA 
for several reasons.  First, the Court noted that the presumption that 
the market will provide a sufficient check is weakened because the 
                                                                                                                 
142 Metro. Life. Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 113. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 114. 
148 Id. 
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employer purchases the plan instead of the employee.149  The Court 
noted that the employer may have incentives to choose the insurer 
who provides lower rates by being stingier in granting claims.  Thus, 
the Court reasoned that the marketplace argument does not work 
perfectly in this situation.150  However, the Court ignored the fact that 
the employees could leave a company that provided insufficient 
benefit plans, so the market argument does still carry some weight 
(assuming employees are perfectly informed).  However, its force is 
reduced because of the difficulty in finding a new job, especially 
considering the historically high unemployment rate of 9.6% in late 
2010.151  So while the “marketplace argument” is not totally 
discredited, its force is significantly undermined by the disconnect 
between the employee and the choice of insurer. 
Second, the Court noted that “ERISA imposes higher-than-
marketplace quality standards on insurers.”152  The Court cites to 
Firestone, which stated that, under 1104(a)(1) of  ERISA, that the 
administrator must “discharge his duties. . . solely in the interests of 
the participants and beneficiaries” of the plan.153  The statute also 
requires that a full and fair review be given to all claim denials.154  
Also, judicial review of claim denials provides an additional check in 
addition to those provided by the marketplace and regulators.155  
Here, the Court notes the difference in the duties imposed on the 
insurance company regulated under ERISA from the duties imposed 
on the normal market participant. Obviously, a normal market 
participant does not have to act for the sole interest of his customers 
and is free to balance his own interests with those he serves, subject 
to the checks placed on his conduct by the market.  So while the 
                                                                                                                 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE, 
UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION SUMMARY (Sept. 2010) 
http://www.bls.gov/ news.release/empsit.nr0.htm 
152 Glenn, 554 U.S. Ct. at 115. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
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market can provide on check on the discretion of the administrator, 
under ERISA more is required.  The duty to act solely in the interest 
of one’s customers goes far beyond the burden placed on any other 
unregulated market participant. 
Finally, the Court noted that the factors advanced by MetLife 
as diminishing the unfairness of any conflict of interest can be taken 
under consideration by any reviewing body or court.156  So, a court 
can consider any countervailing influences to the administrator’s 
desire to act in the financial interest of his company. 
The issue considered whether a conflict of interest existed 
was not an area of much controversy in the law prior to the case, and 
all of the Justices agree that a conflict of interest was present.  In 
fact, in many cases the employer would be willing to submit that a 
conflict of interest existed and contest the appropriate standard of 
review.  The standard of review was much more unsettled, as 
evidenced by the circuit split.  That point is addressed next. 
F.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Next, the Court addressed the question of how the existence 
of a conflict of interest should be taken into account by a court on 
review.  In answering this question, the Court relied on a statement 
set forth in Firestone: “[A] conflict should be weighed as a ‘factor in 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’”157 The 
Court stated it did not want to overrule Firestone, and Court 
reaffirmed Firestone’s reliance upon trust law principles.158   The 
court stated that Firestone simply restated established trust law 
principals in affirming a deferential standard of review to an 
administrator who is given discretion.159  The Court stated that under 
current trust law, a “deferential standard is applied to the 
discretionary decision-making of a conflicted trustee, while at the 
same time requiring the reviewing judge to take account of the 
                                                                                                                 
156 Id.  
157 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 115. 
158 Id. at 116. 
159 Id. 
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conflict when determining whether the trustee, substantively or 
procedurally, has abused his discretion.”160  
The Court declined any invitation to adopt a de novo standard 
of review to any administrator given discretion, stating that it would 
be inappropriate for several reasons.161  First, the Court noted that 
many ERISA plans that require the administrator to assess payments 
and provide payment grant discretionary authority to the 
administrator.162  Since most claim denials occur under these types of 
plans, the court thought it unwise and unmanageable for reviewing 
courts to look at all of these claims de novo.163  Second, the Court 
stated that Congress made no mention of any standard of review in 
enacting the ERISA legislation.164  The Court reasoned that if 
Congress wanted a specific standard of review, it would have 
specifically stated it in the legislation.165  Because a de novo standard 
creates a greater burden on any reviewing court, the Court seems to 
be implying that Congress would have stated its desire for de novo 
review had it wanted one. 
Next, the Court appears to reject the “presumptively void” 
test, stating that there is no need for the creation of “special burden 
of proof rules, or other special procedural or evidentiary rules”.166  
The Court stated that this is a very fact sensitive inquiry because of 
the differences likely to be present in most situations, and the 
                                                                                                                 
160 Id. at 115. 
161 “We do not believe Firestone’s statement implies a change in 
the standard of review, say, from deferential to de novo review.” 
Glenn, 554 U.S. at 115. 
162 Id. at 116. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 116.  The Court never makes no reference to the 
“presumptively void” test or cites to any of the cases which hold 
follow it.  But, the Court’s statement that there is no need for any 
strict rules or rebuttable presumptions leaves little is a strong 
indication that the “presumptively void” test is no longer valid. 
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presence of a conflict is just one factor to be weighed.167  The Court 
stated that if the insurer had taken steps to prevent the conflict of 
interest from playing a role in the administrator’s decision, then this 
factor may not play much of a role in the reviewing court’s 
determination.168  Examples of this would be making sure those 
determining the validity of claims had no incentives to consider the 
firm’s interest in making a profit.169   
The Court concludes by stating, essentially, that because 
there are so many factors that play a role in determining whether an 
administrator’s judgment is fair, it is impossible to articulate a 
precise standard.170  The Court states that a rigid standard or 
procedure would improvidently restrict court’s discretion in dealing 
with many different factual scenarios.171  Essentially the Court is 
acknowledging that no standard can substitute for the process of 
judgment.  Ultimately, the conflict of interest must be considered 
along with any other relevant factors (i.e. whether the Social Security 
administrator had a complete record in front of him at the time the 
decision was made or whether MetLife took steps so that its 
administrator would not be inclined to consider the firm’s profits 
during his decision making process) to determine if the administrator 
abused his discretion.172   The court acknowledged that this standard 
“did not consist of a detailed set of instructions” in keeping with its 
position that the creation of such a standard would be unwise.173  The 
Court acknowledges the limits of these standards in that they can 
                                                                                                                 
167 Glenn, 554 U.S.  at 117. 
168 Id. 
169 One solution is to pay the administrator a fixed salary that is 
not dependent on the firm’s profit or the administrator’s record in 
denying or approving claims.   
170 Id. at 117. (The Court noted it had not articulated a precise 
standard and stated that it is not wise to create formulas that will 
“falsify the actual process of judging.” “There are no talismanic 
words that can avoid the process of a judgment.” Id. at 119.)  
171 Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 116. 
172 Id. at 117. 
173 Id. at 119. 
2010] METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE V. GLENN 215  
 
restrict a judge’s inquiry because they are incapable of allowing a 
judge to take account of all relevant factors all of the time.174  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court holds that a court should review a 
denial of benefits by an administrator given discretion under an 
abuse of discretion standard, and that any conflict of interest must be 
taken into account, but leaves the amount of weight it carries up to 
the reviewing court.175  Additionally, the Court rejected the argument 
that there is a change in the standard of review from deferential to de 
novo.176  The weight the conflict is given will be a fact sensitive 
inquiry, depending upon how much the court determines that the 
conflict factored into the decision.   
 
G.  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS CONCURRENCE 
 
Chief Justice Roberts agrees that an insurer who both 
determines benefits and pays claims has a conflict of interest that is 
“pertinent” in reviewing claims decisions.177  However, Chief Justice 
Roberts disagrees with the majority as to how much it should matter.  
Chief Justice Roberts believes that the presence of a conflict of 
interest should only be considered if there is evidence suggesting the 
conflict affected the administrator’s decision.178  Under this standard, 
the court would be looking to see if an “improper motive” played a 
role the administrator’s denial of benefits, not just to the potential for 
an improper motive. 179  
Chief Justice Roberts is worried that the majority standard 
will prove to be too unpredictable because of the amount of 
                                                                                                                 
174 Id. at 116 
175 Id. at 117-18. 
176 Id. at 115.. 
177 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 119-26. (Roberts, C.J. concurring in all but 
Part IV and concurring in the judgment).  Part IV of the Opinion 
discussed how a conflict of interest should be factored into the 
review of a claim decision. 
178 Id. at 119-20. 
179 Id. at 122-23. 
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discretion it gives to a reviewing court. 180 Chief Justice Roberts 
worries that the majority standard will simply act to substitute 
judicial discretion for that of the administrator.  This is even more 
worrisome to him because the judge is removed from the actual 
proceedings and is given a large amount of discretion.181  He notes 
that important criteria of ERISA were predictability and certainty 
and he explains that the Court’s indeterminate standard strays from 
these policy goals.182  He believes that because the conflict of interest 
is not given a definitive weight the law is left in an uncertain state.  
Chief Justice Roberts reasons that this will lead to fewer companies 
deciding to create employee benefits plans because the companies 
will be unsure about the law and the potential costs of liability.183  
For Chief Justice Roberts, the increase in costs (in terms of 
uncertainty) does not outweigh any benefits that stem from increased 
judicial flexibility.   
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts would uphold the decision 
of the Court of Appeals.184  Even though he does not believe there is 
any evidence that the conflict of interest played a role in the 
administrator’s decision, Chief Justice Roberts believes that the plan 
administrator still abused his discretion.185 He states that the 
administrator’s inconsistent position in regard to the Social Security 
determinations and the lack of consideration to doctor’s reports 
stating that Glenn should not work and its failure to provide its own 
experts with certain doctor’s testimony are all evidence of an abuse 
of discretion—but not evidence that a improper financial interest 
played a role in the administrator’s decision.186  For this reason, Chief 
Justice Roberts states that the decision of the Court of Appeals 
should be affirmed.   
 
                                                                                                                 
180 Id. at 121. 
181 Id. at 121-22. 
182 Id. at 122. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 125. 
185 Id. at 124-25. 
186 Id. at 123-24. 
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H.  JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE. 
 
Kennedy believes that the majority has correctly applied the 
Firestone decision and that framework set out by the Court is 
workable.187  Kennedy states that the framework set out by the Court 
will not undermine the control of dual-role administrators over the 
employee benefit plans because the conflict of interest will not be 
considered by the court if the insurer takes the appropriate 
safeguards.188  Because the administrators retain control, the 
incentive system for the creation of these plans will not be altered 
much.   
Kennedy believes the case should have been remanded to the 
Court of Appeals because the Court stated that the conflict of interest 
can vanish as a factor to be considered if the insurer can show it put 
in place safeguards so that the administrator would not consider the 
financial interests of his employer.189  Because MetLife was unaware 
of this, it did not present any evidence that it put in place the 
appropriate safeguards.190  Kennedy states that it is unfair to MetLife 
to have expected it to put forth evidence regarding any safeguards 
because it had no notice of the relevance of those safeguards.191  For 
those reasons, Justice Kennedy would remand the decision to the 
Court of Appeals.   
 
 
 
 
I.  JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENT 
 
Scalia begins by stating that he agrees that a conflict of 
interest exists because the plan administrator pays benefits out of its 
                                                                                                                 
187 Glenn, 554 U.S.  at 125-27. (Kennedy, J. concurring in all but 
Part IV of the Court’s opinion and dissenting in part).   
188 Id. at 125-26. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 126. 
191 Id. 
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own coffers.192  After that, he parts ways with the majority stating 
that he is in “fundamental disagreement” with the majority 
approach.193  His dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, addresses several 
points. 
First, he states that the majority approach is too 
unpredictable.194  Scalia states that the majority approach makes each 
case unique because any number of different factors must be 
considered and weighed, depending upon the circumstances.195  In 
addition, each factor can be different weights from case to case, 
making ruling unpredictable.196 
Second, Scalia believes that the conflict should not be 
considered unless there is evidence to indicate that the conflict of 
interest improperly motivated the administrator’s decision.197  He 
states that the part of the Firestone opinion stating that a conflict 
must be considered as a factor when an administrator is vested with 
discretion is “sheer dictum” because the administrator in Firestone 
was not conflicted.198  Therefore, the court never had the opportunity 
to consider the standard of review for an administrator with 
discretion.199  While he does believe the Court must be guided 
principles of trust law, Scalia believes that the Court has misapplied 
trust law in an effort to reconcile the Restatement with the dictum in 
Firestone.200  Accordingly, Scalia would adopt the entirety of the 
Restatement “and its clear guidelines for judicial review.”201  Abuse 
of discretion, as he interprets it, refers to four distinct (emphasis 
added) failures; the trustee acted dishonestly; he acted with some 
                                                                                                                 
192 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 127-134 (Scalia, J., with whom Thomas, J., 
joins, dissenting). 
193 Id. at 127. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 127-28. 
198 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 128. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 129. 
201 Id. at. 130. 
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other improper motive; he failed to use judgment; or he acted beyond 
the bounds of a reasonable judgment.202  Scalia emphasizes that these 
are distinct and separate abuses, and so should be considered 
separately in contrast to the majority opinion which allows all 
relevant factors to be considered and weighed at once.203  Scalia takes 
issue with the majority’s approach of simply taking a conflict under 
consideration with all factors and giving it varying amount of 
discretion depending upon the facts.204  He believes it to be too 
unpredictable and “opaque”.205  His solution, adoption of the 
Restatement, requires the four distinct abuses to be weighed 
separately206—not “chucked into a brown paper bag and shaken up to 
determine the answer”.207  This certainly clarifies how the judge 
reached his decision—over time this would likely lead to increased 
predictability.  Essentially, Scalia is arguing for limiting the judge’s 
discretion and increased disclosure on how the judge reached his 
decision. 
As a final point, Scalia argues that a conflict should not be 
considered unless there is evidence that the trustee acted with an 
improper motive.208  If a trustee makes a reasonable decision, then it 
should not be overturned because of the presence of a conflict of 
interest, even if the court believes a better decision could have been 
made.209  Scalia is worried that a trustee will avoid a decision that he 
believes to be in the best interests of the beneficiaries because it may 
appear that the conflict affected his decision, and choose a decision 
                                                                                                                 
202 Id. at 131.  A trustee abuses his discretion by acting on an 
improper motive when he acts ‘from a motive other than to further 
the purposes of the trust’.  Improper motives include ‘spite or 
prejudice or to further some interest of his own other than that of the 
beneficiary.’  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 (2003). 
203 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 131-32. 
204 Id. at 129-30. 
205 Id.  
206 Id. at 129. 
207 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 129. 
208 Id .at 132. 
209 Id .at 133. 
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that looks less self-serving.210  Accordingly, he states “there are no 
gradations of reasonableness…[r]easonable is 
reasonable…[g]radating reasonableness, and making it a ‘factor’ in 
the improper motive determination will have the precise effect of 
eliminating the discretion the settler has intentionally conferred upon 
the trustee.”211  Scalia is apparently worried that the majority’s 
standard will restrict the administrator’s discretion to the detriment 
of the beneficiaries because it gives so much leeway to the reviewing 
court.212 
 
IV. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES FOLLOWING GLENN 
 
Following MetLife, almost every Circuit has addressed the 
question of how to apply the ruling in the MetLife case.  Overall, it 
appears the ruling has produced greater uniformity among the Courts 
than prior to the decision.  Still, there is certainly a considerable 
amount of uncertainty among several of the Circuit as to exactly how 
the ruling should be applied. 
All Circuit Courts to consider the matter have applied a 
combination-of-factors type of review after Glenn, even they do not 
explicitly call it that in their opinion.213  In this regard, there is little 
                                                                                                                 
210 Id. at 132. 
211 Id. at 133. 
212 Id. at 128-30. (Earlier in his dissent, Scalia referred to the 
majority’s standard as “de novo review in sheep’s clothing.” Id. at 
130.).   
213 See Crowell v. Shell Oil. Co., 541 F. 3d. 295, 312 (5th Cir. 
2008) (“…we [must] ‘take account of several different 
considerations, of which a conflict of interest is one’”); Estate of 
Schwing v. The Lilly Health Plan, 522, 525 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a court must “consider a conflict of interest as one of several 
factors in determining whether an administrator of fiduciary abused 
his discretion”); Wakkinen v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 531 F. 3d 
575, 581 (8th Cir. 2008) (“any one factor will be considered as a tie-
breaker when the other factors are closely balanced” (citing Glenn, 
128 S. Ct at 2350).  Holcomb v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of 
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conflict that a conflict of interest is factor that must be weighed 
among any other relevant factors to determine if there is an abuse of 
discretion.  The main source of controversy is how the conflict is to 
be weighed by the judge.  That matter is addressed next.   
While the circuit court approaches in regard to the standard of 
review are not identical after Glenn, there does seem to be much 
more uniformity.  Glenn held that when a conflict is present, there is 
no change in the standard of review from deferential to de novo; 
rather a conflict should be considered as a relevant factor and given 
more weight depending upon the circumstances.214  From this, almost 
all circuits have concluded that a heightened review when a conflict 
is present would be incompatible with Glenn.215  The sliding scale 
                                                                                                                 
Amer., 578 F. 3d. 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Glenn embraces a 
‘combination-of-factors method of review’ that allows judges to 
‘take account of several different, often case-specific factors.’”(citing 
Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 2351)); Carden v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 559 F. 3d 
256,260 (4th Cir. 2009).  (“a conflict just becomes one of the 
‘several different, often case-specific factors’ to be weighed together 
to determine if the administrator abused his discretion” (citing Glenn, 
128 S. Ct. at 2351)). 
214 See supra notes 168-74. 
215 See Holland v. Int’l Paper Co.576 F. 3d. 240, 248 (5th Cir. 
2009) (stating that Glenn directly repudiated the application of any 
form of heightened review when a conflict of interest is present).  
See also Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co. 458 F. 3d 955, 967 
(9th Cir. 2006) (claiming their approach was a “conscious rejection” 
of the sliding scale approach); Estate of Schwing v. The Lilly Health 
Plan, 522, 525 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that “in light of Glenn, our 
‘sliding scale’ approach is no longer valid); Champion v. Black & 
Decker Inc., 550 F. 3d 353, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2008); (holding that 
after Glenn, “the consequence of  this finding [of a conflict of 
interest] is not to modify the standard of review, but rather to 
consider the conflict as but one among factors in determining the 
reasonableness of the plan’s discretionary determination”); Doyle v. 
Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 542 F. 3d. 1352, 1359-60 
(11th Cir. 2008) (holding that Glenn implicitly overrules and 
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approach requires a court to adjust the level of deference depending 
upon how much the conflict factored into the decision, and Glenn 
requires a court to adjust the amount of weight given to the conflict 
while maintaining an abuse of discretion review.  Therefore, almost 
all circuit courts to consider the issue have found the sliding scale 
approach incompatible with Glenn.   The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have all found the sliding scale approach 
incompatible with the standard in Glenn because it requires a 
heightened standard of review.216   
The Ninth Circuit “consciously rejected” the sliding scale 
approach in Abatie,217 which was decided before Glenn. In Montour, 
the Ninth Circuit stated that it has employed the Glenn standard by 
using an abuse of discretion review, and including a conflict of 
interest as a factor to be weighed.218  It then adjusts the weight of the 
conflict depending upon the circumstances.219  After stating that it has 
rejected the sliding scale approach, the court stated that it will adjust 
the level of skepticism it applies depending upon the facts, including 
how much a conflict may have tainted an administrator’s decision.220  
The increased level of skepticism sounds very similar to a heightened 
standard, which most circuits agree is not compatible with Glenn.  It 
also sounds similar to a sliding scale approach, which the Ninth 
Circuit rejected in Abatie.  Ultimately, it is difficult to reconcile a 
purported rejection of the sliding scale approach with using varying 
                                                                                                                 
conflicts with [their] precedent to the extent that it requires district 
courts to review benefit determinations by a conflicted administrator 
under a heightened standard of review); Wakkinen v. UNUM Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 531 F. 3d 575, 581 (8th Cir. 2008) (“the existence of 
a conflict did not lead the court to…a change in the standard of 
review). 
216 See supra note 214.  
217 Abatie, 458 F. 3d at 967.  
218 See Montour v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 588 F. 3d 
623, 632 (9th Cir. 2009). 
219 Id.  
220 Id. 
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amounts of skepticism dependent on the presence of a conflict.  It 
remains to be seen how this will be resolved. 
The Tenth Circuit found that the sliding scale approach 
mirrored the Supreme Court’s approach in Glenn.221 The Tenth 
Circuit stated that the conflict of interest must be incorporated as a 
factor to be weighed upon review.222  The court found that the best 
way to incorporate the conflict of interest factor is a sliding scale 
approach where the court will always review under an arbitrary and 
capricious standard, but decrease or increase the level of deference in 
proportion to the seriousness of the conflict.223  This is certainly in 
direct opposition to the approach taken by the other circuits, and 
seems to contradict with Glenn’s language of not changing the 
standard of review. 
In Doyle, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Glenn standard by 
stating that a heightened review was not compatible with Glenn.224  It 
then rejected arguments that, after Glenn, a court must give greater 
weight to the existence of a conflict if there is no evidence the 
administrator put safeguards in place to assure accurate claim 
assessment.225  The court also rejected arguments that the burden was 
on the administrator to bring forth evidence of safeguards—such that 
if the administrator brought forth no evidence, this would weigh 
against them in the test.226  The Court rejected these arguments “as 
the type burden shifting rule the Glenn court rejects.”227  The Court 
stated that if there is no evidence regarding safeguards, then the court 
should simply focus on other factors—not hold it against the 
administrator.228  The court also rejected an argument that the conflict 
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(10th Cir. 2008). 
222 Id. at 1010. 
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should be given greater weight when an administrator places greater 
weight on medical evidence denying a disability than those affirming 
a disability.229  The court simply stated that an administrator’s 
preference for “objective medical evidence” did not entitle the 
beneficiary to a higher standard of review.230  This ruling is 
consistent with Glenn’s holding that there is no need to establish any 
type of burden shifting rules. 
The Seventh Circuit has struggled with the application of the 
standard of review after Glenn.  Initially, the Seventh Circuit seemed 
to adopt the combination of factors test in Glenn.231 Then, in Marrs, 
the Court took a step back and noted that “there are two ways to read 
the majority opinion.”232  One is a combination of factors approach 
which has been adopted by several of the other circuits, including 
apparently, the Seventh Circuit.  There a conflict is considered and 
weighed among many other factors, depending upon the 
circumstances of the case.  However, the Judge Posner, in writing the 
opinion, expressed discomfort with this standard, stating that it 
“sounds like a balancing test which unweighted factors are 
mysteriously weighed…[s]uch a test is not conducive to providing 
guidance to courts or plan administrators.”233  The Seventh Circuit 
then stated that this “rudderless balancing test did not have to be the 
final word” on the standard that should be applied by [courts and 
plan administrators].234  Accordingly, the court devised a more 
“directive” approach in which a reviewing court looks to the 
“gravity” of the conflict, and the likelihood it influenced the 
administrator’s decision—not just the presence of a conflict as the 
Supreme Court seemed to require.235  The “gravity” of the conflict is 
inferred from the circumstances of the case, including the 
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230 See Doyle, 542 F. 3d. at 1362. 
231 Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564 
F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2009). 
232 Marrs v. Motorola Inc., 577 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2009). 
233 Marrs, 577 F. 3d at 788. 
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reasonableness of the administrator’s procedures and any safeguards 
set up by an employer.236  The main modification of the test in this 
case is the focus on the “gravity” of the conflict instead of its bare 
existence.  The Seventh Circuit is clearly uncomfortable with the 
Glenn test because it does not assign a specific weight to factors or 
even state what factors must be considered.  To remedy this, it 
focuses on the things that are easier to quantify, like “safeguards” 
and “administrative procedure” to determine the weight of the 
conflict.  This still gives a lot of discretion to the reviewing court, but 
the focus on specific factors will seem to force more disclosure 
remedying some of the “mystery” the Seventh Circuit found 
unsettling in the Glenn test.   
The First Circuit stated that a combination-of-factors-test is 
the appropriate test after Glenn, and also slightly modified its 
approach after Glenn.237  Previously, it had used an approach where a 
court could disregard a conflict of interest without more based on the 
market forces approach.  If a conflict of interest was present without 
more, it could be disregarded based on the theory that market forces 
would restrain the administrator from abusing his power.  The court 
based this on the rationale that an employer would not contract with 
an insurer with a “reputation for miserliness.”  If it did, the employer 
would risk losing employees.  After Glenn, the First Circuit noted 
that a conflict must be given some weight regardless of the present of 
“market forces.”238  Overall, the Glenn ruling has resulted in a greater 
uniformity of approaches by the circuit courts.  But, as stated above, 
differences still persist.  The standard in Glenn does not provide 
much guidance as to how exactly a court should consider and weigh 
the many factors it takes into account upon review, and this is largely 
the reason why different approaches live on.   
 
V. ANALYSIS 
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Metropolitan Life v. Glenn represents a battle between two 
approaches to judicial review:  The first approach states that judges 
should be given a large amount of flexibility in making a decision so 
that they can take account of all relevant factors in each individual 
case.  Attempting to delineate a precise standard will result in an 
unnecessary limit on judge's discretion because no standard can 
possibly account for all possible scenarios.  On the other hand, an 
imprecise and vague standard gives judge’s far too much discretion 
and makes it difficult to understand their decisions.  This decreases 
predictability, which leads the dissent to advocate a more predictable 
and open standard which makes it easier to understand judge’s 
decisions.   
As stated above, one of the central purposes of enacting 
ERISA was to increase predictability and uniformity239, and the 
decision in Glenn should be evaluated against this backdrop.  In this 
regard, the decision certainly makes the law more predictable, as the 
circuit courts approach is more uniform than it was pre-Glenn.  All 
circuit courts to consider the matter use a combination-of-factors 
type of review.240  Almost all circuits, aside from the Tenth, now 
agree that heightened scrutiny is not compatible with Glenn.241  So, 
while some differences remain, it is clear the Glenn decision has 
moved the circuit courts into adopting a more uniform approach, and 
hence more predictable approach. 
While the approach is more predictable, individual outcomes 
are not.  Could the decision-making process could be made more 
predictable?  Probably, and this could be done by adopting a more 
uniform, albeit less flexible standard as Scalia argues in his dissent.242  
Adoption of the Restatement on this matter would provide a more 
predictable approach because: 1) it provides less flexibility to judges; 
and 2) a conflict is only considered if there is evidence that the 
conflict actually resulted in the decision being made by an improper 
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motive, i.e. consideration of the plan administrator’s financial 
interest.  This is same point on which the seventh circuit struggled in 
Marrs.243  It was clearly uncomfortable with factors being given an 
indeterminate weight and then being “mysteriously weighed.”  If the 
Supreme Court had accorded specific weights to a number of factors, 
in say, a multi-factor balancing test it would likely have increased 
disclosure by judges, while at the same time limiting their discretion.  
And this would of course increase predictability because it would be 
easier to tell how most judges made their decisions.   
But another goal of ERISA was to provide increased 
protection to employees, and on balance, it seems that the Supreme 
Court’s test does comport with this statutory goal.  By providing 
increased flexibility to judges, the Supreme Court allows judges to 
take account of any factors that may have affected an administrator’s 
determination.  Also, because it may be difficult to prove a conflict 
affected an administrator’s decision, allowing a court to take account 
of the bare existence of a conflict certainly protects employees.  
Scalia would not overturn any decision that is reasonable244, but as 
the seventh circuit noted, both a decision in favor of and in denial of 
benefits, may be reasonable, and so the administrator’s unconscious 
bias may push him to deny the benefits.245  Because evidence that the 
conflict actually affected the decision may be difficult to obtain, 
allowing consideration of the conflict increases employee protection. 
On the other hand, the decreased predictability of this standard may 
result in the creation of fewer employee benefit plans. 
Overall, the majority approach, concurrence by Chief Justice 
Roberts, and the dissent by Scalia all seem to seek the goal of 
benefiting plan beneficiaries.  They simply disagree on how to do so.  
The majority opinion would give judge’s increased flexibility to take 
a conflict of interest into account—this helps beneficiaries because 
any conflict will always be allowed to be taken into account by the 
judge and any conflict will weigh in favor of the beneficiary.  But 
Chief Justice Roberts worries that the increased uncertainty resulting 
                                                                                                                 
243 Marrs, 577 F. 3d 783. 
244 See supra notes 200-201.  
245 Marrs, 577 F. 3d at 789. 
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from the indeterminate weight given to the conflict will lead to the 
creation of less employee benefit plans.  He understands that 
increased unpredictability is equivalent to increased risk and 
therefore, increased costs.246  If one assumes that employers are risk 
averse, this is an economically sensible analysis.  If they are risk 
averse, employers will dislike the possibility of a ruling against them 
more than they will like the possibility of a ruling for them.  
Essentially, the argument is that employers would prefer have an 
exact standard to taking a 50-50 chance where they could end up 
better or worse off.   If employers are risk-averse, and the majority 
standard leads to increased unpredictability, then Chief Justice 
Roberts may be correct that less employee benefit plans will be 
created.  Scalia’s dissent also seeks increased predictability, which as 
explained above, would help promote the creation of employee 
benefit plans or at least maintain the current number of employee 
benefit plans. 
 Finally, the prevalence of the benefit plans at issue has 
grown rapidly.  As stated earlier there are currently about 131 million 
Americans enrolled in employee benefit plans.  247Of course, these 
leads to a multitude of factual scenarios that must be considered 
upon review by judges.  In this regard, the flexible standard stated by 
the majority is the better standard.  As the majority recognized, no 
standard can take account of all relevant factors, and so it is better to 
allow judges flexibility in making this determination.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Ultimately, the majority decision was the correct decision.  
The flexibility it provides to a reviewing court that is forced to take 
account of a wide range of factual scenarios combined with the 
protection it provides to employees by allowing a conflict to be taken 
into account regardless of whether evidence can be produced 
                                                                                                                 
246 If one does not accept the proposition that increased 
uncertainty to employers is equivalent to increased costs, then the 
analysis is not compelling.   
247 See supra note 1. 
2010] METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE V. GLENN 229  
 
outweigh the increased predictability of a more rigid standard.  
Because the majority approach seems to better reflect the reality that 
benefit decisions are very complicated and the reality that evidence 
proving a conflict provided an improper motive is difficult to obtain, 
it is on balance the better approach. 
 
FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS:  
INDUSTRY PRACTICES AND REGULATORY CONCERNS  
 
Esteban Carranza-Kopper* 
 
*** 
During the past decades, there have been multiple discussions on 
the issue of fronting arrangements. In general terms, a fronting 
arrangement can be considered as an alternative risk transfer method 
(ART)1 where an insurer licensed in a certain jurisdiction (fronting insurer) 
issues a policy to cover local risks but all or virtually all of such risks are 
then ceded or reinsured with an unlicensed carrier (reinsurer), who will 
normally take over the administration of all claims related to the risks.2 In 
exchange for its services, the fronting company normally receives a small 
percentage of the total premium.3 It can be said, therefore, that the fronting 
company issues a policy and appears to the world to be an insurer, but in 
reality it has actually passed on to a given reinsurer most or all of the risk 
of coverage4 and most claim-handling obligations. 
The debate surrounding this practice has focused on multiple 
subjects, such as whether the fronting practice is a way to circumvent state 
statutes,5 whether the fronting practice is good or bad when analyzed from 
the perspective of the policyholder6, the regulators,7 or the industry,8 and 
                                                                                                                 
* The author is an alumnus of the University of Connecticut School of Law 
(LL.M., Insurance Law, 2010), where he was awarded the 2010 Insurance Law 
Center LL.M Prize and the Anthony J. Smits International Scholarship. He 
obtained his law degree in the University of Costa Rica (2007) and currently serves 
as an Associate Attorney in the law firm Arias & Muñoz in San José, Costa Rica. 
This Article was finalized in May, 2010, as part of the University of Connecticut 
School of Law’s Insurance Law LL.M. curriculum. The author wishes to thank 
Professors Patrick Salve, Douglas Simpson, and Peter Kochenburger for their 
valuable guidance and expertise. 
1 See Thomas Holzheu, Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) Products, in Reinsurance: 
Fundamentals and New Challenges 113, 117 (Ruth Gastel ed., 4th ed. 2004). 
2 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2000). 
3 See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 1017 (4th ed. 2007). 
4 See ERNEST H. GORE, PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE: A BASIC GUIDE 
160 (2008). 
5 See, e.g., Salvatore R. Curiale, The Dark Side of Fronting, RISK 
MANAGEMENT, Jan. 1991, at 26-27.  
6 See, e.g., Fred A. Simpson, When Fronting Carriers Fail, Equity Protects 
Policyholders, 8 J. TEX. INS. L. 2 (2006). 
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also whether the practice should be banned or further regulated. As will be 
examined in this article, some regulatory attempts relating to the fronting 
practice have been discussed by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC),9 while certain jurisdictions have gone beyond the 
attempt and have actually enacted statutory provisions on this matter. In 
addition, there is case law examining this practice and recent rulings are 
worthy of thought. 
Given the above considerations, this article seeks to provide a 
thorough analysis of this practice, the motivations for companies to support 
it, as well as its negative aspects and associated risks. This article will also 
examine regulatory reactions, statutes, and recent case law dealing with 
the subject of fronting. 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION TO FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS 
 
A.  DIVERSITY OF DEFINITIONS 
 
As noted above, the practice of fronting involves an insurance 
company that issues a policy, which is then completely reinsured with a 
reinsurance carrier. This reinsurance carrier is usually unlicensed in the 
jurisdiction of interest. Notwithstanding some approaches to reach a 
definition of fronting and although most regulators would agree that 
fronting includes a cession of an entire line or class of insurance to an 
unlicensed carrier who controls the underwriting and claims decisions, 
there is no common definition among the states or within the industry.10 
Moreover, one could validly argue that this practice has the characteristics 
of a “chameleon”, because fronting may take different forms and 
appearances depending on the specific motivation for its use.  
                                                                                                                 
7 See, e.g., NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, FRONTING QUESTION PRESENTED: LEGAL 
OPINION, (Jan. 14, 2005), http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2005/rg050111.htm. 
8 See, e.g., Howard W. Greene & Jon Harkavy, Fronting is a Consumer Right, 
RISK MANAGEMENT, Jan. 1991. 
9 See Vincent J. Vitkowsky & John L. Ingersoll, Survey of 1992 Developments 
in the Public Regulation of Insurance, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 408, 408 (1993). 
10 See NAC Reinsurance Corp., Reinsurance Contracts: Content and 
Regulation 33 (1991) (unpublished material, available from NAC Reinsurance 
Corp., One Greenwich Plaza, Greenwich, CT 06836). 
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For example, fronting arrangements can be used to insure risks that 
a company cannot write directly.11 When fronting is used to write business 
directly in a state where a given insurer is not licensed, it has been 
described by a Court as an arrangement through which a state-licensed 
insurance company issues certain policies, which are immediately reinsured 
to 100 percent of their face value by an out-of-state unlicensed insurer.12 
Such Court explained: 
 
In a fronting arrangement - a well-established and perfectly 
legal scheme -policies are issued by a state-licensed 
insurance company and then immediately reinsured to 100 
percent of their face value by the out-of-state, unlicensed 
insurer. In a typical fronting arrangement, the fronting 
insurer issues policies on its own paper and in its own 
name, and the out-of-state unlicensed insurer takes over the 
administration of all claims as part of the reinsurance 
agreement13.  
 
When a fronting arrangement is used for self-insurance purposes, a 
Court described the fronting policy as "a form of self-insurance in which 
the deductible is identical to the limits of liability, and the insurance 
company acts only as surety that the holder of the fronting policy will be 
able to pay any judgment covered by the policy.”14 On a more aggressive 
court approach, it has been said that “[i]n a fronting policy, the insured 
essentially rents an insurance company's licensing and filing capabilities, 
but the insurance company does not actually pay any claims.”15 In this 
sense, by using fronting as a self-insurance mechanism, an insured can 
retain all of the risks originally covered by the fronting policy.16 
Focusing on self-insurance and the captive17 market, it has been 
said that fronting denotes a practice whereby “a commercial insurance 
                                                                                                                 
11 JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3. 
12 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000). 
13 Id. 
14 Landers v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., Nos. 81506, 81531, 2003 WL 
21468908, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 2003). 
15 Dorsey v. Fed. Ins. Co., 798 N.E.2d 47, 51 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
16 Tharp v. Berdanier, No. CIV.A. 21473, 2003 WL 22900646, at *4 n.3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003). 
17 A captive insurance company can be defined as a “company formed to 
insure the risks of its parent corporation.” HARVEY W. RUBIN, DICTIONARY OF 
INSURANCE TERMS 70 (5th ed, 2008). 
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company ("fronting company") licensed in the state where a risk to be 
insured is located, issues its policy to the insured,” and such risk is then 
fully transferred to a captive insurance company.18 Consequently, the 
insured obtains a policy issued on the paper of the commercial insurance 
company, but, economically, the risk of that coverage resides with the 
captive insurance company.19 
Some authors conceptualize fronting as a specialized form of 
reinsurance.20 While by examining common definitions of reinsurance,21 
the motivations for its use,22 and its usual purposes23 one could think of 
valid arguments against such conceptualization, it is difficult to 
differentiate between fronting and traditional reinsurance practices.24 Even 
                                                                                                                 
18 See John Prescott & Deborah Lambert, What’s Up Front: A Guide to 
Fronting Arrangements, Mar. 1 2002, http://www.captive.com/newsstand/ 
jlcovt/Fronting.html. 
19 Id. 
20 Holzheu, supra note 1, at 116 n.2. See also Prescott & Lambert, supra note 
18. 
21 Reinsurance is normally defined as “insurance for insurance companies.” 
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3. It can be defined as “the transaction whereby 
the assuming insurer in consideration of premium paid, agrees to indemnify the 
ceding company against all or part of the loss which the latter may sustain under 
the policy or policies which it has issued.” See REINSURANCE ASS’N OF AMERICA, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY AND CASUALTY REINSURANCE 47 (2008). 
22 It is argued that the “fundamental objective of insurance, to spread the risk 
so that no single entity finds itself saddled with a financial burden beyond its 
ability to pay, is enhanced by reinsurance”.  NAC Reinsurance Corp., supra note 
10, at 1. In the same sense, “[r]einsurance is a mechanism used by the insurance 
industry to spread the risks it assumes from policyholders.  Through it, the 
industry's losses are absorbed and distributed among a group of companies so that 
no single company is overburdened with the financial responsibility of offering 
coverage to its policyholders.” Donald A. McIsaac & David F. Babbel, The World 
Bank Primer on Reinsurance 1 (World Bank Fin. Sector Dev. Dep’t, Working 
Paper No. 1512, 1995). 
23 Normal motivations for reinsurance reside in the fact that reinsurance can 
increase an insurer´s underwriting capacity, stabilize its profits from fluctuations, 
reduce unearned premium reserves, and provide protection against catastrophic 
losses. See GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 
116 (10th ed. 2008). From an economic perspective, one of the most important 
functions of reinsurance is the insurer’s ability to take balance sheet credit for the 
amount of reinsurance coverage protection it holds. Deirdre G. Johnson, Unlocking 
the Mysteries of Reinsurance, 760 PRACTISING L. INST. 243, 255 (2007). 
24 See Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8. 
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though customary reinsurance definitions normally recognize the 
possibility that an insurer could potentially transfer “all” of the risk under a 
given policy,25 one could argue that the fronting practice in principle does 
not seem to fit with the objectives, types, and purposes of reinsurance as to 
qualify as a specialized form of reinsurance. For example, fronting does not 
seem to pursue spreading risks within a given mass but actually involves 
the full transfer of a set risks to a reinsurer, who seems to act more like an 
insurer and less like a reinsurer. Moreover, fronting normally involves the 
transfer of claim handling obligations, which in traditional reinsurance are 
normally held by the underlying insurer.26  
As noted above, one of the uses of fronting arrangements is to 
permit a reinsurer to write coverage that it cannot do directly.27 Therefore, 
in this author´s opinion and for the purposes of this article, fronting will be 
considered as an arrangement that uses reinsurance as its transfer vehicle28 
and, therefore, as one of its components, but not necessarily constituting by 
itself a specialized form of reinsurance. 
Aside from the situation described above, there is another practice 
that has been conceptualized as fronting reinsurance. “[F]ronting 
arrangements devised by direct insurers and reinsurers have been replicated 
by reinsurers and retrocessionaires” in the higher layers of coverage.29 
Unlicensed or unaccredited reinsurers may turn to other reinsurers to serve 
as fronts for reinsurance contracts in order to meet solvency, security or 
other statutory requirements,30 thereby enabling the underlying insurer to 
obtain credit for the reinsurance coverage. When agreement is reached, the 
fronting reinsurer will issue the required reinsurance and will retrocede all 
or a significant portion of the risk to the unlicensed or unaccredited 
                                                                                                                 
25 See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3; REINSURANCE ASS’N OF 
AMERICA, supra note 21. 
26 See Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 Conn. Ins. 
L.J. 345, 372 (2009). 
27 JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3. 
28 In this sense, fronting has been defined as “arrangements by which an 
insurer, for a specified fee or premium, issues its policies to cover certain risks 
underwritten or otherwise managed by another insurer or reinsurer. The insurer 
then transfers all, or substantially all, of the liabilities thereunder to such insurers 
by means of reinsurance”. REINSURANCE ASS’N OF AMERICA, supra note 21, at 31 
(emphasis added). 
29 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE 1-25 (2d ed. 2000). 
30 Id. 
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carrier.31 Fronting practices at these layers of coverage can enable an 
unlicensed or unaccredited alien reinsurer to effectively provide coverage 
without having to comply with the trust fund requirements that are 
customary for unlicensed alien reinsurers. This situation was explained by a 
federal court in New York when analyzing a case where a carrier acted as a 
front for a reinsurance syndicate from London.32 The court explained: 
 
Plaintiff ASRIC is an insurance company organized under 
Delaware law . . .  Elkhorn/Delta was a member of a 
reinsurance syndicate in London managed by Stetzel 
Thomson & Co. Ltd. . . . Elkhorn/Delta was one of twenty-
two members of this syndicate and the only member 
incorporated in the United States . . . According to ASRIC, 
because Elkhorn/Delta was the only member incorporated 
in the United States, Stetzel designated Elkhorn/Delta as 
the “fronting” company for the syndicate . . . Under the law 
of Delaware, ASRIC's state of incorporation, an insurer 
will receive reinsurance credit only if the reinsurer is 
licensed to transact insurance in Delaware or in another 
state with comparable standards of insolvency for 
insurance companies. If the reinsurer is an unincorporated 
alien insurer, the reinsured can obtain reinsurance credit 
only if the reinsurer establishes a trust fund here for the 
benefit of the reinsured.” Because most states have 
comparable standards, the fronting arrangement allowed 
ASRIC to obtain a reinsurance credit for all the risks ceded 
to Elkhorn/Delta, without the other members of the 
syndicate having to post security in the United States.33 
 
Considering the various uses and forms of fronting, the 
development of a precise definition is not a simple task. Moreover, the 
definition that a given jurisdiction may adopt would probably depend on 
the specific concerns that such jurisdiction may find in the practice of 
fronting. Nevertheless, by examining the common elements of its various 
uses, the author of this article considers that a definition of fronting could 
be proposed as follows:  
                                                                                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 American Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta America Re Ins. Co., 836 F. Supp. 
183, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y., 1993). 
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Fronting describes a series of alternative risk-transfer 
methods that share the following common elements: a) the 
presence of a company (fronting company) that issues an 
insurance or reinsurance policy, which is then completely 
or substantially ceded to a carrier (assuming carrier), b) the 
assuming carrier is normally unlicensed or unaccredited in 
the jurisdiction where the fronting company is licensed or 
accredited, c) the assuming carrier normally controls the 
underwriting and claims decisions of the respective policy 
or policies.  
 
B.  PURPOSES AND MOTIVATIONS. 
 
Considering the variety of definitions and uses of fronting 
arrangements, it is reasonable to infer that these risk-transfer schemes can 
respond to various purposes and motivations, which depend on the specific 
business of a given company or group of companies. In general terms, it 
can be said that fronting arrangements may respond to one or more of the 
following motivations: 
* For Licensing Purposes: By means of a fronting arrangement, a 
carrier is enabled to write coverage that it cannot do directly34 by using the 
services of a fronting company that is licensed in the state of interest. Such 
a risk-transfer method may be used where the insurer is not licensed to 
write business or a specific line of insurance in a particular state, and where 
the specific - and sometimes multi-state - insurance program would require 
such licensure35.  
A fronting program may permit an insurer to write national 
programs during the time its’ state licenses are being processed.36 It may 
also be an appropriate tool when “statutory prohibitions serve to undercut 
an insurer's longstanding relationship with its insured.”37 Needless to say, 
this licensing motivation is normally subject to strong criticism by state 
                                                                                                                 
34 JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3. 
35 See Larry P. Schiffer, Up-Front About Reinsurance, INT’L RISK MGMT. 
INST. (Jan. 2004), http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2004/schiffer01.aspx.  
36 See Robert M. Hall, Fronting: Business Considerations, Regulatory 
Concerns, Legislative Reactions and Related Case Law (2001), 
http://www.robertmhall.com/articles/frontingdoc.htm. 
37 Curiale, supra note 5. 
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regulators,38 who see this as a way to circumvent state statutes, as will be 
noted in Section III of this article. 
* For Rating Reasons: Sometimes an insurance program or an 
insured will require a certain financial rating for a carrier to be qualified.39 
When this situation occurs and the interested carrier does not fulfill the 
rating requirement or later suffers a downgrade of its rating that could force 
it to exit the program, the interested carrier may use the services of a 
fronting company in order to comply with such rating requirements.40  
* For the Purpose of Entering or Exiting a Given Market: Fronting 
can be the mechanism through which a carrier may gradually enter a new 
insurance field with the financial and technical support of a reinsurer.41 By 
using a fronting arrangement, a carrier may gradually test an insurance line 
or a whole market with additional security and protection. Conversely, 
fronting can also be a sound tool where a carrier wishes to exit a given field 
but regulatory requirements oblige the business to be renewed for a certain 
period of time.42 The carrier will continue to renew the business during the 
required time period but completely transfer its risks to a given reinsurer.  
As it will also be noted in Section III below, there is a significant 
caveat on this motivation, which is that despite the transfer of risk, the 
company may have not entirely freed itself from its liability and related 
obligations.43  
* For the Functioning of Captive Companies: There are situations 
in which a company or a group of companies consider that the creation of a 
“captive” insurance company, which they own and control, provides a 
method of obtaining insurance coverage for their operations in a more 
                                                                                                                 
38 For example, as addressed by the Committee on Insurance of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1993, “[t]o insurance regulators, 
the term fronting usually has a pejorative connotation, implying a situation in 
which the reinsurance arrangement is a matter of form between a licensed ceding 
company and an unlicensed reinsurer, the purpose of which is to allow the 
unlicensed reinsurer to do indirectly what the state prohibits it from doing directly: 
sell insurance within the state. Regulators view fronting as a device which enables 
an unlicensed reinsurer to avoid the restrictions to which it would be subject if it 
were a licensed insurer directly issuing insurance policies to the public . . . .” 
OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-37. 
39 See Schiffer, supra note 35. 
40 Id. 
41 Hall, supra note 36.  
42 Id. 
43 See Abramovsky, supra note 26, at 372.  
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efficient and productive manner.44 Captives can be defined as special 
purpose insurance companies which are created for insuring or reinsuring 
the risks of its parent company or associated corporation.45 In this type of 
ART method, fronting is said to be a necessary service for the success of 
captive insurers.46  
Because captives are normally off-shore or out-of-state 
companies47 that would probably not comply with statutory requirements 
for insurers, a majority of captives lack the required licenses to transact 
business of insurance.48 The captive operation, therefore, normally requires 
the existence of a fronting arrangement to enable the risk-transfer 
mechanism.49 Because of the size50 and popularity51 of the captive business, 
one would think that the majority of fronting arrangements probably occur 
within the captive market arena. 
                                                                                                                 
44 See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3. 
45 Thomas F.X. Hodson & Cathleen T. Heath, The Outlook for Fronting 
(Special Report: Captives & ART), RISK & INSURANCE (Mar. 1, 2002).  
46 Id.  
47 The primary jurisdictions where captives are incorporated are Bermuda, the 
Cayman Islands, and the state of Vermont. See TOWERS PERRIN, CAPTIVES 101: 
MANAGING COST AND RISK 1, 
http://www.captive.com/service/TowersPerrin/images%20and%20pdf/Captives%2
0101.pdf.  
48 Hodson & Heath, supra note 45 (“Generally, a company must be licensed to 
do business in the jurisdiction in which a policy is issued. A majority of captives 
lack the required licenses to do business and, therefore, captives often must use a 
fronting arrangement in order to do business in a state in which its parent's risks 
are located. A fronting insurer is a licensed carrier that issues the policies that a 
captive cannot issue.”). 
49 See id. (“A typical fronting arrangement will operate as follows: (i) the 
captive's parent pays a premium to the fronting insurer; (ii) the fronting insurer 
issues a policy to the parent; (iii) the fronting insurer cedes the balance of the 
remaining premiums back to the captive; and (iv) the captive may retrocede a 
portion of the risk to a reinsurer.”). 
50 See TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 47 (“Captive insurance is big business. 
More than 40% of major U.S. corporations and many multinational companies own 
one or more captives.”). 
51 As a curious note, even the teams of the National Football League (NFL) 
created in 1984 a Bermuda captive for the purposes of reinsuring the teams’ 
workers’ compensation insurance through fronting arrangements, although such 
company ended in liquidation proceedings. See N.F.L. Ins. Ltd. v. B & B 
Holdings, Inc., No. 91 CIV. 8580, 1993 WL 78090 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1993). 
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It has been noted that the use of captives and fronting arrangements 
normally increase in times of hard market conditions.52 The hardening of 
the market creates a series of challenges for companies such as increased 
cost of risk management programs, decreased coverage, changes in terms 
and conditions of coverage, reduced limits or capacity offered at renewal, 
and increased deductibles and retentions mandated by carriers.53 This 
market situation normally causes a significant number of companies to seek 
alternative risk-transfer schemes, such as the use of captives and fronting 
arrangements. As noted in recent industry surveys, fronting is an essential 
service for the captive industry.54 
* For Tax Deduction Purposes: Although this motivation is 
normally linked with the operation of captive insurers, it is appropriate to 
treat it separately due to its importance. Normally, a company that chooses 
to insure its operations through a captive company would wish to achieve 
tax deductibility of its premiums through successful risk-shifting.55 The 
reasons are obvious; while premiums paid to a captive insurance company 
are deductible as business expense for tax purposes, the sums set aside in a 
self insurance program are not deductible as a business expense.56  
It is important to point out that on December 11, 2009 the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) released two Private Letter Rulings, where it 
approved the use of a captive reinsurance arrangement involving a fronting 
insurer.57 In these rulings, the IRS analyzed the situation where a group of 
                                                                                                                 
52 See Hodson & Heath, supra note 45. 
53 Id. 
54 The 2010 results of the annual survey conducted by the Captive Insurance 
Companies Association (CICA), show that 100% of consulted captive entities rated 
the overall level of importance of fronting to their captive as either very important 
or important. Other aspects of interest follow: a) 78% of respondents said that 
having an A rated fronting company as very important, b) 85% of respondents 
listed admitted paper among the primary reasons for using a front, c) 46% of 
respondent listed regulatory compliance among the primary reasons for using a 
front, and d) 89% of respondents characterized the price of fronting as reasonable. 
See United States: 2010 Survey Results on Fronting and Reinsurance Released by 
CICA, PRWEB (March 11, 2010), 
http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/3689674.pdf.   
55 See Prescott & Lambert, supra note 18, at 1. 
56 See RUBIN, supra note 17, at 70. 
57 See IRS Approves Captive Reinsurance Arrangement as "Insurance" for Tax 
Purposes, SONNENSCHEIN CLIENT ALERT (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.snrdenton.com/news__insights/alerts/irs_approves_captive_reinsuran.a
spx. 
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individuals formed a captive reinsurer, which ultimately reinsured certain 
risks originally insured by a fronting company.58 The IRS considered that 
the captive reinsurance arrangements constituted insurance for tax 
purposes, since risk shifting and risk distribution were present in such 
arrangements.59 
 
II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Despite the criticism and regulatory concerns towards fronting 
arrangements, it is unquestionable that such arrangements continue to exist 
today and with few exceptions remain unregulated. One could then validly 
think that these arrangements are not only widely used, as noted above in 
relation to the captive market, but must also have positive opinions and 
supporters.  
In general terms, fronting arrangements have been considered as 
valid and legal mechanisms of risk-transfer by both courts and some 
industry experts.60 The Reliance Court for instance described fronting 
arrangements as well-established and perfectly legal schemes.61 Similarly, a 
footnote in the Tharp Court decision described fronting programs as legal 
                                                                                                                 
58 Id. “In the facts of each PLR, a group of individuals formed a domestic 
captive reinsurer (the Company) which ultimately reinsured certain risks of two 
groups of entities. One group of entities (the related entities) was owned by the 
shareholders of the Company; the other group of entities (the unrelated entities) 
was unrelated to the Company. The risks of each entity were insured by a fronting 
insurer; portions of the insured risk were reinsured by two intermediate reinsurers 
before being ultimately reinsured by the Company.”. 
59 Id. “The PLRs held that the Company's captive reinsurance arrangement 
constituted insurance for tax purposes, applying the definition of insurance 
enunciated in the seminal 1941 Supreme Court case of Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 
U.S. 531 (1941). The Court stated in LeGierse that, in order for an arrangement to 
constitute insurance for tax purposes, risk shifting and risk distribution must be 
present. . . . A private letter ruling such as the PLRs constitutes binding authority 
only for the taxpayer to whom it is issued. Nonetheless, such a ruling is viewed as 
expressing the current views of the IRS with respect to the subject matter of the 
ruling.” 
60 See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 6, at 1 (“Through variations of these 
arrangements, companies enjoy a lawful and cost effective way to self-insure 
losses without meeting the formal legal requirements to qualify as insurers (or self-
insurers) in those jurisdictions where the companies do business.” See also JERRY 
& RICHMOND, supra note 3 (“Although ‘fronting’ has a pejorative connotation in 
most usages, fronting in insurance is often highly appropriate.”). 
61 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Shriver, Inc., 224 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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risk management devices.62 Considering the potential levels of coverage 
where fronting may occur, it has been noted that both insurer-reinsurer and 
reinsurer-retrocessionaire fronting contracts have been upheld in the face of 
challenges to their validity.63 It must be noted that even though fronting is a 
controversial subject, most commentators do not address whether it is legal 
or not, they simply note that it is an existing practice that causes significant 
concerns.64  
Upon analyzing the question of whether New York Insurance Laws 
restricted or prohibited fronting, the New York Insurance Department 
concluded that proper licenses shall be obtained if an unauthorized insurer, 
under the guise of reinsurance, engaged in activities that would require a 
license.65 Nonetheless, the Department acknowledged that the Insurance 
Laws do not preclude an unauthorized insurer from reinsuring 100% of an 
authorized insurer’s risks, as long as this activity does not allow the 
unauthorized insurer to engage in activities that would otherwise require it 
to obtain a license.66 
One of the most avid critics of fronting has even considered that 
the practice should not necessarily be banned and noted that some fronting 
is useful.67 Other experts acknowledge some of the benefits that fronting 
may bring.68 Some authors have even qualified fronting as a consumer 
                                                                                                                 
62 See Tharp v. Berdanier, No. CIV.A. 21473, 2003 WL 22900646, at *4 n.3 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003). 
63 See OSTRAGER AND VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-28. 
64 Robert M. Hall, Fronting and Direct Actions Against Reinsurers: The Final 
Chapter, 1 (2008), http://www.robertmhall.com/articles/FrontFinalChapArt.pdf. 
(“Experienced insurance executives know that fronting carries with it significant 
business, regulatory and solvency concerns. It has been on and off the regulators’ 
radar screen for at least fifty years.”) 
65 See NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, supra note 7.  
66 Id. 
67 See Curiale, supra note 5 (“Does this mean regulators should ban the 
practice? Not necessarily; some fronting is useful and arguably should remain. 
Fronting can, in limited and defined instances offer a means by which all parties 
can achieve their goals in a cost-effective manner. For example fronting may be 
appropriate when statutory prohibitions serve to undercut an insurer's longstanding 
relationship with its insured. This may occur when an insurer of a multistate firm 
lacks the requisite authority for writing particular lines in certain states or when an 
overseas insured opens a U.S. branch and seeks to retain its foreign-based insurer, 
especially when such insurer would qualify (and perhaps intends to apply) for 
licensure in the state in which the risks are resident.”). 
68 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 36 (“From a business standpoint, fronting has two 
benefits: (1) it allows reinsurers to run primary insurance programs without being 
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right, and considered that its elimination would not only be bad policy but 
would be an anti-consumer policy.69 
 
III. NEGATIVE OPINIONS AND REGULATORY CONCERNS 
 
As much as fronting may have supporters of the practice, it does 
have a considerable number of opponents, especially among regulators.70 
The most common argument cited against fronting is that it enables an 
unauthorized carrier to circumvent existing statutes71 and offer direct 
coverage without proper licensing. On the contrary, at least two authors 
consider this argument as “ironic” since a major reason of fronting is to 
                                                                                                                 
licensed as such or establishing the mechanisms to service insureds; and (2) its 
gives primary insurers the opportunity to profit from fronting fees without 
incurring significant insurance risk.”). But the author warns that “[w]hile the first 
benefit may be real, the second is often illusory given the highly leveraged nature 
of the transaction, the adverse interests inherent in the relationship and the 
particular vulnerability of the front when something goes wrong. Many insurers 
have learned through sad experience the pitfalls of fronting.” Id. 
69 See Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8 (“Problems with definition aside, 
eliminating fronting is bad policy because it is anti-consumer. Fronting is not done 
to the policyholder; it is done for the policyholder. When an admitted carrier enters 
a fronting arrangement with a policyholder's captive, it does so at the behest of, 
and for the benefit of, that policyholder.”). 
70 See Hodson & Heath, supra note 45 (“While fronting is accepted as a 
necessary service for the success of captive insurers, it is not necessarily favored 
from a regulatory standpoint.”). See also Schiffer, supra note 35 (“In certain states, 
fronting is not looked at very favorably by insurance regulators.”); Vitkowsky & 
Ingersoll, supra note 9, at 417 (“While fronting transactions serve useful functions, 
insurance regulators believe that fronting transactions should be subject to careful 
scrutiny. There is great discomfort among regulators with the notion of unlicensed 
foreign and alien insurers using a licensed insurer to reinsure risks in the licensed 
insurer's state of domicile, when such foreign and alien insurers are not subject to 
state regulation.”). 
71 See Curiale, supra note 5 (“No matter how you slice it, fronting is a fiction 
designed to circumvent the existing insurance regulatory framework.”). See also 
Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8 (“Opponents view fronting as a method of 
circumventing state laws.”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3 (“Also, at times 
such [fronting] policies may be written for illegal or unethical purposes, such as for 
the purpose of evading state regulation or taxation.”); Hodson & Heath, supra note 
45 (“When a company fronts business and then reinsures it 100 percent to a 
captive, a regulatory may see the transaction as a way to circumvent the licensing 
requirements of the state.”). 
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seek compliance with state laws relating to financial responsibility.72 
Another weakness in the circumventing argument is that it could be used 
against any conduct a regulator dislikes. For instance, a tax regulator could 
use a similar argument against customary tax advice. Thus, it must be 
recognized that as the market evolves into new practices, it usually dictates 
ways to legally conduct certain businesses, which may initially seem to 
circumvent the statutes but in the end result to be perfectly legal schemes.73  
Very similar or at least related to this circumventing argument, is 
the notion that fronting aids and abets an unlicensed carrier to do business 
within a given jurisdiction.74 In an opinion issued by the New York 
Insurance Department, about one year after the opinion cited in Section II 
above, the Department clearly stated its position that through fronting, a 
licensed insurer may illegally aid an unlicensed carrier.75 The opinion states 
the following: 
 
The Department is also concerned about the issue of 
fronting, which generally arises when a ceding insurer is 
100% or substantially insured on a risk, by an unauthorized 
insurer. This situation occurs when unauthorized insurers, 
in order to avoid New York’s statutory requirements, enter 
into reinsurance agreements with domestic companies 
who, in essence, act as fronting companies for the 
unauthorized insurers. Any arrangement or activity that 
would constitute the aiding of an unauthorized insurer 
would violate Section 2117 of the Insurance Law, and any 
authorized insurer that did any business that is equivalent 
to one of the specified types of insurance contained in N.Y. 
Ins. Law § 1101(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 2005) in a manner 
designed to evade the provisions of the Insurance Law 
would be in violation of N.Y. Ins. Law § 1102 (McKinney 
                                                                                                                 
72 See Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8. 
73 As expressed by Allan Meltzer in the Wall Street Journal, “[t]he first 
principle of regulation is: Lawyers and politicians write rules; and markets develop 
ways to circumvent these rules without violating them.” See Abramovsky, supra 
note 26, at 345. 
74 See Hall, supra note 36. 
75 See NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, REINSURANCE – PERCENTAGE OF RISKS 
RETAINED BY CEDING INSURER: LEGAL OPINION, (Jan. 6, 2006), 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2006/rg060105.htm. 
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Supp. 2005). Each case would be evaluated on its own 
facts.76 
 
At least one author has considered the aiding and abetting 
argument as “metaphorical” because most states have very precise rules on 
what activities by unauthorized insurers constitute doing business and 
fronting generally does not violate such rules.77 One could also argue that if 
regulators wish to ban or regulate fronting, a precise and clear rule should 
be the way to do so, instead of relying on potentially ambiguous or 
questionable arguments.  
Regulators have also expressed concern about the potentially 
fraudulent conduct that may be committed through the use of fronting.78 
Some arrangements may trick consumers into believing they are doing 
business with a sound insurer when in reality their insurance is being 
provided by an unfunded or unknown carrier.79 Without a doubt, fronting 
would serve a dark purpose under this scenario. One could think of fronting 
as an ethical practice when chosen or at least known by the insured, but it 
certainly turns unethical when used with the intent to deceive the 
policyholder. 
Another commonly cited concern of fronting is the potential 
solvency issue that may arise from its practice, as it could threaten the 
solvency of the ceding insurer.80 This concern involves situations such as 
credit risks associated with fronting practice, potential insolvency of the 
fronting company, and even potential insolvency of the reinsurance or 
captive company. On this matter, it should first be noted that even when a 
fronting company cedes all of the risk associated with a policy, that 
company still remains liable to the direct insured for all of the associated 
                                                                                                                 
76 Id. 
77 See Hall, supra note 36. 
78 See OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-39. 
79 Id. 
80 Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8 (“First, some contend that fronting 
threatens the solvency of the ceding insurer. They argue that the ceding insurer is 
putting itself on the hook for risks it does not underwrite, since it simply passes the 
risk on to a reinsurer for a fee.”). But the author validly points out that “[i]f a 
regulator questions the security of fronted business, he or she has the power to 
deny credit for reinsurance to the ceding carrier in accordance with state laws . . . . 
The power to grant or deny credit for reinsurance is available to regulators for 
traditional reinsurance arrangements, and fronted transactions should be treated 
just like any other.” Id. 
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coverage.81 Consequently, if the reinsurer becomes insolvent or there is a 
substantial coverage disagreement,82 the fronting carrier will find itself in a 
very difficult position, since it will face the obligation to pay 100% of the 
ceded risks with a very small percentage of the premium.83 For these 
reasons, a prudent fronting carrier should investigate its reinsurer’s 
reputation and claims-handling practices,84 and obtain appropriate collateral 
security.85 Such collateral is useful not only to protect the company from 
the credit risk associated with potential failure by the reinsurer, but also to 
address the balance sheet impact of an unlicensed reinsurer on the fronting 
company due to the application of statutory accounting principles.86 
Although these measures do not solve the problem entirely, as the 
operations still carry associated risks, they do help reducing some of these 
risks. 
 Another complicated situation may be present in the event of 
insolvency of the fronting carrier. Absent a cut-through endorsement87 and 
due to the highly probable presence of a standard insolvency clause88 in the 
reinsurance agreement, if the fronting company goes insolvent, the 
reinsurance recoverable would probably be collected for the benefit of all 
policyholders of the front and not necessarily for any specific underlying 
insured. This would certainly destroy the original intent of the fronting 
program and would leave the insureds with no protection. As will be 
                                                                                                                 
81 See OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-26. 
82 Klaus Gebhardt, Being Clear Up Front: There are More Areas of Potential 
Reinsurance Coverage Disputes Than You May Think, BEST’S REVIEW, May 1, 
2002 (“Apart from the obvious credit risk associated with ceding business to other 
insurance and reinsurance companies, the peril of fronting also may manifest itself 
in coverage disagreements.”). 
83 See Hall, supra note 36. 
84 See OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 29, at 1-27. 
85 See William N. Curcio, Putting up a Good Front, BEST’S REVIEW, Oct. 
2003, at 71, 74. 
86 Id.  
87 “A cut-through endorsement amends a reinsurance agreement by providing 
that, in the event of insurer insolvency, the reinsurer will pay reinsurance proceeds 
due to the insurer directly to the individual or entity named in the endorsement.” 
See NAC REINSURANCE CORP., supra note 10, at 34. 
88 An insolvency clause will nearly be found in all reinsurance contracts due to 
statutory rules relating to credit for reinsurance, and will allow the liquidator of an 
insolvent insurer (normally the Commissioner of Insurance in a given state) to 
directly collect the reinsurance recoverable under reinsurance contracts for the 
benefit of all policyholders and creditors of the insolvent company. See NAC 
REINSURANCE CORP., supra note 10, at 29. 
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examined under Section V of this article, this situation could be solved if 
recent court rulings, that recognize a direct policyholder action against 
reinsurers of a fronting program, become adopted as standard case law for 
fronting practices. 
  
IV. REGULATION OF FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Considering the regulatory concerns over the practice of fronting, 
there have been various proposals to regulate it which go back as far as the 
1950’s.89 For example, in the 1970’s and the 1980’s, the New York 
Department of Insurance proposed a fronting regulation (Regulation 82) 
due to their ongoing concern about this practice, but the Regulation was 
never adopted.90  
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has also 
discussed proposals to regulate the practice, most notably the draft model 
acts entitled “Limitations on Reinsurance Activities of Insurers Model 
Act”91 and the “Fronting Disclosure and Regulation Model Act”.92 These 
attempts, however, encountered severe opposition in the industry, due to 
the prevalence of using fronting arrangements for captives and other 
businesses.93  
Despite such strong opposition from the industry, the NAIC 
adopted the “Fronting Disclosure and Regulation Model Act” in their 
                                                                                                                 
89 See Hall, supra note 36. 
90 See NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, supra note 7. 
91 Vitkowsky & Ingersoll, supra note 9, at 416. 
92 See Hall, supra note 36. 
93 See Vitkowsky & Ingersoll, supra note 9, at 417 (“An early 1992 exposure 
draft of the fronting model Act received a great deal of criticism from the 
insurance industry.”). See also Greene & Harkavy, supra note 8, at 29 (“If the 
NAIC's draft model act were to become law, it would mean that policyholders 
would lose an important part of their ability to manage their own risks. No longer 
could captives be used to reinsure their parents' coverage. Risk managers would be 
unable to tap admitted reinsurance capacity and the excess and umbrella market. 
The NAIC draft would prohibit policyholders from using capacity for difficult-to-
place risks which may not be available in the traditional market under acceptable 
terms. Risk managers would not even be permitted to designate the reinsurers on 
their own risks. In short, many responsible and well-established insurance 
programs would no longer exist.”). 
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Winter National Meeting in December, 1993.94 The purpose of the Act, as 
provided in its June 1993 Draft, is as follows: 
 
The purpose of this Act is to ensure proper disclosure and 
regulation of reinsurance transactions in which an insurer 
domiciled in this state or, if the transaction covers risks 
resident in this state, an insurer licensed in this state, 
delegates to an unauthorized reinsurer underwriting or 
claim settlement authority, on business written directly by 
the licensed insurer or assumed from another licensed 
insurer.95  
 
The Act later provides the requirement of prior regulatory approval 
for certain reinsurance transactions, most notably: a) when the annual gross 
written premium for business subject to the proposed transaction exceeds 
5% of the insurer’s statutory policyholder surplus, as reported in its most 
recent financial statement,96 b) when annual gross written premium for the 
business subject to the transaction when added to all similar transactions is 
expected to exceed 15% of the insurer’s statutory policyholder surplus, as 
reported in its most recent financial statement.97  
Despite certain exemptions contemplated in the Act, the industry’s 
opposition continued to be strong.98 A sector of the industry considered the 
NAIC regulation not only as redundant but as impeding consumer access to 
alternative risk-transfer methods.99 Moreover, it was alleged that the 
practical result of this regulation was to increase the costs of captive 
transactions because the additional burdens placed on the fronting carriers 
would be passed on to the captives.100 It appears that the opposition was 
strong enough since the Model Act was not adopted by any state.101 
                                                                                                                 
94 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, FOURTH QUARTER 1993 PROCEEDINGS 
15 (Mar. 1995). 
95 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, Third Quarter 1993 Proceedings, 665 
(Nov. 1994). 
96 Id. at 666. 
97 Id. at 667. 
98 See Paul S. Brown, Insurance Consumer Wary of Insurance Regulators, 
ROUGH NOTES (Jan. 1, 1994), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3615/is_199401/ai_n8726254.  
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See Hall, supra note 36. 
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 Despite the failure of the NAIC Model Act, certain states – most 
notably Florida102 – have issued some form of regulation of fronting, either 
by statute, regulation, or bulletin. It has been noted,103 however, that the 
number of states is very limited – only 17 states and the Virgin Islands - 
and that their regulation is either vague or overly broad.104 Additionally and 
as previously mentioned, other states rely on the Aiding and Abetting 
statutes in an attempt to forbid the fronting practice.105 
As noted above, fronting regulation has often failed to be precise or 
to even contain definitions of the forbidden practice. If regulators want 
proper regulation of fronting practices, a clear and precise language should 
be the norm. For example, such language could refer to the amount of risk 
retained by a fronting carrier106 or the delegation of claims handling 
                                                                                                                 
102 Florida statutes forbid an authorized insurer to act as fronting company for 
an unauthorized insurer which is not an approved reinsurer.  FLA. STAT. § 
624.404(4)(b) (2004). The statute later defines fronting company as “an authorized 
insurer which by reinsurance or otherwise generally transfers more than 50 percent 
to one unauthorized insurer which does not meet the requirements of s. 
624.610(3)(a), (b), or (c), or more than 75 percent to two or more unauthorized 
insurers which do not meet the requirements of s. 624.610(3)(a), (b), or (c), of the 
entire risk of loss on all of the insurance written by it in this state, or on one or 
more lines of insurance, on all of the business produced through one or more 
agents or agencies, or on all of the business from a designated geographical 
territory, without obtaining the prior approval of the office.”. Id. 
103 See Hall, supra note 36. 
104 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 193U (excludes fronting transaction 
from the definition of a medical malpractice insurer but fails to define fronting); 
VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-2614 (2007) (also forbids fronting but fails to define it); 
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 1695 (1993) (limits the scope of fronting regulation by 
defining a fronting company as “an insurer or ambulance service association which 
by reinsurance or otherwise, generally transfers to one or more unauthorized 
insurers or ambulance service associations, the risk of loss under ambulance 
service contracts written by it in the territory”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6627 (also 
vaguely defines a fronting company as “an authorized insurer or licensed service 
warranty association which, by reinsurance or otherwise, generally transfers to one 
or more unauthorized insurers or unlicensed service warranty associations, the risk 
of loss under warranties written by the company in this state.”). 
105 See NEW YORK INS. DEP’T, supra note 75. 
106 See HODSON & HEATH, supra note 45. (“The distinction between a ’proper’ 
reinsurance transaction and an ’improper’ fronting arrangement is perhaps found 
in the amount of risk retained by the fronting company and the purpose of the 
transaction. A regulator might question the legitimacy of a fronting arrangement if 
the purpose is solely to avoid a state's licensing requirements and the entire 
amount of the risk is passed along by the fronting company.”). 
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obligations. As explained above, however, strong industry opposition 
should be expected to any regulatory attempt to curtail fronting 
arrangements. 
 
V. COURT EXAMINATION OF FRONTING ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Under typical reinsurance contracts and absent a specific cut-
through endorsement, an underlying insurer does not have privity of 
contract with, or a right of direct action against, a reinsurer107, since the 
only contracting parties are the cedent and the reinsurer108. This situation 
also arises due to the indemnity nature of the reinsurance contract, which 
requires the cedent insurer to initially pay a claim in its entirety before 
demanding the reinsurance recoverable.109 Moreover, when a cedent insurer 
becomes financially troubled and is subject to state insolvency laws, 
reinsurance recoverables are normally collected by the Insurance 
Commissioner, or the state official administering the insolvency, by 
enforcing the insolvency clauses that are commonly required by statutes in 
order for the cedent to obtain credit for reinsurance.110  
Both of the situations mentioned above would typically cause an 
insured to fail in an attempt to sue a reinsurer directly. Some courts, 
however, are inclined to accept a direct claim from an insured to a reinsurer 
when the financially-troubled insurer merely acts as a fronting company 
rather than a true insurer111. In these cases, reinsurers have been held to the 
same standards as insurers when they act as insurers rather than 
reinsurers112.  
For example, in 1959 the Supreme Court of Missouri, upon 
analyzing a typical fronting case, held in O’Hare v. Pursell that by taking 
over the complete risk, service of business, and other obligations, a 
reinsurer put itself in the position of a contracting party with the insureds. 
                                                                                                                 
107 See Johnson, supra note 23, at 250; see also J.C.Penney Life Ins. Co v. 
Transit Casualty Company in Receivership, 299 S.W.3d 668, 673-74 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009) (“Ordinarily, the original insured has no interest in the reinsurance.  
Indeed, a reinsurance contract ‘operates solely as between the reinsurer and the 
reinsured. It creates no privity between the original insured and the reinsurer.’ … 
The reinsurer is ‘solely and exclusively’ liable to the reinsured and has no 
contractual obligation or liability to the original insured.”). 
108 See REINSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 21, at 9. 
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-88-10(a). 
111 See Johnson, supra note 23, at 250. 
112 See Hall, supra note 36, at 6.  
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The Court held that the law supplied the privity necessary for insureds to 
maintain a direct action against the reinsurer113. Similarly, in 1979, the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana held in Foremost Life Insurance Company v. 
Department of Insurance that consumers may proceed directly against 
reinsurers as third party beneficiaries where a reinsurer assumes 
responsibility directly to the policyholders114. The Court analyzed a 
reinsurance treaty where the reinsurer took 100% of the risks and assumed 
all administrative responsibilities of the policies.  
In addition to these opinions, there are two fairly recent cases - 
both from Pennsylvania - that are very important to consider as part of any 
fronting analysis. A brief explanation of such cases follows: 
 
A.  KOKEN V. LEGION115 
 
This case involved petitions for liquidation of Legion Insurance 
Company and of Villanova Insurance Company by the Pennsylvania 
Insurance Commissioner, M. Diane Koken. Both Villanova and Legion 
were rather sizeable fronting insurers that became insolvent despite 
significant funding efforts by their common parent company116. As part of 
the proceedings, several insureds who used Legion as part of their fronting 
programs, sought direct access to the respective reinsurance agreements in 
order to avoid the reinsurance proceeds from going to the insolvent estate 
for the benefit of all creditors, as advocated by the Commissioner.  
These insureds were Pulte Homes, Inc., Psychiatrists Purchasing 
Group, Inc., American Airlines, Inc., and Rural/Metro Corporation. The 
court recognized that in the fronting programs of these insureds, the 
reinsurer not only bore 100% of the underlying risk but was directly chosen 
by the respective policyholders as part of their fronting programs.117 
Despite strong opposition, the Court approved the Commissioner’s 
petition to liquidate the companies, but, it also granted the petition of the 
insureds and gave them third-party beneficiary status with respect to the 
reinsurance agreements. In doing so, the court applied the Guy118 test with 
                                                                                                                 
113 See O’Hare v. Pursell, 329 S.W.2d 614, 620 (Mo. 1959). 
114 See Foremost Life Insurance Company v. Department of Insurance, 395 
N.E.2d 418 (Ind. App. 1979). 
115 See Koken v. Legion Ins. Co., 831 A.2d 1196 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). 
116 See Simpson, supra note 6, at 3. 
117 See Koken, 831 A.2d at 1241. 
118 Id. at 1237 (“In Guy [Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983)], our 
Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining third-party beneficiary 
status: (1) recognition of the beneficiary's right must be ‘appropriate to effectuate 
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regard to the insureds’ third-party beneficiary status, but clarified that 
direct access to reinsurance is a right to be established on a case-by-case 
basis. The court reasoned: 
 
The Policyholder Intervenors all assert third-party 
beneficiary rights but on different factual grounds. The 
rights of Pulte, Rural/Metro and PPG stem from facultative 
reinsurance agreements specific to their individual risks; 
they were issued facultative certificates. American claims 
rights under a reinsurance agreement that is not strictly 
facultative, i.e., a facultative obligatory treaty. On the other 
hand, the contract, or wording, between Legion and 
Syndicate 271 contains language that expresses American's 
right to cut-through Legion to collect reinsurance directly 
from Syndicate 271 [Footnote omitted]. In spite of the 
differences in their circumstances, all the Policyholder 
Intervenors can demonstrate third-party beneficiary status 
under the two-part Guy test. 
 
First, it was the intention of the parties that the reinsurer 
assume all underwriting risk. Legion's only role was that of 
a fronting company, and the parties did not intend that 
Legion use the proceeds of the reinsurance for its general 
business purposes. Further, the reinsurance proceeds were 
used exclusively and entirely for the payment of 
Policyholder Intervenor claims, which satisfies the second 
part of the Guy test. Payment by the reinsurance companies 
was through Legion but for the benefit of the Policyholder 
Intervenors. In short, each “reinsurer” functioned as the 
direct insurer for each of the Policyholder Intervenors.119 
 
Direct access to the reinsurance contracts was granted in these 
situations because the “true” insurer of the policyholders was actually the 
                                                                                                                 
the intention of the parties,’ and (2) contract performance must ‘satisfy an 
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary’ or ’the circumstances 
indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the 
promised performance.’”). 
119 Id. at 1237. 
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reinsurer and not Legion. As clarified by the court, granting such a right 
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.120 
 
B.  ARIO V. SWISS RE.121 
 
This case involved the parties’ objections to a Referee’s ruling on 
whether direct access to reinsurance should be allowed on fronting 
programs covering the insured’s liability for workers compensation upon 
insolvency of the fronting carrier. Both parties, the Insurance 
Commissioner and the insured Tribune Company, considered the Koken 
case to be supportive of their positions. Tribune wanted direct access to 
certain reinsurance recoverables under fronting programs, but the Insurance 
Commissioner considered that Tribune had no such right, relying on the 
reasoning of the Koken case122. 
According to the facts of the case, Tribune Company and Swiss 
Reinsurance entered into certain fronting programs for Tribune’s workers’ 
compensation exposure, using Reliance Insurance Company as a front. The 
first program, entitled Guaranteed Cost Program (GCP), provided that 
Reliance would insure and transfer certain workers’ compensation 
liabilities to Swiss Reinsurance, subject to certain interim and aggregate 
limits. This meant that Reliance was left with potential excess liability. The 
second program, entitled Loss Portfolio Transfer (LPT), provided that 
Reliance would also insure and transfer certain workers’ compensation 
liabilities to Swiss Reinsurance.  However, this program differed due to the 
absence of significant caps and the presence of excess insurance by 
Tribune. As a result, Reliance was left with no real exposure and acting 
merely as a pass-through entity. 
Because the transaction was not structured as an up-front 
arrangement and Reliance retained certain underwriting risk, the court 
upheld the Referee’s ruling that Tribune should not have direct access to 
reinsurance related to the GCP program123.  As for the LPT program, the 
court also upheld the Referee’s ruling that Tribune should have direct 
access to reinsurance since the purpose of the transaction was simply a 
pass-through liability to Swiss Reinsurance.124  
                                                                                                                 
120 Id. at 1236. 
121 Ario v. Swiss Reins Am. Corp., 940 A.2d 552 (Pa.Commw. Ct. 2007).  
122 See id. at 554. 
123 Id. at 556. 
124 Id. at 558. 
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The court identified several factors to be used in deciding whether 
an insurer should have direct access to reinsurance. The factors to be 
considered are: 1) did the insurer take on any underwriting risk or act as a 
front, 2) did the insurer enter into the transaction in order to generate fees, 
and not premium, 3) did the ‘reinsurer’ function as a ‘direct insurer’ for the 
policyholder and was the claims handling process and the funding of claims 
the responsibility of the reinsurer, 4) did the policyholder facilitate the 
reinsurer's involvement, 5) did the equities favor the policyholder's claim to 
direct access.125 Although this test could provide a useful guide for fronting 
situations, the court did not clarify if all factors had to be satisfied or if the 
presence of some but not all factors would suffice. 
By examining the previously cited cases and opinions, one could 
conclude that courts are recognizing direct policyholder actions against 
reinsurers when there is a clear fronting program. But until such rulings are 
adopted by the overwhelming majority of courts, it is reasonable to think 
that each case will be evaluated on its own facts and such evaluations will 
vary considerably depending on the jurisdiction. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
By analyzing the above considerations and facts, several 
conclusions can be reached. First, fronting can be characterized as a legal 
risk-transfer mechanism, except where it is expressly prohibited or 
restricted. Although there has been an ongoing discussion on whether or 
not the practice of fronting circumvents existing statutes, there does not 
seem to be a strong argument against it and courts have generally 
considered these arrangements as legal. If a given state wants to forbid or 
regulate the practice, then a clear and precise set of express rules should be 
the norm.  
Second, fronting is a helpful tool when properly used as it may 
enable a company to plan a successful captive program or an insurer to 
maintain its long-standing relationship with a client. As noted above, 
fronting has been considered an essential component for the survival of the 
captive industry and even its most avid critics believe that at least some 
form of fronting should be allowed.  
Third, even though reinsurance contracts normally do not grant any 
privity rights to the underlying policyholders, it is unquestionable that 
courts have taken a more progressive approach when viewing the fronting 
practice and they have acknowledged the reality of the relationship 
                                                                                                                 
125 Id. 
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between the parties. Courts are moving towards recognizing policyholders’ 
direct rights of action against reinsurers when the cedent insurer has only 
acted as a front and the reinsurer is acting as the true insurer.    
Fourth, despite the above remarks, one cannot blind oneself from 
the negative implications and consequences that fronting can bring when 
used improperly. It is understandable why regulators are concerned with 
the practice of fronting. There have been abuses that resulted in 
insolvencies, potential fraud on policyholders, and evasion of state 
controls. In this sense, at least some regulation is necessary and helpful. For 
such regulation to be successful, however, a precise definition of the 
targeted practice is fundamental.126 The construction of a definition should 
focus on the common elements of the practice in order to achieve that 
precision. 
Given the diverse characteristics and widespread uses of fronting 
arrangements, one can conclude that state authorities have the option of 
regulating this practice through either a general or specific regulatory 
approach. A general approach would seek to regulate fronting as a general 
practice, either by prohibiting it or by limiting and regulating its use. 
Again, a precise definition is a mandatory component of such legislation. In 
contrast, a specific approach would seek to regulate the areas or fronting 
practices that cause specific concerns to a given regulator, without banning 
or restricting the practice in general. For example, a given regulator may 
not be concerned about all fronting practices, but may be alarmed by 
specific aspects or uses of it127. The determination of the potential aspects 
to be regulated, however, depends on the specific concerns of each 
jurisdiction.  
As general conclusion, fronting is a valid, useful, and legal tool, 
except where expressly prohibited. Due to the negative consequences that 
fronting may also bring, at least some regulation establishing clear and 
precise guidelines would be appropriate; but, a general ban of the practice 
would not be convenient, especially for the captive industry. If a state 
chooses to regulate fronting, a specific regulatory approach would not only 
be more effective for compliance and enforcement purposes, but would 
probably be viewed more positively by the industry. Ultimately, this is a 
matter of state choice. 
                                                                                                                 
126 See HALL, supra note 36, at 3. 
127 For example, when fronting is used to deceive consumers. 
252 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
 
 
 
ANNUITY COEPTIS: IS THERE A WAY TO AVOID 
AMERICAN EQUITY INVESTMENT LIFE INSURANCE CO. V. 
SEC BECOMING A HERALD FOR THE SEC GAINING 
REGULATORY CONTROL OVER ALL SECURITIES-
RELATED INSURANCE PRODUCTS? 
 
Russell Hasan 
 
 
 This note is a critique of the July 2009 D.C. Circuit case American 
Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, in which the court rejected a 
challenge to the Securities Exchange Commission’s Rule 151A, which had 
subjected fixed index annuities to SEC regulation. The court held that the 
1933 Securities Act’s section 3(a)(8) exemption for insurance did not exempt 
fixed index annuities from SEC regulation. This note begins by exploring in 
considerable detail the case law on the insurance exemption contained in the 
1933 Securities Act. The note then looks at the history of the rise of fixed 
index annuities, and examines the economic theory that underlies index 
investing, which is the investment strategy that gave birth to a demand for 
fixed index annuities. The note proceeds to look at contemporary case law 
applying the insurance exemption to decide whether fixed index annuities are 
exempt from SEC regulation under section 3(a)(8). The note then offers 
substantive analysis of why fixed index annuities should be exempt as 
insurance. The note argues that fixed index annuities transfer the risk of 
stock-picking from insured to insurer and that the beta risk vs. non-beta risk 
distinction from index investing theory is a suitable basis for regulating index 
annuities differently than variable annuities. The note argues that fixed index 
annuities pose challenges of solvency and contractual interpretation, which 
are the regulatory challenges of insurance, but do not pose disclosure 
challenges, which are the regulatory challenges that the SEC addresses. The 
note then argues that the D.C. Circuit completely misunderstood the 
economics of how fixed index annuities function. The note concludes by 
offering policy arguments on why it is best for the states and not the SEC to 
regulate fixed index annuities. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the July 2009 D.C. Circuit case American Equity Investment Life 
Insurance Co. v. SEC, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed 
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the question of whether fixed index annuities are insurance.1 This question 
matters because annuity products which qualify as insurance are exempt 
from the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 because of the 
insurance exemption in § 3(a)(8) of the Act, and are therefore not subject to 
regulation by the Securities Exchange Commission.2 The SEC had earlier 
in 2009 released its new Rule 151A, which stated that fixed index annuities 
(for the most part) are not insurance under § 3(a)(8) and are therefore 
subject to SEC regulation.3 The petitioners, who included American Equity 
Investment Life Insurance Company, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, and as amici curiae Phillip Roy Financial Services LLC 
and Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America, brought suit and 
argued that the SEC’s classification of fixed index annuities as securities 
and not as insurance was unreasonable.4 The court in American Equity held 
for a variety of reasons that the SEC had been reasonable in determining 
that fixed index annuities were not insurance.5 The court relied heavily 
upon precedent in the two most relevant United States Supreme Court cases 
addressing the insurance exemption, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life 
Insurance Co. of America (VALIC) and SEC v. United Benefit Life 
Insurance Co. (United Benefit).6  
                                                                                                                 
1 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2009), 
amended by 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14249 (D.C. Cir.  July 12, 2010). 
2 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (2006). The insurance 
exemption in the Securities Act of 1933 provides that the Act does not apply to 
“[a]ny insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity 
contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance 
commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like 
functions, of any State or Territory of the United States or the District of 
Columbia.” Id. 
3 Indexed Annuities And Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. 
3138 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified at17 C.F.R. Pts. 230 and 240). The SEC was 
responding to allegations that buyers of fixed index annuities had been victimized 
by various frauds necessitating heightened regulation, including the possibility that 
fixed index annuities might be marketed as investments and sold to buyers for 
whom the fixed index annuities are not suited. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Coleman, 
Equity Indexed Annuities: "Securities," or Exempt Insurance Products Under the 
Federal Securities Laws?, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 80 (2006). 
4 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 572 F.3d at 924-25. 
5 Id. at 934. 
6 Id. at 926. 
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Because I believe that the D.C. Circuit both misinterpreted the 
relevant precedent and severely misunderstood the nature of the financial 
product in question, I argue in this note that the court reached the wrong 
result in American Equity in holding that the insurance exemption did not 
apply to fixed index annuities. In the process of this analysis I present a 
new conceptual framework for understanding insurance, risk, and 
securities, which courts will be able to use when examining other quasi-
security annuity products in the future. I conclude by examining the policy 
implications of whether the SEC should have a broad regulatory net for 
catching every new and innovative financial product or whether the SEC’s 
mandate should be more narrow and allow more control to the states; I 
argue that the latter choice is preferable. 
I begin by explaining the precedent that is important to 
understanding the issues relating to fixed index annuities in Part II. I then 
explore the theory of index investing, the rise of fixed index annuities, and 
the SEC’s efforts to regulate fixed index annuities in Part III.A. Then I 
present the contemporary cases that reached the question of whether fixed 
index annuities qualify for the insurance exemption in Part III.B. In Part 
IV.A, I present my conceptual framework for understanding insurance risk 
and show why a fixed index annuity is actually a form of insurance and is 
not a security. I conclude with policy arguments in Part IV.B. 
 
II. PRECEDENT DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE INSURANCE 
EXEMPTION 
 
A.  EARLY CASES DEFINING SECURITIES AND INSURANCE 
 
One of the first Supreme Court cases to discuss the question of 
what is insurance is Helvering v. Le Gierse, a case that involved a decedent 
who had purchased a life insurance policy and an annuity simultaneously 
from the same insurer for similar amounts, such that each policy hedged or 
counterbalanced the other.7 The decedent died and the beneficiary tried to 
claim the life insurance proceeds as tax-exempt under a tax exemption for 
life insurance.8 The Court held that the life insurance policy did not qualify 
as insurance for purposes of the insurance exemption in the 1933 Act 
because the two contracts considered as a whole did not constitute “risk-
                                                                                                                 
7 Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 536 (1941). The Court was 
interpreting section 302 of the Revenue Act of 1926. Id. at 537. 
8 Id. at 537. 
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shifting and risk-distributing,” which is the essence of insurance.9 The 
Court found that usually life insurance involves shifting the risk of death 
from those dependent upon the insured to a group of people (implicitly, 
everyone else who buys life insurance).10 
Helvering is significant because the United Benefit Court cites 
Helvering for two propositions: (1) that a contract which is insured is not a 
contract of insurance and, (2) assuming investment risk does not create 
insurance. The case does stand for those propositions, but the Court in 
Helvering also looked at whether a financial product shifts and distributes 
economic risk to determine whether or not it is insurance, whereas the 
Court in United Benefit failed to do this kind of Helvering analysis; later I 
will argue that an analysis of fixed index annuities satisfies this risk-
shifting test used in Helvering. 
In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., the Supreme Court held that 
a contract to sell and develop land was a security even though it did not 
precisely match the enumerated list of products defined as securities in the 
1933 Act because it matched one of the more general descriptions of 
securities in the Act.11 This case is relevant because it held that “what 
character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the 
plan of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the 
prospect” are all relevant in determining whether a product is a security.12 
The Supreme Court in the landmark case SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 
held that deals termed land sales combined with management contracts 
were actually products that sold shared profits in citrus farms in exchange 
for contributions of money and were therefore securities.13 The Court held 
that whether the financial product was speculative, and whether the product 
was backed by an asset with intrinsic value, was irrelevant to whether it 
was a security. Rather, “[t]he test is whether the scheme involves an 
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely 
                                                                                                                 
9 Id. at 539-40. 
10 Id. at 540. 
11 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). The Court 
was interpreting section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 350. 
12 Id. at 352-53. 
13 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). The Court was 
interpreting section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 297. 
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from the efforts of others.”14 Fixed index annuities would clearly fit within 
this definition of securities unless the insurance exemption applied.15 
 
B.  VALIC 
 
1. The Majority Opinion 
 
The United States Supreme Court first had the chance to directly 
address the question of whether security-related annuities qualify for the 
insurance exemption to the 1933 Securities Act in SEC v. Variable Annuity 
Life Insurance Co. of America (VALIC).16 In VALIC, the court was faced 
with a variable annuity product in which the insured paid premiums into an 
account which were invested in common stocks and other equities by the 
insurer and then received payments from the insurer based upon the return 
of the investments.17 The variable annuity insurer claimed that the variable 
annuity was insurance exempt from SEC regulation.18 The VALIC majority 
held that the variable annuity was a security and not insurance.19 Its 
reasoning is summed up in a key quote from the case: 
 
We realize that life insurance is an evolving institution. 
Common knowledge tells us that the forms have greatly 
changed even in a generation. And we would not undertake 
to freeze the concepts of ‘insurance’ or ‘annuity’ into the 
mold they fitted when these Federal Acts were passed. But 
we conclude that the concept of ‘insurance’ involves some 
investment risk-taking on the part of the company. The risk 
of mortality, assumed here, gives these variable annuities 
an aspect of insurance. Yet it is apparent, not real; 
superficial, not substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a 
variable annuity that has no element of a fixed return 
assumes no true risk in the insurance sense. It is no answer 
to say that the risk of declining returns in times of 
                                                                                                                 
14 Id. at 301. 
15 See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). 
16 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65 
(1959). 
17 Id. at 69. 
18 Id. at 66-68. 
19 Id. at 71. 
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depression is the reciprocal of the fixed-dollar annuitant's 
risk of loss of purchasing power when prices are high and 
gain of purchasing power when they are low. We deal with 
a more conventional concept of risk-bearing when we 
speak of ‘insurance.’ For in common understanding 
‘insurance’ involves a guarantee that at least some fraction 
of the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts. The 
companies that issue these annuities take the risk of failure. 
But they guarantee nothing to the annuitant except an 
interest in a portfolio of common stocks or other equities 
an interest that has a ceiling but no floor. There is no true 
underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance as it 
has commonly been conceived of in popular understanding 
and usage.20 
 
Thus, the Court found variable annuities were securities, not 
insurance, because the insurer did not assume risk and did not pay out a 
fixed amount.21 I will return to this quote later, but for now I point out two 
things. First, the Court claims that fixed payments are required in order to 
constitute insurance.22 The Court can be read to say that fixed payments are 
necessary to be insurance as a per se rule, or it can be read to say that the 
insurer assuming risk and providing a reduction in risk for the insured are 
necessary to constitute insurance, since the reasoning the court offers is that 
fixed payments are necessary precisely because they offer the reduction of 
risk for the insured and an assumption of risk in the insurance sense for the 
insurer. I discuss what it means to assume risk in the sense of insurance 
below. Second, the Court says it does not freeze a definition of insurance. 
To summarize the overall theory of the case, the VALIC majority expresses 
a theoretical paradigm for understanding insurance according to which 
“insurance” is defined as a product in which the insurer—not the 
consumer—bears the investment risk. 
 
2. Justice Brennan’s Concurrence 
 
Justice Brennan wrote a long and influential concurrence in VALIC 
in which he agreed that the variable annuity was not insurance, but on 
                                                                                                                 
20 Id. at 71-73 (citations omitted). 
21 Id. 
22 VALIC, 359 U.S. at 70-71. 
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slightly different grounds than the majority.23 His analysis was based upon 
looking at the purpose of the insurance exemption. In his view, the purpose 
of the insurance exemption was not that Congress wanted to prevent dual 
state-Federal regulation, nor that Congress believed that state insurance 
regulators who regulated insurance at the time the Act was drafted were 
perfect.24 Rather, Justice Brennan argued that the insurance exemption 
existed because there were insurance financial products that state insurance 
regulators were better designed to deal with than the SEC. In his view, the 
test for whether a financial product is a security to be regulated by the SEC 
or an insurance product to be regulated by the states should depend upon 
whether the product poses the kind of challenges that were being dealt with 
either by the 1933 Securities Act or by the state insurance regulations that 
existed at the time the Securities Act was passed.25 
When he fleshed out this test, Justice Brennan asserted that the 
purpose of the 1933 Act was primarily to ensure disclosure to investors.26 
He said that “the philosophy of the Act is that full disclosure of the details 
of the enterprise in which the investor is to put his money should be made 
so that he can intelligently appraise the risks involved.”27 According to 
Justice Brennan, state insurance regulation of annuities is different in that 
the focus of annuities regulation is, first, to interpret contractual terms, and 
second, to ensure that the insurance companies are solvent and have 
adequate financial reserves capable of paying out the benefits that they are 
obligated to pay under the policies.28 According to the nature of fixed 
annuities at the time the 1933 Act was created, there was no need for 
disclosure relating to fixed annuities, whereas there was a strong need for 
solvency and reserves regulation of fixed annuities.29  Therefore, because 
the annuities at the time the Act was passed did not require disclosure 
regulation, and the purpose of the 1933 Securities Act was primarily to 
enforce disclosure, the insurance exemption made perfect sense.30 
                                                                                                                 
23 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65, 73 
(1959) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
24 Id. at 75. 
25 Id. at 75-76. 
26 Id. at 77. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 VALIC, 359 U.S. at 77. 
30 See id. 
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Applying his analysis to variable annuities, Justice Brennan held 
that because variable annuity insureds are exposed to the investment 
management of the insurers, the disclosure regulations of the 1933 
Securities Act were highly relevant, and the contractual, solvency and 
reserves regulations of state insurance regulation were not.31 Justice 
Brennan, while arguing that the variable annuities also fall under the scope 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, said “[t]hese are the basic 
protections that Congress intended investors to have when they put their 
money into the hands of an investment trust; there is no adequate substitute 
for them in the traditional regulatory controls administered by state 
insurance departments. . . .”32  In footnote 26, Justice Brennan notes that 
the “least-subtle” example of an area that state regulators are not equipped 
to cope with is “investment policy,” in that the states do not regulate how 
the variable annuity insurers invest the premiums, which stocks they may 
invest in, and when they are allowed to change their investing strategy.33 
Justice Brennan astutely opined that “[m]uch bewilderment could 
be engendered by this case if the issue were whether the contracts in 
question were ‘really’ insurance or ‘really’ securities-one or the other. It is 
rather meaningless to view the problem as one of pigeonholing these 
contracts in one category or the other,” because what matters is the 
relevance of state insurance or Federal securities regulation, and not the 
intrinsic essence of the product itself.34  Despite his rejection of any effort 
to classify the essence of the product, Justice Brennan took the time to 
explore the features of the product at issue in great detail and based his 
analysis of the relevance of Federal or state regulation on what he found the 
product’s risks to consist of.35  Summarizing the theory of the concurrence, 
Justice Brennan’s paradigm of what constitutes insurance is quite different 
from the majority: it turns not on the risk-shifting nature of the product, but 
rather on the presence of risks that state insurance regulation seeks to 
address (i.e., solvency and contract interpretation). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
31 Id. at 78-80. 
32 Id. at 85. 
33 Id. at 86 n.26. 
34 Id. at 80. 
35 See VALIC, 359 U.S. at 81-85. 
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3. Justice Harlan’s Dissent 
 
In VALIC, Justice Harlan authored a spirited dissent in which he 
began by observing that the insurance exemption codified a longstanding 
tradition that insurance regulation belonged to the states and not to the 
Federal government.36 Although the dissent failed to adequately address the 
arguments raised in the majority opinion and the concurrence, it did make 
an interesting argument, typified by two quotes, the first of which is: 
“[Congress’ intent that the states regulate insurance] in my view demands 
that bona fide experiments in the insurance field, even though a particular 
development may also have securities aspects, be classed within the federal 
exemption of insurance, and not within the federal regulation of 
securities.”37  The second quote, which evinces a strong state’s rights view, 
is: 
 
It is asserted that state regulation, as it existed when the 
Securities and Investment Company Acts were passed, was 
inadequate to protect annuitants against the risks inherent 
in the variable annuity and that therefore such contracts 
should be considered within the orbit of SEC regulation. 
The Court is agreed that we should not ‘freeze’ the concept 
of insurance as it then existed. By the same token we 
should not proceed on the assumption that the thrust of 
state regulation is frozen. As the insurance business 
develops new concepts the States adjust and develop their 
controls. This is in the tradition of state regulation and 
federal abstention. If the innovation of federal control is 
nevertheless to be desired, it is for the Congress, not this 
Court, to effect.38 
 
                                                                                                                 
36 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65, 97 
(1959) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted portions of the legislative 
history showing that Congress had been concerned because at the time the Act was 
passed it was debatable whether the Federal Government could regulate insurance 
under the Commerce Clause power. See 77 CONG. REC. 2935-39, 2945-46, 3109 
(1933). 
37 VALIC, 359 U.S. at 100. 
38 Id. at 100-01. 
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Thus, although the dissent did not delve into the ways in which 
contemporary state insurance regulation might be adequate to regulate the 
investment aspect of variable annuities, Justice Harlan argued that 
experiments could be classified as insurance, and should be so classified 
given the strong history of state regulation of insurance.  He also argued 
that there is every possibility that state insurance, if capable of evolution 
and not frozen in the form it consisted of in 1933, might actually become 
competent to regulate quasi-security products.39  Justice Harlan’s theory of 
insurance seems to be that any time an insurance company launches a bona 
fide experiment, the resulting product is insurance. In other words, the 
defining feature of insurance is the involvement of an insurance company, 
not the risk-shifting nature of the product (as in the VALIC majority’s 
theory) or the risks being regulated (as in Justice Brennan’s theory). 
 
C.  UNITED BENEFIT 
 
In United Benefit, the United States Supreme Court was tasked 
with evaluating a new quasi-security product called a Flexible Funds 
annuity and deciding whether it qualified for the insurance exemption.40  
The annuity in question greatly resembled a variable annuity in that the 
premiums, less a deduction for expenses (namely the net premiums,,),, 
were held in a separate account and were invested primarily in common 
stocks for the purpose of both interest returns and capital gains.41  The 
annuity differed from prior variable annuities in that a percentage of net 
premiums, which increased over the life of the contract from 50% in year 
one to 100% in year ten, was guaranteed to be paid back to the insured, 
although the product did not guarantee a rate of interest.42  The Court held 
that Flexible Funds annuities do not qualify for the insurance exemption 
even though part of the payments were fixed, for several reasons. 
First, the Court argued that because the aspect of the payments that 
were fixed could have been offered separately from the investment aspect 
of the product, the fixed aspect was conceptually separable from the 
variable investment-related payments and the two aspects could be 
                                                                                                                 
39 Id. 
40 SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co. (United Benefit), 387 U.S. 202, 204 
(1967). 
41 Id. at 205. 
42 Id. at 205-06. 
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considered and analyzed separately.43  Secondly, the Court found that the 
products were marketed for growth and were “considered to appeal to the 
purchaser not on the usual insurance basis of stability and security but on 
the prospect of ‘growth’ through sound investment management.”44  Third, 
the Court held that the product was not insurance because it was an insured, 
i.e., hedged)),) contract rather than a contract of insurance, and the mere 
assumption of investment risk did not create insurance.45  The Court cited 
Helvering in support of this proposition and used that citation to argue that 
the Flexible Fund was not insurance even though the insurer’s guarantee of 
a return of principal reduced somewhat the insured’s risk. Helvering 
formed the basis of this distinction, meaning that risk-shifting and risk-
distributing seem to be a factor in distinguishing an insured (hedged) 
contract from an insurance contract.46  
The United Benefit Court cited with approval Justice Brennan’s 
VALIC concurrence, and claimed that under Brennan’s analysis the 
purchasers of Flexible Funds were seeking “growth through professionally 
managed investment,” and were comparable to purchasers of mutual funds 
and, therefore, entitled to SEC regulations governing disclosure.47  The 
Court in United Benefit appeared to espouse the theory of insurance 
embodied in Justice Brennan’s VALIC concurrence in that disclosure was 
the relevant regulatory challenge for the growth and investment 
management aspects of the Flexible Funds and its regulatory risk 
determined whether the product was insurance.48  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
43 Id. at 209. 
44 Id. at 211. 
45 Id. The contract was hedged in the sense that some portion of the investment 
was guaranteed. 
46 United Benefit, 387 U.S. at 211; see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying 
text. 
47 United Benefit, 387 U.S. at 210-11. 
48 The United Benefit Court also cited C.M. Joiner for the proposition that a 
relevant test of a security is “what character the instrument is given in commerce 
by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements 
held out to the prospect,” and found that this test showed that the product was a 
security because it was marketed for growth rather than stability and security. Id. at 
211. 
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III. THE RISE OF FIXED INDEX ANNUITIES AND SEC’S 
RESPONSE 
 
Fixed index annuities are a type of financial product that first took 
off in the 1990s.  The SEC has attempted to regulate fixed index annuities, 
taking differing approaches to regulation at different times.  This section 
will explain what fixed index annuities are and trace the SEC’s regulatory 
response. 
 
A.  THE THEORY BEHIND INDEX INVESTING 
  
In order to understand the nature of fixed index annuities it is 
important to understand the investment theory behind index investing. 
Index investing employs the strategy of passively investing in a securities 
index (which is a very large group of stocks taken to represent the market 
as a whole, for example the S&P 500, which consists of 500 stocks, or the 
Russell 2000, which contains 2000 stocks) instead of picking individual 
stocks.  The theoretical basis for index investing is based upon two schools 
of financial thought: Modern Portfolio Theory (also known as MPT) and 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (also known as CAPM).49  Modern Portfolio 
Theory, first developed by Harry Markowitz,50 essentially boils down to the 
proposition that the best way to reduce the risk inherent in a portfolio of 
stocks is to diversify (in other words, to purchase a multitude of stocks 
each of which will perform differently under different conditions so that at 
any given time the odds are that some of the stocks in the portfolio will be 
doing well and, therefore, the odds of the portfolio as a whole doing well 
will increase,,),, and to the corollary proposition for investing strategy that 
a diversified portfolio is superior to a non-diversified portfolio from the 
point of view of managing uncorrelated risk.51 
Modern Portfolio Theory later evolved into a new financial theory 
called Capital Asset Pricing Model, developed by William Sharpe among 
                                                                                                                 
49 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 183-210 
(4th ed. 1985). 
50 See generally Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) 
(presenting what is widely viewed as the original presentation of Modern Portfolio 
Theory). 
51 See MALKIEL, supra note 49, at 193-99. 
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others.52 Capital Asset Pricing Model introduced the idea of “beta,” a 
mathematical statistical quantification of market risk, also called the 
systematic risk.53  The Capital Asset Pricing Model posits that the risk that 
is specific to an individual stock—the non-beta risk—can be diversified 
away by building a diversified portfolio based on sound statistical and 
mathematical models with other stocks that counterbalance the risk of the 
first stock.  At the same time, CAPM asserts that each stock also contains a 
risk inherent in the individual stock which cannot be diversified away, 
which is risk that comes from the relation of the stock to the market as a 
whole; that risk is called beta.54  An example of non-beta risk is the risk 
that a specific public company will have incompetent or dishonest 
management.  Beta quantifies the risk that a stock will go up or down 
because the market as a whole goes up or down.55  The Capital Asset 
Pricing Model modifies the general investing principal that more risk earns 
greater reward to assert that more beta should earn greater reward, but more 
non-beta risk should not earn more reward because any competent investor 
can diversify all non-beta risk away and be left only with beta risk.56 
The Modern Portfolio Theory and Capital Asset Pricing Model 
became fashionable in the 1970s.57  The MPT/CAPM theory, with its 
strong emphasis on diversification, is the theoretical structure that gave rise 
to index investing.58  Index investing seeks to accomplish as much 
diversification as possible and to diversify to the point of having only 
systematic beta risk and eliminating non-beta risk by buying the stocks of 
an index, such as the S&P 500, which is a collection of 500 reputable 
stocks that is generally used as a measure of the performance of the stock 
market as a whole.  
The theory of index investing is that by buying an index one 
assumes beta, the risk that the market as a whole will go up or down, but 
avoids the individualized risks inherent in each stock that comprises the 
market.  The reasoning is that one can avoid non-beta risk without any loss 
                                                                                                                 
52 See generally William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964) (presenting what is 
usually viewed as a substantial contribution to the creation of Capital Asset Pricing 
Model). 
53 See MALKIEL, supra note 49, at 199-209. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 Id. at 208-09. 
58 Id. at 322. 
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in returns, and therefore sensibly risk-averse investors will do so; however, 
one cannot avoid the risk that the market as a whole will go up or down 
because every stock’s beta inextricably ties it to the market, and therefore 
beta is the only risk that a sensible investor will assume. 
The index investing philosophy believes that it is impossible to 
beat the market average, i.e., the index, by picking stocks.  This is because 
the movements of individual stocks are random, the stock market is 
efficient and therefore stocks are usually priced correctly and rarely present 
opportunities to buy undervalued stocks or sell overvalued stocks, and the 
costs of picking stocks exceed the costs of passive investment.59  It is 
important to understand that index investing, unlike most investing 
strategies, is not a strategy for choosing the right stocks, and does not 
purposefully assume any of the risks inherent in choosing stocks.  It is a 
strategy that foregoes choosing individual stocks and chooses to invest only 
in the market as a whole as a way to eliminate the risks inherent in 
choosing individual stocks and to grow one’s money as the economy 
grows.  The fundamental idea behind index investing is diversification as a 
means of reducing financial risk. This matters because an investment 
strategy devoid of stock-picking does not pose the same regulatory 
challenges as traditional investing. 
 
B.  THE RISE OF INDEX INVESTING PRODUCTS 
 
Given that MPT/CAPM and the associated postulates of index 
investing hold that one can and should diversify all non-beta risk away, that 
it is impossible to beat the indexes by picking stocks, and that the market 
can only go up over the long term, it follows from this investing philosophy 
that a smart investor, instead of choosing individual stocks, should simply 
buy the market.  Doing so reduces or eliminates the risks associated with 
picking stocks and hopefully allows one’s money to keep pace with the 
growth of the market over the long term. In the 1970s, Wall Street saw the 
demand for financial products designed to satisfy believers in MPT/CAPM, 
and Wall Street gave birth to the index mutual funds, including mutual 
funds that allowed small individual investors to invest according to an 
                                                                                                                 
59 See MALKIEL, supra note 49, at 129-33, 174-76. See also CHARLES R.T. 
O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS 201-05 (5th ed. 2006). 
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index such as the S&P 500.60  By 2007, the fixed index annuity market had 
grown such that there were 322 fixed index annuities offered by 58 
different insurance companies, and at that time the collective sales volume 
of fixed index annuities was $24.8 billion, and fixed index annuity assets 
had reached $123 billion.61  Since their inception, index mutual funds have 
become very popular, with at least $255 billion invested in S&P 500 index 
mutual funds as of June 2005.62 
Life insurance companies began to offer fixed index annuities in 
1995.63  There are many kinds of fixed index annuities with different 
features, but generally a fixed index annuity is an annuity in which the 
insured makes payments to the insurer, and the insurer guarantees a return 
of some percentage of the principal plus a minimum percentage interest 
rate of return, similar to a fixed annuity.  In addition, a fixed index annuity 
offers the possibility for a higher percentage rate of return in excess of the 
guaranteed rate of return, calculated by reference to the annual growth of 
an equity index, although the formula used to calculate the excess rate can 
be complicated.64  A fixed index annuity is similar to an index mutual fund 
in that both offer returns based on the performance of indexes, but there are 
also differences between the two.  The purchaser of a mutual fund suffers 
the risk that if the index goes down he will lose money, whereas the owner 
of a fixed index annuity does not risk loss below the guaranteed levels.65  In 
addition, an index mutual fund actually invests the purchaser’s money in 
the stocks comprising the index, whereas a fixed index annuity insurer is 
free to invest the insured’s payments however it wishes so long as it ends 
up with enough money to pay the insured the amounts that he is owed 
under the policy.66  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
60 See MALKIEL, supra note 49, at 322-23; see Gary O. Cohen, Indexed 
Insurance Products Versus Index Mutual Funds: Status Under the Federal 
Securities Laws 2007, 1596 PRACTICING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 507, 515-16 (2007). 
61 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2009), 
amended by 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14249 (D.C. Cir. July 12, 2010). 
62 See Cohen, supra note 60, at 517. 
63 Id. at 518. 
64 See id. at 526-43. 
65 Id. at 511-12. 
66 Id. 
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C.  THE SEC’S EFFORTS TO REGULATE FIXED INDEX ANNUITIES 
 
The SEC’s approach to regulating fixed index annuities has 
changed and evolved considerably over the last twenty years.  Beginning in 
1986 fixed index annuities were covered by Rule 151, which is a “safe 
harbor” SEC regulation under which insurance products meeting certain 
conditions are considered to be insurance not subject to the 1933 Securities 
Act.67 Rule 151 provides that: 
 
(a) Any annuity contract or optional annuity contract (a 
contract) shall be deemed to be within the provisions of 
section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 
77c(a)(8)), Provided, That 
 
(1) The annuity or optional annuity contract is 
issued by a corporation (the insurer) subject to the 
supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank 
commissioner, or any agency or officer performing 
like functions, of any State or Territory of the 
United States or the District of Columbia; 
 
(2) The insurer assumes the investment risk under 
the contract as prescribed in paragraph (b) of this 
section; and 
 
(3) The contract is not marketed primarily as an 
investment. 
 
(b) The insurer shall be deemed to assume the investment 
risk under the contract if: 
 
(1) The value of the contract does not vary 
according to the investment experience of a 
separate account; 
 
(2) The insurer for the life of the contract 
                                                                                                                 
67 Gary O. Cohen, SEC Regulation of Index Annuities Versus Index Mutual 
Funds, 1732 PRACTICING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 
699, 727 (2009). 
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(i) Guarantees the principal amount of 
purchase payments  and interest credited 
thereto, less any deduction (without 
regardto its timing) for sales, 
administrative or other expenses or 
charges; and 
 
(ii) Credits a specified rate of interest as 
defined in paragraph (c) of this section to 
net purchase payments and interest 
credited thereto; and 
 
(3) The insurer guarantees that the rate of any 
interest to be credited in excess of that described in 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section will not be 
modified more frequently than once per year.68 
 
The application of Rule 151 to fixed index annuities was relatively 
uncertain from 1986 until 2008.  In 1997 the SEC, having learned of the 
growth of fixed index annuities since 1995, issued a concept release 
seeking comments as to how it should regulate the new financial 
products.69  But the SEC did not follow the comment process by 
immediately promulgating a rule, and in the wake of SEC’s silence the 
industry assumed that fixed index annuities could qualify for the insurance 
exemption on a case-by-case basis, an approach that was tacitly approved 
by the SEC in a statement on the SEC website.70 
The SEC proposed Rule 151A, a new rule which defined fixed 
index annuities as securities unless they met a specific set of requirements, 
in June of 2008.71  After two separate comment periods in 2008, during 
which the issue of fixed index annuity regulation led to divisive debate in 
the insurance community, the SEC adopted Rule 151A by a vote of four to 
one in December of 2008.72 The rule takes effect in January 2011.73 
                                                                                                                 
68 17 C.F.R. § 230.151 (2009). 
69 See Cohen, supra note 60, at 518. 
70 Id. at 518-19.  
71 Cohen, supra note 67, at 711. 
72 Id. at 711-13. 
73 Id. at 715. 
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The text of Rule 151A provides that: 
 
(a) General. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of 
this section, a contract that is issued by a 
corporation subject to the supervision of the 
insurance commissioner, bank commissioner, or 
any agency or officer performing like functions, of 
any State or Territory of the United States or the 
District of Columbia, and that is subject to 
regulation under the insurance laws of that 
jurisdiction as an annuity is not an “annuity 
contract” or “optional annuity contract” under 
Section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. 
77c(a)(8)) if: 
 
(1) The contract specifies that amounts 
payable by the issuer under the contract 
are calculated at or after the end of one or 
more specified crediting periods, in whole 
or in part, by reference to the performance 
during the crediting period or periods of a 
security, including a group or index of 
securities; and 
 
(2) Amounts payable by the issuer under 
the contract are more likely than not to 
exceed the amounts guaranteed under the 
contract.74 
 
A summary of Rule 151A is that to be insurance a fixed index 
annuity must calculate its excess rate of return at or after the conclusion of 
the time period during which the index’s performance is measured, and it 
must be probable that the majority of money paid to the fixed index annuity 
owner will be guaranteed (i.e., will not come from the index-linked excess 
rate of return).75  The SEC’s adopting release on the Federal Register seems 
                                                                                                                 
74 17 C.F.R. § 230.151A(a) (2009). The exception in paragraph (c) of Rule 
151A states that “[t]his section does not apply to any contract whose value varies 
according to the investment experience of a separate account.” § 230.151A(c). 
75 § 230 .151A. 
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to suggest that the centerpiece of the rule is the “more likely than not” test, 
which was designed to express SEC’s belief, based on its interpretation of 
VALIC, that if the majority of payout is guaranteed then the insurer bears 
the majority of the risk and the financial product is therefore insurance, 
whereas if the majority of the payout is not guaranteed then the insured 
bears the majority of the risk and the product is therefore a security.76 
 
IV. CONTEMPORARY CASES APPLYING INSURANCE 
EXEMPTION JURISPRUDENCE TO FIXED INDEX 
ANNUITIES 
 
There is scant case law to date on whether fixed index annuities are 
insurance and thus exempt from regulation under the 1933 Act.  The status 
of fixed index annuities has been addressed in two recent cases.  The first 
was Malone v. Addison Insurance Marketing Inc., a 2002 case in federal 
district court in Kentucky in which the court held that fixed index annuities 
qualified for the § 3(a)(8) insurance exemption and also met the criteria to 
qualify under the Rule 151 safe harbor.77  The second case is American 
Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, a case in which a coalition of 
life insurance companies challenged the SEC’s Rule 151A in the D.C. 
Circuit in 2009. 
 
A.  MALONE 
 
Malone was a case in which a plaintiff claimed securities fraud in 
her purchase of fixed index annuities, requiring the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Kentucky to decide whether her fixed index 
annuities were securities or were exempt under the insurance exemption.78  
The court focused on VALIC and United Benefit as the two controlling 
cases, and phrased its task as one of determining whether the contract at 
issue operates more like a variable or fixed annuity.79  The court quoted the 
United States Supreme Court as saying that “in searching for content in the 
term ‘security,’ ‘form should be disregarded for substance and the 
                                                                                                                 
76 See Indexed Annuities And Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. 
3138, 3141-44 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. Pts. 230 and 240). 
77 Malone v. Addison Ins. Mktg. Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 743 (W.D. Ky. 2002). 
78 Id. at 745-48. 
79 Id. at 748-49. 
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emphasis should be on economic reality.’”80  The court discussed VALIC 
and United Benefit and focused on whether the insured was exposed to 
investment risk, and whether the insurer guaranteed a fixed dollar amount 
for the insured, as factors in determining risk in the insurance sense.81  The 
court then had this to say: 
 
Plaintiff's effort, therefore, to classify her American Equity 
contracts as the sale of a variable annuity fails for several 
reasons.  First, Plaintiff's two contracts with American 
Equity guaranteed her a minimum 3 percent return, 
irrespective of the performance of the S & P 500 Index.  
As the Benefit Summary and Disclosure form states, the 
annuity contracts were “designed to accumulate value 
based on the average change in the S & P 500 Equity Index 
during each contract year, without risking loss of premium 
due to the S & P volatility.”  In other words, in the event 
the S & P 500 performed poorly, Plaintiff still received a 3 
percent interest payment on top of her principal annually.  
Consequently, American Equity assumed the investment 
risk and not Plaintiff who received payment regardless of 
how poorly the market performed. 
 
Second, Plaintiff's benefit payments from American Equity 
were not directly dependent on the performance of 
investments made with her money.  That is to say, as a 
structural matter, Plaintiff's contract did not operate like a 
variable annuity: her payments were not a function of a 
personalized portfolio and her principal was not held in an 
independent account.  Had Plaintiff participated in a 
variable annuity, she would have retained control over the 
investment of her account.  In this case, Plaintiff paid 
American Equity lump sum premiums in the amount of 
$216,289.53 and $64,214.32 and signed a contract that 
guaranteed her a 3 percent return or more if the S & P 500 
Index faired well.  Moreover, at no point does Plaintiff's 
complaint allege that her premiums were maintained in 
separate accounts or that, for some reason, they should 
                                                                                                                 
80 Id. at 748 (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)). 
81 Id. at 749-50. 
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have been-the keystone characteristic of all variable 
annuity contracts.82 
 
Thus, the Malone court held that because both principal and 
interest were guaranteed, the insurer had assumed a risk sufficient to 
constitute insurance and the insured was not exposed to the risk of the 
index performing poorly, and because there was no separate account that 
invested the insured’s money, the insured was not exposed to investment 
risk.83  The Malone court then went on to address and refute an argument 
which the American Equity court later found to be dispositive in reaching 
an opposite result, the argument being that because the potential for 
increased returns was tied to the performance of the S&P 500 that the 
insured was exposed to a securities-like investment risk.  The Malone court 
said: 
 
Finally, Plaintiff focuses on the fact that her return over 
and above the guarantee depended on the performance of 
the S & P 500 Index.  In that way, her annuity contract did 
involve an element of risk and uncertainty.  However, this 
argument is not conclusive for Plaintiff in these 
circumstances.  Defendants actually bore as much or more 
of the risk than Plaintiff.  American Equity guaranteed 
Plaintiff at least three percent of the return or the S & P 
500 Index based on whichever was greater.  If American 
Equity was unable to surpass this indexed rate in its own 
investment of the Plaintiff's premium, then it was the loser.  
More importantly, Plaintiff's risk was not that she would 
lose the value of her initial investment, but rather the risk 
that had she chosen a different contract her money might 
have been worth more than 134 percent at the end of the 
ten-year contract period.  That type of risk-that she could 
have gotten a better deal but for the pressure she 
encountered to enter into this particular contract-is not the 
type of risk central to determining whether a security 
exists. See VALIC, 359 U.S. at 71, 79 S.Ct. 618 (noting 
that “it is no answer to say that the risk of declining returns 
in times of depression is the reciprocal of the fixed-dollar 
                                                                                                                 
82 Id. at 750. 
83 Malone, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 750. 
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annuitant's risk of loss of purchasing power when prices 
are high and gain of purchasing power when they are 
low”).  Because the Defendants assumed a much greater 
risk, Plaintiff's Investment seems a lot more like insurance 
and less like an investment for the Plaintiff.84 
 
The court seems to be saying that because the principal and interest 
were guaranteed, the risk of loss from the index not performing well was 
smaller than the reduction in risk that came from the guaranteed portions of 
the contract.  The court also implies that the risk that the index will not 
perform well enough to increase the payout is not the risk that the insured 
will lose her money, it is the risk that if she had invested in a different 
financial product she might have made more money.  Here we see a hint of 
the question of whether the risk of not receiving a benefit is the same as the 
risk of suffering a loss.  The Malone court seems to think that it is not; I 
will argue later that the question is debatable but that the Malone approach 
is preferable. 
The Malone court went on to also hold that the fixed index annuity 
in question satisfied the Rule 151 safe harbor.85  This part of the opinion is 
interesting mainly because the court, after examining the product’s 
insurance contract and sales brochure, found that the fixed index annuity 
had been marketed primarily for stability and security and not primarily for 
growth.86  The court, although it did not address the issue explicitly, 
noticed no difference between setting the index rate before the annual 
period or after the annual period for the purpose of meeting the safe harbor 
requirement that the index rate be set annually.87 
 
B.  AMERICAN EQUITY 
 
Malone did not decide the validity of Rule 151A, having been 
decided six years before. In 2009, after the promulgation of Rule 151A, a 
coalition of insurers, joined by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, sued to overturn the SEC’s Rule 151A, culminating in the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. 
                                                                                                                 
84 Id. at 751. 
85 Id. at 751-54. 
86 Id. at 753-54. 
87 Id. at 753. 
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SEC.88  The petitioners argued that the SEC’s Rule 151A conflicted with 
the plain language of the insurance exemption in the 1933 Act, that it was 
not supported by VALIC and United Benefit, and that it contradicted the 
prior Rule 151, and the petitioners additionally made an administrative 
procedural argument about the promulgation of Rule 151A.89  The court 
applied the Chevron two-step test that would affirm the rule if, as the first 
step, the statute in question was ambiguous, and, as the second step, the 
SEC as the agency interpreting the statute offered a reasonable 
interpretation.90  The court held that both steps were satisfied and affirmed 
the SEC’s Rule 151A, based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in VALIC 
and United Benefit.91  In particular, the American Equity court placed a 
great deal of emphasis on VALIC’s holding that a variable annuity is not 
insurance because the concept of insurance involves investment risk-taking 
on the part of the insurer, that all the investment risk was on the insured 
and none was on the insurer, and that the variable annuity insurer assumes 
no true risk in the insurance sense.92  The court took United Benefit to stand 
for the proposition that a financial product marketed for growth rather than 
stability and security is not insurance.93 
The American Equity court wholeheartedly accepted SEC’s 
characterization of the facts in the case, specifically SEC’s analysis of the 
nature, function and appeal of fixed index annuities.94  According to the 
SEC, the buyer of a fixed index annuity is “exposed to a significant 
investment risk-i.e., the volatility of the underlying securities index,” the 
insured “assumes the risk of an uncertain and fluctuating financial 
instrument, in exchange for participation in future securities-linked 
returns,” and “an FIA's return was neither known nor guaranteed.”95  The 
SEC asserted that the fixed index annuity’s guarantees as to principal and 
interest rate were “superficial and unsubstantial” and they did not shift the 
                                                                                                                 
88 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2009), 
amended by 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14249 (D.C. Cir. July 12, 2010). 
89 Id. at 929-30. 
90 Id. at 930-31. 
91 Id. at 926-27, 930-31, 934. 
92 Id. at 926. 
93 Id. at 927. 
94 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 572 F.3d at 928-29. 
95 Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Indexed Annuities And Certain 
Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138 (Jan. 16, 2009) (to be codified as 17 
C.F.R. Pts. 230 and 240)). 
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investment risk to the insurer.96 While the court mentioned that fixed index 
annuities do not entail any investment management, it said that this was not 
the only relevant factor in the analysis.97 
The court agreed with the SEC’s argument that the fixed index 
annuity’s guarantee did not eliminate risk because the apt comparison was 
between a traditional fixed annuity guaranteeing a five percent interest rate 
and a fixed index annuity guaranteeing a one percent interest rate with a 
potential for an index-based ten percent interest rate, such that the fixed 
index annuity which fluctuates from one to ten percent was obviously far 
more risky than the traditional fixed annuity which remains stable at five 
percent, even though some rate of interest was guaranteed by the fixed 
index annuity.98  The court accepted this argument in response to 
petitioner’s challenge that the SEC used an unreasonable definition of risk. 
The insurers in American Equity and their amici argued that SEC’s 
definition of risk is irrational because risk is loss of principal and it is 
arbitrary that an annuity with a guaranteed minimum return is less risky 
than the same annuity with that minimum plus a chance at a higher return 
tied to an index.  The flaw is their argument, and the reason the court did 
not buy it, is that it does not analyze risk in terms of the function of an 
insurance contract. It is also problematic because the court believed that the 
insured would have to pay higher premiums to gain access to index-based 
rewards than those in a comparable non-indexed annuity. 
Obviously for the analogy between a five percent rate of return and 
a rate of return between one and ten percent to be persuasive the court must 
have believed that the risk of not receiving a benefit is the same risk as the 
risk of suffering a loss.  The court held that how a product is marketed is 
not a necessary component of insurance exemption analysis, even though it 
was central to United Benefit.99  The court nonetheless found that the fixed 
index annuities were being marketed as securities, although this finding 
was based not on empirical data but on the a priori analysis that because 
the product entailed investment risk it was therefore surely being marketed 
as a security.100 
The court accepted the SEC’s analysis along the lines of Justice 
Brennan’s VALIC concurrence that fixed index annuities were better suited 
                                                                                                                 
96 Id. at 929. 
97 Id. at 930-31. 
98 Id. at 931. 
99 Id. at 933. 
100 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 572 F.3d at 933. 
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to be regulated by federal securities regulators than by state insurance 
regulators.  But the court did not look at the risks necessitating disclosure 
as opposed to the risks necessitating solvency and reserves requirements as 
Justice Brennan had done. Instead it looked only at whether the product 
was a risky product or a no-risk product.101  The court, in response to the 
petitioner’s argument that Rule 151A contradicted Rule 151, held that fixed 
index annuities do not fall under the Rule 151 safe harbor requirements, 
because according to the court’s interpretation of Rule 151 the interest rate 
for the annual period had to be set prospectively at the beginning of the 
annual period.102 
After affirming the SEC’s decision that fixed index annuities are 
not insurance, the American Equity court proceeded to address a second 
issue, whether Rule 151A’s rulemaking was arbitrary and capricious under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.  The court found that it was arbitrary 
because SEC had failed to properly conduct an analysis of Rule 151A’s 
effects upon efficiency, competition, and capital formation, and also 
because the purpose that SEC claimed for its Rule 151A, namely that it 
would provide clarity and certainty, would have been provided by any 
rule.103 The court initially remanded the case for SEC to complete the 
proper economic analysis.104  However, in July 2010 the D.C. Circuit 
amended the decision in an unreported opinion, changing only the final 
paragraph of the prior opinion and ordering that Rule 151A be vacated.105  
The court observed that the SEC had argued that it was likely to reissue 
Rule 151A, but noted that SEC’s analysis of the rule’s effects upon state 
law had not yet been completed.106  The SEC has refused to say whether it 
will reissue Rule 151A and has refused to comment on the legal status of 
fixed index annuities in the wake of Rule 151A’s being vacated, so one can 
presume that the current legal status of fixed index annuities is uncertain.107 
 
                                                                                                                 
101 Id. at 928. The court also interpreted Justice Brennan’s concurrence to 
mean that the presence or absence of adequate state regulation is irrelevant to 
insurance exemption analysis. Id. at 931. 
102 Id. at 933-34. 
103 Id. at 934-36. 
104 Id. at 936. 
105 Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14249, at *2-
4 (D.C. Cir. July 12, 2010). 
106 Id. at *3. 
107 Telephone Interview with John Heine, Deputy Dir., SEC Office of Pub. 
Affairs (Sept. 17, 2010). 
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V. WHY AMERICAN EQUITY WAS MISTAKEN IN HOLDING 
THAT FIXED INDEX ANNUITIES ARE NOT INSURANCE 
 
Although petitioners won the American Equity case based on 
procedural grounds, ultimately their victory may be pyrrhic if the SEC 
cures the procedural defects.  In this section I argue why, from a purely 
legal point of view applying the relevant precedent to the facts of the case, 
the American Equity opinion’s decision that fixed index annuities are not 
insurance was wrongly decided. I will then outline the various policy 
justifications for leaving regulation of fixed index annuities to the states. 
  
A.  LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
 
1. The VALIC Argument 
 
The risk that is transferred in a fixed annuity from the insured to 
the insurer is the risk of picking stocks when investing for retirement.  This 
is the same risk that is transferred with a fixed index annuity.  In a variable 
annuity, the insured bears the stock-picking risk of the insurer; with a fixed 
index annuity the risk of picking stocks is eliminated. 
Risk-reward analysis may be useful to understand what is the 
reduction of risk in the insurance sense, which was key to the VALIC 
majority opinion.108  The fundamental principle that ties insurance and 
securities together is the principle that to earn a greater reward you must 
assume more risk. A security is an assumption of more risk in exchange for 
a higher potential reward.  An insurance policy is a reduction in risk bought 
in exchange for a reduction in reward (i.e. you get less money in return for 
a lower reward). Quasi-security insurance products do not fit neatly into 
either category but can be examined using the same analysis.  A traditional 
fixed annuity provides a full guaranteed return that is lower due to the 
buyer’s reduced risk.  This is why it makes sense to fall under the insurance 
exception.  In a variable annuity in contrast, the buyer assumes higher 
risk—in the form of investment risk—in exchange for greater reward in the 
future, but more risk is in exchange for greater reward. This makes it a 
security. On its surface, a fixed index annuity appears to involve an 
assumption of market risk in exchange for greater reward.  As such it may 
be interpreted as a security. In fact, however, its purpose is to eliminate 
non-beta risk, so like a fixed annuity its purpose is actually the reduction of 
                                                                                                                 
108 See supra text accompanying note 20. 
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risk, via the transfer of risk to the insurer. From the buyer’s point of view, 
he: (1) shifts the non-beta risk to the insurer, and (2) reduces some beta risk 
via the guarantee (absent the insurer’s insolvency.109 
If a person saving for retirement himself could not use insurance 
products and had to save for retirement, he would have to invest in equities 
to keep pace with inflation, and he would bear the risk that those 
investments would decrease in value.  This risk, the risk of investing for 
retirement and of suffering losses if one incorrectly chooses stocks while 
investing for retirement, which can also be called the risk of investment 
management, is precisely the risk that is transferred to the insurer from the 
insured with a fixed index annuity. The insurer bears the non-beta risk of 
investing, not the buyer.  This risk is not transferred with variable annuities 
that are invested in actively managed stocks, because the insured continues 
to bear non-beta risk. 
With a fixed index annuity, the buyer transfers his non-beta risk to 
the insurer and keeps only the beta risk, i.e., that the economy will 
irrevocably collapse.  The insurer then takes the risk of investing the 
insured’s money from the insured.  It is not the guarantee of being paid a 
certain percentage of premiums that makes it insurance, and indeed the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence precludes such an argument. The fact that 
the insurer bore some risk was not sufficient to create insurance under the 
VALIC analysis in United Benefit, and I would argue that it is not the 
insurer’s bearing risk but rather the insurer’s taking the insured’s risk away 
from the insured that creates insurance.  It is the act of transferring risk 
from the insured to the market that makes a fixed index annuity insurance. 
What risk does the insured pass to the insurer in a fixed index 
annuity? The risk that the insured would have kept in the absence of the 
contract, which is the non-beta risk. It is the transfer of this non-beta risk, 
that a fixed annuity insurer takes from the insured in exchange for 
premiums. 
 
2. The Risk of Loss 
 
In American Equity, the insurers argued that the insurers assume 
the risk of investing because if they invest badly they will have to pay the 
insured’s payments with their own money, which is clearly true.  But the 
                                                                                                                 
109 It must be acknowledged that the buyer does not receive full return of 
principal (either gross or net of fees). 
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court did not buy this argument because it believed that the buyer retained 
market risk over and above the guaranteed return. 
What risk of loss does the fixed index annuity buyer bear?  He 
bears a risk that the index will not perform well enough for him to receive a 
higher interest rate above the minimum.110  But this is not a non-beta risk, 
because it does not depend upon stock picking; it is a market risk, it is beta.  
The insured bears the risk of not receiving a benefit, but this is not the same 
thing as a risk of loss.  The insured bears the risk of short-term market 
downturns resulting in a loss of potential earnings.  The American Equity 
court seemed to think that potential loss of potential earnings is a risk, but 
if you understand the theory behind index investing then it makes sense to 
suppose that the buyers themselves will not understand it as a risk, and the 
court should defer to their understanding. 
Regarding the American Equity court saying that a fixed annuity 
with a five percent guaranteed interest rate is less risky than a fixed index 
annuity with a one percent guaranteed interest rate and a potential ten 
percent index-related interest rate, the court is comparing apples and 
oranges.111  The comparison of apples to apples is a fixed annuity with a 
five percent interest rate compared to a fixed index annuity with a 
guaranteed five percent interest rate that could go up to ten percent based 
on an index.112 That is the right example, but the court simply ignores it.  In 
fact, a fixed index annuity is not riskier than a comparable fixed annuity.113 
 
3. The Brennan Concurrence Argument 
 
The Brennan concurrence in VALIC, as elaborated on in United 
Benefit, dictates that the insurance exemption does not apply where 
disclosure is the regulatory problem and does apply where contractual 
interpretation, solvency and reserves are the regulatory problems.114  
Disclosure and anti-fraud protections make a lot of sense with equity 
                                                                                                                 
110 He also has a certain loss of some fraction of his principal, maybe 
consisting of the insurer’s costs, maybe more. 
111 See supra text accompanying note 98. 
112 All other things being equal, of course, including the guaranteed amount of 
principal returned. 
113 The court’s argument regarding risk of loss is not totally invalid, but to the 
extent that there is a legitimate concern the states can adequately regulate fixed 
index annuities. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. 
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investments, whose shares and financial information can be manipulated or 
misrepresented. Meanwhile, for the market risk aspects of fixed index 
annuities, the disclosure concerns are less.  There are big problems with the 
calculation of the principal return on fixed index annuities and even with 
the calculation of the excess interest rate that require disclosure.  But on top 
of that, fixed index annuities present insolvency concerns. State regulators 
can address both—the SEC cannot. 
The gist of Brennan’s VALIC concurrence is that the 1933 Act’s 
purpose is to require disclosure so that investors can make an informed 
decision.  Normally when purchasing an individual stock there is a very 
great deal of risk, and so it makes sense from a policy standpoint to ensure 
that the consumer is making an informed decision and knows what he is 
getting into.  Otherwise there is the risk that the consumer may be taken 
advantage of, and even if he is not, he is still entitled to know and 
understand the details of where his money is going. 
But this concern largely exists only for individual stocks and 
actively managed investment strategies, which present non-beta risk and 
can be amazingly complicated.  Indexes are relatively simple compared to 
stocks, because the index is an aggregate that over the long-term reflects 
the strength of the market and the economy as a whole.  The information 
necessary to disclose the risks of investing in an index are quite simple: the 
risk is only that the market and the economy will go up or down, and so 
disclosure of non-beta risk is a second order issue.  In contrast, the terms of 
the fixed index annuity contracts, and concerns about the insurer making 
proper payments, having adequate reserves from which to make payments, 
and remaining solvent, are far more of an issue, and this falls generally 
under what Brennan claimed to be the scope of state insurance regulation.  
Therefore fixed index annuities should also be treated as insurance under 
Brennan’s concurrence analysis. 
The American Equity court seemed to have thought that the 
insurers were arguing that the insurance exception applies because state 
regulation is adequate and fixed index annuities contain no risk, which is a 
horribly oversimplified, incomplete account of what the insurers’ argument 
was (or should have been) with respect to the Brennan concurrence.115  
What Brennan is saying is that the question is not whether adequate state 
regulation exists, but that there is a kind or genus of investment, called 
insurance, which presents different problems than the 1933 Act was 
designed to deal with, and therefore qualifying for the insurance exemption 
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turns on whether the financial product contains the risks that insurance 
regulation was designed to prevent.  Because the American Equity court 
mistakenly ignored the solvency risk inherent in fixed index annuities it 
thinks that the problem is the same as for stocks.  Because the fixed index 
annuity is not based on picking stocks, disclosure is a lesser issue and the 
solvency and reserves regulation that Brennan claimed for the states is 
more relevant. 
The needs for disclosure that the SEC claims are met by Rule 151A 
include disclosure of the terms of the contract, pricing, benefits, the details 
of the guarantees, and the ways in which the rate is calculated from the 
index.116  None of the SEC’s disclosure provisions pertain to the index 
itself, which is supposedly where the riskiness of the product comes from.  
Instead, they all have to do with the terms of the annuity contract, which 
are fundamentally no different than the contractual terms of a fixed annuity 
contract that are traditionally regulated by the states. 
 
4. The United Benefit Argument 
 
The fundamental argument under the United Benefit rule, which 
can be seen as the updated version of VALIC, is that to be insurance the 
purpose of the financial product must be stability and security rather than 
growth through investment management.117  The purpose of a fixed index 
annuity, like the purpose of index investing itself, is precisely this, to 
achieve stability and to enable money to grow at a greater rate without 
assuming any non-beta risk. 
The MPT/CAPM theory shows that the purpose of index investing 
is stability and security, not growth. Can reasonable men differ on Modern 
Portfolio Theory?  While people can differ on whether it is a good strategy 
for managing money, no one can dispute that its purpose is to reduce and 
spread risk, which is the definition of insurance. Similarly, no one can 
interpret index investing as investment management with the risks of stock-
picking.  The purpose of index investing is identical to that of a fixed 
annuity, to eliminate the risk of stock-picking. Its purpose is stability and 
security, not growth.118 
                                                                                                                 
116 Indexed Annuities And Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. 
3138, 3161. 
117 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. 
118 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, when it adopted the “fraud on the 
market” theory for Rule 10b-5 securities fraud analysis, effectively endorsed the 
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The American Equity court repeatedly asserts that fixed index 
annuities appeal to consumers on the basis of growth rather than stability 
and security.  Hence, according to the court, it necessarily follows that 
fixed index annuities are marketed like a security because their appeal is 
based on the performance of securities.119  If that were true, people who 
buy fixed index annuities would buy variable annuities or individual stocks 
instead. What attracts people to fixed index annuities is not the assumption 
of investment risk in exchange for higher returns, it is a way to eliminate 
investment risk by investing in the market over the long term by means of 
products whose guarantees of interest and principal eliminate the risk of 
loss in the event that the index has a short-term loss.  The Malone court 
found as much.120 Therefore, if marketing is a necessary prong in the 
analysis the SEC was unreasonable because the product, ever so far from 
appealing as an investment risk, has as its main appeal, and has achieved 
widespread popularity, as a means of using index investing to reduce and 
eliminate investment risk.  
 
B.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
1. What Should SEC Worry About? 
 
With the recent troubles on Wall Street the SEC has enough to 
worry about in preventing frauds involving traditional stocks without 
expanding its mandate to claim regulatory control over every financial 
product that it can get its hands on. The SEC would perform best if it kept 
to a tightly focused mission and did not overextend itself by becoming too 
broad.  Such a strategy would utilize the SEC’s limited resources in the 
most efficient manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
efficient market hypothesis which underlies much of Modern Portfolio Theory and 
Capital Asset Pricing Model. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 94-96, 100 
120 See supra text accompanying note 86. 
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2. Consumer Protection 
 
Some commentators have argued that SEC regulation is necessary 
to protect insureds from fraud by fixed index annuity insurers.121  However, 
the kind of fraud of which there is a risk is not distinctly securities fraud 
and is such that state insurance regulators can guard against it. 
 
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
As SEC acknowledged, compliance with Rule 151A could cost the 
insurance companies many millions of dollars, even up to $800 million.122  
There seems to be little benefit to the consumers who would eventually be 
forced to bear these costs. In the contemporary recession-plagued economy 
there is no basis for placing a major burden on the insurance industry 
absent a compelling justification, especially when it is the fixed index 
annuity consumers who will ultimately pay the SEC’s bills. 
 
4. The Benefits of State Regulation 
 
There are classic yet relevant arguments that states are just as 
competent as the Federal government, that allowing freedom to the states 
increases experimentation which leads to progress and innovation in 
regulation, and that the Federal government is bureaucratic and 
inefficient.123  These ideas remain forceful today.124 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The variable annuities in VALIC and United Benefit were 
investment management products masquerading as insurance in order to 
                                                                                                                 
121 E.g., J.S. Coleman, Equity Indexed Annuities: "Securities," or Exempt 
Insurance Products Under the Federal Securities Laws?, 34 no. 2 SEC. REG. L.J. 
Art. 1 (2006).  
122 See Indexed Annuities And Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. 
Reg. at 3168. 
123 E.g., Douglas R. Richmond, When It Comes to Insurance Regulation, Is 
Uncle Sam the New Sherriff in Town?, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2696; see supra 
text accompanying notes 37-39. 
124 Indeed, it is worth noting that during the housing boom which led to the 
recent recession, insurance regulation largely worked better than federal securities 
regulation. 
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escape from the SEC, but that doesn’t mean that it is impossible for a 
securities-related financial product to truly be insurance. Fixed index 
annuities are such a product. From a policy viewpoint, too much 
unnecessary regulation is unwise and inefficient.  From a legal viewpoint, a 
logical argument can be made that an insightful analysis of the case law on 
the insurance exemption in the Securities Act of 1933 combined with an 
astute understanding of the facts involving fixed index annuities leads to 
the conclusion that fixed index annuities qualify for the insurance 
exemption.  Even if the United States Supreme Court is unwilling to 
overturn American Equity, hopefully this note will provide a conceptual 
framework involving risk-reward analysis for future judges to use going 
forward so that the insurance exemption in the 1933 Securities Act 
continues to function.  There is every reason to believe that imaginative, 
creative financial entrepreneurs will develop new kinds of insurance, some 
of which may be connected to securities, and even though the trend seems 
to be towards giving the SEC control over all new securities-related 
financial products, it would be unfortunate to see a day when insurance 
exemption analysis is abandoned and every securities-related insurance 
product is automatically classified as a security. 
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